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
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DESPATCHES,  
CORRESPONDENCE, AND MEMORANDA  
OF  
FIELD MARSHAL  
ARTHUR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, K.G.

Wellesley, 1st.

EDITED BY HIS SON,  
THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON, K.G.

[IN CONTINUATION OF THE FORMER SERIES.]

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VOLUME THE FOURTH.

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DESPATCHES,  
CORRESPONDENCE, AND MEMORANDA,  
OF  
F. M. THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

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SUBSTANCE OF THE SPEECH OF HIS GRACE THE DUKE OF [ 721. ]  
WELLINGTON, IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS, ON WEDNESDAY,  
2ND MAY, 1827.

MY LORDS,

I do not intend to trouble your Lordships with a discussion on the subject of this petition, or to dispute with the noble Lord (Earl Grosvenor) whether the petitioners, seeking for further concessions to the Roman Catholics, have chosen the time most propitious to the prayer of their petition, considering that the administration are favourably disposed to grant such concessions; but my object in claiming your Lordships' attention is to answer the call of the noble Baron on my right (Lord Ellenborough).

There is no man more sensible than I am, that the House of Lords has nothing to say to the changes which may take place in his Majesty's councils. It is his Majesty's prerogative to appoint his own ministers, and to change them as he pleases; and the House of Lords cannot take into consideration the special circumstances under which such changes have been made, except in particular cases, in which an administration has been removed in consequence of an address from this House. I have, therefore, to apologise to your Lordships for taking up your time upon this subject, for which my only excuse is the manner in which I have been treated by the corrupt Press in the pay of the government.

I do not mean to attribute this misconduct to the noble Lords personally (the ministers sitting in the House); but the fact is certain, that I have been accused, in these recent transactions, of conspiracy, combination, dictation to my Sovereign,

and nearly every crime, short of high treason, of which a subject could be guilty; and I should be more than man if I could resist availing myself of the opportunity of justifying myself, which the question of the noble Baron has given me.

My Lords, my conduct has been called in question in two respects; first, my quitting the Cabinet; secondly, my resignation of the command of the army. I do not consider that I have any right to reveal anything that ever passed in conversation with his Majesty, or in his councils; but fortunately I can elucidate my conduct without making such disclosures; and without disclosing any fact mentioned to me in conversation, which was not likewise mentioned to others. I must trouble your Lordships with some details upon this subject; but your Lordships may rely upon it that I will detain you as short a time as possible.

On the evening of the 10th of April, I received from the Right Honourable gentleman now at the head of his Majesty's councils, a letter, which I am about to read to the House:—

Foreign Office, 10th April, 1827,  
6 p.m.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

The King has, at an audience from which I am just returned, been graciously pleased to signify to me his Majesty's commands to lay before his Majesty, with as little loss of time as possible, a plan of arrangements for the reconstruction of the administration.

In executing these commands it will be as much my own wish, as it is my duty to his Majesty, to adhere to the principles on which Lord Liverpool's government has so long acted together.

I need not add how essentially the accomplishment must depend upon your Grace's continuance as a member of the Cabinet.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington,  
your Grace's sincere and faithful servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

I beg your Lordships will observe, that this letter does not state of whom it was intended that the proposed administration should be formed, although I have since learned that that information was conveyed to my colleagues; nor who was to be at the head of the government; nor was I invited, as others were, to receive further explanations, nor referred to anybody who could give such; nor, indeed, did I consider the invitation that I should belong to the Cabinet to be conveyed in those terms to which I had been accustomed in my constant inter-

course with the Right Honourable gentleman up to that moment, nor to have been calculated to induce me to continue in the administration about to be formed. I was determined, however, that I would not allow such considerations to influence my answer; and I wrote to the Right Honourable gentleman on the same night what I am about to read to the House:—

MY DEAR MR. CANNING,

London, 10th April, 1827.

I have received your letter of this evening informing me that the King had desired you to lay before his Majesty a plan of arrangements for the reconstruction of the administration, and that, in executing these commands, it was your wish to adhere to the principles on which Lord Liverpool's government had so long acted together.

I anxiously desire to be able to serve his Majesty as I have done hitherto in his Cabinet, with the same colleagues. But before I can give an answer to your obliging proposition, I should wish to know who the person is whom you intend to propose to his Majesty as the head of the government.

Ever, my dear Mr. Canning, yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

The House will observe that I expressed my anxious desire to form part of a Cabinet, with *the same colleagues*—the Right Honourable gentleman having omitted all mention of colleagues in his letter to me—but that I postponed to give my answer to what I termed his *obliging proposition* (although I think it was scarcely an invitation), till I should learn the name of the person intended to be recommended by the Right Honourable gentleman to his Majesty as the head of the administration. To this note the Right Honourable gentleman wrote me, on the afternoon of the 11th, the answer which I am about to read to the House:—

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Foreign Office, 11th April, 1827.

I believed it to be so generally understood that the King usually entrusts the formation of an administration to the individual whom it is his Majesty's gracious intention to place at the head of it, that it did not occur to me, when I communicated to your Grace yesterday the commands

which I had just received from his Majesty, to add that, in the present instance, his Majesty does not intend to depart from the usual course of proceeding on such occasions.

I am sorry to have delayed some hours this answer to your Grace's letter; but, from the nature of the subject, I did not like to forward it without having previously submitted it (together with your Grace's letter) to his Majesty.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington,  
your Grace's sincere and faithful servant,

GEORGE CANNING.

I will postpone my observations upon this answer for a few minutes, and I will only request the House to remark here, that it was not calculated to remove the impression which the Right Honourable gentleman's first letter had made upon my mind, namely, that he did not wish me to belong to the Cabinet.

However, as the House will observe from my reply, that impression was not the reason which influenced my conduct in desiring to retire from the Cabinet, nor did that impression, or the tone and temper of the Right Honourable gentleman's letters to me, influence the tone and temper of my answers to the Right Honourable gentleman.

This is what I wrote to him in answer to his letter of the 11th:—

MY DEAR MR. CANNING,

London, 11th April, 1827.

I have received your letter of this day; and I did not understand the one of yesterday evening as you have now explained it to me. I understood from yourself that you had had in contemplation another arrangement, and I do not believe that the practice to which you refer has been so invariable as to enable me to affix a meaning to your letter which its words did not in my opinion convey.

I trust that you will have experienced no inconvenience from the delay of this answer, which I assure you has been occasioned by my desire to discover a mode by which I could continue united with my recent colleagues.

I sincerely wish that I could bring my mind to the conviction that, with the best intentions on your part, your government could be conducted practically on the principles of that of Lord Liverpool; that it would be generally so considered; or that it

could be adequate to meet our difficulties in a manner satisfactory to the King, and conducive to the interests of the country.

As, however, I am convinced that these principles must be abandoned eventually, that all our measures would be viewed with suspicion by the usual supporters of the government, that I could do no good in the Cabinet, and that I should at last be obliged to separate myself from it at a moment at which such separation would be more inconvenient to the King's service than it can be at present, I must beg you to request his Majesty to excuse me from belonging to his councils.

Ever yours, my dear Mr. Canning,

WELLINGTON.

I will here leave the question of my retirement from the Cabinet. I have no objection, if noble Lords choose, to discuss all the reasons stated in this letter; but I believe it is better to avoid such discussion. I will, however, observe that the events which have occurred in the short space of time which has elapsed since the termination of this correspondence, will tend to show that I did not form an incorrect judgment of the matters described in my letter of the 11th April; and I am much mistaken if experience does not prove hereafter that I was quite right.

But before I go into the discussion of my reason for resigning the command of the army, I will address a few words to your Lordships upon the charges which have been made against me.

I am accused of having deserted and abandoned my Sovereign. My Lords, I have always considered that the most important of all the acts which the Sovereign of this country has to perform, is the choice of his ministers; and most particularly the selection of that person who is to fill the office of First Minister.

In making this choice, the Sovereign determines upon what principle of policy his domestic government or his foreign relations are to be conducted, and he chooses the men to administer his government whose opinions are consistent with those according to which his Majesty has decided that the policy of the government shall be guided.

I will now apply this principle to the case which has recently occurred; and I will suppose that his Majesty has selected



a gentleman to be his First Minister who differs in opinion from his Majesty upon an important question of domestic policy, such as the question of further concession to the Roman Catholics; and that I, being called to his Majesty's councils, agree in opinion with his Majesty, but differ from his minister. My Lords, in these cases there can be no secret understandings in this country. Men must act openly and fairly, whether in Parliament or in the Cabinet. His Majesty and the country would look to me, and to those in the Cabinet who should entertain the same opinions as I do, that the acts of the government should be consistent with its professed policy; whereas I should find those acts daily leading to a different result. I beg your Lordships will refer to what the Right Honourable gentleman himself (Mr. Canning) said on a former occasion of the nature of the preponderating influence of a First Minister in such questions, and particularly in this question of domestic policy; and to observe the arguments of the noble Lord (Earl Grosvenor) in the commencement of this discussion, which had for their object to prove to your Lordships, that nothing ought to be done by your Lordships or the public upon the Roman Catholic question at the present moment; because the concession of everything was certain, in consequence only of the nomination of the Right Honourable gentleman as First Minister.

While advertng to this part of the subject, I beg leave to suggest to your Lordships an important distinction between Lord Liverpool and the Right Honourable gentleman.

The object of Lord Liverpool's policy was not to take anything from the Roman Catholics, but to govern the country fairly and impartially according to the existing laws. That of the Right Honourable gentleman (who, it must be remembered, is the most able and active of all the partisans of the other side of the question) is to make an important alteration of the laws. The action of the two systems cannot be compared. Lord Liverpool might act impartially; and, composed as his Cabinet was, he was under the necessity of so acting, even if it could be supposed that his desire was to act otherwise. But the influence of the Right Honourable gentleman's government must have the effect, even if not so desired by him, of forwarding his own opinions and views of policy, notwithstanding his professions of an adherence to the policy of Lord Liverpool's government.

I would ask, then, how it was possible for me to go into the Cabinet, and give the Right Honourable gentleman that fair confidence and support which, as head of the government, he would have had a right to claim from me, when I knew that the necessary result of his system must be, to bring the government to that state which I think, and which his Majesty is supposed to think, one of peril?

His Majesty, however, thought proper to appoint the Right Honourable gentleman to be his minister, and I had no resource but to withdraw.

But it has been stated that I withdrew myself because his Majesty would not submit to my dictation and threats, in case I should not myself be appointed his minister; and this accusation is most curiously coupled with another, viz., that his Majesty offered to make me his minister, and that I refused.

My Lords, those know but little of his Majesty who suppose that any man can dare to dictate to him, much less to threaten him.

My Lords, his Majesty never offered to me to make me his minister. His Majesty knew as well as I did, that I was, and must be, totally out of the question; and I so considered myself, and so stated myself repeatedly; and I was no party to any suggestion, that I should be the person to fill the vacancy occasioned by the misfortune which we all deplore.

Do your Lordships suppose that, having raised myself to the highest rank in the profession which I had previously followed from my youth; that having been appointed to the highest situation in that profession (for I may say I raised myself without indicating any desire to underrate my obligations to my noble, gallant friends, the General officers of the army, by whom I am surrounded, and still less those which I owe to his Majesty for his most gracious favour and kindness; I may safely say that his Majesty could not have placed me where I was if I had not rendered some service to the State deserving of his approbation), I say then, that having raised myself to such a station in my profession, I could not be desirous of leaving it in order to seek to be appointed to be the head of the government, a situation for which I am sensible that I am not qualified, and to which, moreover, neither his Majesty, nor the Right Honourable gentleman, nor any one else, wished to see me called.

Do your Lordships think it possible, that I was not gratified by being restored to my old relations of command over my old friends and companions, and to have attained the power of recommending them to his Majesty for the professional rewards of their services, after having passed my life in exciting and directing their exertions?

Does any man believe that I would give up such gratification in order to be appointed to a station, to the duties of which I was unaccustomed, in which I was not wished, and for which I was not qualified; as it must be obvious to your Lordships, that not being in the habit of addressing your Lordships, I should have been found, besides other disqualifications, incapable of displaying as they ought to be displayed, or of defending the measures of government as they ought to be defended in this House, by the person thus honoured by his Majesty's confidence? My Lords, I should have been worse than mad if I had thought of such a thing.

Then, my Lords, it is said that I endeavoured to attain this object by means of concert, conspiracy, and combination with others. My Lords, I assert, that till I wrote to the Right Honourable gentleman the letter of the 11th of April, which I have read to your Lordships, no man knew what line I intended to follow. If I concerted, conspired, and combined with anybody, let it be said with whom.

There were thirteen of us in the Cabinet. The hand of Providence has deprived us of one; and there are six, including the Right Honourable gentleman himself, still remaining in the Cabinet. My Right Honourable friend, the member for the University of Oxford, is unanimously acquitted; but I would ask the noble Lords present whether they ever heard of anything like the arts with which we have been charged? There is my noble friend, the Chancellor of the Duchy, who resigned his office, and was afterwards induced to accept it again, did he ever hear of anything like conspiracy and the other crimes with which we have been charged? If he has, I beg him to inform his present colleagues and the House of the facts. If he has not, and I know he has not, I call upon any man to come forward, and say if he knows that such conspiracy or combination existed; and I will engage to prove that it is false that I ever was a party to such.

The other point to which I wish to draw your Lordships'

attention is my resignation of the command of the army, which I conveyed to his Majesty in a letter dated April the 12th, of which I will now read to your Lordships the extract applicable to the subject :—

“ Mr. Canning will, I doubt not, have submitted to your Majesty the letter which I have written to him in answer to the one announcing to me that he had been appointed by your Majesty to be at the head of your government.

“ I have frequently had occasion to express to your Majesty my most grateful acknowledgments for your Majesty’s most gracious favour and kindness towards me; and your Majesty can now more easily conceive than I can express the pain and grief which I feel upon requesting your Majesty to excuse me from attendance in your councils; and, in consequence thereof, and adverting to the tenor of the letters which I have received from your Majesty’s minister by your Majesty’s command, upon asking your Majesty’s permission to lay at your feet those offices which connect me with your Majesty’s government.”

My Lords, I held two offices under his Majesty’s government, that of Commander-in-Chief, and that of Master-General of the Ordnance. Having declared to the Right Honourable gentleman that I could not serve in the Cabinet presided over by him, my office of Master-General of the Ordnance became vacant. I might still have continued to hold the office of Commander-in-Chief, notwithstanding the political circumstances as set forth in my letter of the 11th, which separated me from the councils of the government. My illustrious and lamented predecessor in office had done so; and I should have followed his example in this respect, as I had endeavoured to do in others. Indeed, I never could see any reason why political differences of opinion should prevent me from commanding the army at the Horse-Guards more than they would an army in the field, if circumstances should render it necessary so to employ my services. But besides political circumstances, the tone and temper of the Right Honourable gentleman’s letters, and particularly of that of the 11th (which had been previously submitted to his Majesty, and was, therefore, a communication from the King), were of a nature to make it impossible for me to retain the command of the army.

My Lords, I must trouble you with a short statement of the

nature of the office of Commander-in-Chief, and of its relations towards his Majesty on the one hand and the Right Honourable gentleman on the other.

The Commander-in-Chief must necessarily be daily in confidential relations with his Majesty on all points of the service. He must likewise be so with the person filling the situation filled by the Right Honourable gentleman. Although the Commander-in-Chief has nothing to say to the finance of the army, yet there are questions under discussion every day respecting allowances to officers and soldiers, and expenses of every description, upon which the Right Honourable gentleman cannot decide in a satisfactory manner, unless after reference to the Commander-in-Chief.

But this is not all. If the Right Honourable gentleman wishes to reinforce or diminish the army in Portugal, or to recall it altogether, he must consult with the person holding the office of Commander-in-Chief.

In the same manner the reinforcement of the troops in any of his Majesty's possessions, abroad or at home, must be a matter of concert with the Commander-in-Chief, and the Right Honourable gentleman will find when he comes to make up his budget that he must concert his arrangements with the Commander-in-Chief.

How was it possible for me to consider that I was likely to possess the Right Honourable gentleman's confidence on any of these points, after receiving from him, in his Majesty's name, such a rebuke as was contained in his letter to me of the 11th?

But it has been stated by the Right Honourable gentleman's friends that I had given him cause of offence by my letter of the 10th, and had provoked his answer of the 11th; and it is but fair to consider that letter, and to see whether it did give the Right Honourable gentleman any ground to complain.

That letter contained a clear distinct answer to the one which I had received from the Right Honourable gentleman, as far as I was enabled to give it, in the usual terms of my constant correspondence with the Right Honourable gentleman.

I stated my anxious desire to remain in the Cabinet with *my recent colleagues*; and for the purpose of receiving information, I asked who was to be at the head of the government, in hopes

that the information which I should receive might be such as to enable me to belong to the Cabinet.

I must here inform your Lordships that in a conversation which I had had with the Right Honourable gentleman on the 2nd of April, he had explained to me that in case his Majesty should commission him to suggest arrangements for the reconstruction of the administration, the plan which he had in contemplation was to propose that the Right Honourable gentleman, late the Chancellor of the Exchequer, should be called to the House of Lords, and be made First Lord of the Treasury; and in case the Right Honourable gentleman had, in answer to my letter of the 10th, informed me that he still had that plan in contemplation, it was my intention to suggest to him, and to endeavour to persuade him to adopt one better calculated in my opinion to keep the government united. Your Lordships will see, therefore, that the question asked in my letter of the 10th was fully justified, and fairly founded upon a communication made me on the 2nd of April by the Right Honourable gentleman himself. The question was fully justified likewise by former practice.

In the year 1812, a noble relation of mine (now Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland), waited upon a noble Earl, now in this House (Earl Grey), and a noble Lord (Lord Grenville), whose absence on account of illness nobody laments more than I do, by command of his Majesty, then Prince Regent, with a view to consider of the formation of an administration; and Lord Wellesley, in the course of the discussion upon that subject declared, that he considered himself merely as the instrument of executing the commands of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent on that occasion. He even went so far as to say that he neither claimed nor desired for himself any share in the administration. Upon that same occasion the Right Honourable gentleman himself apprised Lord Liverpool, on the part of Lord Wellesley, that the Prince Regent had laid these commands on Lord Wellesley.

Subsequently in the same year 1812, Lord Moira had the Prince Regent's instructions to take steps towards the formation of a new ministry. It does not appear that Lord Moira, or the noble Earl, or the noble Baron, to whom he addressed himself, considered that he was to be the head of the administration which he had a commission to form. In addressing this House

on the 12th June, his Lordship said, "I came to the subject unfettered in every way; not an individual was named for a Seal; and no place was pointed out even for myself."

How then, my Lords, could I take it for granted that his Majesty had nominated the Right Honourable gentleman to be his First Minister, only because the Right Honourable gentleman informed me that his Majesty had signified to him his commands to lay before his Majesty a plan of arrangements for the reconstruction of the administration?

It is obvious that I could not give the Right Honourable gentleman an answer to his proposition, that I should be one of the Cabinet, till I should ascertain who was to be the Prime Minister; and the necessity of ascertaining this point was my only motive for asking the question.

I will now show from the best authority possible (that of the Right Honourable gentleman himself) that the question might be asked without offence.

On the — of May, 1812, Mr. Perceval having just then been assassinated, Lord Liverpool waited upon the Right Honourable gentleman, by command of his Majesty, then Prince Regent, to invite the Right Honourable gentleman to become a member of his Majesty's councils.

The first question which it appears from a memorandum drawn by the Right Honourable gentleman himself, which the Right Honourable gentleman asked was, Who is to be the First Lord of the Treasury? and it does not appear that the noble Lord rebuked the Right Honourable gentleman for asking that question.

The negotiation failed for other reasons not worth discussing at present, excepting to observe that the Right Honourable gentleman then thought that the influence of the head of the government was likely to be paramount in the discussion of the Roman Catholic question.

Surely, my Lords, I could not merit a rebuke for asking the Right Honourable gentleman, in 1827, the same question which he, under nearly similar circumstances, asked Lord Liverpool in 1812.

But, my Lords, there is another view of the case, which ought to be taken. Although I was rebuked on the 11th for asking this question on the 10th, and was told that the practice was so generally understood that it did not occur to the Right

Honourable gentleman to add that his Majesty did not intend to depart from the usual course of proceeding on such occasions; the fact is, that the Right Honourable gentleman was not appointed his Majesty's minister till the afternoon of the 12th, according to what he has stated himself in another place.

Indeed, my Lords, it appears very clearly, from the Right Honourable gentleman's letter to me of the 11th, that till he had laid my letter of the 10th before his Majesty he had not been appointed his minister. If he had, he might, without reference to his Majesty, have stated the fact with as much of rebuke as he might think proper to use.

I cannot believe that the Right Honourable gentleman laid my letter of the 10th, and his answer of the 11th, before his Majesty, in order to cover the rebuke which this answer contained with his Majesty's sacred name and protection. I say it unfeignedly, that I believe the Right Honourable gentleman is as incapable of doing so as I believe I am myself. My Lords, the conclusion is obvious, the step of laying these letters before his Majesty must have been taken, because, in fact, the Right Honourable gentleman was not his Majesty's minister at the moment he received my question, as appears indeed quite clearly from his own statement in another place.

Upon the whole, then, I considered when I received that letter of the 11th, that my situation, in relation both to his Majesty and the Right Honourable gentleman, was so altered, as that not thinking it proper, for the reasons stated in my letter of the 11th, to remain in the Cabinet, I did not think I could continue in command of the army with advantage to his Majesty's service. If I was hasty in coming to this decision, or the decision was founded in error, I ought to have been informed. I had always been on the best terms of goodwill and confidence with all my colleagues; and I believe there was nobody who enjoyed more of the confidence, even of the Right Honourable gentleman himself, than I did. I would appeal to the noble Lords (the ministers present) whether I ever made difficulties, or ever acted otherwise than with a view to accommodate differences of opinion. Then, my Lords, if I took a hasty or intemperate view of this case, I ask them why they did not come forward and render me the service, which I had more than once rendered to others, of representing to me that I was wrong?



Such a step has never been taken by them; and the reason is obvious, it did not suit the Right Honourable gentleman's views that I should remain in command of the army unless I should belong to his Cabinet.

I beg pardon for troubling your Lordships at such length upon a question personal to myself; and I return my best thanks for the attention with which you have listened to what I have had occasion to address to you.

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*Viscount Palmerston\* to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

War Office, 2nd May, 1827.

I send you a letter which I have received from the Attorney-General in reply to one which I wrote to him yesterday, and I have requested him to desire Mr. Dealtry to prepare immediately the proper form for you to execute.

My dear Duke, yours sincerely,

PALMERSTON.

[ ENCLOSURE. ]

MY DEAR LORD,

New Street, Spring Gardens, 2nd May, 1827.

In reply to your letter respecting the proper mode of accomplishing the Duke of Wellington's resignation as Commander-in-Chief, I lose no time in stating that an office held by Patent during the King's pleasure may be vacated either by the grant of a new Patent to another officer, or by a simple act of revocation signed by his Majesty, or by a surrender of the office by deed, under the hand and seal of the patentee, if it be his Majesty's pleasure to accept it. For the last, no formal words are essential, but it will be best to prepare the instrument in the accustomed manner. For which purpose if you do not countermand me, I will take your letter as authority to direct the clerk in the Patent Office, Mr. Dealtry, to prepare a deed of resignation in the usual form, and without delay.

I am, my dear Lord, yours faithfully,

J. SCARLETT.

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*To Viscount Palmerston.*

MY DEAR LORD PALMERSTON,

London, 3rd May, 1827.

I have received your two notes, the last enclosing that of Mr. Scarlett, regarding the form of my resignation. This last discussion and Mr. Scarlett's opinion are another proof of the mischief resulting from men not looking about them before they act, and considering well the consequences of their actions. I will sign and seal the formal resignation as soon as you will

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\* Secretary-at-War.

send it to me; and I beg you to return me his Majesty's acceptance of it, and in the mean time I shall have no objection to confirm any court-martial, or to perform any other act which may be required.

You may also rely upon me at all times to do everything in my power to maintain the order, discipline, and subordination of the army, and to assist you in any way in which you may require my assistance.

Ever, &c.,  
WELLINGTON.

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*Sir George Murray to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD,

Dublin, 3rd May, 1827.

I did not trouble you with a letter of congratulation when you were appointed to the chief command of the army, because I then anticipated having an early opportunity of seeing you; and I was satisfied you would, at all events, give me full credit for the same sentiments with which I had witnessed every foregoing step of elevation to which you had attained.

I will not, however, allow any delay to take place in telling you with what sincere regret I have received the intimation of your resignation. I am sorry for it, on account of its withdrawing you from a high situation which I am sure you would have discharged in a most distinguished manner; and also on account of the apprehensions I entertain that the change will prove very injurious to that branch of the public service. It is impossible, I believe, that his Majesty can have all the details of the military business which passed through the Commander-in-Chief's office brought under his own immediate notice; and I much fear that in a State, the government of which is constituted as ours is, abuses very detrimental to the army will gradually creep in, unless there be a vigilant and powerful guardian appointed to watch and to oppose them.

I know nothing of the political causes which have led to the present changes. I have been very little of a politician; and it is possible that my opinions upon some questions, if I were called upon to express them, might not have an exact concurrence with yours. But in whatever situation you may be placed, my personal feelings towards you can never alter. They have been founded upon long experience of your friendship, upon a knowledge of your great qualities, which is the more fixed and certain because it had begun to be formed before you had mounted to so great a height as you have since reached; and because, even after that had taken place, I had the best opportunities of being a very close observer of them; and, lastly, because I believe there is no one who either sets a greater value upon your services to the country, or who can estimate more truly how much they are exclusively attributable to your own character and talents.

I remain always, my dear Lord, most sincerely yours,

G. MURRAY.

*Lord Ashley\* to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Thursday, 3rd May, 1827.

You have in so many instances shown me such kind attention and friendship, that I can hardly look upon myself as taking too great a liberty when I venture to express the enthusiastic delight with which I heard your manly and impressive speech of yesterday evening. It seemed to me that whatever there is open, true, honourable, and dignified, was set forth in the simplicity of your justification, and you would not think this a mere compliment on my part if you could have seen how deeply I felt it. I may perhaps be going rather far in assuming a kind of intimacy by writing to you thus unreservedly, but the fact is, that I have, as an Englishman, great gratitude for your public services, and as an individual, for your frequent kindnesses.

I am, my dear Duke, with sincerest respect, very truly yours,

ASHLEY.

*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Downing Street, 5th May, 1827.

I have read the report of your Grace's speech in the House of Lords, from which I learn, in confirmation of rumours (hitherto incredible to me), that your resignation is attributed by you in part, at least, to the letters which I addressed to your Grace on the 10th and 11th of last month.

As I am sure that the misrepresentations with which the statements recorded in the newspapers abound must have been involuntary, I offer to your Grace some explanations upon them, without any apprehension that the motives of my doing so should be mistaken.

In the first place, you are made to say, "I was not desired by the Right Honourable gentleman to come, nor was I referred to anybody for explanation. To me the Right Honourable gentleman neither came nor sent, but I have since heard that *explanations were given to others of our colleagues*. The Right Honourable gentleman either invited *all* to call upon him, or else he waited upon *them*, or sent a friend."

Now this is entirely an error.

I received the King's commands to form an administration so late in the afternoon of Tuesday, the 10th, that (the day fixed for the adjournment of Parliament being Thursday the 12th) I had not an instant to lose in proceeding to the execution of those commands.

Lord Granville, Mr. Huskisson, and Mr. Planta happening to be at my office when I returned from the King, I requested Lord Granville to convey to Lord Harrowby, Mr. Huskisson to Lord Melville and Mr. Wynn, and Mr. Planta to Mr. Robinson *verbally* the same announcement which I addressed, at the same time, in writing to Lord Bathurst, to Lord Westmorland, to Lord Bexley, and to your Grace.

I wrote also to the Lord Chancellor to ask leave to call upon his Lordship in the evening, and I wrote to Mr. Peel to ask him to call here; but

\* The Earl of Shaftesbury, K.G.

subsequently (Mr. Peel being at the House of Commons when my first letter was sent to him) I offered to call upon *him* on my return from the Lord Chancellor, which I did.

The difference of these modes of communication with my several colleagues was dictated, as your Grace will see, only by the necessity of the case. To write to all I had not time. To call upon all was physically impossible. To have invited all to call upon me would have been to consume in conferences the whole of the only day intervening before my report to the King must be made. My communication to all was in substance the same, except that my letter to your Grace was (as I thought) more pressing than to any other person.

What your Grace means by "explanations given to others and not to you," I really cannot comprehend. I had already stated to your Grace, in the fullest detail, all that passed at my audience with the King at Windsor. I had absolutely nothing more to tell, with the exception of the simple fact announced to your Grace in my letter of the 10th, that "the King had directed me to lay before his Majesty, with as little loss of time as possible, a plan of arrangements for the reconstruction of the administration."

Fault is found by your Grace with the style or tone of my letters of the 10th and 11th.

I have looked them over and over again in search of the supposed objectionable passages, but I confess I cannot discover any such.

The address, "My dear Duke of Wellington," is precisely the same as has been uniformly employed in our private correspondence; and if some more formal words were introduced at the conclusion, it should be remembered that the letter was in a certain degree of an official character, and one, the copy of which was to be submitted to the King. I recollect perfectly well that I doubted for a moment, whether I should introduce those slight formalities or not, a doubt which, it appears, I decided unluckily, but certainly with no intention of offending.

My letter of the 11th I submitted to his Majesty before I sent it, simply because when a doubt had been expressed in any quarter (more especially in one so important) as to my position with respect to his Majesty, it became necessary for me to have his Majesty's authority to confirm my description of it.

Of your Grace's answer to my letter of the 10th, which produced my letter of the 11th, I will not permit myself to speak. I am willing that the world shall judge of it.

The question whether the individual employed to form an administration is "*usually*" placed at the head of it is one upon which, till the receipt of that letter of your Grace's, I did not suspect a difference of opinion to exist.

Your Grace, indeed, is made to say, in justification of your doubt upon the subject, that "when upon the death of Mr. Perceval, Lord Liverpool waited upon Mr. Canning to propose to him to become a member of the administration then about to be formed, the first question put to the noble Lord by Mr. Canning was, Who is to be the First Lord of the Treasury?"

With your Grace's leave, this is *not* the question that I put, nor is it so

stated in the printed record from which you draw your information. I beg your Grace to turn again to that record, where you will find the passage to run thus: "*In answer to a QUESTION put by me, Lord Liverpool stated that his colleagues were desirous that he should be appointed to the office of First Lord of the Treasury, &c.*" Now the question to which this was an answer was *not*, "Who is to be the First Lord of the Treasury?" *but* "Are you what you are *by election of your colleagues?*" I had heard a rumour to that effect, which I took this occasion of verifying. Your Grace has, on a recent occasion, agreed with me and with Mr. Peel in objecting to such a mode of constituting a First Minister.

Your Grace states further that Lord Wellesley and Lord Moira successively conducted, in 1812, negotiations for the formation of a government, without having previously accepted office. This may be true of Lord Wellesley; of Lord Moira I speak with less certainty; but your Grace must recollect that both these negotiations *failed*. And my opinion was at the time, and has always since been, that they failed *mainly because* Lord Wellesley and Lord Moira did not, in the outset, ascertain and assert their own precise situation as ministers.

Your Grace will see, then, that the transactions of 1812 were full in my mind, but that I considered them not as precedents, but as warnings.

There are two very different versions of what your Grace said about Mr. Robinson's possible appointment to be First Lord of the Treasury. In one, the 'New Times,' your Grace is made to say, "I had a conversation with Mr. Canning, in which he stated that one of the plans submitted by him to his Majesty's consideration was to call the then Chancellor of the Exchequer to the House of Lords, conferring upon him the office of First Lord of the Treasury, and this Mr. Canning stated as one of the modes of keeping men together; but I had no difficulty in expressing my entire persuasion that no scheme could be devised less calculated to produce the effect contemplated, viz., that of keeping a government together." In the other, 'The Times,' your Grace is reported to have said, "I had a conversation with Mr. Canning, in which he stated to me, that in case his Majesty should desire him to reconstruct the government, one of his plans was to recommend that Mr. Robinson, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, should be called up to your Lordships' house, and should be made First Lord of the Treasury; and I confess to your Lordships that it was my intention, if I had heard anything more of that scheme, to have proposed such a modification of it as would have kept the members of the old administration together."

If the latter version be the correct one, and if the sort of "modification" which your Grace would have proposed was the substitution for Mr. Robinson of a Peer holding your Grace's opinions on the Catholic question, the proposition would have resolved itself into one which I had from the beginning and invariably rejected.

I do not believe, therefore, that any good could have arisen from a discussion with your Grace on the subject of that particular arrangement.

Your Grace evidently was determined to insist upon the superinduction of an anti-Catholic First Minister over my head, on the principle which, if it was not (as your Grace does me the honour to say repeatedly it

was not) one of *personal* objection to me, could be no other than this, that an individual holding *my* opinions upon the Catholic question was *ipso facto* disqualified from occupying that post.

I, on the other hand, was determined (as your Grace from the beginning perfectly well knew) to quit the government, rather than submit to the degradation of exhibiting in my person the exemplification of that principle of proscription.

We had long understood each other distinctly on this main point; and there could be no use in discussing it, unless your Grace was prepared to waive your objection.

But a "head of the Government" is not always *necessarily* "First Lord of the Treasury."

In the reign of George I., Lord Townshend, as Secretary of State, was *the* minister, while Sir Robert Walpole, though uniting the offices of First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer, acted under him. In the seven years' war, Mr. Pitt is generally supposed to have been *the* minister, while the Duke of Newcastle was at the head of the Treasury, but I think this instance doubtful. In the year 1766, Lord Chatham unquestionably formed an administration, in which he took to himself the comparatively unimportant post of Privy Seal, and was in that post *the* minister, putting the Duke of Grafton at the head of the Treasury.

Now it was his Majesty's especial desire that I should retain the seals of the Foreign Department, uniting with that department the attributes of First Minister; and the instance of Mr. Pitt during the seven years' war was particularly pressed upon me, as showing such an arrangement to be practicable.

*If* practicable, I had not the slightest objection to it. I liked my then office a thousand times better than any other, and I had no ambition for the title of First Lord of the Treasury, provided there were no misapprehension as to WHERE the chief power of the government was to reside.

It was on these grounds that I stated to your Grace in our conversation of the 2nd of April, my willingness to remain where I was, Mr. Robinson going to the House of Lords, with the DEPARTMENT of First Lord of the Treasury. I presently found, however, that it would be impracticable to make this arrangement without incurring one or other of two inconveniences. Either the new First Lord of the Treasury would have been considered as, in effect, First Minister, or he might have been induced to think himself degraded by the abstraction of the attributes most usually attached (in latter times) to that office.

This second inconvenience I should deeply have lamented; the former was the very one, the avoiding of which I had declared from the beginning to be a *sine quâ non* condition of my acquiescence in *any* arrangement.

The only advice which I tendered to his Majesty was to form an exclusively anti-Catholic administration, not certainly from an abstract partiality to such an administration, but because I thought it of the utmost importance to his Majesty's ease and comfort that his Majesty should clearly ascertain whether they who advised his Majesty to proscribè a minister favourable to the Catholic claims would undertake to form a government in their own sense.

I knew not what had been the advice of his Majesty's other counsellors

upon this point, nor what was his Majesty's final decision upon it, till I went into the closet on the 10th of April.

There is but one other part of your Grace's speech which appears to call for any observations from me.

Your Grace emphatically says that *your* being at the head of the government was "wholly out of the question."

I learn this opinion of your Grace's with sincere pleasure. The union of the whole power of the State, civil and military, in the same hands (for your Grace, as Prime Minister, could never have effectually divested yourself of your influence over the army) would certainly, in my opinion, have constituted a station too great for *any subject*, however eminent, or however meritorious, and one incompatible with the practice of a free constitution. Nothing would have induced me to serve under such a form of government, and I am rejoiced to find that your Grace's opinion was always against such an arrangement. But I confess I am surprised that such being your Grace's fixed opinion, it should nevertheless have been proposed to me, as it was, more than once, and up to the 9th of April inclusive, to concur in placing your Grace at the head of the government. There is in this apparent contradiction a mystery which I cannot explain.

In rejecting, however, as I did, that proposition, I do assure your Grace, I was not actuated by any feeling unfriendly or disrespectful to your Grace, nor am I conscious of any such feeling now.

I take nothing personally amiss in your Grace's speech. I retain a recollection corresponding with your own of the intercourse which has for some years subsisted between us on political affairs; and there is not in the nation, or in the army itself, an individual who regrets more deeply than I do that your Grace should have thought it necessary to withdraw from the command of the army, at the same time that you resigned your seat in the Cabinet.

Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington, as ever,  
very sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

P.S.—I must request you to excuse me for having employed another hand in this letter. I kept the draft of it by me twenty-four hours, in the hope of finding time to transcribe it myself, but it has really been out of my power to do so.

G. C.

[ 723. ]

. To the Right Hon. George Canning.

MY DEAR MR. CANNING,

London, 6th May, 1827.

As you told me yesterday at the Royal Academy that you had written to me, in order to avoid further discussion in Parliament upon the subject of my resignation (which I regret that I was ever under the necessity of discussing in Parliament), I willingly proceed to state to you what was the general purport of what I said in the House of Lords on the points referred to by you.

I am very much surprised that you should not have known till after that discussion, and that you should have doubted the truth of the rumours which stated that my resignation was attributed by me to the letters which you had written to me on the 10th and 11th of last month.

I conclude that you advised his Majesty's answer of the 13th to my letter of the 12th April; and at all events you must have seen the latter, in which I expressed the grief and pain that I felt in requesting his Majesty to excuse me from attendance in his councils; and in consequence thereof, and adverting to *the tenor of the letters* which I had received from his Majesty's minister by his Majesty's command, in asking his Majesty's permission to lay at his feet those offices which connected me with his Majesty's government.

I have not read the newspapers, and I do not know whether they have accurately reported what I said in the House of Lords.

I did say that in your letter to me of the 10th there were two important omissions; the first, who were to be my colleagues; the second, who was to be the head of the government.

This is fact, as you will see on reference to your letter.

I did likewise say that I was not invited to receive further explanations, as Lord Westmorland (to whom, by-the-bye, your letter contained the explanation that his colleagues were to be in the Cabinet with him, which was omitted in that to myself) and Lord Bathurst were; nor referred to anybody for explanation, as Lord Melville and Lord Harrowby were, and as it now appears, Mr. Wynn and Mr. Robinson were; and in the House of Lords I also said that to some you went yourself, as, for instance, to the Chancellor and to Mr. Peel.

But I admitted in the House of Lords, as I do now, that although I was struck by the omissions in the letter of the 10th instant addressed to myself when I wrote to you on that night, and although I thought it but a very cold invitation to belong to the Cabinet, yet I was not aware till afterwards of the different mode of communication adopted towards others.

I have only further to observe upon the mode of concluding your letter to me, which you admit was not the usual one, and which new mode you doubted whether to introduce or not, that in the letters addressed to Lord Bathurst and to Lord West-



morland, which I presume were, equally with those addressed to me, to be laid before the King, you did not think it necessary to introduce such or other formalities.

I said in the House of Lords, and I here repeat, that the question in my letter of the 10th April was asked for the purpose of obtaining the information which yours of the 10th did not convey; and that my conversation with you on the 2nd had given me reason to believe that you had had in contemplation another arrangement (viz., that Mr. Robinson should be called to the House of Lords, and be made First Lord of the Treasury) in case the King should have proposed to you to lay before his Majesty a plan for the reconstruction of the administration.

Had you stated in answer to my question, as you might have done, that you still had that arrangement in contemplation, I would have taken the liberty of suggesting some other arrangement better calculated, as I thought, to keep the government together.

I likewise said in the House of Lords that I did not think the practice, as stated by you in your letter of the 11th, was so general as to induce me to assign a meaning to the words of your letter of the 10th which in my opinion they did not convey, more particularly when taking into consideration what you had yourself said to me respecting your plans.

In relation to the practice, I referred to the record of the transactions of 1812, from which it appears clearly that there were two instances of persons of high rank, station, and reputation employed by his present Majesty to make arrangements for forming a ministry, and that these persons themselves stated that it was not settled that they were to be the head of such administrations. It does not signify, in my view of the case, whether the want of success of these persons was to be attributed to that fact or not.

I might have quoted another instance, that of the formation of the last ministry under the Duke of Portland, of which I was perfectly aware when I wrote to you on the 10th April, and of course, when I addressed the House of Lords.

I was not in England in 1812, and knew nothing of the transactions of that period, excepting what is in the record above referred to; and I confess that I believed that your question to Lord Liverpool was asked, as mine certainly was to you, for the purpose of obtaining information as to who was

the person to be the head of the government, and not in what mode he came to be placed in that situation.

I must add that I was confirmed in that impression by the perusal of the speech which you made in the House of Commons in May, 1812, in which you declared your reasons for declining to become a member of the administration. Your objection was not to the manner in which Lord Liverpool was appointed to be the head of the government, but mainly, that a person differing from you on the Roman Catholic question was to exercise the influence of the government.

I did not state in the House of Lords, nor is it necessary that I should now state, what was the suggestion which I intended to make to you in case you had answered my letter of the 10th as I expected you would, viz., that you still thought of Mr. Robinson.

I am one of those who think it desirable that the King in forming his ministry should select a person for its head of the same general opinions with himself upon the great questions of policy, whether domestic or foreign, and particularly in a case likely to come frequently under discussion, on which the opinions of the empire are so divided as to render it impossible to form an efficient administration composed exclusively of persons of either opinion.

I judged from the conversation which I had with his Majesty at Windsor, that his Majesty did consider it important that the administration should be composed of persons of both opinions upon the Roman Catholic question, and that the head of the government should be of the same opinion with his Majesty, and that it was essential that he should continue to enjoy the benefit of your services. But I don't know where you found the evidence that I was determined not to act under any person as First Minister who did not entertain anti-Catholic opinions; neither have I learnt where or when I was to know perfectly well that you were determined to quit the government rather than submit to what you term "the degradation of exhibiting in your person the exemplification of that principle of supposed proscription."

I never had but one conversation with you upon the subject of the government, and that was on the 2nd of April.

In that conversation, although we discussed the principle of exclusion from office on the score of Catholic opinions, it was

not with reference to your own alleged right to be First Minister. Indeed, this was so much the case, that I perfectly recollect stating to you that the conclusion to which I understood we had come, was that the arrangement must include persons of both opinions, and no more; and that I should state that to be the conclusion, as I did in fact so state it to Mr. Peel.

Although, however, I did not know that you claimed to be First Minister as a *sine quâ non*, I was very sensible that to succeed to this post was a reasonable object of ambition to you. It never occurred to me that any man could have a right to insist on this post as a *sine quâ non*, and I thought it not impossible that when you should come to consider the inconveniences to yourself as well as to the public interests, of your being the First Minister, taking into account the history of your opinions, conduct, and speeches upon the Roman Catholic question even to the last, and contrasting in your mind such opinions of yours with those of the King, you might have consented to act in a government which was avowedly to be formed upon the principles of Lord Liverpool's administration, in the same relation to the government in which you had stood when Lord Liverpool was at its head.

I was mistaken in these expectations; but there was certainly nothing in them disrespectful or unfriendly towards you.

I never recommended to the King to form an administration composed exclusively of persons entertaining the opinion that no further concessions ought to be made to the Roman Catholics.

I should have declined to serve his Majesty in his councils as one of such an administration, because I am convinced that such an administration would be, under existing circumstances, too weak to carry on the government. The attempt, therefore, to form such an exclusive administration would, in my opinion, be the greatest misfortune that could happen to his Majesty and the public; and I must add that his Majesty's honour and welfare, and that of the State, are the circumstances which I think ought on this subject to be considered principally and in priority to the claims and pretensions of any individuals.

It is not necessary that I should enter into the discussion, whether as the head of the government you ought to be First Lord of the Treasury.

In modern times so much power has been given to the Treasury over the expenditure of other departments of the government, and it is so necessary now for the Treasury to exercise that power, and it would be so inconvenient to have that power exercised by a subordinate minister, that I believe you will find it to be most embarrassing, if not impossible, for the First Minister to hold any other office.

In respect to myself, I did say in the House of Lords that I had always considered myself out of the question, as his Majesty also had, when speaking to me of the arrangements to be made for filling the office vacated by the affliction visited upon us all in the person of Lord Liverpool.

Considering myself out of the question, on account of the painful professional sacrifices I should have had to make in relinquishing the office of Commander-in-Chief, and still more on account of the want of personal qualification necessary, in my opinion, to enable any man to perform the duties of the head of the government to the advantage of his Majesty and to his own honour, it is not necessary that I should discuss whether a high military reputation is or is not a disqualification for office.

Whatever others may have thought or said about me, and whatever may have been the proposition and whenever made to you, it was not made in concert with me, and still less at my suggestion.

There remains only one topic in your letter to which I have not adverted, and it relates to my resignation of the command of the army.

I considered your letters to me, and most particularly the one of the 11th of April, in which, be it observed, you state that you had previously submitted it to his Majesty, to have placed me in such a relation towards his Majesty, and towards yourself as his First Minister, as to render it impossible for me to continue in my office of Commander-in-Chief.

I could not be otherwise than in constant confidential relations with his Majesty on the one hand, and with yourself on the other, as you will find by-and-bye, when you shall come to conduct the duties of the office of First Lord of the Treasury; and it was impossible for me to look for that personal good will and confidence in such communications which are absolutely necessary, and which I think I deserve, after I had received

from you a letter in which I thought you made use of a tone of rebuke not provoked by anything contained in my letter to you, and for which the sanction of his Majesty was, as I think, very unnecessarily obtained.

I know what I owe to his Majesty, but I should be unworthy of his Majesty's favour and kindness, and quite useless to him hereafter, if I had continued to endeavour to serve him in the post of Commander-in-Chief of his army, after I had received that letter. I am not in the habit of deciding upon such matters hastily or in anger, and the proof of this is, that I never had a quarrel with any man in my life.

If I could have entertained a doubt upon the subject of your letters to me, and the course which I ought to have pursued in consequence of them, the letter which I received from his Majesty of the 13th of April, written, I conclude, by your advice as his minister, must have confirmed the impression which the preceding communications had made.

Ever, my dear Mr. Canning,  
yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

*May 7th, 2 P.M.*—I commenced to write this letter last night, but have only now been able to finish it.

724.]

*To Lord Lynedoch.*

MY DEAR LORD LYNEDOCH,

London, 9th May, 1827.

I have received your note, and I assure you that there is no man more anxious than I am to pay every mark of respect to the memory of the Duke of York. But I should think we are rather too near that calamitous event for the particular description of mark of respect proposed, viz., a public dinner.

Four months have just elapsed since the calamity befel us; five months will not have elapsed when the dinner will take place. His Majesty is still and will be still in mourning for his brother, as well as his ministers and the great officers of his household. I would besides observe that a dinner is the mode of commemorating an event which has occasioned joy and happiness, and not the mode of commemorating a calamity which has occasioned the utmost grief to his Majesty and his Royal Family, and covered the nation with mourning.

I beg you to do me the favour to suggest these considerations to his Royal Highness the Duke of Clarence, and I hope they will have the effect of inducing his Royal Highness to postpone for a further period of time, if not to forego altogether, the intention of adopting this mode of commemoration. But if his Royal Highness should persevere in his intention, I shall conclude that its execution has his Majesty's most gracious approbation; and in that case I will beg you to have my name put down to attend this dinner after that of Lord Anglesey, or the Secretary-at-War, or of the Adjutant, or Quartermaster-General, or the King's first Aide-de-camp, whose presence at the dinner will convince me that I have taken an erroneous view of its nature.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

United Service Club.

At the suggestion of his Royal Highness the Duke of Clarence, the General Committee of Management, at their meeting yesterday (May 8),

Resolved, that a dinner in the great saloon should be held on the 4th June next in commemoration of his Royal Highness the late Duke of York, under the following *regulations* :—

Officers to be in uniform, with crape on their arms.

The number that can be accommodated is calculated to be 120, therefore the first names set down to be preferred.

The dinner, including wine, &c., 30s. a head.

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To Sir Herbert Taylor.

[ 725.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

London, 10th May, 1827.

I return Major ——'s letter to you. I cannot recommend him for brevet promotion without at the same time recommending a great many others, even if I thought the service rendered by Major —— to which he refers was of a nature to merit such a mark of distinction.

But I beg leave to add, that I never recommended any officer to be promoted by brevet who had not distinguished himself in the field before the enemy, generally more than once; and if only once it must have been in a very extraordinary and conspicuous manner.

I am certain that I should not have recommended Major —— for superintending in time of peace the march of some

thousands of German troops from Hanover into the Netherlands, however well that duty might have been performed, if he had applied to me at the time; and I cannot do so at present.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

'26.]

*To Sir Herbert Taylor.*

MY DEAR GENERAL,

London, 12th May, 1827.

I know nothing from any authority, but I have heard that matters are going on badly in Portugal, and that the Guards had been marched from Cartaxo to Lisbon, which is above fifty miles, in two marches.

Sir William Clinton was ordered not to disperse his force, which, if not dispersed, was strong enough for anything, and was not only in safety but in a situation of military respect and honour. He was moreover ordered to return to Lisbon as soon as the armed deserters sent into Portugal from Spain should have been driven out of Portugal or dispersed.

Every man is interested in maintaining the honour of his Majesty's arms; but these little details, which are very important, are not everywhere well understood. I entreat you to attend to this point. I am perfectly ready to give you every assistance in my power; but I beg you not to let us have any misfortune, or be exposed to anything like disgraceful hurry or forced marches to avoid one.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

*Sir Herbert Taylor to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

Horse-Guards, 12th May, 1827.

Immediately upon receiving your Grace's kind letter I wrote one to Mr. Hay, of which I have the honour to enclose a copy, and I hope you will approve it. I could have no scruple in writing, as from my general knowledge of your Grace's opinions, and your instructions to Sir William Clinton, as they had been more than once expressed by you in my hearing, I felt fully impressed, from what you had said, of the extreme importance of not disseminating the small corps serving in Portugal. I preferred writing to Mr. Hay to seeing him, as I thought he would show my letter to Lord Goderich, and it might be sent to Sir William Clinton

by the opportunity which, I understood, would offer this day. At all events the communication could not be mistaken and would remain on record.

I have the honour to enclose copies of both your Grace's letters, and I cannot close this without assuring you how truly grateful I feel to you for the kind and confidential manner in which you communicate with me, and for the no less kind disposition to give me your assistance upon these and other occasions. No person can be more sensible of the value and importance of such assistance than I am, and I shall not scruple to appeal to your Grace under any difficulty. Your kindness will lessen the embarrassment of my present situation, and give me confidence; but things ought not to be as they are *here*; it is impossible that the army should not suffer from such an arrangement, particularly if Lord Palmerston should remove, and I anxiously look forward to a beneficial change. Every exertion will be used to maintain the system established by the poor Duke of York, and upheld by your Grace, but an arrangement of departments, more or less independent of each other, does not accord well with military affairs or military principles.

I have the honour to be, with great regard, my dear Lord Duke,  
your Grace's most obliged and faithful servant,

H. TAYLOR.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*Sir Herbert Taylor to Mr. Robert William Hay.\**

MY DEAR HAY,

Horse-Guards, 12th May, 1827.

Have you any recent accounts from Sir William Clinton? There are reports that things are not going on well in Portugal, and that the Guards had been marched from Cartaxo to Lisbon (about 50 miles) in two marches.

You are well aware that when our small corps was sent to Portugal, the utmost stress was laid by the Duke of Wellington upon the necessity of keeping it united, and of not yielding to any application from the Portuguese authorities which might lead to its dissemination and to its exposure in detail.

I have often heard his Grace urge the importance of adhering closely to this instruction, and I have heard him say that Sir William Clinton was ordered not to disperse his force, which, if not dispersed, was strong enough for anything, and was not only in safety, but in a situation of military respect and honour. That he was moreover ordered to return to Lisbon as soon as the armed deserters sent into Portugal from Spain should have been driven out of Portugal or dispersed.

I may be premature in this communication, but I consider it my duty to convey, not my own opinions, but those of the Duke of Wellington, of which I am in possession, and which ought to have paramount weight.

There is always something to excite suspicion, and even discredit, in hurry and forced marches. It is natural to suppose that they are produced by the desire to avoid disaster, and our troops ought not to be placed in a situation which may commit their credit or security.

Ever, &c.,

H. TAYLOR.

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\* Under Secretary of State for the Colonies and War Department.



727.]

*To Lord Ellenborough.*

MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH, London, 13th May, 1827.

I would have answered your note at an earlier period if I had not wished to consult the opinions of others. I confess that my own feelings would have led me at once to tell you that I could not support the motion of which you thought of giving notice. But upon talking with others I find many equally averse with myself to take any step which can be deemed offensive to the King.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Colonel Napier\* to Lord FitzRoy Somerset.*

MY DEAR LORD FITZROY, Devises, 13th May, 1827.

I have some scruple in plaguing you with a letter, but I cannot help congratulating you upon the manly and open explanation of the Duke. The malignant sneers that have been cast at him show that he has hit hard, and I think the country is by no means so pleased with the new gentleman as his friends think. In this part of the world, although under the dynasty of Bowood, there is no emotion created, no excitement of any kind, and, I observe with pleasure that, notwithstanding the pestiferous newspaper editors have, one and all, opened their venal throats, and have even threatened the people if they do not meet to address the throne upon the *happy change*, no public meeting has yet been got up except at Liverpool, his own dunghill, and then only faint praise was bestowed. It is, to be sure, a curious coalition:—

*Canning, the sneering Tory*, who objects to the repeal of the Test Acts, leaves Catholic Emancipation in abeyance, and detests reform.

*Lord Lansdowne, the moderate Whig*, calling the Catholic question a vital one and complaining of Lisbon jobs.

*Burdett, the radical Reformer*, who called Canning the ass that knew his crib, who walked out of the house when the farce of Catholic Emancipation was mentioned, who declared that Whig and Tory were alike, who abused Mr. Fox for coalescing with the Grenvilles without making a stipulation in favour of reform, who has so often declared that nothing could save the nation from ruin but a radical reform, who as often declared that with reform all abuses would vanish, without it none would even be abated.

“It is a damned bad world we live in, my masters,” I wish it were changed for a better. It cannot be changed for a worse when the Duke’s exploits, and clean hands and honest heart, cannot save him from the scurrilous knaves who rail at him the moment his power is lessened, and who would lick the dust off the soles of his feet if they could get anything by it; and that such rascals should find it their interest to rail is the worst sign of the times; however, time will remedy some of this at

\* General Sir William Napier, K.C.B.

all events, and until it does I will sit like Timon of Athens cursing mankind, with a few exceptions, among which I place you, and am your very faithful friend,

W. NAPIER.

P.S.—Not knowing your direction, I send this to the Ordnance Office.

*To Sir Herbert Taylor.*

[ 728. ]

MY DEAR GENERAL,

London, 13th May, 1827.

I have received your letter of the 9th. I see no reason why Brigadier Anbury should not be made a knight. I conclude that he is a colonel in the army.

A chief engineer and a commanding officer of artillery at a siege are very differently situated from other officers.

I don't think the officer recommended for the efficiency of his arrangements for the supply of the army can be rewarded by the Order of the Bath.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

*Sir Herbert Taylor to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

Horse-Guards, 13th May, 1827.

Lord Goderich desired to see me in consequence of my letter to Hay, and has shown me the despatches of 27th February and 2nd May from Sir William Clinton. In the first he states that, in consequence of the Marines being withdrawn from Belem, and the alarm of the Infanta, &c., he had determined to move a battalion of Guards to Lisbon, and would probably place the brigade in barracks there. That in such case he would contract his remaining cantonments, bringing the artillery to Sacarem, with one brigade at Villa Franca, the 10th Hussars to Rio Major, and the troops from Coimbra to Leiria. His object was to concentrate them on and near the Tagus, but to avoid if possible occupying cantonments in the valley of the Tagus, lest the health of the troops should suffer from them. For the same reason he wishes to avoid placing the great body of the troops in Lisbon, in case a further concentration should become advisable.

In his letter of the 2nd May, he reports further alarm at Lisbon, the occurrence at Elvas, and the consequent movement of the Guards, and adds that he was carrying into effect the further movements adverted to in his letter of 27th. The letter which I saw said nothing of the general state of affairs, but one of the Foreign Under Secretaries told me the accounts were far from satisfactory.

Lord Goderich has written to Sir William Clinton, and has urged the importance of keeping his small corps concentrated.

I have the honour to be, with great regard, my dear Lord Duke,  
your Grace's most obedient and faithful servant,

H. TAYLOR.

*Sir Herbert Taylor to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

Horse-Guards, 17th May, 1827.

Lord Goderich has shown me a letter from Sir William Clinton, dated 5th instant, in which he states that all continued quiet; that the Guards occupied the barracks in the upper town, and that their presence had inspired confidence. The artillery had been withdrawn from Villa Franca to Belem. It was his intention to collect his corps, and the 4th Regiment had begun its march from Coimbra, and would reach Leiria on the 11th, but the remainder of the brigade continued at Coimbra, and its removal would depend on circumstances.

The Spanish head-quarters were at Caçeres, and it was stated that the corps in that quarter had received some small reinforcements, but no certain intelligence from it later than the 28th April. Lieutenant-Colonel Burgoyne\* was again to be sent to Abrantes, &c., to collect information.

I have the honour to be, with great regard, my dear Lord Duke,  
your Grace's most obliged and faithful servant,

H. TAYLOR.

Sir William Clinton assigned as a reason for leaving the detachment at Coimbra the importance of giving confidence to the well-affected Portuguese in the north, but its station does not accord with the declared intention of concentrating his corps.

[ 729. ]

*To Sir Herbert Taylor.*

MY DEAR GENERAL,

London, 18th May, 1827.

You may rely upon it that, situated as Portugal is at present, there is no safety for our troops excepting in a collected form, and they will not be able even to withdraw with honour unless they should have an easy and secure communication with the shipping and forts on the Tagus. I have stated these opinions over and over again in my communications with the King's ministers.

According to the instructions of which I have a knowledge, our troops have nothing to say to the Portuguese Constitution, or concern in giving protection to well-disposed Portuguese. Our affair was the foreign enemy and to protect the Portuguese Royal Family. But these are political questions. The affair for your consideration is purely military.

That which I always foresaw is now coming to pass, though not exactly in the way that I foresaw it would occur. The poor Princess is dying, if not actually dead; and we may rely upon it that we shall witness a scene in Portugal, in which the utmost

\* Field Marshal Sir John Fox Burgoyne, Bart., G.C.B.

prudence of our commanding officer must be exercised, in order to keep our troops in security and honour, and in a position to be able to execute the orders of government, whatever they may be.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

*Sir Herbert Taylor to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

Cadogan Place, 20th May, 1827.

I am infinitely obliged to your Grace for the communication of Mr. Canning's letter to you of the 5th instant, and the copy of your answer, which I have read with great attention, and do not delay returning.

Mr. Canning's letter had been previously read to me, as I mentioned to your Grace yesterday morning, and the perusal of it certainly confirms the opinion you expressed yesterday, that the general tone of it and certain expressions are not so smooth or conciliatory as would seem to be suited to the professed object, a friendly explanation; and that which I verily believe, from all I have heard from those who have the opportunities of learning his sentiments, was Mr. Canning's object in addressing you upon this occasion. Possibly this tone may have involuntarily arisen from the eagerness which attaches to the discussion, and the circumstance of many of the observations being made upon the newspaper reports of your Grace's speech in the House of Lords. I own that I feel anxious that it should bear that construction, in proportion as I am solicitous, that nothing that has been said or done should have the effect of closing the door to such explanation and consequent arrangement, as may restore your Grace to the command of the army, in such manner and upon such a footing as may be consistent with your high and distinguished character and your feelings. Whatever may be the construction to which other parts of Mr. Canning's letter are liable, I cannot but dwell with some satisfaction upon the concluding sentence of it, which expresses that which he has twice stated to me in very strong terms, and that which I know he has expressed to others in terms as strong.

Your Grace's is a fair, manly, and straightforward statement in reply to Mr. Canning, and I quite agree with you that the tone and the general expression of it are as civil and friendly as the nature and character of the discussion allow. Here again it is natural that the anxiety which I feel for your Grace's resumption of the command of the army should induce me to seek more especially for that which may not have the effect of closing the door to so desirable an event, and it results, if I be not mistaken in my understanding of the point, that your Grace's resignation of the chief command of the army was influenced chiefly by the tenor and tone of Mr. Canning's letter of the 11th April, which he had previously submitted to the King; which tone was that of rebuke, not provoked, and for which the sanction of his Majesty appeared to you to have been very unnecessarily obtained. Your Grace considered this letter to have placed you in such a relation towards his Majesty, and towards Mr. Canning as his First Minister, as to render it impossible for you to continue in an office in which you

could not look for that personal good will and confidence in such communications as are absolutely necessary, and which you deserve; and the impression made upon your Grace by the preceding communications was confirmed by the letter which you received from his Majesty of the 13th April, written, you conclude, by the advice of Mr. Canning, as his Majesty's minister.

If I be warranted in the impression which I have received from what I have heard in other quarters of the feeling which dictated the concluding part of Mr. Canning's letter, and in the conclusion drawn from your Grace's reply, I hope that I shall not be considered as presuming too far upon the kindness and confidence with which your Grace has honoured me upon this and other occasions, if I venture to express an earnest and anxious hope and solicitude that the door is left open to further communication and explanation, and that they may prove such as may lead to the result which the country and the army have equally at heart.

Your Grace will, I trust, forgive the freedom with which I have written, and the earnestness with which I dwell upon one main object. They are, I assure you, unconnected with any selfish feeling or interested motives; they are produced by the deep solicitude which I feel, with almost every other well-affected subject of his Majesty, for the welfare and honour of the country, and the interests and credit of the profession of which I am a member; and they are closely blended with the sentiments of respect which every individual must entertain for your high character, and of confidence with which every soldier must look to you, if entrusted with the administration of the army.

I have the honour to be, with great regard, my dear Lord Duke,  
your Grace's most obliged and most faithful servant,

H. TAYLOR.

[ 730. ]

*To Sir Herbert Taylor.*

MY DEAR GENERAL,

London, 21st May, 1827.

I have received your letter of yesterday. I stated in Parliament, as well as upon every occasion elsewhere, that I considered that there was nothing of a political nature which ought to prevent me from taking the command at the Horse-Guards, equally as of an army in the field. I resigned the command because I had received a rebuke for which I had given no provocation, and in which the authority of the King's name was very unnecessarily introduced. I believe there is no difference of opinion between us upon this subject, any more than there is that this rebuke was such a signal of want of confidence, as that I could not continue to hold my office with advantage to his Majesty.

Considering this rebuke as proceeding from the highest authority, I have never thought this affair a private matter,

requiring what is called reconciliation. Those in authority will decide whether I was mistaken in the view which I took of these communications (which they have never said yet), and whether confidence exists, and under what circumstances, in what manner, and at what time, such decision shall be made. For this the door can never be closed.

It will then remain for his Majesty and his servants likewise to decide whether it suits his Majesty's service and his purposes that I should resume the command. But it appears to me quite clear that till they will have made up their minds upon the first point it is useless to think of this last.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[This is a letter I wrote to Sir Herbert Taylor, which Mr. Canning saw on the morning of the day on which he advised the King to write to me, viz., the 21st May.]

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*The King to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR FRIEND,

St. James's Palace, 21st May, 1827.

I learn from my government, as well as from other quarters, that you have obligingly expressed your readiness to afford your advice, if required, upon any matters of military importance or detail that might occur. These circumstances renew in me those feelings towards you, which God knows (as you must know) I have so long and so sincerely felt, and I hope on all occasions proved; at least it was always my intention so to do. I cannot refrain therefore from acquainting you that the command of *the army* is still open, and if you choose to recall that resignation, which it grieved me so much to receive, you have my *sincere* permission to do so.

Ever your sincere friend,

G. R.

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*The Right Hon. George Canning to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Downing Street,  
21st May, 1827, 10 p.m.

I have abstained from replying to your answer to my letter of the 5th, lest our correspondence should degenerate into controversy, which would have been entirely contrary to my intentions.

The contents of my other letter of this date\* will, I trust, render any continuance of that correspondence altogether unnecessary.

Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington, very sincerely yours,

GEORGE CANNING.

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\* The letter alluded to has not been found.

[ 731.]

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

MY DEAR MR. CANNING,

London, 22nd May, 1827.

I received when I returned home last night your two letters of 10 p.m., and I now enclose a letter which I have addressed to the King in answer to that which his Majesty was most graciously pleased to write to me.

Believe me, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*To the King.*

London, 22nd May, 1827.

Your Majesty's most gracious letter of yesterday reached me last night, and I beg leave to return your Majesty my most grateful acknowledgments for your kindness.

I cannot claim the merit of having had any communication of any description with your Majesty's government since I quitted office. I did state both to Lord Anglesey and to Sir Herbert Taylor that I should be most happy to render each of them every assistance in my power to enable them to carry on the duties of their several offices; and to the latter in particular I have since written twice in consequence of reports which had reached me of the state of affairs in Portugal, inducing me to believe that it was desirable that your Majesty's forces in that country should be collected in one body and encamped in the neighbourhood of Lisbon.

I have served the late King and your Majesty for forty-two years; thirty-four of which either in the field against the enemy in the command of your Majesty's armies abroad, particularly for six years in the Peninsula, or in active political office; and even if I had not been, as I was, a party to the advice given to your Majesty to send a body of troops to Portugal, the anxiety which I feel for the honour of your Majesty's arms, and the gratitude which I owe to your Majesty for your Majesty's most gracious favour and kindness towards me, would have induced me to state my opinion to that officer who was principally confided in by your Majesty in military affairs, when it appeared to me that the position of your Majesty's troops was becoming critical.

I am delighted that my doing so has attracted your Majesty's

favourable notice ; but I assure your Majesty that I had not a notion that the existence of these letters would ever be made known to your Majesty ; still less did I intend, in writing them, to manifest any desire to withdraw my resignation of the office of Commander-in-Chief. Your Majesty has been pleased to observe that the command of the army is still open, and that if I choose to recall my resignation of that command I have your Majesty's permission to do so.

I earnestly hope that your Majesty will have the goodness to refer to the reasons which I stated to your Majesty on the 12th of April, and more fully to your Majesty's minister on the 6th of May, as having imposed upon me the painful necessity of offering to your Majesty my resignation of the command of your Majesty's forces.

I humbly entreat your Majesty to bear in mind that those reasons still continue in force, and that were I under such circumstances to recall my resignation, I should by that act admit that I had not been justified in retiring ; and I should disable myself from rendering that useful service to your Majesty which it would be, as it ever has been, the pride of my life to render.

All of which, together with the expression of my gratitude for the kind sentiments contained in your Majesty's letter to me, is submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most devoted subject,

WELLINGTON.

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*Sir William Clinton to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Lisbon, 24th May, 1827.

I have been very desirous of writing to your Grace, but as my chief motive for doing so, in this instance, has regarded myself, I have felt extremely unwilling to trespass on your time.

I request to be allowed to preface what I have to say by the expression of my unfeigned and heartfelt concern that any circumstances should have arisen to deprive the country of your Grace's valuable services, the importance of which it cannot but highly appreciate, while every well-wisher to its prosperity must earnestly desire to see those services again in full activity.

Permit me now to say a few words on the very minor subject of my own concerns, and relative to the high situation I have the honour to hold at the Board of Ordnance ; a situation which, of all others, I considered most eligible. I am extremely desirous of stating to you the grounds upon which I still continue, and propose remaining at the post where (at your Grace's very flattering recommendation) his Majesty was pleased to place



me. From the best considerations I have been able to give to the subject, it appears to me that, circumstanced as I am here, employed on a particular service (a distinction it again behoves me to say I owe to your Grace), and having to fulfil to the best of my endeavour and ability a measure of government, I cannot be supposed to take any part in political questions at home, and that my resignation, therefore, while so employed, is neither called for or to be expected of me.

In taking this line I confidently hope that all my friends will see reason to approve my conduct, but there is no one whose approbation in this instance I am more solicitous to obtain than that of him to whose notice I owe what little military fame I possess, and whose good opinion it is my most earnest wish to merit and to retain.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke,  
your faithful and obedient servant,

W. H. CLINTON.

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*Sir Charles Metcalfe\* to the Governor-General.*

EXTRACT from an Official Letter from SIR CHARLES METCALFE, Bart., Resident at Delhi, to the Secretary of the Governor-General, dated 28th May, 1827.

It would, I consider, be entirely contrary to our established policy to interfere in any possible disputes which might arise in the Punjab, on the demise of Rajah Runjeet Singh, unless they took a turn dangerous to the tranquillity of our own dominions.

So far as merely the internal strife of contending competitors is concerned, I do not foresee any probability of any serious inconvenience to ourselves, but a case might arise out of such contentions which would require our earnest attention.

If the empire established by Runjeet Singh be torn to pieces after his death by internal contests, or even if it fall undivided into hands less able than his to hold it together, the invasion of the Punjab by the Mahomedan fanatics who lately made the attempt may be renewed with better success, and were they to succeed the event would be of eminent importance to our interests, for it seems certain that Syed Uhmud, Moolvee Ismael, and their colleagues, have established a very extensive, if not universal influence over the minds of our Mahomedan subjects. During the period of their recent attack on Runjeet Singh's territories, the most fervent anxiety for their success pervaded the Mahomedan population of Delhi; numbers quitted their homes and marched to join them, including some who resigned their employment in the Company's service, both the civil and military branches, for that purpose.

It is said that the King of Delhi encouraged this spirit. If he did, the fact was not forced on my attention so as to compel me to notice it, and I preferred letting the ardour burn out of itself to adding fuel to it by opposition. If, however, the fanatics had been successful, it would undoubtedly have increased. It subsided on their failure, but eager eyes are still directed towards them.

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\* Afterwards Lord Metcalfe.

It is remarkable that no intelligence has been received regarding them since the defeat of their coadjutor Yar Mahomed Khan of Peshawur. The subsequent occupation of Peshawur by Runjeet Singh, Yar Mahomed Khan's submission, and his sending of his son in token thereof, are matters of notoriety; but whether Syed Uhmud and Moolvee Ismael, &c., are still in arms, or have fled to any distant country, and relinquished the actual prosecution of their design for the present, does not clearly appear; and it is not decidedly established that they and their immediate followers were engaged in the encounter between Yar Mahomed Khan and the troops of Runjeet Singh.

Syed Uhmud is in correspondence with Ameer Khan, and was formerly in his service, but is now his spiritual guide, and is said to have great influence over him. The Nuwab has the family of the Syed under his protection; he told me so, in order, as he said, that he might not be charged with it hereafter as a crime against our government. The Syed passed through Ameer Khan's territory, on his way to the north-westward, and the latter is no doubt privy to his designs whatever they may be. It appears, indeed, that they are regarded with intense interest generally by the Mahomedans of this quarter of India.

I have adverted to this matter as one which may possibly give us more positive interest at no distant period in the affairs of the Punjab than we should otherwise have, but as it is one of uncertain character, the rising up of which at all times is not certain, and the prevention of which by premature interference on our part is not certain either, it seems best not to deviate from our established policy until a clear necessity arise for our doing so, which may at the same time indicate, without the probability of mistake, the wisest course to be pursued for the protection of our own interests.

It does not seem to be desirable that any further notice should be taken of the supposed overture of Kurgh Singh than what it has already received in the reply of the Governor of Bombay. If Kurgh Singh be desirous of submitting similar propositions to the Supreme Government, he will find a way to make his wishes known.

I have, &c.,

C. T. METCALFE, Resident.

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*To the Marquess of Anglesey.*

[ 732. ]

MY DEAR LORD ANGLESEY,

London, 13th June, 1827.

I was in hopes that I should have seen you before you left town, to speak to you on the subject of this letter; but as you are gone to Cowes I think it best to write to you.

I have heard it reported that a Russian squadron, consisting of nine sail of the line and nine frigates, and a French squadron, are to be assembled with one of his Majesty's in the Levant this autumn. I ask no question respecting the fact; still less do I give an opinion on a subject on which I can know nothing excepting from common report.

I trouble you upon this subject only as it bears a relation to your department. These will be very extraordinary Allies if they should not require some assistance in stores during their service; and possibly it might be desirable that you should look at the returns of the store of powder at Malta and in the Ionian Islands, and enquire respecting the calibre of the ordnance of these Allies, and send out a supply of shot accordingly, that the most essential articles may not be wanting. This state of preparation in our magazines will not only be creditable to the department under your superintendence, but may have the effect of preventing the Allies from seeking to form establishments of their own in the Levant. The expense, if any, will only be an advance, as of course they will pay for what they take.

Believe me, &c.,  
WELLINGTON.

733.] *To Charles Thorpe, Esq., Senior Master of the Guild of Merchants, Dublin.*

SIR,

London, 16th June, 1827.

I have received your letter of the 10th instant enclosing the unanimous address of the Guild of Merchants testifying the approbation of my fellow citizens of my conduct, for which I beg you to convey to the Guild my most grateful acknowledgment.

I thought it proper to decline to belong to his Majesty's councils for reasons well known to the public; but I did not, nor shall I, refuse my support to the administration formed by his Majesty, upon every occasion on which I shall think their measures calculated to promote the honour, the peace, or the prosperity of the country.

I have the honour, &c.,  
WELLINGTON.

*Earl Grey to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Berkeley Square, 18th June, 1827.

I have the honour of returning to your Grace your correspondence with Mr. Huskisson, which I received last night from Lord Jersey, with many thanks for your kindness in allowing it to be communicated to me.

After reading it very attentively, I must acknowledge that the letter of the 24th of May appears to me to admit of the construction put upon it in

Mr. Huskisson's subsequent explanation; but without that explanation, and with reference to what you had stated to be your object in proposing an alteration to guard the warehouse system against abuse, I should have understood it in the same manner as your Grace.

I remain, with the highest respect,  
your Grace's obliged and faithful servant,

GREY.

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*To Sir William Clinton.*

[ 734.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

London, 20th June, 1827.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 24th May, and it appears to me that you have formed a correct judgment of your position in relation to the government and to your office at the Board of Ordnance.

I resigned my office of Master-General because I did not think it possible for me—for reasons stated in a letter to Mr. Canning of the 11th of April, which has been published in the newspapers—to continue in the Cabinet. But I stated in Parliament, and repeatedly both by letter and in conversation, that no political circumstances or opinions would have induced me to quit the command of the army at the Horse-Guards any more than I would the command of an army in the field. I quitted the command because I received a letter from the King's minister, written in the King's name, and stated to have been submitted to the King, which was not on a subject strictly official, which was couched in such a degree in a tone of taunt and rebuke as to render it quite clear to me, as I believe it now is to everybody else, that I could not retain the command with honour to myself or with advantage to his Majesty or his government.

If circumstances had been different I should have acted otherwise, and should now be in the command of the army. There is therefore no reason why you, being under circumstances quite different, and such as I should have been in if I had not received the letter from the King's minister above referred to, should not retain your command even though you should differ in politics with the King's government. But even upon this point I understand that you have not made up your mind; and in the existing state of things, and in the midst of representations of all colours and descriptions such as I believe never existed before in this country, and I hope never will again,

I earnestly recommend to you not to fix your opinion till you shall return to England.

Supposing the King's minister to allow you to postpone till that period your decision whether you will or will not give him your confidence and support his government as a man does who gives the minister his confidence, you might keep your office till your return if the minister should not require you to resign it on other grounds. But it appears to me that whenever you will decide that you cannot give the minister that fair confidence which he has a right to expect, you ought to resign an office which has always hitherto been held by those who felt that confidence; and this whether you should be abroad and continuing to hold your command in Portugal, or at home.

Ever, my dear General, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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*Count Nesselrode to Prince Lieven.\**

PRINCE,

St. Petersburg, 9th (21st) June, 1827.

I have lost no time in placing<sup>y</sup> before the Emperor the reports received from your Highness, dated the 23rd November (5th December) last. But as your despatches informed us of the fresh communications which the representatives of Russia and Great Britain were about to address to the Cabinets of Vienna, of Paris, and of Berlin, relative to the negotiations for the pacification of the Levant, it was necessary, before returning you a reply, to wait till we were informed, which we could not fail to be without much delay, as to the manner in which these communications were received on the part of our Allies.

Now, however, that the opinions of the Austrian and French Foreign Offices are before us, and a special proposal having emanated from the latter, we shall touch in the present despatch upon the negotiations which have passed between you and the principal Secretary of State of her Britannic Majesty, and which followed upon our despatches of the 7th (29th) September and the overtures of the Courts of Austria and France.

The first impression which they have made upon the Emperor is one of sincere and lively satisfaction, a feeling which results from the reciprocal confidence of which they so happily afford proof. We shall endeavour to justify this feeling, so far as we are concerned, by a frankness which we regard as the sole mode of preserving with our Allies those relations of friendship and intimacy whose value is augmented by the present condition of Europe.

Your conversations with Mr. Canning, and the communications which we have just addressed to the Courts of Vienna, of Paris, and of Berlin,

\* From "Correspondence with Russia, relative to the Affairs of Greece previous to the Conclusion of the Treaty of July 6th, 1827."—*Parliamentary Papers, Commons*, 1863, page 22.

related chiefly to decisions to be arrived at in case the measures we have taken for the re-establishment of peace in Greece should fail of success at Constantinople. France has adopted the views we hold in common on this point; and, on her side, has made to us a proposition which would give the more binding and solemn character of a European treaty to the preliminary stipulations to which we agreed with the Cabinet of St. James in the Protocol of 23rd March (4th April).

In the same degree that the pacification of Greece has always seemed to us the necessary result of our other negotiations with the Ottoman Porte, we have always conceived it to be indispensable to the general welfare of Europe and to our own interests; in short, the more we have insisted upon the advantages of an agreement upon this subject among the principal Christian States, and the more benefits we discover in the propositions put forward by the Cabinet of the Tuileries, the more eager must we be to welcome them. What still further induces us to adhere to them is, that Mr. Canning himself lately admitted that it would be expedient to see the other Allied Courts become contracting parties to the Protocol we have signed at St. Petersburg with the Duke of Wellington; and that, after that, we cannot doubt that the government of his Britannic Majesty will lend itself to the wish expressed by the Court of France. But it is not enough to conclude a treaty in such circumstances—it is necessary to combine for its execution; and as two preliminary modes of execution have already been mentioned by the Cabinets of St. Petersburg and London, the question for us to discuss is whether, according to the most probable calculations, these means are sufficient to enable the Courts who employ them to obtain what they desire, and if the conclusion of a treaty does not impose upon us the duty of determining eventually the most effectual measures to be adopted.

The subject is so important that we do not hesitate to reproduce here the observations which we have already had occasion to offer.

Our first remarks will relate to the nature itself of the means above mentioned, upon which we have recently called the attention of our Allies. To satisfy ourselves to what extent we may anticipate success from them, we will examine, in the first place, the difficulties to which they may be exposed; we will judge of them by the only criterions we possess for judging of the future—the experience of the past and the nearly analogous cases which have been offered by previous negotiations with the Porte; and we shall see if we have grounds for anticipating the speedy solution of the difficulties which we must expect to encounter. Great Britain proposed to us in the month of September, 1826, to decree, in principle, that if the Porte obstinately refused to listen to the overtures which might be made to it, the Powers who intervened should recall their representatives at Constantinople, and that they should show themselves disposed at some future day to recognise the independence of Greece. The first of these measures is conditional in the estimation of the Cabinets of London and Paris. They would adopt it only if it were simultaneously taken by all the Powers who might demand the pacification of Greece. The second would be for the present but a simple menace, which subsequent events might or might not realise. Neither of these measures have been opposed by us, but neither again have inspired us with full confidence, and we should place not only

ourselves but our Allies in a false position, if we withheld from them our opinion that if these methods of negotiation were the only ones to which recourse was to be had, we should conceive ourselves to be entering upon one of the most difficult problems ever offered to diplomacy, with but little likelihood of arriving at a satisfactory conclusion. The recall of the ambassadors should be simultaneous. We appreciate perfectly the motives which make this accord desirable, and we are the first to recognise its advantages. But, on the one hand, it does not yet exist, and, perhaps, with the conditions which the Court of Vienna wishes to place upon it, is not likely ever to be established. On the other hand, we perceive that in the last instructions to Mr. Stratford Canning,\* the English minister orders him not to quit Constantinople, even should the accord in question be realised, without express authorisation. Our doubts, therefore, of the efficacy of this measure must be in proportion to the uncertainty there is as to its adoption. But we will go still further. We will suppose that this measure, namely, the recall of the ambassadors, will be fully adopted. Is it clearly shown, and can we be assured, that it will produce a sufficiently strong impression, and that the moment the representatives of the Allied Courts quit Constantinople the Divan will change its politics and its language? This change does not appear certain to us, and our apprehensions are founded on experience. In 1821, Russia found herself forced repeatedly to employ strong menaces towards the Porte, she was forced to break off her diplomatic and commercial relations with it, and, nevertheless, she did not obtain the adhesion of the Turkish government to her first demands. It will be objected, no doubt, that if the recall of the ambassadors were simultaneous we might fairly anticipate a better result. Our reply, nevertheless, is that the fear of a hand-to-hand struggle with Russia is one of those which act most powerfully at Constantinople.

The menaces used from time to time by Viscount Stratford have only elicited false promises, violated almost as soon as they were made. Moreover our demands at these different periods were perhaps less directly opposed to the prejudices of the Turks than the demand that they should adhere to the bases of the Protocol of the 23rd March (4th April), and if on the one side the arrangements whose principles are therein perpetuated are in conformity with the well-understood interests of the Ottoman Empire; yet we must be prepared, on the other, to combat in these circumstances all the errors that prejudice can inspire, and all the obstinacy that blind passions can impart. It is, moreover, an incontestable truth which the habit of negotiating with the Porte has revealed to us, that Oriental governments are gifted with an extraordinary instinct for distinguishing simple demonstrations, of whatever character, from serious resolutions of which the accomplishment will not fail to follow the announcement. This is how Russia was for a long time unable to reap any fruit from her moderation, notwithstanding the menacing language addressed by her Allies to the Porte, but how five months were sufficient to accomplish a work vainly attempted for ten consecutive years, as soon as an intuitive perception, which never deceives them, warned the Turks that patience was exhausted, and that deeds would succeed to words. It

\* Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, G.C.B.

is owing to a religious and political principle that Orientals enter into engagements only from absolute necessity; but, on the other hand, as soon as this necessity arises, the engagement is made. This system forms part of their faith, as of their customs, their traditions, and the essence of their government, and it authorises us to believe that even if the recall of the representatives of Russia, Great Britain, France, and Prussia (that of the Internuncio of Austria is very doubtful, judging by the reply of the Austrian Cabinet), should take place, it would only conduct us to the object of our wishes if it were, as it has almost always been in diplomacy, the infallible sign, if not the immediate consequence, of the employment of a real coercive force. But, then, as we have observed, this measure necessitates others, it renders necessary also that these other measures should be combined, fixed upon, and executed in concert. We do not wish to say by this that it should not be employed; but we affirm that alone it may be insufficient; that in this case the Allied Powers will have compromised their dignity without having devised measures to sustain it; that this inconvenience being possible should be guarded against, and that, therefore, an understanding should at once be arrived at as to the resolutions which may preserve us from it.

The second proposition which we, together with the Court of St. James, have made to our Allies, presents itself from two points of view. It consists in the idea of announcing to the Porte that by rejecting our overtures she would cause closer relations between the Greeks and the intervening Courts, who might decide upon recognising on some future day their entire independence. This idea appears, from one point of view, beneficial. A reconciliation with the Greeks would give an opportunity to rescue this people from the double scourge of the intestine dissensions, and that of revolutionary influences which agitate it; but, considered with regard to the effect it would produce upon the Divan, does not this second means of negotiation appear even less decisive than the former, and can it be crowned with success? The penetration of the Turks would doubtless enable them at once to distinguish that Greece, in its present state, cannot be recognised by the first Courts of Europe; it would enable them to take the resolution of hastening the war, in order to reply by the destruction of the Greeks to the vain menace of the Allied Cabinets. Meanwhile the grave inconveniences which led to the signature of the Protocol of the 23rd March (4th April) would continue in all their force. The struggle would be prolonged, the same results would be apprehended, acts of piracy would require the same measures for repression, commerce would be subject to the same hindrances, the same dangers, the position of Russia with regard to the Porte would continue to be equally precarious; and finally, supposing that the Allied Courts should wish to realise their menace, would the recognition of Greek independence be easy? Would it be in conformity with the stipulations of the Protocol of the 23rd March (4th April)? Would it not lead us beyond the limits of that act, would it not necessitate new arrangements, and could the concurrence of the great European Powers be counted upon with certainty to conclude them? We repeat that Russia, in the month of September, gave her consent to the employment of this menacing declaration, and she will not withdraw it. And, moreover, she does not ignore the necessity of exhausting the means of conciliation, and would



esteem herself essentially happy to find her presentiments unfulfilled and the Divan giving way, either at the recall of the ambassadors, or at the threat of some day recognising the independence of Greece. But her arguments always bring her back, with unassailable force, to the conclusion that this second means of negotiation, if it is solely adopted as such, may be no more efficacious than the first, because it is difficult to admit that the prospect alone of an uncertain evil must necessarily overcome the opposition of the Turkish government, and that therefore in this hypothesis also it would be a want of foresight, and a yielding to dangerous illusions, not to calculate the possibility of a continued refusal, and not to combine the measures required by it.

The considerations we have now stated are so far in relation to the Protocol of 23rd March (4th April), but how much more weight would they not acquire if they are applied to a formal treaty between the first Powers of Europe. If it is true (and we think it is difficult to question the correctness of this assertion) that in the present state of things the Allied Courts would be compromised by demanding the adhesion of the Porte to arrangements tending to the pacification of Greece without wishing for it, or without being able to obtain it, it is evident that their failure would be followed by still more grievous consequences if they suffered this victorious resistance after having signed a mutually obligatory treaty, a treaty of which the clauses would assume *ipso facto* the most imposing character; the more willing the Emperor is to conclude a treaty, the more useless he will think it to invest the Protocol of the 23rd March (4th April) with a more solemn form without laying down altogether more certain measures for its execution. According to us, it would be to negotiate to no purpose, to allow valuable time to pass, and consequently to act against the particular interest of the affair before us which it is essential to terminate, and against the welfare of the general cause.

This affair does not entrench upon (as we think we have sufficiently shown at different times for some years) the domain of common right. If it did, the force of the Turkish arms would alone be privileged to decide the question, and the European Powers would not be more authorised to counsel spontaneous sacrifices to the Sultan than to require him in a peremptory manner to subscribe to the arrangements of which the Protocol of the 23rd March (4th April) presents the sketch. But this right is modified, either by the absolute impossibility of exercising it in its original state, or when the exercise of it would be obviously prejudicial to a third party; now in the case of Greece, this third party who suffers a real injury is Europe. Europe, in effect, sees that the hatred between the litigant parties has arrived to such a point that the war, if left to its own course, can only finish by the destruction of one of them, and Europe has unanimously agreed that, on the one hand, the destruction of a whole Christian people was not an event admissible by Christianity; and on the other, that the present state of Greece offers inconveniences of the gravest nature, because it maintains a dangerous agitation in all countries, because it shackles commerce, because it encourages piracy, because it necessitates measures of repression, which occasion considerable expenditure, because finally the experience of five years past has proved that the Turkish government finds it impossible to put an end to it. In this alternative Europe has more

than a right; it is her duty to exercise a benevolent intervention, and if her intervention is rejected, her interests and her requirements force her to cause this right and this duty to be respected. Such are, in our opinion, the general motives which justify the Protocol of the 23rd March (4th April), and which will eternally justify in the eyes of the civilised world the resolutions which will be adopted for the execution of this Act. Russia has provoked it, because it is upon Russia that the above enumerated inconveniences weigh, because for five years she has supported them with constant moderation, and yet she cannot support them for ever, because she cannot be required to allow a people which professes her religion, which was one of the most useful intermediaries of her commerce, which sent 300 vessels to the ports of her southern provinces, to perish entirely by the sword of the Mussulman. But Russia, in signing the said Act, far from reserving to herself exclusive advantages, has refused them; far from wishing to annul the ancient rights of the Porte over Greece, she has proposed to modify their exterior forms and to ameliorate their results. When, therefore, Russia claims the accomplishment of the Protocol of the 23rd March (4th April), it is not the Ottoman empire that she seeks to strengthen. If her principles with regard to Greece had been less pure, if she had wished to take advantage of her position and of her right to put a stop to a war of which she feels the effects more than the other Powers, it would have been easy for her to have placed among the conditions of the Treaty of Akerman, and to have obtained, the pacification of the Morea and the Archipelago. Such, nevertheless, has not been her policy, she has preferred to preserve a collective character to an affair which she had already treated collectively, and to reinforce her special right to arrive at the peace which she desires by the right of the other European governments. If the result for her has been delay, it is one reason more which she alleges in order to hasten an event now which she could formerly have brought about without the concurrence of her Allies.

The scruples manifested in the reply of the Austrian Cabinet have engaged us in this explanation; for as to the Powers who laid down the Protocol those doubts are resolved, and the question to decide reduces itself to whether they will or will not realise stipulations which are evidently salutary. In this respect, it appears to us that antecedents leave them no option. The existence of the Protocol of the 23rd March (4th April) is known to the Turks. It is known to the Greeks, since Mr. Stratford Canning has informed them that he was only awaiting the arrival of M. de Ribeaupierre to take steps in their favour. It is known to the whole of Europe, as all newspapers have already made mention of it. And, in the last place, Mr. Stratford Canning has judged the present moment to be so propitious for negotiations with the Porte that he has expressed the wish to be supported without delay by the representative of the Emperor at Constantinople. His Imperial Majesty fulfils his engagements too religiously for it to be possible for him to refuse this request, and we consequently hastened to send to M. de Minciacky the confidential instructions of which a copy is annexed at the moment we trace these lines. General attention is already excited, the first steps are taken, the discussion is perhaps opened. Is there now time to draw back by deciding

that means of negotiation, of which the success is doubtful, shall alone be employed? We think not. If a common interest dictated the Protocol of the 23rd March (4th April), common honour now seems to command its execution, and we should misunderstand the principles which direct the policy of our Allies, if we insisted further upon a consideration of this nature. But there is another which we will not pass by in silence. The conviction on the part of the Divan, that the unanimity which exists between Russia and England, on the subject of Greece, will necessarily influence the state of our relations with the Porte. It will again embitter them, it will deprive us momentarily at least of the ascendancy which the Convention of Akerman should have gained for us, and our sacrifices will be still further augmented if we are obliged to suspend our diplomatic relations with the Court of Constantinople. The more this position may become grievous, the more right we have to exact that it shall continue as short a time as possible, and that by a just compensation it shall serve to attain the end for which we have consented to submit to it. Here again the interest of Europe is in accordance with ours, for our situation with regard to the Porte being precarious—and it will be so as long as a solid peace is not restored to Greece—all the other States find themselves essentially interested in operating, by the re-establishment of this useful peace, our complete and durable reconciliation with the Ottoman empire. To admit other opinions on these two points would be to believe, according to us, either that in signing the Protocol of 23rd March (4th April), and in acceding to it, an important object has been proposed, with the reservation of only pursuing it by means which can never lead to it, or that we ourselves have lent ourselves to negotiations eternally sterile, and whose only consequence would be to compromise our own advantages, a conclusion which reason alone disavows, and which is also repelled by our legitimate confidence in the good faith of our Allies.

Convinced of their loyalty and intelligence we will here give in few words a digest of the observations and decisions of his Imperial Majesty:—

1. The Emperor consents to the proposition of the Cabinet of the Tuileries to convert into a treaty the Protocol of 23rd March (4th April), and Russia will sign this treaty with all the Powers who choose equally to sign it. To facilitate its negotiation the Emperor even consents that it should be discussed and concluded at London, and orders me to furnish you to that effect with the full powers and necessary instructions.

2. The Emperor not being able to admit as entirely certain the success of the two coercive measures already fixed by the Courts of St. Petersburg, London, and Paris, in case the Porte should reject their overtures, only gives his consent to the above-mentioned Treaty on the condition of inserting a secret clause, or of joining to it either a protocol or separate declarations, specifying the measures which would be taken by the contracting Powers supposing that the two measures just spoken of should be insufficient.

3. In order to explain our idea more clearly, we shall propose to graduate the coercive measures in general in the following manner:

(a). Menace of being forced to an immediate reconciliation with the Greeks. This declaration would be, in our opinion, more efficacious and less compromising than if it were joined to the expression of the design of

some day recognising the independence of Greece: less compromising, because it would not make us take an engagement which might be impossible to fulfil; more efficacious, because its realisation would be more prompt. The reconciliation would be brought about by means of sending public agents from the contracting Powers to the Greek authorities.

(b). Recall of the representatives of the contracting Powers, if, at the end of a month, the menace of reconciliation with the Greeks does not produce the desired effect.

(c). If the recall of the representatives does not induce, within \* weeks, the adhesion of the Porte, the adoption of a measure which England has herself indicated, and of which the efficacy does not appear doubtful, viz., union of the squadrons of the contracting Powers, with the object of preventing all help of men, arms, or of Egyptian or Turkish vessels, from arriving in Greece or in the Archipelago. These squadrons would thenceforward treat the Greeks as friends.

(d). If, which seems impossible, this measure was still insufficient, a clause bearing that the contracting Powers would continue to pursue their end, and that they would, for that purpose, lay down ulterior determinations which they might occupy themselves from this time by concerting.

We have deduced the imperious motives which engaged us to propose this step, and we will terminate the present by attacking the objections which our ideas may raise.

It is possible, to begin with, that the arguments may not convince, which appear to us to establish the truth of our assertions relative to the small success that may attend the two coercive measures already concerted between Russia, Great Britain, and France. But one of two things must happen: either there is a firm conviction that these measures are sufficient, and then no risk is run in concerting ulterior resolutions which might be apprehended, but which it would be certain would not be accomplished; or else there is not this conviction, and then we cannot conceive how a refusal to arrange other measures could be joined to the desire to execute the Protocol of the 23rd March (4th April).

It is also possible that the fear of coming to a real war with the Turks should produce a just hesitation. Here we will invoke our recent experience, and the testimony of Mr. Stratford Canning. This ambassador believes the moment favourable for negotiations with the Porte, because the Porte is not in a state to oppose a real resistance to us. The Convention of Akerman is a proof of it, but it also proves that the Porte only cedes to an evident necessity. She has required, so to say, to see the glitter of our arms before deferring to our wishes. We may then presume that it will be the same in Greek affairs, that she will not admit our propositions till she sees the Allies irrevocably decided, and already prepared to act, but that she will admit them before they really do act.

Besides, even should hostilities take place, the issue would be certain, and the object determined beforehand. It is towards this object, and this object alone, that the engagements of Russia would impose on her the duty of advancing. It is to this object again that her own interests would

\* Blank in Parliamentary Paper.

direct her, for would the results of the Convention of Akerman, joined to the pacification of Greece, leave us anything to desire? And would not the wishes of the other Courts of Europe be equally satisfied when they would thus witness the disappearance of all the ancient germs of those alarming discussions which arose between the Cabinet of St. Petersburg and the Ottoman empire? Never, we venture to affirm, would a more useful enterprise have been attempted with more pledges of security and success in war and in peace.

Your Highness is authorised to communicate this despatch to the principal Secretary of State of her Britannic Majesty.

Receive, &c.,

NESSÉLBODE.

[ 735. ]

*To the Duke of Cumberland.*

SIR,

London, 23rd June, 1827.

I have had the honour of receiving your Royal Highness's letter of the 7th instant, and I am much gratified by your Royal Highness's kindness in allowing the intention which I had of recommending Mr. Gascoigne to be a cornet in the Horse-Guards to be carried into execution. He is a very fine young man, and I doubt not will give your Royal Highness satisfaction.

I was certain that your Royal Highness would lament the changes which have taken place here, and I sincerely wish that they may not be attended by worse consequences than the removal from the King's government and presence of men who had so long served his Majesty to his advantage and satisfaction.

I can give your Royal Highness no account of the cause of the change. His Majesty thought proper (as he had undoubted right to do) to take Mr. Canning as his minister, and six of his servants, of whom I was one, did not think that we could act with Mr. Canning in that situation. My reasons for entertaining that opinion are clearly explained to Mr. Canning in a letter which I wrote to him on the 11th April. I knew that Mr. Canning would not be supported as Lord Liverpool had been by the old supporters of the Crown; that he must look for support in other quarters; that to obtain that support he must alter the course of action of the government; that he would not maintain the principles of action of Lord Liverpool's government; that those principles must be abandoned; and that I should be obliged to quit the government at a moment at which such separation would be more inconvenient than that at which I wrote.

The prophecy which that letter contained has already been fulfilled; but I besides felt that Mr. Canning's temper and habits were such that it would be impossible to remain in a government of which he should be the head without forfeiting all pretension to independence of judgment or opinion, and becoming liable daily to the consequences of acts done or words spoken in heat and passion, or quarrelling with him. I therefore thought it best to retire from the Cabinet.

In the course of the correspondence upon this part of the subject, Mr. Canning wrote me a letter in the King's name, which he stated that he had submitted to his Majesty, in such terms of taunt and rebuke that I did not think it proper that I should continue to hold the office of Commander-in-Chief. What I felt was this: Mr. Canning, as First Lord of the Treasury, was my official superior, and I admit that he had a right to convey to me the signification of his Majesty's displeasure upon any parts of my official conduct. This correspondence was not upon official matter, but upon matters of a private though important nature. He had no right to write such a letter on his own part; and in clothing it with his Majesty's name and authority he showed me what I had to expect in my official communications with him, which your Royal Highness knows might be daily. I felt therefore that I could not hold the situation with honour; and for that reason not with advantage to his Majesty's service. I therefore resigned.

About six weeks after I had resigned I received a most gracious and kind letter from his Majesty, in which his Majesty informed me that if I wished to recall my resignation I had his permission to do so.

I must inform your Royal Highness, however, that on the very morning of the day on the night of which I received that most gracious letter from his Majesty I had written to Sir Herbert Taylor a letter, of which I enclose your Royal Highness a copy,\* in answer to one which he had written to me, in which he expressed a hope that the door was not closed to accommodation. Your Royal Highness will observe that in this letter I state clearly the road which must be followed, in my opinion, in order to produce this accommodation. Sir Herbert Taylor

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\* See p. 34.

showed this letter to Mr. Canning as soon as he received it; and Mr. Canning, after seeing that letter, advised his Majesty to write to me, but without telling his Majesty what I had written Sir Herbert Taylor, or that I had written to him at all.

It is not unfair then to think that Mr. Canning did not intend that I should accept his Majesty's offer that I should be permitted to recall my resignation; as indeed it turned out; as I found myself under the necessity of writing to his Majesty that as the reasons for tendering my resignation remained in force I could not desire to recall my resignation without admitting that I had tendered it without reason, and thus disgracing myself and making myself incapable of rendering to his Majesty those services which it had been, and ever would be, the happiness and pride of my life to give.

In respect to the state of things here, your Royal Highness will learn it more perfectly from others than from me. The only reliance of the country in regard to the Roman Catholic question is upon the exercise of his Majesty's prerogative to refuse his assent to a Bill to remove the existing disabilities, which Bill will have been carried through the Houses by the influence of his Majesty's government. I believe that since the days of King William this prerogative has not been exercised. The influence of the government has always been exerted to prevent measures obnoxious to the interests or the views of the Crown from being carried through the Houses of Parliament. But the outworks will upon this question be carried; and we must rely upon the body of the place to save us. This alone is a great evil. The exercise of the prerogative of the Crown, on this subject in particular, will expose the King personally to much abuse, and will dissatisfy many of his subjects.

But this is not all. I confess when I see the ancient enemies of good order and government in this country, the Radicals here, the *Liberal party* as it is called and Jacobins in all other countries, applaud this change in his Majesty's councils, I cannot but think that it portends no good to his Majesty, to the system for which he has contended for the last seventeen years, and to the established order of the world. I cannot but look back to the speeches which have been made, and to the expectations which have been encouraged, as the causes of this applause; and I earnestly and anxiously hope that his Majesty may never

find himself mistaken ; but that if he should it will be before the evil is beyond a remedy.

I have not seen his Majesty since a few days before these unfortunate events occurred in April last, but I understand he is quite well.

I have the honour to be, with the utmost gratitude and respect, your Royal Highness's most faithful and obedient servant,

WELLINGTON.

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*Sir Willoughby Gordon to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Chelsea, 26th June, 1827.

Being unexpectedly, but unavoidably, confined to the house to-day, and I am told also for to-morrow, and as probably your Grace may be now about to leave town, I cannot resist the desire to express how highly I have been pleased with the perusal of the proceedings of last night in the House of Lords.

Your own statement is so clear, straightforward, convincing, and kind in its manner, as must satisfy every one whose judgment is worth having that your opinion in matters of civil and domestic government are as able, as you have proved them to be in matters of more difficulty and of higher importance ; and this impression at the close of a session, at this juncture, appears to me to be useful. This to me is not new, nor should I perhaps have now indulged in this freedom of expression of it, but as in some shape connected with the speech which Lord Grey is reported to have delivered, and which I have read with the greatest gratification.

It appears to me that while he asserted his own independence and consistency of character, he took an opportunity of maintaining his rights as a peer, and of defending the aristocracy as a body in their conduct upon the recent opposition to the Corn Bill. That in doing this, he singled out your Grace as a man the most distinguished of that body, and whose conduct, upon all occasions the most splendid, yet upon this occasion had been calumniated and grossly aspersed, when in the discharge of an important duty, in the most upright, conscientious, and able manner ; and that he placed himself at your side, in defence and support of all you had done, as to motive and conduct, with a firmness of mind and of purpose that I think, under all circumstances, has done him much honour.

I confess that this has gratified me personally very much, and knowing Lord Grey as I do, I am satisfied that he would not have done this for any man, or anything, if he had not been convinced that, in every point of view in which your Grace's conduct could be viewed, it had been such as ought to have the utmost support that every well-conditioned gentleman could give to it.

I beg of your Grace not to think of answering this letter. but to excuse the liberty of my having written it.

Yours most respectfully and faithfully,

W. GORDON.



EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM SIR HERBERT TAYLOR TO LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR WILLIAM CLINTON; FORWARDED TO FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

Horse-Guards, 29th June, 1827.

“I mentioned to you in my letter of the 24th instant, that the Duke of Wellington had frequently expressed great uneasiness in consequence of the wide extension of your cantonments, and that he had strongly urged their concentration to the northward of Lisbon, with a direct and easy communication with the forts and shipping. I have since communicated to his Grace the substance of your letters of the 2nd and 9th instant, which Lord Goderich showed me, and I think it right to mention to you that his opinion continues unchanged; and although not in communication with the government, and although he has not again authorised me to press this point further with them, he has not objected to my repeating his opinion to you, and to my conveying to you privately his friendly caution not to suffer yourself to be misled by your desire to preserve interior tranquillity into false military measures, which you may have cause to regret, if events should occur, which, though not now apprehended or foreseen by you, *may arise suddenly*.

“His Grace does not fear that a British brigade may not march through Portugal without being exposed to defeat or serious molestation; but he does apprehend their being exposed to the necessity of hurried and forced marches not free from insult and loss, and therefore more or less disgraceful, and which ought to be avoided, as the object is to protect Portugal against foreign attack and not to take a share in or to appear to be committed in intestine broils. He considers also that it is very desirable not to occupy the town of Lisbon, or to have the troops so placed as to be obliged to pass through Lisbon, if circumstances should require that they should be withdrawn. And finally, that if the latter crisis should occur, the measure should, for the credit of this country and its arms, appear to be the result of choice and of the system of policy pursued under the original instructions given to you, and not the result of a resolution hastily adopted and produced by necessity. Such is, as far as I have collected from frequent communications (the last of which was made this day), the Duke of Wellington's view of your situation, and I feel bound to put you in possession of it. If you have positive instructions which are in opposition to his Grace's sentiments, you must of course obey the former; but if you are to act according to your own discretion, you will probably feel disposed to attach some weight to his Grace's opinion.”

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[ 736. ] MEMORANDUM SENT TO SIR HENRY WELLESLEY WITH THE PAPERS RESPECTING MY RESIGNATION.

July, 1827.

The substance of the speech in the House of Lords, which has been extracted from the most authentic reports of the debate, submitted to many persons who heard it, and revised by myself, is as accurately correct as it can be made; and it contains

all that passed respecting my resignation, excepting a letter from the King of the 13th April, which I don't think it proper to show to anybody. It contains, however, nothing material to the case excepting his Majesty's acceptance of my resignation.

Mr. Canning's letter to me of the 5th of May was founded upon what I said in the House of Lords, and mine to him of the 6th is an answer to his.

Then follows his Majesty's letter to me of the 21st May, and my answer of the 22nd.

It would have been impossible to obey his Majesty's command in point of form. I had resigned my office in the most formal manner by his Majesty's desire, and my resignation must have been enrolled. I therefore could not "recall it." But my objection to take the step required by his Majesty was to the substance, not to the form; and accordingly I stated my reasons for thinking that I ought not to desire to recall my resignation as permitted by his Majesty.

All these letters speak for themselves. But besides these there is a letter from me to Sir Herbert Taylor which is deserving of attention. I had given to Sir Herbert Taylor my correspondence with Mr. Canning to peruse, and he returned it to me on the 20th May with a letter stating his opinion that there was nothing in it to close the door to accommodation. I wrote to Sir Herbert Taylor an answer to this letter on the 21st May, in the morning, in which I detailed my opinion of the position in which we all stood in this affair; and the road to be taken to attain this desired accommodation.

Sir Herbert Taylor showed this letter to Mr. Canning as soon as he received it, and notwithstanding the clearness with which it states that Mr. Canning's letter to me of the 11th April must be explained before I could consent to resume my command (if his Majesty and his ministers should think proper that I should resume it), Mr. Canning still thought it proper to go to the King and advise his Majesty to write me his letter of the 21st May, without telling his Majesty what my opinion was of the course which ought to be followed.

WELLINGTON.

*Major-General Woodford\* to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Corfu, 1st July, 1827.

As it is probable no correct accounts of the surrender of the Acropolis of Athens may have yet reached England, I venture to send your Grace the statements which have been received here as authentic.

The garrison, though much worn, certainly could have held out longer; and at first the chiefs imperiously refused to acknowledge General Church's instructions, or to surrender upon any terms; but after some secret negotiations, chiefly with the French naval officers of Admiral de Rigny's squadron, an alteration in their sentiments took place, and they capitulated on terms very favourable to the garrison.

The officers and men marched out with arms and baggage, and were embarked in the French ships of war. The Athenians and their families were all permitted to return to their native villages, under strong promises of protection and support; and this clemency made a great impression on the population. Colonel Fabvier's conduct appears to have been mysterious, and the immediate interference of the French Admiral, in the absence of the British ships of war, has given rise to much speculation on the increasing influence of France with the Porte.

The Greek troops have taken up a strong position on the Isthmus of Corinth, from Megara to the opposite shore. The Turkish fleet, consisting of twenty-five pendants, completely commands the sea, and can debark troops on any point favourable for their operations.

Lord Cochrane is supposed to be gone to Candia, where the Turkish garrisons are said to be in distress.

The Greeks generally have lost confidence and hope, their internal dissensions exist as strongly as ever, and the supplies of money are quite exhausted.

General Church continues to hold confident language, and expects to be able, by means of a flotilla, to harass the Turkish posts. The garrison of Athens, about 2000 strong, has been relanded by the French fleet.

There are indications of a fresh insurrection in Albania.

Some officers lately returned from Constantinople have described the new drill of the Turkish troops to be proceeding successfully. They are instructed by French non-commissioned officers; the Sultan will not permit any Frank to hold an officer's commission in his service, and it does not appear that the Turkish officers are equally instructed with the men. The recruits are chiefly very young, but there are several corps completed, and tolerably well equipped with French arms, accoutrements, and hair knapsacks. They are reported to exercise smartly with the firelock, but have not acquired any order in movement. On the whole, however, a very extraordinary change and considerable progress have been effected.

The Sultan frequently inspects and superintends the drill, and walks about the streets unattended in the daytime.

Should your Grace have already heard these few particulars, I hope you will forgive my troubling you with them.

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\* Field Marshal Sir Alexander Woodford, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.

I sincerely hope your Grace is in good health, and I beg to add my fervent wishes for a continuance of it, wishes anxiously shared by all those around me.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke,  
your Grace's obliged, humble servant,

ALEXANDER WOODFORD.

PROTOCOL.

St. Petersburg, 23rd March  
(4th April), 1826.

His Britannic Majesty having been requested by the Greeks to interpose his good offices in order to obtain their reconciliation with the Ottoman Porte, having in consequence offered his mediation to that Power, and being desirous of concerting the measures of his government upon this subject with his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, and his Imperial Majesty on the other hand being equally animated by the desire of putting an end to the contest of which Greece and the Archipelago are the theatre, by an arrangement which shall be consistent with the principles of religion, justice, and humanity, the undersigned have agreed:—

TREATY FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF  
GREECE.

6th July, 1827.

In the name of the most holy and undivided Trinity.

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, his Majesty the King of France and Navarre, and his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, penetrated with the necessity of putting an end to the sanguinary contest which, by delivering up the Greek Provinces and the Isles of the Archipelago to all the disorders of anarchy, produces daily fresh impediments to the commerce of the European States, and gives occasion to piracies which not only expose the subjects of the high contracting Powers to considerable losses, but besides render necessary burdensome measures of protection and repression; his Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and his Majesty the King of France and Navarre having besides received on the part of the Greeks a pressing request to interpose their mediation with the Ottoman Porte, and being, as well as his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, animated by the desire of stopping the effusion of blood, and of arresting the evils of all kinds which might arise from the continuance of such a state of things, have resolved to unite their efforts, and regulate the operations thereof by a formal Treaty, with the view of re-establishing peace between

the contending parties by means of an arrangement, which is called for as much by humanity as by the interest of the repose of Europe.

Wherefore they have nominated their plenipotentiaries to discuss, agree upon, and sign the said Treaty, viz.: his Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland—the Right Honourable William Viscount Dudley, peer of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, councillor of his Britannic Majesty in his Privy Council, and his principal Secretary of State for the department of Foreign Affairs:

His Majesty the King of France and Navarre—the Prince Jules Count de Polignac, peer of France, Knight of the Orders of his Most Christian Majesty, Major-General of his armies, Grand Cross of the Order of St. Maurice of Sardinia, &c., &c., and his ambassador to his Britannic Majesty:

And his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias—Christopher, Prince de Lieven, General of infantry of the armies of his Imperial Majesty, his aide-de-camp general, Knight of the Orders of Russia, of those of the Black Eagle and Red Eagle of Prussia, of that of the Guelphs of Hanover, Commander of the Grand Cross of the Order of the Sword, and of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, his ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to his Britannic Majesty.

Who, after having communicated their full powers, and found the same in good and due form, agreed upon the following articles:—

Article 1.—That the arrangement to be proposed to the Porte, if that government should accept the proffered mediation, should have for its object to place the Greeks towards the Ottoman Porte in the relation hereafter mentioned.

Article 1. — The contracting Powers will offer to the Ottoman Porte their mediation, with the view of bringing about a reconciliation between it and the Greeks.

This offer of mediation shall be made to this Power immediately

Greece should be a dependency of that empire, and the Greeks should pay to the Porte an annual tribute, the amount of which should be permanently fixed by common consent.

They should be exclusively governed by authorities to be chosen and named by themselves; but in the nomination of which authorities the Porte should have a certain influence.

In this state the Greeks should enjoy a complete liberty of conscience, entire freedom of commerce, and should exclusively conduct their own internal government.

2.—In order to effect a complete separation between individuals of the two nations, and to prevent the collisions which must be the necessary consequences of a contest of such duration, the Greeks should purchase the property of Turks, whether situated on the continent of Greece, or in the islands.

3.—In case the principle of a mediation between Turks and

after the ratification of the Treaty, by means of a collective declaration, signed by the plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts at Constantinople; and there shall be made at the same time to the two contending parties, a demand of an immediate armistice between them, as a preliminary condition indispensable to the opening of any negotiation.

2.—The arrangement to be proposed to the Ottoman Porte shall rest on the following basis:

The Greeks shall hold of the Sultan, as of a superior Lord (suzerain); and, in consequence of this superiority, they shall pay to the Ottoman Empire an annual tribute (relief), the amount of which shall be fixed once for all by a common agreement.

They shall be governed by the authorities whom they shall themselves choose and nominate, but in the nomination of whom the Porte shall have a determinate voice.

To bring about a complete separation between the individuals of the two nations, and to prevent the collisions which are the inevitable consequence of so long a struggle, the Greeks shall enter upon possession of the Turkish property situated either on the Continent or in the Isles of Greece, on the condition of indemnifying the former proprietors, either by the payment of an annual sum to be added to the tribute which is to be paid to the Porte, or by some other transaction of the same nature.

3.—The details of this arrangement, as well as the limits of the

Greeks should have been admitted in consequence of the steps taken with that view by his Britannic Majesty's ambassador at Constantinople, his Imperial Majesty would exert in every case his influence to forward the object of that mediation. The mode in which and the time at which his Imperial Majesty should take part in the ulterior negotiations with the Ottoman Porte which may be the consequence of that mediation, should be determined hereafter, by the common consent of the governments of his Britannic Majesty and his Imperial Majesty.

4.—If the mediation offered by his Britannic Majesty should not have been accepted by the Porte, and whatever may be the nature of the relations between his Imperial Majesty and the Turkish government, his Britannic Majesty and his Imperial Majesty will still consider the terms of the arrangement specified in No. 1 of this Protocol as the basis of any reconciliation to be effected by their intervention, whether in concert or separately, between the Porte and the Greeks, and they will avail themselves of every favourable opportunity to exert their influence with both parties in order to effect this reconciliation on the above-mentioned basis.

5.—That his Britannic Majesty and his Imperial Majesty should reserve to themselves to adopt hereafter the measures necessary for the settlement of the details of the arrangement in question, as well as the limits of the territory and the names of the islands of the Archipelago to which it shall be applicable, and which it shall be proposed to the Porte to comprise under the denomination of Greece.

6.—That moreover his Britannic Majesty and his Imperial Majesty

territory on the Continent, and the designation of the Islands of the Archipelago to which it shall be applicable, shall be settled in a subsequent negotiation between the high Powers and the two contending parties.

4.—The contracting Powers engage to follow up the salutary work of the pacification of Greece, on the basis laid down in the preceding articles, and to furnish without the least delay their representatives at Constantinople with all the instructions which are necessary for the execution of the Treaty now signed.

5.—The contracting Powers will not seek in these arrangements any augmentation of territory, any exclusive influence, any commercial advantage for their subjects, which the subjects of any other nation may not equally obtain.

6.—The arrangements of reconciliation and peace which shall be

will not seek in this arrangement any increase of territory, nor any exclusive influence, nor advantage in commerce, for their subjects which shall not be equally attainable by all other nations.

7.—That his Britannic Majesty and his Imperial Majesty being desirous that their Allies should become parties to the definitive arrangements of which this Protocol contains the outline, will communicate this instrument confidentially to the courts of Vienna, Paris, and Berlin, and will propose to them that they should in concert with the Emperor of Russia guarantee the Treaty by which the reconciliation of Greeks and Turks shall be effected, as his Britannic Majesty cannot guarantee such a Treaty.

WELLINGTON.  
LIEVEN.  
NESSELRODE.

definitively agreed upon between the contending parties, shall be guaranteed by such of the signing Powers as shall judge it useful or possible to contract the obligation.

The mode of the effects of this guarantee shall become the object of subsequent stipulations between the high Powers.

7.—The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the ratification shall be exchanged in two months, or sooner if possible.

In faith whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed it with their arms.

Done at London, July 6th, 1827.

DUDLEY.  
POLIGNAC.  
LIEVEN.

#### ADDITIONAL AND SECRET ARTICLE TO THE TREATY.

In case that the Ottoman Porte does not accept within the space of one month the mediation which shall be proposed, the high contracting parties agree upon the following measures:—

1.—It shall be declared by their representatives at Constantinople to the Porte, that the inconveniences and evils pointed out in the public Treaty, as inseparable from the state of things subsisting in the East for the last six years, and as the termination of which through the means at the disposal of the Sublime Porte appears still remote, impose upon the high contracting parties the necessity of taking immediate measures for an approximation with the Greeks.

It is to be understood that this approximation shall be brought about by establishing commerce with the Greeks, by sending to them for that purpose, and receiving from them, consular agents, so long as there shall exist among them authorities capable of maintaining such relations.

2.—If within the said term of one month, the Porte do not accept the armistice proposed in the first article of the public Treaty, or if the Greeks refuse to execute it, the high contracting Powers shall declare to that one of the two contending parties which shall wish to continue hostilities, or to both, if such become necessary, that the said high contracting Powers intend to exert all the means which circumstances may suggest to their prudence to obtain the immediate effect of the armistice, the execution of



which they desire, by preventing in as far as may be in their power all collision between the contending parties; and in fact, immediately after the aforesaid declaration the high contracting Powers will conjointly employ all their means in the accomplishment of the object thereof, without however taking any part in the hostilities between the two contending parties.

In consequence the high contracting Powers will, immediately after the signature of the present additional and secret article, transmit eventual instructions, conformable to the provisions above set forth, to the admirals commanding their squadrons in the seas of the Levant.

3.—Finally, if contrary to all expectation these measures do not yet suffice to induce the adoption by the Ottoman Porte of the propositions made by the high contracting parties, or if, on the other hand, the Greeks renounce the conditions stipulated in their favour in the Treaty of this day, the high contracting Powers will nevertheless continue to prosecute the work of pacification on the basis agreed upon between them; and in consequence, they authorise from this time forward their representatives in London to discuss and determine the ulterior measures to which it may become necessary to resort.

The present additional secret article shall have the same force and value as if it had been inserted, word for word, in the Treaty of this day. It shall be ratified, and the ratification thereof shall be exchanged, at the same time as those of the said Treaty.

In faith whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed it, and have thereto affixed the seals of their arms.

Done at London this 6th of July in the year of Grace 1827.

DUDLEY.  
POLIGNAC.  
LIEVEN.

[ 737.]

*To Lieut.-Colonel Sir James Colleton, Bart.*

SIR,

London, 10th July, 1827.

I have received your letter of the 1st, and I assure you that I have always fully appreciated your merit in the improvements made in the construction of the pontoons in the service, and your zeal and activity in carrying those improvements into execution.

But I beg leave to remind you that I have never recommended or even concurred in the promotion by brevet of any officer for any service excepting distinguished conduct when opposed to the enemy in the field. I do not mean to say that you do not possess that claim to promotion as well as others; but I cannot now urge that claim without urging similar claims in favour of many others; and I cannot urge the claim on account of your invention of a pontoon at all.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To Lord Maryborough.*

[ 738. ]

MY DEAR WILLIAM,

London, 14th July, 1827.

I cannot express to you how much gratified I was by what you have told me respecting the King's most gracious kindness ; and I assure you that I would with the utmost eagerness avail myself of the opportunity suggested by you to enable me to approach his person ; and I really feel that although not actively employed in his service, there is nothing that could embarrass me in presenting myself before his Majesty.

But I cannot forget his Majesty's high station, that his subjects cannot be allowed to invade his privacy, even under the pretence of inquiring for him, without exposing him to the greatest inconvenience ; and that it is not the practice for those who visit in the neighbourhood of Windsor so to intrude upon the King. Such a step taken by me would be liable to every possible misconception, and I really should not know how to explain it.

I beg you, however, to take an early opportunity of presenting my duty to the King ; and you may with great truth assure him that I should be relieved from a load of anxiety if I were enabled to present myself before him, and that I should attend his commands to do so at any time and from any distance, with the greatest joy and alacrity.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To Lord Maryborough.*

[ 739. ]

MY DEAR WILLIAM,

Stratfield Saye, 19th July, 1827.

Referring to what I wrote to you some days ago, and understanding from you that the King has expressed his surprise that I have never presented myself to him since I quitted office, particularly being in his neighbourhood, I am now going to the Lodge to present my duty to his Majesty.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*Sir Herbert Taylor to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

Horse-Guards, 21st July, 1827.

I am too much flattered by your Grace's kindness and confidence in writing to me on the subject of your visit to Windsor, to delay thanking you for your letter, and I was extremely happy to hear that his Majesty's reception of you and his manner had been so cordial and satisfactory.

Your visit and the circumstance, which appeared to be generally known, of its being by invitation from the King, have excited very general hopes and expectations, and I am certain your Grace will forgive my saying that no one would feel more anxious than I should to be allowed to indulge such, though I own that I have not felt sanguine, and, from what you say, I fear that nothing has passed to justify my hopes of your return to us.

We do want you sadly; we want you were it but to stem the torrent of military reductions with which we are threatened, and to place, or rather to maintain, that question upon the proper footing. I remonstrate to the utmost of my power; but my feeble voice is raised in vain, and I am doomed to be an agent in measures which I deprecate and detest. All I can hope to be able to do is to obtain the adoption of expedients which may lessen the pressure of these measures upon individuals, and their consequent distress. But the fabric which had been raised on such good foundations, and arrangements which were working so well, will be destroyed, or so unhinged and weakened as to render all previous labour almost useless. I am sick of being here under such circumstances.

I have the honour to be, with great regard, my dear Lord Duke,  
your Grace's most obedient and faithful servant,

H. TAYLOR.

*The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Whitehall, 25th July, 1827.

I think there cannot be a doubt that, immediately after you left Windsor the other day, a letter was sent to Mr. Canning, giving him an account of the interview, and assuring him that the visit was entirely voluntary on your part, and quite unexpected by the King. Two persons have been with me this morning. Each of them had happened to see Sturges Bourne. To each he mentioned your visit. To one he said that he—in short, what he said was exactly to the purport of the paragraph in the 'Courier'—to the other he mentioned that he had seen the letter from Windsor which showed that you had come without invitation, merely to pay your respects on the coronation-day, and that you were unexpected by the King.

All this shows how necessary your caution was, and how anxious the adherents of the government are to fasten the visit upon you.

The Lieutenancy of Edinburgh is to be kept open for the Duke of Buccleugh. Whig applications were made for it, but resisted. They say, however, that the Whigs are in the highest spirits.

No successor to Hobhouse is yet appointed, and he is very anxious to be gone. I rather think that the Solicitor-General has no great desire to remain.

Ever, my dear Duke, most faithfully yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

*To Lord Maryborough.*

[ 740. ]

MY DEAR WILLIAM,

Stratfield Saye, 26th July, 1827.

I send you a Memorandum which is the result of my thoughts of last night. A letter received this morning from London convinces me that *the* — male and female, have stated to Mr. Canning that I went to Windsor without receiving any intimation whatever from the King. I believe Mr. Canning subsequently discovered the truth. But he certainly did not know it from the King; and the ministers declare that I went of my own motion!!!

I suspect that this visit, however well intended, will have removed farther than ever my return to the command of the army.

It will not answer anybody's purpose, excepting that of Mr. Canning, that I should return otherwise than as I ought; but the contest will give us all a great deal of trouble, and may occasion much ill blood and mischief.

From what I have above stated you will see that it is not safe for you to be a party in the case at all; and I earnestly entreat you to keep out of it. If you or Lady Maryborough say anything let it be in the principle of this Memorandum.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM.

26th July, 1827.

It is my opinion that Mr. Canning is now endeavouring to prevail upon the King to adopt the new arrangement for the command of the army, which I explained to Lord Maryborough last night.

The adoption of this arrangement will be forced upon him unless I will consent to take the command of the army unconditionally; that is to say, without apology from Mr. Canning.

This I neither can nor will do as long as Mr. Canning is the minister.

It matters not to me in what channel the apology comes provided it is clear and distinct, and so conveyed as that it can be communicated to all mankind.

It is absolutely necessary that it should be as public as the offence has been, and as my return to office would be.

I am quite certain that it is not safe for the King to take any step whatever in this business, unless it be through the channel of his minister.

WELLINGTON.

[ 741. ]

*To Earl Bathurst.*

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST,

London, 30th July, 1827.

After you left Stratfield Saye, Lord Maryborough came over again from Fern Hill, and I judge from what he told me that the alarm which my visit at Windsor had created in London had its influence at Windsor; and that great anxiety was felt lest the detail of what had been said and done should be made public. I think that his Majesty had not communicated to his minister, in the first instance, more than the fact that the visit had been made very unexpectedly on the coronation-day; but the medical adviser communicated the remainder. Upon this the paragraph in the 'Courier' of Saturday was written. The subsequent discussions in the newspapers brought out the paragraph in the 'Times,' of Tuesday, which was written I understand by Brougham.

A letter was shown to Lord Maryborough from Mr. Canning to the King, written upon his knowledge of the visit, urging his Majesty to adopt the arrangement proposed to carry on the duties of the command of the army, as I had not expressed my readiness to accept his Majesty's proposition of the 21st May to recall my resignation.

I have entreated Lord Maryborough to keep himself clear of all further communication of the description of those which have recently taken place, if he should be inclined to retain his office; and I gave him a Memorandum, of which the enclosed is a copy,\* respecting the language he was to hold if anything should be said to him about me. Send me back this paper, as I have no other copy.

I understand that they have conveyed a hint to the King

\* See page 65.

that the Factions are very bad company for him at the Lodge, and that he ought to have the Whigs, &c. His Majesty answered, I will have nobody! I know that something of this kind passed, but this is between ourselves. He has lately had his family and the Duchess of Kent, and Leopold, but nobody else except Clanwilliam.

In other respects there is nothing new. There is a report of the reduction of the army to the amount of 10,000 men, and orders have been given to stop the recruiting. But I am mistaken if these orders do not finish the whole affair, and that the recruiting will be very quietly recommenced before three months pass over our heads.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Cirencester, 30th July, 1827.

I am very much obliged to you for your letter and for the enclosure, which I return.

The desire which the King has shown to conceal from Mr. Canning the various steps which he took to procure the visit from you, and what passed at the interview, gives to the whole a very different complexion from what I gave to it when I thought that it was in some measure brought about, if not by Mr. Canning's advice, at least with his concurrence. It is very possible that his jealousy on the occasion has been excited by his Whig friends, who may have heard of the King's manner of talking of them, and are now endeavouring to force themselves into an invitation to the Lodge, under the pretence of counteracting the bad effect of his having received you.

It is, I think, clear that at present they do not wish you to accept the command, except by recalling your refusal in May last; but I suspect that the report which has reached you of Mr. Canning pressing the completion of another military arrangement, is part of the same system which made Lady Conyngham tell Lady Bathurst, when she saw her immediately after your refusal in May, that the arrangement which the King had suspended in order to see the effect of his letter to you, would be then put into execution. And yet you see nothing was done then.

I am very glad you have written the Memorandum for Lord Maryborough's guidance. In the position in which the King now stands with Mr. Canning in regard to you, it will be very desirable for the present to avoid exposing the King to the demands which it seems will be made upon him on the revealing of any late confidences to you, or any further unauthorized advances for another interview.

The Duchess of Gloucester has been twice at the Lodge since your visit there. At the first visit (the day after yours) the King told her of his having seen you; that he had a long conversation with you; that of course

on some things you did not agree, but that he was delighted at feeling that all was right again with you. At this last visit not a word of anything like politics was talked, but that it appeared as if he did not much like his being to meet his new Secretary of State at Windsor on the Saturday. I do not know what has been the wear and tear of the army during the last six months, or how the recruiting has gone since our Portuguese expedition; but if there be a simultaneous withdrawing of the British and French troops from the Peninsula in autumn, I should imagine that the recruiting may be suspended: and even a small reduction may take place, to bring back the army to what it was when Clinton was sent out. But as for the reduction of ten thousand men it is impossible, and I am quite sure that Lord Anglesey will join with the King in remonstrating against any reduction in the most expensive arm, viz., the cavalry. There will, I suspect, be great exertions made to get the French to evacuate Spain; not only to enable Mr. Canning to boast that he has succeeded in his Portuguese expedition by procuring the evacuation of Spain, but also as the means of conciliating Lord Grey, who laid great stress on the occupation of Spain by France.

Yours ever very sincerely,

BATHURST.

Matters will be made up at the Royal Lodge by inviting Mr. Canning to the King's birthday on the 12th of August, and by not inviting either you or Lord Lansdowne; but probably Lord Carlisle will be asked, as he is an old inmate there.

[ 742. ]

*To the Earl of Aberdeen.*

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

London, 31st July, 1827.

I have not seen you to relate to you the causes and circumstances of my visit to Windsor, which created such an earthquake in London.

Before I left town on the 14th, my brother, Lord Maryborough, had come up to press me to go down to his house near Windsor, in order to avail myself of the opportunity of being there to go over and pay my respects to his Majesty. The King had desired him to do so. However, I wrote to decline to act according to his suggestion, as I could not presume to approach his Majesty excepting in consequence of his commands, even under pretence of inquiring after his health. Lord Maryborough afterwards came over to Stratfield Saye to suggest other schemes, all of which I declined to adopt, and at last he told me that he was desired by the King to say that his Majesty was surprised that, not having gone to take leave of him when I resigned my office, I declined to go to pay my respects, particularly being in his neighbourhood. I then determined

that I would go; and I wrote to Lord Maryborough the following morning that I was just about to set out to pay my respects to his Majesty in consequence of the communication which I had received through him. It thus follows that it was as true that I was not invited nor expected, as it is true respecting two thieves, one of whom holds the stolen articles, the other having stolen them, that the plea is good that the first did not steal them and that the second has not got them in his possession.

His Majesty was very kind and gracious in his conversation with me, which lasted I think above three hours. He went over the whole story of the change of the ministry in his own way, in answer to which I told him that I thought I recollected some circumstances as having occurred in a manner different from that in which his Majesty had stated that they had occurred, and of others I had no knowledge; and that I recollected others which his Majesty had not mentioned, but that upon the whole I thought it best not to enter upon that discussion.

In respect to the command of the army, I explained in detail to his Majesty the principle on which I had acted, and that it was impossible for me to return to the command, after all that had passed, till Mr. Canning should make reparation for his offensive letter. The whole conversation was in perfect good humour, and we parted the best friends possible.

This interview proved to me that I had not been mistaken when I judged in April that his Majesty was determined at all hazards that Mr. Canning should be his minister; and that the influence still exists in at least as strong a degree as ever. The *earthquake* which the visit occasioned in London, and the misrepresentations upon the subject of it, show the importance attached to any intercourse between his Majesty and myself, and that I viewed that matter correctly as well as the other. In other respects the visit has done no good.

You may show this letter to Lady Aberdeen, with my best respects, and

believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[ 743. ]

*To Earl Bathurst.*

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST,

1st August, 1827.

My opinion respecting the King's conduct is this. He was not aware that my visit to Windsor would occasion an *earthquake* in London; and he wished to see me for several reasons; such as to satisfy Lady Conyngham and his family, and possibly to have a resource in case of an evil day; and likewise, if he could, to *coax* me into taking the command back again without requiring any concession from Mr. Canning, and of course giving him all the advantages which would result from the arrangement so made.

But when he found the last failed, he misrepresented to Mr. Canning the mode in which I had been prevailed upon to visit him at the Lodge.

The consequences, however, of that visit will prevent him from seeking a repetition of it, and from inviting me to the Lodge; and the only advantage that will have been derived from the visit is to show me exactly how all the parties stand towards each other.

Lord Maryborough positively saw part of a letter from Mr. Canning to the King in which he laments that I did not manifest a readiness to accept his Majesty's offer of May last; and he referred to some other arrangement, which Lady Conyngham as usual said was all ready for signature.

Believe me, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

*Viscount Palmerston to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Stanhope Street, 1st August, 1827.

Taylor told me to-day that you were good enough to say that if you had leisure you would put in writing such observations as might occur to you upon the papers which I desired him to show you upon the subject of the proposed reductions in the army. I need not say how much value would attach to your opinions on this matter, and how much obliged to you I should feel if you would take the trouble of giving them to me: and as the subject cannot be considered by the government till next week, if you should have a leisure half-hour before the end of this week it would be quite time enough.

My dear Duke, yours very sincerely,

PALMERSTON.

*Sir Herbert Taylor to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

Horse-Guards, 4th August, 1827.

I have the honour to send your Grace the letter to Lord Goderich, in which you may possibly find some useful details; also a short pamphlet which I published in 1822, and which contains a comparative statement of our force in 1792 and 1821, and some marginal notes of subsequent date showing the alterations and additions in 1825. There are also some observations upon the question of reliefs.

And I have added a comparative statement of the force on foreign stations in 1792 and 1827, with the detail of battalions and companies in the latter year in a separate sheet. I hope your Grace will find these documents clear. I have not noticed the Staff corps anywhere, as it is dispersed by companies and small detachments, forms a very immaterial part of the force anywhere, and as the introduction of it would merely confuse the general return.

I have the honour to be, with great regard, my dear Lord Duke,  
your Grace's most obedient and faithful servant,

H. TAYLOR.

[ENCLOSURE.]

1827.

*Colonies and Foreign Stations, exclusive of India.*

Gibraltar .. .. .	5 Battalions, at 516 each .. ..	2,580
Leeward Islands .. .. .	8 Battalions, at 516 each	4,128
	1 West India regiment	647
		<hr/> 4,775*
Jamaica .. .. .	5 Battalions, at 516 each .. ..	2,580*
Bahamas .. .. .	} 2nd West India regiment ..	1,000
Honduras .. .. .		
Canada .. .. .	5 Battalions, at 516 each .. ..	2,580
Nova Scotia .. .. .	4 Battalions, at 516 each .. ..	2,064
Newfoundland .. .. .	3 Veteran companies .. ..	300
Bermuda .. .. .	1 Battalion .. .. .	516
New South Wales .. .. .	2 Battalions, at 516 each	1,032
	3 Veteran companies ..	160
		<hr/> 1,192
Ionian Islands .. .. .	6 Battalions, at 516 each .. ..	3,096*
Malta .. .. .	3 Battalions, at 516 each	1,548
	Maltese Fencibles .. ..	462
		<hr/> 2,010
Sierra Leone and Dependencies ..	1 Battalion .. .. .	1,000
Cape of Good Hope .. .. .	3 Battalions, at 516 each	1,548
	Cape Corps, 3 companies	234
		<hr/> 1,782*
Mauritius .. .. .	3 Battalions, at 516 each .. ..	1,548*
Ceylon .. .. .	4 Battalions, at 516 each	2,064
	1 Ceylon Corps .. ..	1,600
		<hr/> 3,664*
	Total .. .. .	<hr/> <hr/> 30,687

\* One battalion proposed to be withdrawn.

*Remarks.*

The garrison of Bermuda has been increased, on account of the public works carrying on there.

The force in New South Wales had generally consisted of 2½ battalions, 1 battalion being on passage, as escorts to convicts, and it being understood that no relief shall go from New South Wales to India until half of that battalion should have arrived; but the battalion which had been ordered to New South Wales was diverted to Portugal, and General Darling has detained half of the Buffs, which ought to have gone to India. In fact, there ought to be constantly 3 battalions in New South Wales besides the 3 companies of Veterans which are for police duties.

*The Abstract of Force on Foreign Stations (exclusive of India).*

49 British battalions .. .. .	} On the British Establishment.
2 West India regiments .. .. .	
6 Companies Veterans .. .. .	
1 Ceylon regiment (16 companies)	} Colonial Establishments.
1 Cape Corps (3 companies) .. .. .	
1 Maltese Corps (7 companies) .. .. .	

Of the 49 British battalions, 6 proposed to be withdrawn.

*Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR ARTHUR,

Vienna, 6th August, 1827.

I have received your letter of the 10th of July, and have communicated its enclosures to Prince Metternich, who has shown them to the Emperor. His Imperial Majesty expressed to me yesterday, in the presence of Lord Hertford, how much he was gratified at this mark of your confidence in him, and how much he admired and approved your conduct upon a late occasion. Nothing could be more cordial than the sentiments which the Emperor expressed towards you, and I must say that the same feeling is general throughout his government.

Your letter is the only one I have received upon the subject of the late changes. Canning has, as usual, overshot his mark. He has sacrificed, without scruple, the King's government to his own personal objects; but I cannot believe that it could have been his intention to establish a *Radical* government in its room. I should think that he must bitterly repent of what he has done, for I cannot conceive a more irksome situation than his must now be.

It seems settled that Lord Dudley is to keep the Foreign Office. I suppose that Canning would like to have this situation to dispose of; he has, however, never hinted such a wish, nor has he, indeed, written me a line since he quitted the Foreign Office. It is a remarkable circumstance that I have now resided here more than four years, during which period much important business has passed through my hands, and yet Canning has never once signified his approbation of my conduct; on the contrary, he appears to have studiously avoided any expression by which I could infer that he was satisfied with my services. Nevertheless I think I have more than once prevented a rupture between the two governments—at least a cessation of diplomatic intercourse excepting through the channel of *chargés-d'affaires*. His conduct to me is the more remarkable, as I know he has been lavish of his praises to other persons who certainly did not deserve better than myself. I am not rich enough, however, to give up my situation

from pique, and I shall retain my situation as long as it suits my convenience, or until he affords me some more clear manifestation of his wishes.

Lord Hertford was very well received by the Emperor and Empress, and particularly so by Metternich.

Ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

Lady Conyngham wrote to Lady Georgiana lamenting most deeply your separation from the King, and saying how unhappy it made him, as he considered you more as a brother than a subject, and how anxious she was that it should be made up again.

Lady G. and Charlotte desire their kindest love to you.

What is to become of Wellesley?

H. W.

*Sir Henry Hardinge \* to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

London, 8th August, 1827.

Lord Lansdowne has gone to Windsor to report officially Mr. Canning's death.† Sir James M'Donald, who had just left him, told my informant that he thought it very likely your Grace would be immediately sent for.

This impression is general amongst the Whig party. I met Calcraft, who asked me if it were true that you had gone to Windsor yesterday. I said I had been out of town all yesterday, but understood you had gone to Stratfield Saye. He observed, "The Duke will be sent for; but he must give up the army." My reply was, that any such arrangement would be a great personal sacrifice, and as a military man I should regret it.

C. "Let the sacrifice be what it may, it must be done. You must have a mixed government, if you want strength and quietness. The *late* government broke up the Tory party. The difficulties of forming a strong government out of the old materials are insuperable. There is equal difficulty in Lord Lansdowne or Lord Grey acting under Mr. Peel; they can under the Duke. You cannot stand by yourselves—the only outlet for the difficulty is to have the Duke premier."

H. "You take it for granted, then, that the Duke must be sent for to form an administration?"

C. "I see no other mode; and indeed till I saw you I understood he had been sent for."

The conversation ended by my saying I should personally regret any arrangement which took you away from your old military friends; and here the conversation dropped.

When I saw Sir Herbert Taylor this morning he said the reports were general amongst all parties that your Grace had been sent for. His politics were, that if Lord Grey could overcome the difficulty of the Catholic question and act with you, the new government, by gaining over the aristocratic Whigs, would render the Radical portion which had lately joined with Canning too contemptible to be dangerous, and that Lord Grey understood the foreign affairs of the country better than any of the Whigs. He then said that the difficulty, as it regarded Mr. Peel, he thought overrated, for he *really believed Mr. Peel would rather be out of office than in!* Not concurring in this opinion, he took up the same ground as Calcraft.

\* The late Field Marshal Viscount Hardinge, G.C.B.

† Mr. Canning died on Wednesday morning, the 8th August, 1827.

Brougham was sent for on Sunday night. It is said he has arrived in town; but I have not ascertained it.

In the Tunbridge market yesterday there was anything but an expression of regret at the prospect of the late administration being upset. The farmers in this part of Kent are composed of small independent *owners* of land, of a very respectable description.

I am, &c.,

H. HARDINGE.

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*The Earl of Westmorland to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

DEAR DUKE,

8th August, 1827.

The news of last night, which I rather credit, was that Lord Goderich was appointed minister. There were talks of Herries being Chancellor of the Exchequer, of Herries exchanging with Grant from the Treasury to the Board of Trade, and of Grant being to lead the House of Commons.

It would seem these can be but temporary arrangements. I consider Lord Goderich has to negotiate with six Cabinet offices: two Secretaries of State, Chancellor of Exchequer, President of Council, Ireland, or Ordnance and Commander-in-Chief. As the asperity respecting Canning may not operate so strongly against him, on the other side the fear of him will not bring so many supporters; still he may go on for a time. They say the Whigs are not pleased; but they are in Cabinet resolved to stick by one another, with a desire of Lords Dudley and Harrowby to quit, when convenient to the arrangements. Georgiana has not yet gone to Osterley; I hope she will go on Monday. I expect her doctor, Maton, on Tuesday, so I shall probably not reach Bankes's before Wednesday morning, where I hope we shall meet. I think you must soon hear something from some of the parties.

Yours sincerely,

WESTMORLAND.

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*Sir Colin Campbell to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Thursday evening, 9th August, 1827, 6 o'clock.

I venture to write you the news of the day.

Lord Goderich is to be the Premier, and the other members of the government are offered to retain their places; but I hear that Lord Harrowby has declared that he wishes to retire, as has Lord Dudley and Ward. Their difficulty appears to be, who is to lead in the House of Commons? They say Mr. Huskisson or Charles Grant; but the Whig party appear to wish Brougham. Herries is to be offered the Chancellorship of the Exchequer.

Their great anxiety is to know whether your Grace will accept the command of the army and the ordnance: they appear to have fears that you will not accept the latter and support the administration; but they think that you cannot well refuse the former, and all parties desire to see you there.

I went to Lord Grantham to call upon my friend Arthur Cole, who has just arrived from India, where I heard what I have before stated, and since confirmed by Mr. Calcraft, who further stated that Lord Lansdowne was willing to serve under Lord Goderich.

Believe me your Grace's devoted servant,

C. CAMPBELL.

*Sir Henry Hardinge to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

London, 9th August, 1827.

Amidst various speculations, all parties agree that the cause of the Whigs is hopeless. They seem to admit they have no chance. After Lord Lansdowne's return yesterday from Windsor it is said they determined to do nothing, but wait quietly at their posts.

Croker has only *one* mode of salvation—your Grace at the head of the government. His expressions of admiration and respect were this morning unbounded. His first advice to Mr. Canning and his last had been to secure, if not your Grace's co-operation, at any rate your acceptance of the army, for that your opposition would be more formidable than that of the whole party put together; that when he mentioned this to Canning about a fortnight ago, after your Windsor visit, Canning was very peevish, and he thought he disliked his freedom.

Croker remarked that in the Commons some of the Whig talkers ought to be obtained; that Calcraft and Mackintosh could be had at the *cheapest* rate; that Tierney's Cabinet situation was a difficulty, but that he thought Lord Lansdowne and his two or three friends would remain, and he should consider him more manageable than Lord Grey, exclusive of the King's dislike of the latter so far back as when they crossed in each other's way with the Duchess of Devonshire; that the *in* Tories would never serve under a Whig leader, and that both parties must now be mixed, whatever might be the extent or quality of the mixture. He said the state of foreign affairs was pressing, and that this morning despatches had again been received regarding Portugal which required decision, and which would *again* be deferred.

Calcraft's language is, Forget the past—we must all put our shoulders to the wheel, and whichever party uses oil instead of vinegar will succeed.

I saw Herries at his house in George Street. He is looking very ill. In any case he says he must for the present resign, as he is completely done up and must go abroad. He said he did not know until lately the extent of the intrigue and dirty work that had been going on—that it was carefully kept from him, but that his resignation had been accepted three weeks ago. Huskisson, he observed, ought to be retained as most important; he thinks he will for the present decline on the score of health, but support as a looker-on. When he took leave of Huskisson, the latter was very uncomfortable at the state of Greece and Portugal, and thought Canning did not see his way; he urged Herries to lose no opportunity which might occur with Canning of convincing him of the necessity of having you back in command of the army, but that both at that moment felt you could then not come back with honour. Herries spoke to Canning, who remarked Huskisson was more than usually nervous when ill. On Thursday last Canning transacted business in bed, and, Herries says, got through it well, but complained of great pain. He advocates oblivion of the past, but rather as it regards Tories *in*, and did not say anything distinct as to the policy of a mixture of Whigs. His secretary being in the room the conversation was not very free. Campbell, the agent, who was at a meeting of nearly fifteen hundred in the city, bankers, merchants, &c., told me the sense of Mr. Canning's political loss, so far from being felt as a calamity, was by the large majority considered the reverse.

The speculations and reports are very general that your Grace has been sent for this morning, after the King saw Lord Goderich. The Whigs now admit that they entered office compromising the Catholic question during the present King's life. This will considerably relieve the difficulty of that question. Those of that party now in are reported to be anxious to remain under your Grace; but no other Tory-Protestant leader.

The confused state of the two great political parties, since the schism in April last, seems to be universally admitted, and the remedy as universally applied of a mixture of both.

I merely give these rumours as the *on-dits* of the streets and coffee-houses.

I am your Grace's devoted servant,

H. HARDINGE.

Brougham it is said is very unwell.

[ 744. ]

*To Earl Bathurst.*

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST,      Stratfield Saye, 10th August, 1827.

I was in London during Mr. Canning's illness till Tuesday; but I did not write to you, as I was unwell myself and confined to my home; and I knew nothing excepting what was in the newspapers. He died on Wednesday morning, and Lord Lansdowne went down to the King to inform him of the event. He could not have been at the Lodge a quarter of an hour. The King had sent for Lord Goderich and Sturges Bourne, who arrived in the afternoon; and must have passed Lord Lansdowne on the road on his return.

I think they mean to endeavour to keep the government together on its existing basis; Lord Goderich to be at the head of it. The Whigs will remain with them. The nature of Lord Lansdowne's reception at Windsor has shown them that they have not yet made much way with the King. Lord Harrowby has expressed his desire to retire; and so has Lord Dudley. They have thus four great Cabinet offices at their disposal. The person from whom I have received this information this morning has, I think, the means of being informed. Lord Lyndhurst was to go to the King either yesterday or this day.

I will let you know if I should hear anything more, or anything from authority.

I go to Bankes's on Monday; and I will be at Cirencester on Friday if they will let me go, or on Saturday at all events.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

I hear that Dr. Farr says that it was Canning's temper that killed him.

*Sir Henry Hardinge to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

11th August, 1827.

I have received your Grace's note of the 10th.

Lord Goderich has actually accepted the office of First Lord of the Treasury, and the warrant for *his future retirement* of 3000*l.* a year is also making out. This may be, and is, I believe, the usual course; but it is a prophetic symptom of a short tenure. He is quite delighted and in high spirits!! So I hear from Holmes, as I have of course not seen him.

They are proceeding to fill up the deficient offices from *within* themselves—no application to Whigs or ex-Tories. The terms are stated to be that the secession of any *one member* of the Cabinet is to break up the *whole* administration, unless the vacancy be supplied by unanimous consent. This appears too childish; but I mention it, as the whole arrangement seems equally farcical.

Holmes will send your Grace the list of the proposed government, the chief alterations being—Palmerston, Board of Trade; Huskisson, Chancellor of the Exchequer and leader in the Commons; Grant, Secretary-at-War; Robert Grant his brother, and young Stanley\* to be brought in.

Herries has positively declined to have anything to say to it; and whilst Lord Goderich was with him ordered his carriage to return to Kent, and took leave of Lord Goderich.

Huskisson will not, it is said, act under any government, and obtained his warrant for 3000*l.* a year the day before he embarked; but laying aside all these details, I hear from Holmes, who of course has it from Lord Lyndhurst, that when he saw the King he at once stated his opinion that no government could efficiently go on without your Grace and Peel as the basis—your Grace to regulate the whole, Peel to lead the Commons. In reply to advice immediately to send for your Grace, the King said you would be, as you always had been, of the greatest comfort to him at this moment; but that after what had so freshly happened, almost with the wax of the present ministers' appointments soft, he could not at once turn round upon those who had adhered to Canning and treat them as if they were Canning's *lacqueys*. He also talked of his own personal dignity, and that the simulacra of an effort should be made, which, when it had been made, would enable him to take his course with you with greater satisfaction.

The Chancellor is stated by Holmes to be so impressed with the necessity of breaking up the present miserable concern, by hastening the catastrophe, that he wishes to resign *immediately*. I should imagine he must have a *direct* communication with the King before he takes any such step. However Holmes says Lord Lyndhurst consulted him as to the best means of having *to-day* a meeting with Lord Eldon, so as to avoid publicity. Perhaps he, Lord Lyndhurst, may wish to ascertain, before he takes any decisive step, the feeling of the ex-Chancellor towards his *bags*; but Lord Lyndhurst looks forward to his, Lord Eldon, being satisfied as President of the Council, and that his experience and support would place Lord Lyndhurst at his ease in the Lords. I ought here to observe that Mr. Peel, to a friend of mine the

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\* The late Earl of Derby, K.G.



day before yesterday, said he apprehended the old Chancellor looked forward to the Seals.

As to Lord Harrowby, the Sunday before Canning's death he wrote a letter to be laid before the King, but not to be opened till after the event, that in any arrangements resulting from Canning's death, he would on no account retain office. His resignation has been accepted, and a very civil letter from the King been received.

The King expressed himself to Lord Lyndhurst very coldly regarding Mr. Peel, at the same time satisfied of the necessity of his leading in the Commons.

Lords Westmorland and Bathurst are parties stated to require management, and Holmes urged me to give an opinion regarding Lord Westmorland, as you are supposed to be the only person who will support him. I gave no opinion. He said he conceived promotion to Lord Burghersh would satisfy him.

Mr. Peel told Lord Camden that, as an old friend of Mr. Pitt's and a minister who had in good and bad weather served in the Tory government, the government never could have got rid of him (Lord Westmorland), although his strange uncouth manner threw a ridicule upon the Cabinet, which those who know Lord Westmorland's real good sense were aware he did not deserve. How far it might *in honour* be advisable to admit or decline his claim he could not take upon him to decide, but he considered it most advisable to manage his remaining out; but that with regard to Lord Melville, so high was his respect for him, and above all for the manner with which he had conducted himself on your and his going out, that he never would listen to any propositions which did not satisfactorily gratify all Lord Melville's wishes; and Lord Camden thought Mr. Peel admitted he could serve under Lord Melville as Premier.

Of Lord Bathurst Mr. Peel gave no opinion to Lord Camden; but the latter is very intimate with Lord Bathurst, and he said he thought he would not very much desire to return, as Mr. Hay had told him some time ago Lord Bathurst wished to retire.

Holmes asked if I thought Mr. Arbuthnot would accept the Treasurership of the Navy, instead of the Woods and Forests. This points to his friend Lord Lowther. I said I had never heard Mr. Arbuthnot's opinion; but that I understood this situation, or the *Mint*, went to assist the salary of the President of the Board of Trade. Wallace is in town, and defers his departure till things assume a more confirmed appearance. *Wetherell*, who is one of the bad bargains of the former administrations, Lord Lyndhurst thinks may be easily satisfied, Alexander being ready to retire when desired.

Those I meet say, of course, your Grace will now accept the command of the army. To those of our friends deserving of an answer, I have said that I know nothing, but am confident you will take no step tending to support an administration which professes to act on a total exclusion of those who seceded with you from them three months ago. The general impression is that you will accept the army, and our political friends are in dismay—the army in spirits.

Lord Elliot received a letter from his father, recommending him to resign if another Whig appointment was made.

However, the opinion is very general with the framers of Cabinets that Lord Grey will, if offered, accept the Foreign Office. Holmes was anxious to ascertain whether your Grace and Lord Grey had ever talked, since your secession, on the formation of a future administration. I answered, decidedly not, that both were free. His observation was, Lord Lyndhurst thought it was so. May I beg your Grace to say to what address I shall send any future communications, as I hear you are to be at Mr. Bankes's on the 14th. Holmes asked if I thought you would write to compliment the King on his birthday. I answered distinctly *not*. Lord Anglesey was with the King yesterday. He takes the same view, I *hear*, as that I have through Holmes attributed to Lord Lyndhurst.

Ever your Grace's devoted servant,

H. HARDINGE.

*Sir Henry Hardinge to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

32, Grosvenor Place, 11th August, 1827.

Your Grace's view at a distance was, at the hour it was written, borne out by the reports which were afloat in town yesterday evening, after I had closed my letter, that Lord Goderich was appointed First Lord of the Treasury, which report came from Lady Grantham.

On the other hand, Lord Goderich had returned from the King on Wednesday. Herries saw him at eleven yesterday (Thursday), and at three, when I saw Herries, he knew nothing of it—merely that things for the moment were to go on quietly. Even this day, at two, Lord Farnborough, who has seen Herries, says the latter knows nothing of it, although he thinks it not unlikely eventually. Lord Anglesey yesterday evening said nothing was settled.

Mr. Peel, whom I saw at one o'clock, says he can trace no authority for the report excepting through Lady Grantham.

Croker had heard the same report, but from no other authority.

Sir James M'Donald (Lord Lansdowne's member) told me he doubted whether the government could now go on; for although Lord Lansdowne had no objection to men, provided the same principles were to be acted upon, he saw the leaning was to a decided Tory administration. The fact is, when Lord Lansdowne went and saw the King first, no communication of his intentions was made. Lord Goderich being sent for the same day, and the Lord Chancellor yesterday, the Tory preponderance became evident to the Whigs; and their game now appears to be to promise support to Lord Goderich—to exclude or impede any junction with their old friends.

In other respects the reports continue as I stated them to be yesterday, that the wisest course the King could take was to send for and consult with your Grace. Lords W. Bentinck, Rosslyn, and others, state this very freely and generally.

Lord Falmouth, whom I met, is in alarm lest you should *now* consent to resume the command of the army.

Sturges Bourne went to the King on the provision that could best be made for Canning's family, which is in bad circumstances.

Croker told me this morning that the King's confidence in Canning was to an extent almost unlimited; that the Sunday week before his death, Warrender, in talking of the effects of your visit to Windsor, was answered by Canning, showing him a letter from the King, in terms which proved that the King had taken him up as the *protector* of his *dignity*, and that by gradual approximation and intercourse with Brougham he would have persuaded the King to give Brougham the first vacant law situation; although Canning, with Croker and Herries, talked of Brougham as if on the verge of an explosion with him.

Brougham remains out of town, but not ill.

I mention this talk as freely as I hear it in circulation. The speculations are too various to be reconciled with common sense.

Croker repeated his conviction that you ought to form the new government, and that for your fame he should delight to hear you were charged with the task, and having accomplished it, to see you retiring from the Premiership into your natural professional position of Army and Ordnance, regulating the machine by the general respect of all, but showing an example of personal forbearance which would, if possible, heighten your reputation, by proving at a period when public men were accused of losing sight of principle for place, that, however worthy for all posts, you adhered to that with which, in the opinion of all men, you were so gloriously identified.

With his usual confidence his government was as follows:— Lord Goderich, First Lord of the Treasury; Peel, Chancellor of the Exchequer, leader in the Commons; Lord Lansdowne or Lord Melville, Home Department, or Colonies, as could best be managed; Lord Grey, Foreign Office and leader in the Lords, as in the Duke of Portland's administration, the Premier need not be leader, &c.; and that Peel, being leader in the Commons, and not as Secretary for the Home Department signing Mr. Canning's dispensation of patronage, could have no solid objection to act under a Catholic Premier, &c.

I apologise for this *talk* again; but excuse it as the news of the day. My own impression is that nothing is settled or likely to be so for some days, further than directing Lord Goderich to take charge of the current business of the day till more permanent plans can be matured. That the King is desirous of upholding what he conceives or pretends to be his own personal dignity in not flying to those men whom he so lately stigmatised as deserters and conspirators. That he cannot, in common decency, treat the present ministers so ill as at once to place them at the disposal of the seceders. That he is pledged to them (the Tory, not the Whig part), and as both his Majesty and his ministers must obviously prefer honourable terms to an unconditional surrender, that they will make a show of going on as they are, intending to try an individual recruiting, beginning with your Grace as Commander-in-Chief.

Lords Harrowby, Dudley and Ward, and the Duke of Portland, it is said, are ready to resign, when convenient to the King's service. But the impression is general that any further junction with the Whigs is completely suspended.

Mr. Peel goes down to Maresfield to-morrow. He asked if you were at Fern Hill or Stratfield Saye. I said the latter, and he answered he was glad of it.

Croker talked of *retiring*, having earned his pension of 1500*l.* a year.

I propose going out of town on Monday evening. In the mean time I shall venture to give your Grace the rumours of the day.

Your devoted servant,

H. HARDINGE.

*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Cirencester, 12th August, 1827.

We shall be delighted to see you on Friday. We have written to Lord Clanwilliam (who intends coming here) to fix him for that time, and if you see Lord Ashley in Dorsetshire, pray bring him with you.

The appointment of Lord Goderich shows that the King will not put himself entirely in the hands of the Whigs; but I have some reason for believing that his intentions do not go beyond that. It will be Lord Goderich's policy, and I believe his inclination, to bring you back to the command of the army, and your acceptance now will not be subject to all the objections to which it would have been liable before the late event. Should the proposition go beyond the simple offer of the command, the question will become more complicated.

I believe Lord Goderich to be as amiable and as honourable a man as the King could have selected; but I doubt whether he be equal to the task imposed upon him. He is too frank to gain an influence over the King, and too good-humoured to control his colleagues, who will be each independent of him in their respective departments. It is, therefore, very material how those which are vacant are to be filled up. I suspect that the Whigs in submitting to Lord Goderich's appointment, have insisted on none but Whigs being introduced. They would break up the government, if that were attempted; and although I foresee little good in Lord Lansdowne having the uncontrolled authority in the Home Office, and still less in Lord Holland directing our foreign relations, I should be sorry to see an entire change, by the general resignation of the Whigs. It would be a very inauspicious moment for a new ministry to begin their career, as they would become responsible for the result of measures too much in progress to correct. Our influence in Portugal is fast on the decline, and it becomes equally difficult to continue our troops there or to withdraw them. We cannot recall our stipulations with Russia and France, and it seems therefore desirable that this crusade should be executed by those who have advised it. A Russian fleet decidedly superior to ours, and a French fleet at least equal to ours, in the Mediterranean will severely alter our political position in those seas in which hitherto we have maintained undisputed ascendancy; but our loss of influence would be attributed to the mismanagement of the new administration, not to the measures of their predecessors.

Why should not Lord Goderich insist on his having his own foreign secretary of state in the person of Sir Charles Stuart?

Yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

Lord Harrowby, on hearing of Mr. Canning's hopeless state, on Monday  
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prepared a letter of resignation to the King, and sent it off on Wednesday, the moment he heard of Mr. Canning's death, before any question could arise as to a successor. He received a gracious acceptance of his resignation.

*Sir Herbert Taylor to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

Windsor, 12th August, 1827.

Your Grace has invariably treated me with such friendship and confidence that I flatter myself you will forgive my taking the liberty of appealing to you upon a question which concerns me personally, for your advice and for the sanction and support of your opinion, if I should be driven to the necessity of referring it to you, with your permission.

I believe I mentioned to your Grace that Lord Dalhousie had written to me respecting the chief command in India, which will become vacant in December, 1828. I gave his letter to Lord Palmerston, to whom I suggested a communication on the subject with Mr. Wynn and with Lord Goderich, and I mentioned it to Mr. Hay, who gave me to understand that Lord Goderich was well inclined to the nomination of Lord Dalhousie. I also found in conversing with Lord William Bentinck that this appointment would be agreeable to him.

A few days after, Lord Palmerston told me that Mr. Wynn had objected to Lord Dalhousie on various grounds, and had stated that he would again endeavour to prevail upon Lord Hill to accept the command, and, that failing, that I had occurred to him. I observed at once that nothing could be more desirable than Lord Hill's appointment, but that however I might be flattered by being thought of for so important and distinguished a command, it was impossible that I should not feel that such an appointment would be objectionable in almost every point of view. That I was the youngest Lieutenant-General but one in the service; that circumstances had deprived me of the opportunities of gaining credit or experience in the field, as had those above and below me; that many of the former were candidates for the command in India, and had desired me to submit their claims; and that two Lieutenant-Generals, seniors to me, were actually serving at Madras and Bombay, one of whom, Sir G. Walker, had applied for removal to Bengal, and both were officers of distinguished service. That although I had been so fortunate as to give satisfaction in the situations which I had filled, something more than official habits and experience was required to ensure confidence and deference in a high command; but that admitting even that I possessed the necessary qualifications (which it must be obvious to the army I did not) the appointment of a very junior officer to that which was so much an object of ambition, could not be otherwise than very grating to the feelings of the elder officers, and must place me in a very invidious situation towards them all, and towards the army in general, and deprive me of that cordial and friendly disposition on the part of my profession and the individuals with whom I should have to associate through life, which I valued much more highly than any object of ambition and emolument. That if I were appointed Commander-in-Chief in India, Sir G. Walker and Sir Thomas Bradford must be recalled or I must have superior local rank, and that either expedient was extremely objectionable.

The first would be highly unjust to the individuals concerned, the latter would be contrary to the principles of the service.

Upon all these grounds I begged Lord Palmerston would prevail upon Mr. Wynn to drop his intention of proposing the command to me.

Lord Palmerston appeared to concur with me, and I heard nothing more on the subject until Friday, when he told me he had spoken to Mr. Wynn, who, however, was not disposed to *let me off*, and did not consider the objections I urged sufficient to prevent the government from employing the individual they thought fit, provided that individual could be brought to consider that his objections on the score of feeling were removed by the responsibility under which the appointment was proposed and made; and that Mr. Wynn considered that the situations which I had held and the manner in which I had been employed would justify the government to the army and to the public, in selecting me for the situation in question.

I repeated my former objections, and placed them in as strong a point of view as I could, but I found Lord Palmerston very much inclined to concur with Mr. Wynn, and I therefore observed that it was difficult for persons not of the profession to enter into my feelings or into the view I took of the question, and if Mr. Wynn should press it upon me I hoped he would allow me to submit the case to your Grace, and to abide by your decision; that for family and other reasons (independently of those I had stated) I should certainly prefer the government of the Cape, but that I wished to exclude these altogether from consideration.

I hope your Grace will not think that I have presumed too far in proposing that the question should be left to your decision, and I shall feel very grateful to you if you will permit me to address you *briefly* with that view in case Mr. Wynn should persist in his intention. I am very sorry to have troubled you with this long letter, but I could not bring what I had to say within narrower compass.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest regard, my dear Lord Duke,  
your Grace's most obliged and faithful servant,

H. TAYLOR.

I conclude that Lord Hill has again declined, but I apprehend that all the following Lieutenant-Generals could accept the command, and those marked \* are known to me to be candidates.

Lord Dalhousie\*; Sir Lowry Cole; Sir William Clinton; Sir Thomas Hislop\*; Sir Charles Colville\*; Sir Henry Fane; Sir John Oswald; Sir George Walker\*; Sir James Kempt; Sir Edward Barnes\*; Sir John Byng; Lord Edward Somerset; Sir Thomas Bradford.

*The Marquess of Londonderry to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Drakelow, 12th August, 1827.

I have not written sooner for fear of boring you with all the speculations that arise in my mind, as well as in that of others, as to the present aspect of public affairs; but if I am to believe the newspapers, Lord Goderich is appointed Premier. This is a plain indication that the sore feelings of the

King towards his late servants have not subsided, and that his Majesty is determined to risk pursuing the course which Mr. Canning has probably pointed out with a diminished talent in the leader of the administration, and with the rankling feeling which the Whig part of it cannot fail of imbibing at seeing Lord Goderich preferred to a chief of their own. The singular feature here appears to be that the Canningite party in the government neither has the talent nor the numerical strength. All this belongs to Lansdowne's phalanx, and yet Goderich is to wield all the power. I hardly think the tail of the Whigs will long submit to these terms; but if they do, I am not sure whether Goderich's nomination will not detach more from the out party than if Canning had not been taken off.

In the first place, Goderich is free from the deep charges of intrigue which belonged to the other; in the second, he has a cordial frank demeanour towards others which makes him popular, and if he is still allowed by his colleagues to flourish with Lord Liverpool's principles, many country gentlemen and others who like to hang on with every government will say there are no grounds to oppose him.

I was long since told by *Littleton*, that if Canning's health failed, Robinson would succeed him, and I have no doubt this groundwork was laid by Canning's partisans. It is a dexterous attempt to uphold the drama that has been acting, while the King is impressed with the belief that he sustains his own dignity, and that his Majesty and *Knighon* will have in Goderich a more pliable instrument than even with Canning. Should Lansdowne and his friends, for the sake of retaining office, submit to the degradation of being apparently governed by Goderich's *squad*, the King may meet Parliament replacing only two or three in the administration.

The curious predicament in which the country is placed by the shabby conduct of Lord Goderich and the Tory deserters, appears to be that we are divided into four distinct parties:

Lord Goderich's, or Canningite party, or the tail of the Tories;

Lord Lansdowne's, or the tail of the Whigs;

The old Tories, and

The old Whigs, or Lord Grey's party.

Out of this separation, it must be admitted that principles have been a good deal laid aside, many are marshalled under false colours, and it seems to resolve into a question of men rather than measures, and where it will lead, or how we are to return to a high-minded course in political affairs, remains to be solved. By a strange singularity also, the two tails are now brought together into a government, and the two heads appear in opposition. But yet these two heads are not united to each other by any common understanding, system, or principle.

The history of the country affords examples of broadbottomed administrations and coalitions of the most powerful and influential men of rank and talent who have been brought together. But this is the first instance of an amalgamation, where *nearly* every one is secondary in name, character, and consideration. And yet I fear, with the King's power and obstinacy, that this new formation may go on.

The point, however, which will occur to our party as by far the most interesting and important is with regard to your own return to the army under such a crisis as now presents itself, and, however presumptuous it may

appear in me to allude to an object which none but yourself can or ought to decide, yet from the kindness you always show me, and the feelings I still cherish for public subjects, I cannot resist saying a word. Under the natural bias of mankind it must be admitted that when you are once again in communication with the King's government in any capacity, you would no longer communicate and live with those adverse political friends with whom you have lately associated. To be Commander-in-Chief without being in the Cabinet, would be to a mind like yours somewhat embarrassing. But the consequence to most of your friends would be, that whether in or out of Cabinet, once you returned to the army they would return to the government, and although you might not wish it, or direct them, they would conceive they were ingratiating themselves best with you by such proceeding. It is very well for a political character to say he will have no party, still men of the ordinary class will look up to some fancied leader at their own risk, and I am persuaded the Tories would be extinct as a party the moment you were recalled to the army.

That every effort will be renewed to induce you to return is quite evident.

That the case may be now put in a far different light from what it was when Canning lived, I am quite ready to admit. That according to your own military opinions, and in conformity with everything you have ever said, if the King was to command you to resume I don't know as a soldier that you could refuse; still I may say as an attached friend, and in common with a large mass of devoted political adherents that belong to you unsought for and unsolicited, that I should for ever deplore the circumstance at this crisis for the complete death-blow it would give to all *our best hopes*.

I have no hesitation in avowing that I look upon Goderich's conduct as the shabbiest that has been displayed, and I am not sure that shabbiness is not more contemptible than deep intrigue. I say this from principle and separate from all interest, because if obligations are to be returned I should have more right to look for favour at his hands than at another's; but as you are the only public man unto whom I owe a deep obligation, so do I feel bound to express my sentiments to you without reserve.

I cannot for a moment suppose that Goderich would accept the office of Premier with any views, but those which will be instilled by the preponderating political influence of the present government, nor can I look upon his administration as anything but substantially Whig, although covered by a veil of deserted Toryism. He has neither talent nor powers to float between the contending party in his government and the opposition Tories, holding out delusive hopes to the latter that he would resort to them in his first dilemma. This game could not be practised by him in face of such men as Lansdowne, Brougham, and Tierney; besides, it would not be on an intelligible principle to the mass of party men who are now keenly alive to the development of the crisis. Goderich's government must be looked upon as Canning's, and as pledged to all those new doctrines and to those measures now carrying on both in our foreign and domestic policy. The present opposition have made a stand against these, but if you are no longer in activity amongst them the probability is that Peel will not have energy to carry on an uphill game, and Goderich will thus paralyse the Tories while he carries on a Whig government.

It is from an anxious view of all these considerations that I feel a deep



interest in the *dénouement* at the present moment, and if you can give me one line at your leisure, to say how you view matters, you will very essentially oblige,

My dear Duke, ever your most affectionate and attached

VANE LONDONDERRY.

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*Viscount Beresford to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Bedale, 12th August, 1827.

I am just setting out to the Moors to be ready to-morrow near the spot to begin our grouse shooting. I have just received the enclosed; the latter sheet that does not go was merely a continuation of private matters. From other quarters I learn that the greatest confusion existed, and which was but the exemplification of what has long existed in Portugal, that *de facto* there is no government there, nothing that acts regularly as such, or that is respected by any party. However, when the packet left there was something like quiet in the town by some little show of energy by the Count de Villa Flor, who had been named governor of Lisbon and the Province. By other information I have, it appears that the removal of João Carlos de Saldanha and that party (that of the clubs) was in consequence of letters from the Marquis of Palmella, declaring it must be a preliminary to his accepting a situation in the ministry, that such situation must be the first and that he must name or approve of all the others; and that this was supported by Mr. Canning, and Sir W. A'Court\* of course acted on that principle. I consider Sir W. A'Court by his vacillating conduct, and by the very little respectability he has been able to attach to himself in Portugal, to have been greatly the cause of the present state of things there. He is now equally detested and despised by all parties, as the insults he is now receiving come from those whom he has been supporting, though he knew them to be personally despicable, and that their political views were by no means such as he was instructed to carry into effect in Portugal; that is, their ulterior views, though they went with him as far as it was convenient to them to receive his escort—and this he knew. I see no good that can arise from Palmella going there; it is only to bring him into collision with the Infante Don Miguel at the very first step (I conclude the latter must go there now of necessity), which in all probability will cause some unpleasantness. The Marquis of Palmella joined Subserra to banish this prince with contumely from Portugal, solely because they considered him as opposed to their private interest and ambition. What then can be expected of Palmella? Why to put Portugal into a still greater state of confusion by placing everything in a state the most uncomfortable to Don Miguel, or to endeavour to prevent his return. He may say differently, but the fact of what has been done is undeniable, and I judge of men by their acts, and we must recollect what he said to Sir W. A'Court as a reason for having deceived and betrayed him—"Ma foi, il faut garder ma place!" I can, therefore, see but one thing to be expected by his going there. I do not think the affairs of Portugal, though very desperate indeed, yet irremediable, but they must (in our Cabinet) be now convinced they have

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\* Afterwards Lord Heytesbury.

been greatly deceived from Portugal, or that they have greatly mistaken the remedy to the state of things there. We have only heard here that Lord Goderich has been named to form a new ministry, and even that without any good authority.

Yours sincerely,

BERESFORD.

P.S.—It is a thousand pities the King cannot know the real state of Portugal, and that we have been encouraging there as bad a democracy as ever disgraced France.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MY DEAR LORD BERESFORD,

Lisbon, 28th July, 1827.

Every day that cometh and every day that passeth by proves evidently and clearly to all the extreme accuracy of your Lordship's views and predictions respecting this unfortunate country, and the results which would arise from the weak and temporary government under the Infanta Da. I. M. Your Lordship's predictions to her, to our ambassador, and to all, are each day more and more realized; yet to those opinions, to those predictions, which were founded not in theory, but on the firm basis of long, very long and dear-bought experience in the service of this very country, none of those personages would lend an ear, which, if they had, all the unpleasant occurrences which are now hourly passing in this capital and in this country might have been prevented, or at least mitigated. Your Lordship must have seen in the papers which I have sent that it was probable Mello Brayan would soon come in again to office; and the clubs proposed a change in the Intendente, and recommended *Leitão*, a man who was formerly in Goa with Count of Rio Pardo. The appointment of Mello Brayan as Regidor da Justiça, and that of *Leitão* as the Intendente, was recommended, it appears, by João Carlos, &c.; but we are informed that the Count of Rio Pardo caused the Infanta to be informed of the character of *Leitão*, and that a more dangerous or a worse choice could not be made. I believe also that Barradas and Trigozo recommended that those appointments should not take place. On the other hand, the clubs, wishing to enforce these nominations, despatched João Carlos to the Caldas to carry their views into effect. He found the Princess would not agree to those two appointments of Mello Brayan or *Leitão*, and in consequence he asked his dismissal. But I rather think the Princess said she would settle this business on his return to Lisbon, which she did by sending João Carlos his dismissal from the situations he held, as also that of Pinto Pizarro. Since this period, which is three days, there has been one continued scene of agitation here. Immense mobs collect at night and parade the streets in spite of the military, crying out, "Viva João Carlos da Saldanha! Viva o Rei Don Pedro! Morre D. Maria da Risgata, Trigozo, vergonhozo!" Many enter into abuse of the Princess and Abrantes, and even this in the Theatre of San Carlos. The first night the mobs collected they went to Basto, the Intendente's, and broke his windows; the second night they went there again, and to Carvalho's, the Minister of Finance, as also to the Minister of Marine. The latter has had his carriage twice stopped in the street, and the mob have insisted on his going to the Caldas immediately, to urge and demand the Princess in their names (the *Respeitavel Povo*) to re-appoint João Carlos again, and without delay. One of the leading persons at San Carlos on Wednesday evening, and who cried most lustily for João Carlos, &c., was Antonio Rodrigues. Last evening mobs were parading the streets till a late hour, and attacking people

as they passed through them. I am told a person by the name of Mattos was stopped in his carriage, and his bolheiro wounded by a pistol-shot. I came home late and saw immense crowds of persons in the Loreto, &c., but was not molested. I fear these excesses may increase. The clubs are now attacked and the re-action will be great; all the canalha and disaffected will enrol themselves under their banners, and by threats, and perhaps by violent excesses, and by everything, will do all they can to alarm the Princess and her advisers to re-appoint João Carlos and Pinto Pizarro again to their former power and situations. We may now witness a struggle between various contending parties, viz., between Miguel's, the Emperor's, and a Republican party. At this moment there is no government, there is no one to direct or to act, and these scenes are going on in the presence of our troops. As I stated on a former occasion, all our troops are coming down to the capital and its environs by order of our government, and it is so far fortunate that this measure has partly taken place, for we have now the Artillery and Guards here, and the 4th Regiment at Onzas, and I believe the troops of the 10th will come immediately to Belem, and the Lancers are to be very near; the remaining corps of the army will not be far from the capital. But, in spite of our occupation, tranquillity has not prevailed for this last three days, and our officers individually are treated with indifference, and even with insult; their horses are struck as they ride through the streets. This has happened to Lords George Hervey and Arthur Lennox. Lord George received two severe blows of a stick from a man who struck his horses. The man was sent to prison, and kept there a day or two, and then the Intendente told Lord George he need not trouble himself any more about the business. Mr. Haden on the same day was insulted by a bolheiro riding against him, and another officer pelted with stones while giving his horse water at a fountain. An officer yesterday morning (of the 10th Hussars), on going from Lisbon to join his regiment, was stopped near Sacarem and robbed of everything. They tied his hands, and left him on the road *in his shirt and stockings!* Were these scenes ever witnessed when the Duke of Wellington commanded in the Peninsula, and when your Lordship *commanded* the Portuguese troops? At present we have no government here; everything is anarchy. Your Lordship may inform the Duke of all this; though at all these painful and alarming events neither his Grace nor your Lordship can be surprised, looking at the crooked and blind policy which has been adopted by certain persons respecting the final arrangement of the regency of this kingdom. Your Lordship long and long ago chalked out the only line of policy to be adopted for the tranquillity and peace of Portugal. It was not adopted; it was not adopted or even listened to by those whose duty it was to listen to, if not to adopt it. All your Lordship's opinions, all your Lordship's advice, was treated with contempt, was treated *en bagatelle*, and we are now experiencing the results. Many believe that the Princess will re-appoint João Carlos again; but this she cannot well do, for then there will be evident proof that the canalha govern; they have, it is true, been governing for a long time, but it has not been publicly known. All these occurrences are favourable to Don Miguel, and there will be nothing settled till he returns. We are told the Marquis de Palmella has written to the Princess (which is true), and his preliminary proposition was that of removing João Carlos and his socius from the government, and before he would accept of his new appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs. But will the Marquis de Palmella accept place in times like these? Can he *ever* act with Don Miguel, who must come here? I need not say that Sir William is very fidgety at all these scenes, and now would be glad to have a person like your Lordship here. The old Admiral laughs at the whole concern, and says

dryly, "Well, what's to be done now? The less you do the better, Sir William." Your Lordship's friend Sir Thomas Hardy is here, I met him at the Admiral's yesterday; he finds things and people much changed. Both the Admirals must remain here for the present, and it is fortunate Sir Thomas came in here, or rather that he was sent. They both quite agree, and *in toto*, about your Lordship's views and predictions of passing events. I find they all—the Generals and Admirals—keep away, and out of the way of a certain *obstinate person*. It is a thousand pities, for otherwise he is a most perfect gentleman, and a most amusing, intelligent, and pleasant man. João Carlos is gone to Cintra, to get out of the way of the mob, of the clubs, &c., and old Count Sampayo went out of town the first night of the disturbances beginning. But he has returned. Yesterday Carvalho, the Minister of Finance, was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs *ad interim*, and Sir William was occupied most of the day in writing to him. To-day Conde de Ponte is named in place of João Carlos, Minister of War, and also that of Foreign Affairs in place of Carvalho; so that in one day we have had two Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and, in the course of the week or less, three; viz., João Carlos, Carvalho, and Ponte. The Count Sampayo is removed from his command, and the Count of Villa Flor appointed in his place as Governor of Lisbon. Things last night were more tranquil than they have been for several nights, as Villa Flor took decided measures to put down the rioters. They, however, made a great noise, which we heard from Sir William A'Court's windows last evening after dinner: a noise and cries not pleasing to his ears. The rioters appear to be composed of, and to be encouraged and led on by, the clubs and João Carlos's party, who of course make use of his name, and who is their valentão. Pinto Pizarro has come into the great promotion which I enclose, and which was made a few days previous to João Carlos's exit. But I understand he goes out. The Princess has been sent for from the Caldas, and is, I believe, to be in town to-day. She is much improved in health, and it appears that the counsels and advice of Count Rio Pardo have been attended to. But all this is most favourable for Don Miguel, and will no doubt induce our government to get him here as soon as they possibly can. I enclose your Lordship the various papers, but the Editor is favourable to the present noisy but miserable party. As for our unfortunate prize-money, at present there is no chance of procuring that; and I understand that João Carlos and Co. laid their hands on one hundred and twenty-one contos of the prize-money sent from England, for the purpose of paying the troops, and I understand secret orders were sent to the Commissioners to pay as little of that money as possible. Sir William himself informed me the last time I had occasion to speak to him about it, that money had been seized for other purposes, and he feared there is very little chance of our getting it. Since the note he sent to Don Francisco d'Almeida, a copy of which was sent to your Lordship *entre nous*, I do not think he has given himself any farther trouble about it. He at that time was very anxious about it, but all of a sudden he fell off, and made no further application for the payment of the money. Could not your Lordship take some legal

[Incomplete.]

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*Sir Henry Hardinge to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

32, Grosvenor Place, 13th August, 1827.

I send your Grace the enclosed list, which I believe to be that which Lord Goderich intends to lay before the King to-day.

The Duke of Portland has accepted the Presidency of the Council. I hear

the offer was made on the ground that the acceptance was essential to carry on the principles and measures of Mr. Canning's government—and in his answer, he states his acceptance *only* as long as he can be useful to his late friend's colleagues and principles; therefore this is evidently provisional—escaping the difficulty of going to Whig or Tory, by the appointment of one of their present Cabinet.

Sturges Bourne has accepted the Woods and Forests, but it is said the offer is to be made to Lowther, or according to Holmes has been made.

Herries has been offered the Chancellorship of the Exchequer, and his answer was to be with Lord Goderich this morning before he went to Windsor. Herries has openly stated that his friend's government won't stand the first week of the session; but he has blown so often hot and cold, that I think he will not refuse the bait.

Huskisson is to be pressed on the same ground as the Duke of Portland—duty to Canning, and to support the King, requiring him at all events *provisionally* to accept, but allowing his name to be used *decisively* with the public. The gain of time they admit to be most important.

Lord Dudley and Ward precisely on the same grounds will hold on. All this looks very provisional; but Holmes says Lord Lansdowne and Tierney are stipulating that when any ex-Tory has been brought into the Cabinet, he shall be balanced by Lord Holland as Secretary of Foreign Affairs. And Lord Lyndhurst declares if Lord Holland is brought in, that the same day his resignation will be tendered.

Holmes, however, is very eager to get back the old Tories, and give merit to his friend, and probably cannot resist a little exaggeration. As the warm line he stated Lord Lyndhurst had taken up had this morning cooled, I asked if he was sure that Lord Lyndhurst had held the conversation reported on Saturday with the King. He remarked upon the words *Mr. Canning's lacqueys*, as having been repeated by Lord Lyndhurst to him as the King's words, and commented upon by both.

However, all these arrangements look as if the King and the present Cabinet were in earnest; with the Whigs calling their government *Mr. Canning's*, and with the Tories *Lord Liverpool's*, and that the *whole* arrangement indicates a determination on the part of the King and his ministers to save themselves from the inconveniences of submitting to the ex-Tories, preferring the gratification of their temper to the benefit of the State. The King's future course will probably be a gradual re-introduction of Tories, on sufferance, rather than in triumph.

I hear that, Lord Goderich having taken the King's pleasure to-day on his government and kissed hands, an offer will be made to your Grace of the army. Regarding this point, the anxiety is great to know your decision. All parties look forward to it as the index by which they are to be regulated.

Croker told me yesterday the King and Lord Goderich were serious in going forward, reckoning upon your acceptance of the army as a complete breaking up of the great Tory party opposition, separating you from your political friends, giving the government the benefit of your experience, where they are weak, on the military policy and measures to be pursued in Portugal and Greece, quoting you of course as their authority to justify and silence the attacks of your political adherents. My observation was, that I

did not believe any *one* knew what your decision would be; that although your resignation was grounded on Canning's personal misconduct to your Grace; that at the moment the offer was about to be made the government were proceeding with the reduction of the army, upon which reduction they had asked your opinion, and must know it to be adverse, whilst they would put you as your first act in the position of executing it against your will; and that however strong your professional sense of duty and attachment to the army, Lord Goderich must feel it was entrapping you after leading the Cabinet on military and foreign affairs for the last ten years, now to take advantage of his own shabby line of politics, and ask your Grace to be the military and political home and foreign *stalking horse* of his miserable government—that I knew nothing and was in the dark, but hoped that such paltry proceedings would fail.

Holmes saw Lord Eldon since I last wrote, who will *never* re-accept the Seals. This has of course been reported to Copley. Lord Eldon told Holmes that your acceptance of the army would be their great aim, quoted what he called a slip of the Duke of Marlborough's, and said they were quite right to get you if they could.

Lord Camden says the King and Lord Goderich are lowering themselves and the government of the country, that if they can even live during a session they can undertake no great measure, and that the whole arrangement is evidently provisional to save the King and the in-Tories from the mortification of retracing their steps.

He hears the Whigs will support Goderich, as the means of keeping the ex-Tories out, hoping to govern through the universally accredited opinion of Lord Goderich's weakness.

Brougham has arrived, but I hear Lord Goderich very civilly declined seeing him. Lambton, who was on his way to Italy, has returned to London.

I do not know on what terms Lord Goderich and Lord Lyndhurst are. Holmes insists the latter wishes to upset the whole arrangement, and spoke very earnestly to the King in favour of Peel's leading the House of Commons; but that personally Peel has kept him at arm's length, not having returned his visit after he was made Chancellor.

Lord Palmerston is a good deal quizzed for having gone in uniform to the review of the Coldstream regiment, accepting the salutes, and showing his aptitude to superintend the field discipline of the army.

I shall write to your Grace to-morrow, before I leave town in the evening. On Friday, the 17th, I shall be at Harrowgate, my letters being addressed to the post-office, and on the 22nd leave Harrowgate for Wynyard, Stockton-on-Tees.

If I were to attempt to condense the feelings and opinions of the upper classes, I should say all wish to see an end to the violence of party spirit which Mr. Canning's conduct raised, as prejudicial to public business, and that in the general sentiment you have so tempered your actions and conduct as to give you the power of combining and uniting the materials of a stronger government than any other man, as the Whigs of weight and character would serve under you, whilst the Tories would submit to their introduction in the confidence of your character.

I am ever your Grace's devoted servant,

H. HARDINGE.

## [ENCLOSURE.]

## CABINET.

*Lord Goderich	..	..	First Lord of the Treasury.
*Duke of Portland	..	..	President of the Council.
Lord Carlisle	..	..	Privy Seal.
Lord Lyndhurst	..	..	Lord Chancellor.
Lord Dudley and Ward	..	..	Foreign Office.
Marquess of Lansdowne	..	..	Home Department.
Lord Bexley	..	..	Lancaster.
Marquess of Anglesey	..	..	Ordinance.
*Huskisson (offered)	..	..	Colonies and Leader.
*Herries (offered)	..	..	Chancellor of Exchequer.
*Sturges Bourne	..	..	Woods and Forests.
Mr. Wynn	..	..	Board of Control.
Lord Palmerston	..	..	War Office.
Tierney	..	..	Mint.
Charles Grant	..	..	Board of Trade (in case Huskisson accepts).
Wilmot Horton	..	..	Vice-President Board of Trade.

*Sir Henry Hardinge to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

London, 14th August, 1827.

Robinson kissed hands yesterday, and excepting Littleton and a Mr. Leake, a solicitor of the Duke of Rutland's and an M.P., I have met no newsmonger.

Littleton came from France to attend Canning's funeral. According to him the government is the best that could possibly be formed, and will gradually be strengthened by the old Tory interests, excepting a small band who will adhere to the ex-ministers; that your Grace must accept the army; that he had intended to have written to you on the subject, and he knew you would accept, on my declaring my belief that no man living knew what your decision would be. He said he had dined at Lord Dudley and Ward's yesterday with Wilmot Horton and Abercrombie, when Lord Dudley assured them that the King in his conference with Lord Goderich, according to the latter's report to him, had not once mentioned your name or that of Mr. Peel. That Abercrombie had seen Brougham, who was all devotion to the new government.

Leake's news was that the Chancellor's friends had discovered a plot between Canning and Brougham and Scarlett—the Chancellor to be discarded, Scarlett to be Chancellor, and Brougham Attorney-General. There can be no doubt that Lord Lyndhurst and Canning were on the very worst terms, as shown in the case of the church preferment; Copley's friend, coming the day of Canning's death into Holmes's room till he found him at home, from five to seven o'clock in the morning, and not concealing his joy.

Lord Lyndhurst's enemies say that the bar is unanimous that he is a failure; that his intellect and information disqualify him for equity law, and that the chancery lawyers are getting up a petition or statement to mob him out of office. Next that he was 20,000*l.* in debt before his elevation, and has raised 20,000*l.* more since to complete some purchase, having

at several of the public offices secured his life, and that this feeling of his heavy debt is (by implication, I suppose, of interested partiality in his decisions) to be brought against him to depress him. There can be no doubt that the Broughams and Scarletts have some intrigue going on against him, and he anxious to bring back the ex-Tories and secure himself against the Whigs. Holmes, who is deep in his confidence, I have not seen to-day, or he might probably throw some light upon these reports which Leake fully believes. Mr. Leake also stated that he had dined yesterday at the Cocoa Tree, with his friend Theodore Hook and three others. That Hook excused his being late, by saying that he had been sent for to his great astonishment by a person *high* in office, to discuss the policy of writing up in his paper a junction of the able men of all parties; your Grace, Mr. Peel, and Lord Melville, with Lord Grey, to return to office, with Lords Goderich, Lansdowne, &c. He went on to details, kicking Lord Bexley out, and giving the Duchy to Sir William Knighton, the Woods and Forests to Lowther, &c., not as what he would wish to see, but as what his official cabinet-framer had sketched out. Leake told me he should *guess* Hook meant Croker. I omitted to say that Littleton told me nothing was to be arranged regarding the House of Commons till Huskisson either returned or gave an answer, and that he doubted whether the offer of the army would be made to your Grace so early as it was reported.

Clanwilliam, who is up to his neck in these preliminary arrangements, told me he had written to you yesterday, and I gathered not only that he expected, but that Lord Goderich expected you would accept. He stated it to be impossible to press you to return to political office, as it was well-known the ex-ministers were pledged not to return unless *en masse*, and that the *grand* coup was to secure your Grace, &c. I insisted that I knew of no such pledge, further than that sort of honourable feeling which would never allow of any seceder individually bartering with the government to return, but that I was confident the old Chancellor did not look to office, although I thought it probable Lord Melville might. He was as usual positive, and considering the arrangements permanent, and that the Duke of Portland is not a stop-gap. We ended our discussion à l'anglaise by my betting him five guineas that the Duke of Portland is not in office the 1st May, which he accepted by qualifying it with the condition, "provided that the Goderich administration would last so long."

Lord Camden had heard from Mr. Peel, as I believe I have already stated, that Lord Eldon might expect to resume the Seals. Lord Camden saw Lord Eldon yesterday, who told him that he never would resume them, and that as to any office he thought it would better become him not to accept any, but support his friends in the Lords. He was very moderate, quizzed the present men, but suspected the King to be vindictive against your Grace and Peel.

I have not been able to ascertain whether Herries is to be Chancellor of the Exchequer or not. Littleton asserts that it has not been offered. Holmes says it has; but it is probable the final arrangement is postponed till Huskisson arrives.

To-morrow morning early I leave town for the north. Lord Londonderry abuses Goderich's administration—the *rubbish* has become the corner stone of the building. Lady Spencer writes to Lord Camden that



she has no regrets to spare for Mr. Canning, always having had a bad opinion of his integrity. I mention these trifling anecdotes as indications of the true feeling towards the man, whose character by a curious *coincidence* has been written up by the press of both parties, owing to the junction of the government and Whig papers.

I am, your Grace's devoted servant,

H. HARDINGE.

*Mr. William Holmes to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Tuesday, 14th August, 1827.

I have nothing to add to what I did myself the honour to write to your Grace yesterday, except that Herries is gone down to Windsor to kiss hands as Chancellor of the Exchequer.

Your Grace's servant,

WILLIAM HOLMES.

*Lord Maryborough to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR ARTHUR,

Saville Row, 14th August, 1827.

I received your letter of yesterday before I left Fern Hill this morning. At dinner yesterday, where we were twenty-two people, all the household except Mr. and Mrs. Fremantle and Mr. and Mrs. Stanhope, there was not a word said either to Lady Maryborough or me about you, excepting asking where you were. I have never heard it said that if you intimated a wish you might be employed, &c., and I can hardly think anybody could expect you to intimate any wish whatever. My own conjecture always has been that an offer would be made you when the administration was arranged, and I see no reason to change my opinion. You may depend upon it that both Lady Maryborough and I will keep quite clear of the subject. We are going on Thursday to the Grove for a week, and by that time probably the matter will be decided.

I hear in London that Goderich kissed hands yesterday at the Lodge. We heard nothing of it there. But everybody was so much engrossed by talking of the cameleopard who had just arrived, that nothing else seemed to be thought of.

Ever yours most affectionately,

MARYBOROUGH.

*Mr. William Holmes to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Wednesday, 15th August, 1827.

Herries accepted office on Monday evening, and ordered horses for the purpose of going yesterday to Windsor; however, in the morning he wrote to Sir William Knighton that he was too unwell to go down, and at the same time wrote to Lord Goderich declining office. Sir William Knighton

came to town last night, and saw Herries this morning, who has been prevailed upon to accept. I hear that some difficulties are now made by the Whig party in the Cabinet, and that it is by no means certain that he will be Chancellor of the Exchequer. A Cabinet is now sitting.

Lord Anglesey came from Portsmouth to-day, and on his way remained two hours with the King at Windsor. A council will be held at Windsor on Friday next, when it is thought all these arrangements will be completed.

Your Grace's servant,

WILLIAM HOLMES.

*Lord Maryborough to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR ARTHUR,

Saville Row, 15th August, 1827.

I think it right to tell you what I pick up. The general impression is that the command of the army will be offered to you; and I hear from authority I cannot doubt, that the whole army are in breathless expectation on the subject. The language the officers hold is, that if you take the Commandership-in-Chief without any political situation you will be the greatest man in the world; and if you do not there will be nothing but despondency in the service. In short, the general feeling of all descriptions of persons is that you should command the army, and I am confident that if an offer is made to you of the command, and you accept it, you will do so with the hearty concurrence and approbation of the whole country. It is important that you should know this.

Nothing further that I know of has transpired about the administration. I find it is generally believed that Charles Grant is to be President of the Board of Trade and in the Cabinet.

Ever yours most affectionately,

MARYBOROUGH.

*Viscount Goderich to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Downing Street, 15th August, 1827.

I am commanded by the King to transmit to you by the hands of Lord Anglesey the accompanying letter from his Majesty.

From the bottom of my heart I hope you will accept the King's offer, and I am sure you will do me the justice to believe that my anxiety that you should do so does not arise from anything which may be personal to myself, but from my entire conviction that your return to the command of the army is of the last importance to the best interests of our common country, which can in no circumstances forget what she owes to your long and distinguished services.

To say more would only be to repeat the same sentiments in other words, and I will only add that

I remain, my dear Duke of Wellington,

ever most sincerely yours,

GODERICH.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*The King to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR FRIEND,

Royal Lodge, 15th August, 1827.

I write for the purpose of again offering to you the command of my army, and I sincerely hope that the time is arrived when the country will no longer be deprived of the benefit of your high talents.

Always, with great truth, your sincere friend,

G. R.

*Mr. William Holmes to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

10, Grafton Street, Thursday, 16th August, 1827.

I write to your Grace, though I have scarcely any news. I have been in the Tower most of the day. Lord Goderich communicated to the Cabinet this afternoon whatever commands he yesterday received from the King. The Lord Chancellor is sent for, and I hear that he goes to Windsor early to-morrow.

Your Grace's servant,

WILLIAM HOLMES.

[745.]

*To the King.*

Kingston Hall, 17th August, 1827.

I have received your Majesty's most gracious commands conveying to me the offer of the command of your Majesty's army, which I accept; and your Majesty may rely upon it that, in performing the duties of the high station which your Majesty has most graciously called upon me to fill, it will be my earnest wish and endeavour to give your Majesty the same satisfaction which it has been the happiness and pride of my life to give you heretofore.

Which is submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most devoted subject,

WELLINGTON.

*The King to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR FRIEND,

Royal Lodge, Friday night, 17th August, 1827.

I have this evening, by the hands of Lord Anglesey, received your affectionate and dutiful letter.

I write to you immediately, that I may have the pleasure and satisfaction (as soon as you can conveniently come to me) of seeing you, that you may kiss hands, and assume the command of the army without delay. I will add one word more, merely to express the happiness I shall have in receiving you.

Ever, with true regard, your sincere friend,

G. R.

*To Viscount Goderich.*

[ 746. ]

MY DEAR LORD GODERICH, Kingston Hall, 17th August, 1827.

I have received your letter from Lord Anglesey. I have never thought that political differences of opinion ought to prevent me from commanding his Majesty's army at the Horse-Guards, equally as an army in the field; and I have written to his Majesty, in answer to his most gracious letter, that I accept his most gracious offer of the command of his army, and that his Majesty may rely upon it that, in the performance of the duties of the high station which his Majesty has most graciously called upon me to fill, it will be my earnest wish and endeavour to give his Majesty the same satisfaction which it has been the happiness and pride of my life to give him heretofore.

Ever, my dear Lord Goderich, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

*To Lord Maryborough.*

[ 747. ]

MY DEAR WILLIAM,

17th August, 1827.

Lord Anglesey came here this morning with an offer of the command of the army, which I have accepted. Lord FitzRoy will show you the correspondence. You will see that I have re-stated to Lord Goderich that I had always considered that political differences of opinion ought not to prevent my taking the command at the Horse-Guards equally as of an army in the field.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Westmorland.*

[ 748. ]

MY DEAR LORD WESTMORLAND,

Kingston Hall,  
17th August, 1827.

I think it possible you may not come here to-day, I therefore send you the enclosed copies of letters which I received this day by the hands of Lord Anglesey from the King and Lord Goderich, and of my answers. I had little or no conversation with Lord Anglesey. It appeared to me from what he said that the King wished that Mr. Herries should be Chancellor of the Exchequer, but that Mr. Herries was but little inclined to take

that office; and that in that case it would be filled by Lord Palmerston.

You are as well aware as I am of what has passed heretofore between his Majesty, Mr. Canning, and myself, respecting the command of the army. I don't think I could have refused to take the command when thus frankly and fairly offered to me—the reasons alleged for resigning no longer existing—without taking new ground for my refusal, differing from that before taken as the reason for resigning, and inconsistent with my former professions in public as well as in private and in writing. I have stated to Lord Goderich distinctly that I take the command of the army as of an army in the field, notwithstanding political differences of opinion. I am aware of the delicacy of the position in which I shall be placed. But I think I can overcome that difficulty more easily than I could the abandonment of my professional position, or any inconsistency upon the reasons of my resignation.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[ 749. ]

*To Viscount Beresford.*

MY DEAR BERESFORD,

18th August, 1827.

I have received your letter, of which I will return the enclosure in a franked cover. It is quite clear that matters are coming to extremities in Portugal as fast as they can. I believe that the government have given orders that our troops should be assembled at Lisbon, and it appears they are collecting thereabout. When once collected, their safety and *their* honour are secure.

I cannot write so positively respecting the honour of the government, as I really don't know what has passed in the way of report from Portugal or of instruction from hence in the political line since the month of February last.

It is difficult to judge of the probable acts of these savages; but I think Don Pedro will come to Portugal. The Buenos Ayres Treaty is much in his favour. I understand that he has secured not only the left bank of La Plata, but likewise payment for all the captures made from him.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

THE DUKE ACCEPTS THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY. 99

*The Earl of Westmorland to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

DEAR DUKE,

London, 18th August, 1827.

I have just received your letter of the 17th. I think you could not have done otherwise upon the grounds you before declined, and you have reserved to yourself your right of acting in conformity to your own opinions. Lord Goderich stands in a very different light from Mr. Canning.

I cannot yet get Georgiana to Osterley, so I am still uncertain every day about leaving town.

Yours sincerely,

WESTMORLAND.

Herries is not Chancellor of the Exchequer, which occasions much surprise. Your letter may explain.

Lushington has carried Carlisle.

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*Sir Herbert Taylor to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

Windsor, 18th August, 1827.

I am certain that your Grace will give me full credit for the feeling of sincere and cordial satisfaction with which I learnt, upon my arrival here yesterday afternoon, that you had agreed to resume the command of the army. I met the King as he was driving to Virginia Water, and he stopped for the express purpose of communicating this circumstance, and to say how very much he was pleased with the letter which your Grace had written to him upon the occasion.

In the expectation of an event which had been the object of the anxious hopes of the country and the army, I had, when I last saw Lord FitzRoy Somerset, proposed to him that he should replace me at the Horse-Guards as soon as your Grace came there, and I flatter myself that you will approve of this arrangement. I will attend as often and as long as he pleases, to give any assistance that may be required. I do not think that anything has passed at the Horse-Guards since May that can produce inconvenience or embarrassment, though a few weeks more might have had that effect if the discussions on the subject of reductions had not been suspended.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest regard,

my dear Lord Duke,

your Grace's most obliged and faithful servant,

H. TAYLOR.

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*Lieutenant-General Sir John Byng\* to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Wrotham Park, Barnet, 19th August, 1827.

Permit me to assure your Grace of the gratification I really feel at your return to the command of the army. Nor would you feel less had you

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\* Field Marshal the Earl of Strafford, G.C.B., G.C.H.

witnessed (as I did) the joy with which the notification of it was received at the United Service Club yesterday. Having the good fortune to be employed, I know well how essential it is to the welfare and discipline of the profession that we should have you as our Commander-in-Chief.

When I heard lately of intended reductions, I felt it my duty to quickly ascertain if any could with safety be made of the force in the manufacturing districts. From every quarter a reluctance was expressed to part with any portion of the troops. Thus confirmed in the opinion I had formed, I felt it my duty to write to Sir Herbert Taylor on the subject. My letter was shown to Lord Lansdowne, who expressed a wish to see me; and for that purpose I arrived in town a few days since, and I am now on my return to my head-quarters. I intimated to his Lordship that there was now very general employment in the manufactories; that the wages are somewhat better, but very low. The profit to the master is trifling, and many complain of severe losses in having kept on the employment they gave for the last twelve months. The present tranquillity is not to be too much relied on, for the worst feeling exists between master and man; and the information given me from all the towns in Lancashire was, that if the troops were removed, I must expect in a short time urgent applications for their return. I further stated, that as far as regards the manufacturing part of Lancashire, I was fearful the tranquillity of it could only be preserved by the military. That opinion is formed from having witnessed how much in awe the masters are kept by the combinations of the workmen, the facility afforded by their unions for an early assemblage of numbers, when a destruction of private property is resolved on. The civil powers in those parts are not adequate for such a state of things. The magistracy are far from good, and little respected (I mean in the manufacturing districts of Lancashire). The civil force is not sufficient, nor is it well chosen; their time fully occupied in, and their whole attention given to, that part of their business which fills their pockets. Any serious mischief may be intended without their having the least knowledge of it; little time is there in consequence to avert or suppress the bad consequences.

I hope you will not consider me intrusive with my opinion, but as the question of reduction may be again discussed, I have considered it my duty to submit to you such information as local knowledge may enable me to give, and that you may be aware of what I had communicated to the Secretary of State.

I have the honour to be,  
your Grace's very grateful and obedient humble servant,

JOHN BYNG.

I have marked this letter private, as I have not seen your appointment officially announced.

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*Sir Herbert Taylor to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

Windsor, 19th August, 1827.

I am this moment favoured with your Grace's letter of yesterday, and I feel very grateful to you for the kindness with which you have entered into the question upon which I took the liberty of troubling you.

I was well aware of the circumstances attending your Grace's appointment to the command of the army in Portugal, but I never for one moment felt disposed to look to that as a precedent which could apply to me, or which I could approach; but it had occurred to me, although I omitted to mention it, that there would not be wanting persons who would say that I had availed myself of the situation in which I recently stood to secure for myself the chief command in India, without any consideration for the feelings and interests of my brother officers; and although I might have shown that I had not done so, it appeared to me that I ought not to place myself under the necessity of so doing, more especially with reference to the cases of Sir George Walker and Sir Thomas Bradford, who would have just cause of complaint in every respect.

Since I had the honour of writing to your Grace, viz., on Tuesday last, Mr. Wynn came to me and repeated the proposal. I stated to him fairly my objections, and observed, that my acceptance of it (supposing even the King should sanction it, which I felt confident his Majesty would not) would be considered by the army and by many of my brother officers an act of *super-arrogation* and of injustice towards them, and that I really could not make up my mind to place myself in that position towards them, or allow it to be supposed or said, that although I might have exerted myself for their interests while they did not clash with mine, I had not hesitated to set them aside so soon as a selfish object interfered.

Mr. Wynn in consequence gave up the point, but stated that, if it should be considered expedient or advisable to unite the civil and military command in the person of Lord William Bentinck, I might be appointed a Lieutenant-General on the Staff in Bengal, and to the command of the troops in that presidency only. I replied that I was quite ready to serve according to my rank and station wherever his Majesty should be pleased to direct; and that I did not wish, under those contingencies, to make any personal objection, or to plead the previous acceptance of a more advantageous, and in many respects a more comfortable situation, namely, the government of the Cape, as I was bound to consider employment in India to be of a more military character.

Here the conversation ended, and I have heard nothing since; but I own that I shall be very glad to hear that Lord Hill or Lord Dalhousie are named to the chief command in India, and that, on private grounds, I shall prefer going to the Cape to serving as a Lieutenant-General on the Staff in India. I do not however wish, on this or any other occasion, to suffer private feeling to interfere with what I may be called upon to perform as a duty.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest regard,  
my dear Lord Duke,  
your Grace's obliged and faithful servant,

H. TAYLOR.

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*The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Maresfield Park, 19th August, 1827.

I this morning received your letter of the 17th, with copies of those of his Majesty and of Lord Goderich to you. I am much obliged to you for sending them to me.

I am bound to say that I do not think you could either consistently with your former professions, with your duty to the country, or with due regard to what you owe to the military service, reject the offer which was made to you by the King.

Ever, my dear Duke, most faithfully yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

[ 750. ]

*To Earl Bathurst.*

Royal Lodge, Windsor, 21st August, 1827.

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST,

I wrote to Peel, and have an answer from him stating his opinion that I could not have done otherwise than I have done. Lord Westmorland the same. I am returning to London, and will see Lord Eldon this day; but I desired Lord FitzRoy to show Lord Eldon the letter which I wrote to Lord Westmorland, and to send a copy of it to Lord Melville.

I was well received here yesterday. I had a short conversation with the King before dinner, but nothing passed of any importance. He is going to town this morning to attend a Recorder's Report, and I am going to London, from whence I will send this letter.

I enclose a curious report of things at Windsor on Friday last. When Herries mentioned to the King the detail of what passed between Lord Goderich and himself, the King was outrageous, said Lord Goderich gave him up to the *Whigs*, "he wants to keep his house till his wife will be confined;" and he rung the bell for the page to call for Lord Bexley, and made him First Lord of the Treasury!! The affair was not settled yesterday when I passed through London.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

*Viscount Goderich to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,                      Downing Street, 21st August, 1827.

First of all, let me thank you for your letter from Kingston Hall by Lord Anglesey, and express the unqualified satisfaction which your acceptance of the command of the army has given, not only to me, but to all classes of persons whom one meets.

I should be very sorry to give you the trouble of coming to town without a necessity, but in the mean time I should be very glad (if you had no objection to send it to me) to see the Memorandum upon the possible reduction of the army, to which you allude. The propriety of making any reduction is a very serious question, and may in great measure depend upon the mode in which it might be proposed to carry it into effect. But if you should prefer not to send it until it is asked for in a more official form, pray do not hesitate to say so. At all events, I should consider it as a confidential communication.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, yours most sincerely,  
GODERICH.

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*General the Earl of Rosslyn to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,                      Middleton, 22nd August, 1827.

I am very unwilling to appear tardy in expressing the satisfaction I feel in the return of your Grace to the command of the army.

The unanimous and ardent wishes of the profession, arising from their experience of the protection and benefits which every branch of the service derived from having your Grace at our head, made us feel more deeply the misfortune of being deprived of that advantage; and your restoration will be hailed with a satisfaction that cannot but be highly agreeable to you.

The general voice of the country has demanded your return, and in the position and circumstances in which your Grace was placed, it was impossible that you should have declined the offer.

I have not offered any congratulations on your own account, for nothing can add to your dignity and consideration, or place you higher in the esteem and opinion of your countrymen; and I cannot conceal from myself that this office, high as it is, must bring with it an accession of difficulty and anxiety, which will go far to counterbalance the pleasure you may derive from reflecting on the benefits which your resumption of the command will have conferred upon the army and the country.

Believe me to be, with the greatest truth,  
your Grace's most faithful and obedient servant,  
ROSSLYN.

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*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Gloucester, 22nd August, 1827.

It is very good in you to have written to me after your visit to the Lodge, more especially as your letter relieved me from the apprehensions I had entertained that the King would place you in his confidence with regard to what passed on Friday last at Windsor, for I heard yesterday much the same reports as that which you were kind enough to send me. Although yours is perhaps more highly coloured, they substantially agree in Lord Goderich's backwardness to show the King's letter to Herries.

Lord Goderich has not nerve enough to contend with the Whigs, and has not weight or influence enough to manage his Majesty, so that things cannot go on as they are; but I should be very sorry if it could be made to appear that the King's conferences with you had hastened the breach.

It is impossible for you to have acted otherwise than you have done in accepting the command. You are placed there fully as much by the public voice as by the King's choice, but there is no denying that your situation is one of embarrassment.

When the government offered you the command of the army without a seat in the Cabinet they either degraded you or the office if they did not mean that the office should, in this instance, be considered as strictly professional. They have, therefore, no right to expect that your political character should be annihilated by your acceptance. They must have known that you have taken much too prominent a part in public affairs, and stand too high in public estimation, both abroad and at home, to have been justified in imagining that you accepted the command on the same conditions on which Sir David Dundas accepted it (Princes of the Blood stand upon a separate footing). If, however, they could have entertained so strange a notion, your letter to Lord Goderich must make it clear that you have not consented to such terms; and yet there must be always great delicacy in taking a part against the existing government, as it will be difficult so to divest yourself of your official influence as not to make it bear somewhat against the government from whence it is derived.

I confess, therefore, that I cannot but feel great doubt of the policy which circumstances have introduced of making the heads of the two professions (army and navy) strictly professional. It is praised by the Liberals as separating political influence from government. This, with me, is no recommendation; but its advantages (whatever they may be) will be more than counterbalanced by the irresponsibility of those whose councils ought to influence the government in the administration of public affairs. Do you think, for example, that any First Lord of the Admiralty, having a seat in the Cabinet, would have consented to a treaty by which we have lost our naval sovereignty in the Mediterranean? All this, however, it was for the government to have considered before they acted on this system. Unless you had been ready to have accepted a seat in their Cabinet, you could not have made the not being included in it the reason for declining the command.

It is understood that the dispute is suspended until Huskisson's answer arrives, which is expected in six or seven days. The last accounts of him

give a very indifferent report of his health. If he therefore accepts, it will be conditional, subject to his getting better; and this will give him time to look about him, for he is a cautious gentleman, and will like to secure a good footing or a safe retreat.

It is very desirable that the substance of your letter should be generally known to prevent misapprehensions, which however it is very difficult to obviate when there is so decided an interest to misrepresent. If there were not such manifest weakness in the formation of this new government, your acceptance of the command, and Mr. Canning's death, would have dissolved the Tory party.

I am in hopes that there will not be a necessity for you to make another visit to the Lodge until the storm has blown over or has burst.

Yours ever, my dear Duke, very sincerely,

BATHURST.

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*The Marquess of Lansdowne to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,      Whitehall, Wednesday morning, 22nd August, 1827.

I think it my duty to apprise your Grace that I received yesterday afternoon his Majesty's commands to prepare your Grace's appointment as Commander-in-Chief, and that I have directed it to be made out immediately, so that it may be gazetted on Friday.

Your Grace will permit me to add, that I have had the greatest satisfaction in executing his Majesty's commands.

I have the honour to be  
your Grace's very faithful humble servant,

LANSDOWNE.

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*To Earl Bathurst.*

[ 751. ]

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST,      Longshawe, 25th August, 1827.

I concur very much in your views, as stated in your letter of the 22nd. My position will be a very difficult one; and I cannot expect to give entire satisfaction in it. But those who will have least reason to complain will be the ministers, as they must be certain that I could not involve myself in all their Portuguese and Greek follies; and that I could not stay away when they shall endeavour, as they will, to make the late government parties to them.

These questions, a corn law question of reduction, and possibly Mr. Canning's scheme for keeping the Roman Catholic question quiet by repealing the Acts which prevent communication with Rome, will be the business of the next session; and if I wish it ever so much, I cannot be otherwise than involved in them

all. However, I have taken my ground. They made the offer after knowing it; and I took it again in the answer which I gave; and they must blame themselves if they should represent that they have been deceived, as nobody else is.

I sent the correspondence to the Duke of Beaufort, Lord Lonsdale, and to my landlord\* here. I showed it to Banks and Lord Falmouth, Sir Charles Stuart, &c. It is very well known in general. I enclose you a letter which I have received from Lord Rosslyn.†

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

I have nothing more from Windsor. I intend to endeavour to keep on the terms on which I found myself when I was there last.

[ 752. ]

*To Viscount Goderich.*

MY DEAR LORD GODERICH,

Longshawe, 25th August, 1827.

I send with this a Memorandum, which I wrote about three weeks ago, upon the proposed reduction of the army, having been called upon by Lord Palmerston for my opinion. I send it to you of course as a confidential communication, but I have no objection to your showing it to your colleagues.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM ON THE PROPOSED REDUCTION OF THE ARMY.

4th August, 1827.

It is my opinion that the duties to be performed by the army ought to be considered in all discussions of the question of reduction in time of peace, and that the government ought to look into this part of the subject in detail.

This shall be the first object of this paper, and, in order to simplify the subject, I will enumerate the number of battalions required for each service; observing that a battalion in India means 1000 men, a battalion on other foreign stations 516 men, and a battalion in Great Britain and Ireland and the Islands in the Channel 740 men; I mean rank and file.

\* The Duke of Rutland.

† See page 103.

It has been the practice to omit the troops in India from the account. But the troops to relieve them must be included; and to include the troops in India themselves renders the view of the application of the military establishment of the country more comprehensive and clear.

	Battalions.
There are in India ... ..	20
Ceylon (besides local corps) ...	4
Mauritius ... ..	3
The Cape (besides a local corps) ...	3
New South Wales ... ..	3
Gibraltar ... ..	5
Malta (and a local corps) ... ..	3
Ionian Islands ... ..	6
Jamaica ... ..	5
West Indies and South America (besides two local corps) ...	8
North America ... ..	10
Ireland (and 20 depôts, of bat- talions abroad) ... ..	18
Great Britain (including 9 in Por- tugal. There are besides 30 depôts of battalions abroad)	22
<b>Total</b>	<b>110</b>

There are seven battalions of Guards, and 103 battalions of the Line in the service, and 50 depôts of battalions serving abroad not in India. Each depôt when complete consists of 224 rank and file.

Gibraltar\* and Malta are considered only just safe from a coup-de-main, and that principally by the strength of their works; and I believe there is no man who will say that any of the following stations are garrisoned at all for defence, or have troops enough for any purpose, excepting for police and

* Gibraltar in 1792 ... ..	2873
,, in 1827 ... ..	2580
Less than in 1792 ... ..	293

the maintenance of the ordinary power and authority of the government within the colony or place in which the troops are stationed, viz.: — Ceylon, Mauritius, the Cape, the Ionian Islands, the West Indies and continent of South America, and North America.

I think I recollect more than one instance in the course of the warfare in the Levant of insults from belligerents to the sovereignty and territory of the Ionian confederacy, which could not have occurred if the islands had not been insufficiently garrisoned.

In one of these instances one of the belligerents took possession of a part of the Ionian territory; in others they captured ships within the bays and harbours belonging to the Confederacy, and in one they landed in one of the islands, engaged in combat on shore, and took prisoners: and if I am not misinformed, there is a recent instance of an insult to the Lord Commissioner himself by Lord Cochrane.

It is impossible to look at the accounts of the forces of all nations which will be assembled, it is said, in that part of the world to consider who the person is whom the Greeks have chosen to place at their head, and of the events likely to occur there, without feeling that six battalions, of 516 men each, are not a force capable of inspiring respect, or of maintaining the security of the possessions of his Majesty's dependents, or the dignity of his Majesty's crown in that part of the world.

I don't believe that the government are aware that the Russian squadron will be manned by not less than from ten to twelve thousand as good soldiers as any in the world.\*

It has been very much the practice to compare the military establishments of this day with those which existed in 1792. It would not be difficult to show that the public interest suffered materially from the state of those establishments, but there can be no comparison between the two periods, as the state of possession of the world and the state of society throughout the world are different.

In 1792 there were 2552 men in the West Indies; there are now, including two black battalions, 5000 men. But it must be observed that there are three islands and three colonies on the coast of South America, conquered since 1792, to be

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\* This calculation refers to the whole squadron.

occupied ; and, in point of fact, half the force in the West Indies is stationed in these newly conquered colonies.

There were in 1792 in Jamaica 2491 men. There are now 2580. But the agreement with the Colonial Assembly is that there shall be 3000, and this agreement ought to be performed.

But it must be observed in respect to the military establishments in the West Indies, as well as in Jamaica, that there did not exist a black empire in St. Domingo in 1792, and the government of the countries bordering on the Gulf of Mexico was not then unsettled, and that the minds of the inhabitants of all descriptions of his Majesty's dominions in that part of the world were not at that time disturbed by discussions abroad as well as at home on the state of society in those islands, a fresh subject of *this* kind having been brought forward only in the close of the last session of Parliament.

It is quite obvious that, as long as the existing state of affairs continues, every attempt to reduce the military establishments in the West Indies and Jamaica will terminate, as all others have terminated, by their augmentation, at an augmented expense, after the loss of reputation at least, if not of lives, and the destruction of much property.

There are now 5160 men in his Majesty's North American colonies, including, however, one battalion at the Bermudas, which important station will even require a larger force, if not for its defence against a foreign enemy, at least to keep in order the convicts sent there to execute the works. The remaining force in North America will be 4644.

There were in 1792, 3800 men. But in 1792, Upper Canada was scarcely known. The United States had no army ready to invade his Majesty's dominions whenever this country should unfortunately be engaged in discussions with any other, and these North American colonies had not become so prosperous and important as they are at present.

There were in 1792, 380 men in New South Wales, there are now 1548 ; but I believe that, considering the nature of the population there and their increasing numbers, it will be necessary to augment the troops, rather than diminish those numbers ; indeed, they are scarcely sufficient to serve as guards for the convict ships going out.

The number of troops in Ireland cannot be diminished without risk of disturbance of the public peace.



Very shortly before I quitted office a plan was proposed to build a barrack for two or three battalions between Manchester and Liverpool, in order to have troops disposable for both countries at the same time.

This plan would be worthy of consideration, but it must be observed that it would cost more money immediately than could be saved by any possible reduction. I mention the fact to show that the military establishments are not equal to the demands of the country.

I come now to consider the force in Great Britain, and I will state first the points which it is absolutely necessary to occupy with troops.

London, seven battalions of Guards. If there are not Guards there must be others. For instance, there is now one battalion of the Line, the 69th, in the Tower, and one battalion of the Line, the 21st, at Windsor, which duties would in ordinary circumstances be taken by the Guards. There are at present four battalions of Guards in London, one in Ireland, and two in Portugal. But I must say that I don't believe there exists a military establishment in the world of which the troops are so worked by duty in time of peace as the Guards are at the present moment in London; and this not exclusively for military purposes, nor for purposes of State, nor for guards for his Majesty's palaces, nor of his person, but for the purposes of the police of the town, which they are found to perform more efficiently than any other description of men. But four battalions, besides a battalion of the Line for the duty of the Tower, and one for Windsor, are not sufficient for the duties of London, including the escort duties, without calling upon the men for duty more frequently than they ought to be called upon in time of peace.

	Battalions.
London ... ..	7
Portsmouth requires ... ..	4
Plymouth ... ..	3
The Islands in the Channel ... ..	2
Chatham ... ..	0
(as the recruits of the regiments in India perform the duty.)	

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Carried forward      16

	Battalions.
Brought forward...	... 16
Dover ... ..	0½*
Sheerness ... ..	1
Landguard Fort... ..	0½
Tynemouth ... ..	0½
Chester ... ..	0½
Weedon ... ..	1
Hull ... ..	0½
Isle of Man ... ..	0½
Carlisle ... ..	0½
Edinburgh ... ..	1
Stirling ... ..	0½
Berwick ... ..	0½
Fort St. George, Fort William, &c. ...	0½
	24

Thus, then, the absolute necessity of providing garrisons for the naval arsenals,† the castles, and stations, in which magazines and stores are kept in Great Britain, and for the islands in the Channel, and without allowing a man of the infantry for the service of the police of the country excepting in London, requires 24 battalions.

Besides the stations above recited there are the following, which would not be found very tranquil without troops:—Glasgow, Paisley, Sunderland, Manchester, Leeds, Sheffield, Birmingham.

I have stated that there are twenty battalions in the East Indies which ought to be relieved periodically.

One of these has been twenty-two years in that country, three twenty-one years, three more twenty years, one fourteen years, and one ten years. There are fifty battalions employed on foreign service in other parts, principally in unwholesome climates, which require the same periodical reliefs to be made upon fixed principles.

\* By half a battalion I mean a depôt of a regiment on a foreign station which is not in numbers equal to a third of a battalion, and can never be quite complete.

† Among the naval arsenals I ought to mention Milford Haven, where there is a dockyard, and a work is projected.

Humanity, which ought to be felt for and to be exercised towards the troops, as well as towards other classes of his Majesty's subjects, and justice, and a regard for the honour and interests of the country, require that these reliefs should be made; as it must be obvious that troops kept for such long periods of time in such climates, must lose their discipline and efficiency.

I will suppose that the relief of every battalion ought to take place after ten years' service abroad, and that the relief of a battalion in the East Indies takes two years from the period at which the relieving battalion sails from Ireland to the period at which the relieved battalion will have returned to England, and will be completed with men, and in a state fit for home service again, whether in Great Britain or Ireland; as it must be observed that the battalions in the East Indies have no depôts in England.

For the relief of the troops in the East Indies, each battalion after ten years' service in that country would thus require four battalions constantly at sea, or in a state of preparation and discipline at home.

In the same manner I should say that the relief of the fifty battalions on service in other parts of the world, each after ten years' service abroad, and reckoning only one year upon an average of the whole force in Ceylon, New South Wales, Mauritius, and the Cape, with those nearer home, for the period to elapse from the embarkation of the relieving battalion to the return and completion for service of the relieved battalion, would require five battalions to be at all times afloat, or in the act of recruiting and reforming.\*

This would of course require more troops. It will be observed that if reliefs are necessary after such short service, there will not be troops to afford the relief, unless they can be spared from Ireland.

It must be observed, that when each of these battalions will return home, it will find only 224 men in its depôt. The remainder must be recruited, equipped, and disciplined, within the year, supposed sufficient to return this battalion complete for service in Great Britain or Ireland.

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\* Since writing this paper I have learnt that it had been settled that the relief of the troops in Jamaica, the West Indies, and South America, should take place after five years' service.

Thus nine battalions are, according to these calculations, required to be constantly upon the sea for the relief of the seventy abroad, or in a state of recruiting or discipline in England.

These, added to the twenty-four already shown to be necessary for the garrisons in Great Britain, make thirty-three battalions, exclusive of those in Ireland and the seventy battalions employed abroad.\*

There are in Great Britain twenty-two battalions, including nine in Portugal, and thirty depôts. Reckoning three depôts to be equal in numbers to a battalion on home service, which it is obvious they are not, the number of battalions in Great Britain and the islands, including the force in Portugal, may be reckoned thirty-two. Reckoning two depôts as one battalion, which will be but little more than half the strength, the number of battalions in Great Britain, including Portugal, would be thirty-seven, leaving four battalions for the occupation of the places mentioned (in page 110), which always require the presence of troops. It must be observed, however, that these numbers afford no infantry for a reserve, or for any service whatever.

If such troops are required for any internal purpose in Great Britain, or to send to Portugal, or for any other service, they must be borrowed from Ireland; or if Ireland cannot spare them, the relief of the troops abroad must be stopped. This has been and must continue to be the invariable practice.

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\* First, to show what these battalions in England are, I mention that one of them arrived in England in December, 1826, having been twenty-one years in India; and one in January, 1827, having been nine years in the West Indies; one in January, 1827, having been twenty-two years in the East Indies and Mauritius; and one in December, 1826, having been twenty-two years in the East Indies; and four others since February, 1827, each having been nine years in the West Indies.

When the troops went to Portugal in December, 1826, there remained in Great Britain four battalions of Guards and two battalions of the Line, one of which has since gone to New South Wales, and the other to Ireland. Eight of the battalions of the Line now in Great Britain have returned from service in the tropics since December, 1826, and the ninth from service in North America.

The conclusion to which I come is, that the infantry of the army cannot be reduced with justice to the service.

I will add in confirmation of this opinion, founded as it is upon the actual wants of the service, clearly and distinctly detailed, that upon every occasion on which an attempt has been made since the year 1817 to reduce the force, a necessity has been found to exist immediately for augmenting it again at a large expense, following a large expense incurred in the reduction.

The reason is obvious. The empire is immense, and includes nearly every important post in the world, whether naval, military, or commercial. None of these posts are occupied even for defence, much less to be able to assist each other, even if they were within distance. Every service must be provided for in, and proceed from, Great Britain,\* and it is astonishing that we should be able to maintain seventy battalions on foreign service generally within the tropics, and twenty-eight (including twenty depôts) in Ireland, with the small number that we have in Great Britain.

We have not more troops than we require, or even so many as we require, and I earnestly recommend that the infantry should not be touched.

In this discussion upon the state of the establishments of the infantry I have not adverted to the possibility of war; but I beg that it may be understood that I have not lost sight of that contingency.

I have more than once endeavoured to draw the attention of the government to the alteration which the invention and application of steam to ships has made in the probable operations of war; particularly a system of hostilities directed against naval arsenals at the commencement of a war. I never thought that steam could be applied successfully to ships of war. But vessels moved by steam can be used as transports, or to tow transports, and their use would give a certainty to the movements of an expedition having such objects in view which such expeditions have never had hitherto, and is well deserving the consideration

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\* This was not the case in 1792, the establishment of Ireland was separate, and supplied part of the force for the West Indies and Jamaica.

of the government in the discussion of all questions of military establishments and defence.\*

In respect to the cavalry, there are four regiments in the East Indies, seven in Ireland, and fifteen, including three of Guards, in Great Britain. Two of the fifteen are in Portugal. The Guards cannot be dispensed with in London and at Windsor; and the cavalry are absolutely necessary in Ireland for the purposes of police.

I should doubt its being possible to dispense with the services of the cavalry in Great Britain, seeing that they are stationed at Glasgow, York, Leeds, Manchester, Coventry, Hounslow; the last being upon the King's duty.

There are three regiments dispersed along the coast from Dover to the Land's End.

The preceding statement applies to the proposed reduction of horses. It must not be supposed or expected that the cavalry can perform any service, even of police, when their horses will be reduced. The horses that will remain in each regiment after the reduction can be considered only as affording schools for training the men to ride.

This is a consideration for those charged with the police of the country.

A much more important military consideration is the reduction of six men per troop of the cavalry. This reduction tends to destroy the efficiency of this important arm in time of war; and however necessary the infantry is at present, I should far prefer that the same number of infantry should be reduced, and the cavalry soldiers kept in the service.

The infantry can soon and easily be replaced. Much time is required to form a cavalry soldier, and if a newly-raised cavalry soldier is to ride an untrained horse, it must not be expected that he will for a great length of time render any efficient service.

While writing upon this subject I must say that, notwithstanding the apparent advantages which we possess in men and horses, arms, appointments, &c., the cavalry is certainly the branch of the service which labours under the greatest dis-

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\* Portsmouth, Plymouth, Sheerness, Chatham, and Milford Haven, would not be safe from destruction at the commencement of a war, unless there should be a large body of men in each.

advantages. We can never have in the field the same proportion of cavalry to infantry that other armies in Europe have, on account of the great expense of the maintenance of the horses; and the cavalry of our Allies, whose troops generally form a large part of our armies, is of a very inferior description, and very few in numbers. It should be the policy of this country, therefore, to form its cavalry in time of peace in such manner as that it will be most efficient in war, and be the example of the cavalry of the Allies of the country, and the foundation of all their movements and operations. Such views, however, cannot be entertained if the cavalry should be so reduced as that, in case of war, it will require years to reform it.

Having now endeavoured to show the inexpediency on military grounds of these reductions, I will take another view of the subject, and will show that the wishes of Parliament in respect to the expenses of the army have been more than fulfilled.

In the year 1817 a Committee of Finance sat in the House of Commons, and estimated the expense of the establishment of

the army at	...	...	...	...	£8,500,000
and of the ordnance at	...	...	...	...	1,150,000

Total £9,650,000

I have put the army and the ordnance together, as some of the expenses of the army have since been transferred to the ordnance.

In 1818 the estimate for the two departments was for the

army	...	...	...	...	...	£9,061,881
the ordnance	...	...	...	...	...	1,154,600

Total £10,216,481

or 566,481*l.* more than the estimate of the Finance Committee.

The estimate for 1818 included half-pay and pensions, which

for the army in 1818 amounted to	...	...	...	...	£2,607,702
and for the ordnance to	...	...	...	...	289,100

Total £2,896,802

leaving the charge for the effective establishments of the army and ordnance in 1818, 6,753,198*l.*

The vote for the army in 1827 has been £7,747,000

for the ordnance	...	...	...	...	1,649,972
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Total £9,396,972

or less than estimated by the Finance Committee of 1817 to the amount of 253,028*l.*, and less than the estimate of 1818 to the amount of 819,509*l.* But the half-pay and pensions of the army were in 1818 as above stated £2,607,702 they are in 1827 ... .. 2,881,738

more in 1827 ... .. £274,036

The half-pay and pensions of the ordnance were in 1818 ... .. £289,100 they are in 1827 ... .. 377,706

more than in 1818 ... .. £88,606

Both together in 1827, more than in 1818... 362,642

Add this excess of half-pay and pensions to the decrease of the total amount of the estimates of 1827, compared with those of the Committee of Finance of 1817, and it will be found that the effective establishment of the army and ordnance, civil and military branches, cost less than estimated by the Finance

Committee of 1817 to the amount of... £656,578

and less than the same cost in 1818 to

the amount of ... .. 1,296,051

I will not contend that this excess of expenditure, which appears to have taken place on account of half-pay and pensions since 1818, is entirely to be attributed to the several reductions of the army (followed, however, by augmentations), which took place between 1818 and 1827; but it must be admitted that these reductions, although found to be ill judged, occasioned a part of the expense, and that when the subject comes to be examined in detail it will be found that, unless care is taken to provide effectually for the performance of the service after a reduction, but very little expense will be saved by such reduction.

I must say likewise that the view which I have above taken of the expenditure of the army is a most satisfactory one for Parliament of the administration of the finance of the military departments.

It is said that a large reduction was intended in 1827 below the estimate of 1826; and, in fact, the estimate of 1827 is 108,000*l.* less than that of 1826.

More ought to be saved if possible, and I entertain no doubt that more might and will be saved. But it ought not to be



at the expense of the efficiency of the service, and the consequent security of his Majesty's dominions, and the honour of his crown, which I think I have proved are scarcely provided for at present; and experience has shown that the establishments cannot be touched without immediate inconvenience, and eventual re-augmentation and expense.

The plans which have been communicated to me have not proposed any reduction of officers, but I have heard that the reduction of one major and the officers of two companies are intended.

I beg the reader of this paper to observe that this is to be done at the moment that it is very doubtful, even to the minds of those most anxious for reduction, whether any reduction whatever ought to be made, and it is asserted by all whose duty it is to understand this subject, and I think I have proved clearly that, if justice is to be done to the service, we have not a man more than we ought to have.

Have the government ever contemplated the distress and ruin occasioned by these reductions, not of prospects only, but of fortune, to the amount of the total that some of these officers possessed?

There are some officers now in the service who have purchased from half and full-pay not less than three times since the last peace, and some of these might be reduced again. This would be unworthy of consideration if any man could rely upon the reduction being permanent. But if, as in my opinion is certain, any reduction must be followed by an immediate augmentation, it would be cruel in the extreme to make any fresh reduction of officers.

WELLINGTON.

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*The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Haddo, Aberdeen, 25th August, 1827.

I have to thank you for your kindness in sending me copies of the letters connected with your resumption of the command of the army. I think it must be admitted by every person who was informed of what had passed on this subject, that it was quite impossible for you, with any degree of consistency, to refuse to accede to a request made as this has been. Unquestionably, too, it requires some strong reasons to persevere in resisting the wish of every man in the kingdom who is interested in the welfare of the army. How far the office of Commander-in-Chief may affect your

political conduct and position is a question too difficult for me to decide ; but you must be aware that in whatever situation you may be placed your opinions must be regarded by numbers with no common degree of interest.

Believe me, my dear Duke, very sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

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*Viscount Beresford to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Duncombe Park, 25th August, 1827.

I have had the pleasure of your letter of the 21st instant, with the copies of the correspondence leading to your again accepting the Commander-in-Chiefship; and, indeed, I cannot see how you could decline it under such circumstances, and I confess I am glad you were enabled to do it. Had you refused it, after so very graciously repeated an offer, no doubt the feelings of his Majesty would have been supported by the nation, and in truth as a national object it became necessary that you should accept it.

I send to you a publication made in Portugal, and which was stuck up in several places in Setuval. This speaks out the intention of the party that has been governing in Portugal since the arrival there of the constitution from Don Pedro; it is the same party I refused to act with, and I at the time told Sir W. A'Court, as I believe I wrote to you, what their object was at that time; and the whole of the diputados in their House of Commons are of that mind; and it was to ensure that very object that it was carried in that house to establish Guardos Civicos, that is, to arm the nation, which were not even to be under the command of the military chief. I send you also accounts of what passed on the late change of ministers in Portugal, at Lisbon, and at Oporto. The whole of the officers at present employed have been most carefully chosen by that party, as I also told you before. As to General Stubbs, he is what he always was. The ministers now employed there can have little weight with the nation, which remains without any government. There is now no improbability in Don Pedro's coming; he is wild enough to do anything, though he would be risking much for very little as regards himself. If he comes, he will no doubt, so long as he stays, keep down the voice of the nation; but when he returns to the Brazils, if he does not arrange to take Don Miguel with him, or to leave him as Regent, he will in all probability become a pretender to the crown itself, and the troubles of Portugal will be renewed, and the voice of the nation will continue for Don Miguel. If you think these communications of any consequence, you might get them translated. Could the King see them, as well as the last communication I sent you? We have had terrible weather for our grouse-shooting, I have had almost more wettings than grouse.

Yours sincerely,

BERESFORD.

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*Sir George Murray to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD,

Dublin, 27th August, 1827.

I received your letter of the 24th yesterday morning before I saw the Gazette, and it gave me very great pleasure, because the circumstances which had transpired in regard to Mr. Herries's appointment made me apprehend there might have been some general derangement of the plans in contemplation.

I am inclined to think that your being avowedly unconnected, *politically*, with the ministers is no disadvantage to the situation you fill. Indeed, the less of party politics there is supposed to be at any time in the Commander-in-Chief the better it will be, I believe, for the public service. And at this moment the affairs of the State seem to be in one of those awkward situations when a single individual, standing so very high as you do, can alone perhaps hinder their getting worse, by preserving a steady and a strictly unbiassed course amidst the confusion there is around him. I know the straightforward way in which you have always served the country, and if I am not taking an exaggerated view of its difficulties, it has seldom had more need of your assistance. It is of infinite importance I think just now to the Crown, to have a man near it in the situation you now occupy, who stands above the troubled atmosphere of party, and whose mind is sufficiently enlarged to take in the broadest views of State affairs, and to discriminate accurately between interests which are only temporary or partial, and those which will have a general and a permanent influence upon the welfare of the country.

But in going into these matters, which are rather above my sphere, I am presuming a little too much perhaps upon your indulgence, although I have never yet found it fail me. I feel, however, strongly impressed with an opinion that public affairs are in a difficult, and even precarious situation, and that it rests with you, more perhaps than with any other person, to prevent their getting worse, and bring them gradually into a better state.

I remain always, my dear Lord, very sincerely yours,

G. MURRAY.

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*The Marquess of Londonderry to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Wynyard Park, 28th August, 1827.

As I have not heard from you, I fear you consider my last letter presuming. I can only say that no one more cordially congratulates the army and the country than I do on the Gazette of to-day, and no one more strongly feels that your own judgment is superior to all others upon a point of such delicate importance.

I will say nothing of the scene that now presents itself, but my apprehension is that the Whigs will yield to the King rather than abandon their hold. Goderich seems to prove himself even weaker than I thought him.

We are in these parts in the utmost dismay lest your arrear of occupation at the Horse-Guards should prevent your promised visit. There is so

much preparation in progress at Sunderland, Newcastle, &c., that so soon as you can give us any certain data, or at least as far as anything in these times can be certain, the more we shall be obliged to you. And if you can give me an idea how long you can spare yourself to us (and the longer the better) I would endeavour to arrange the line of march through our Durham territory and to Newcastle in such manner as would cause you the least trouble, and the community the greatest gratification. The time you can give us at Wynyard had better be before the days that the people look for at Sunderland, Durham, &c.

We calculate now, you will return with us the 23rd of September from Doncaster to Wynyard, and I am desirous of shaping and preparing our campaign for the time you are in these parts.

Lady L. desires to be most affectionately remembered, and believe me ever, my dear Duke, yours most affectionately,

VANE LONDONDERRY.

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*To Lord Eldon.*

[ 753. ]

MY DEAR LORD ELDON,

Stratfield Saye, 1st September, 1827.

I am very much obliged to you for your letter, and as I had not heard from you on the subject of that one which I had desired Lord FitzRoy Somerset to show you, I intended to write to you.

I certainly thought and wished that there should be no mistake in regard to the principle on which I accepted the office of Commander-in-Chief, and to the relation in which its acceptance would place me to the politics of the government.

In regard to the acceptance of the office itself I had declared myself in public, as well as in private, and in writing to his Majesty and to his late minister; and I had likewise declared in Parliament the relation in which I should stand to the politics of the government; with those declarations before them, then, the King and his ministers called upon me to give my service on the ground of the public interests requiring it, and in accepting I have again declared my principle. I may have placed myself too high, and, like others, fall from the difficult position which I have assumed. But this is quite clear, viz., that I have assumed that position, and there I will remain as long as I can do any good in it.

I am not astonished that the friends of the administration should consider this arrangement as a great gain. In one sense it is so. If, on the one hand, the administration have no claim upon my services out of my profession, I, on the other, can be of no counsel or party against them, and they are certain that

one great branch of the service will be conducted according to their wishes.

I don't think that the sentiments of the administration on the Roman Catholic question, and on the Corporation and Test Acts, are the only points on which they are objectionable. In my opinion they, equally with the late administration, are a *falsehood personified*. To the world they are all liberality; they are supported by the Liberals throughout the world, and by the Radicals in England, upon that principle; to the Throne, the Church, and the friends of the Monarchy, they are for supporting the old principles of policy on which the monarchy is founded. There must be among the members of this administration some secret bargain upon certain questions, which, like all secret bargains, will not bear public discussion. Then they are too weak to undertake any measure for the public interests; and the individuals composing the administration are, almost without exception, inexperienced in public business and unable to execute the duty of their several offices.

Ever, my dear Lord Eldon, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[ 754. ]

*To Lieutenant-General Sir George Murray.*

MY DEAR MURRAY,

Stratfield Saye, 4th September, 1827.

I have received your letter respecting Estersley, whose views I should be very happy to promote. I don't propose, however, to take any steps respecting the vacancy till it will be regularly reported to me. I rather think that Estersley is found so useful that there will be objections to his removal.

I have likewise your letter of the 27th August.\* You are very right: public affairs in this country are in a very embarrassing situation. The government under Mr. Canning were not strong enough to undertake anything, even when assisted by his talents in Parliament. They are not stronger at present, though I think that some persons will support Lord Goderich's government who would not have supported Mr. Canning's, and they labour under the misfortune of having lost his parliamentary talent, which certainly kept many in awe.

They besides inspire no respect either abroad or at home.

\* See page 120.

Nobody animates them, and I believe that the individuals composing the administration have not the capacity necessary to enable them to perform the public business.

It is not in the power of any individual to remedy this state of things. I was driven from the King's service by Mr. Canning for very obvious reasons, and I have been brought back to it because it was thought that many would be disposed to follow what they might choose to think the example of my adhesion. But circumstances which have occurred since have proved that I have nothing to say to the government, or to anything excepting the business of my own office; and in fact I have not, in the fortnight that I have been in office, had any communication with any minister upon any subject whatever, excepting one letter from Lord Goderich in answer to one from me, in which I told him I had called upon him. Neither had I, when I saw his Majesty after I had accepted office, one word of conversation with him upon any public matter. All this is as I expected, and as it should be. But you will admit that, as long as I shall remain in this position (and I confess I don't see how it is to be changed), it will be impossible for me to do either much good or any harm.

The truth is this: *we* could not remain in office under Mr. Canning. The King knew it well, and so did Mr. Canning; though the King told him so, yet his Majesty chose to have Mr. Canning for his minister, which he had an undoubted right to do. But he had no right to make this choice and then to say that we abandoned him and ill-treated him. In so saying he has treated us ill, and I am afraid that a Sovereign can seldom be brought to look favourably on a subject whom he has ill-treated in this manner.

The cry now is, that the King is determined to keep in office Mr. Canning's friends in order to manifest his attachment to Mr. Canning. That of Mr. Canning's friends is, that they can't serve with us because we would not serve under them.

To be sure, the public interest comes in for little share of consideration in all this; but so goes the world.

This government is now organised; we shall see how it will go on. Those composing it are not very well satisfied with each other or with his Majesty, nor are they respectable or respected by the public, nor have they the experience or the habits necessary for the performance of the business of the

government, and I believe the majority in Parliament is against them. They can certainly undertake nothing, and I doubt whether they can resist the torrent of mischief which is preparing for them. But who can help it? certainly not the man who has no communication either with the King or his ministers!

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Viscount Beresford to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Thimbleby, 4th September, 1827.

I send the translations of the papers I had received from Lisbon; and you will perceive that at Lisbon, Setuval, and Oporto, there was a combination both in time and object; which latter, I think, went at the moment no further than to frighten the Regent to reinstate Saldanha as Minister of War, knowing that if they could effect that the remainder would follow as a thing of course, as it would have thus placed his authority independent of, and indeed above that of the Regent, and would have put all power in his hands. He is not so much the organ as the tool of the democrats; and it was with this faction that Sir W. A'Court wished me to act, and which he has been strenuously supporting for so long, though I told him from the beginning their objects, and that they had a more deadly antipathy to the actual constitution than those called Royalists. There are scarcely a dozen deputies in the Lower House, that of the Representatives, that are not of this sect. Their object is what is stated in the paper published at Setuval, the constitution of 1822, but without Royalty, and to have an elective head. I know that was the final intention with the Cortes of the revolution in 1820 till 1823, when it was upset. It is both as to respectability and numbers a most insignificant party, and nothing but having the power in their hands can make them of the least consequence. I know them all personally, and it was that which made them fear and hate me. It is the party that has ever been inimical to English interests; and when at Lisbon, I foretold to Sir W. A'Court that he would find out that ere long. But this is the wretched party our policy has been supporting in Portugal; and the truth was that Mr. Canning was afraid to hear the truth on this subject; and he being aware of my opinion, never saw me after my return from Portugal.

Believe me, my dear Duke, yours sincerely,

BERESFORD.

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*Viscount Beresford to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Thimbleby, 5th September, 1827.

Though you will most probably have learnt on your arrival in town of the new state of things as regards Portugal, still I will not omit informing

you of what I have learnt. It appears that by the last packet from the Brazils, a person arrived from the Emperor with a letter to Don Miguel, desiring him to repair to Portugal and assume the Regency.

There appears to have been a communication previously made to the Emperor, but which could not have reached him, from England and Austria, insisting upon his complying with the terms of the charter, by which his daughter Donna Maria da Gloria would be proclaimed queen, thereby cutting off immediately the Emperor's authority over Portugal, and establishing Don Miguel as regent under the charter. I believe he was told that if he did not accede to this proposition, the two Powers would not oppose Don Miguel's establishing what he might consider his own rights in Portugal.

The doubt now appears to be, if Don Miguel is to conform to the present desires of his brother, and proceed to Portugal, by which he would virtually acknowledge the Emperor's rights, and must govern in his name; or wait the result of the communication stated, when he would govern entirely under the charter.

I will not offer any opinion, under this state of things, which is somewhat unexpected, but one may ask how Portugal in the mean time is to be governed, as *bonâ fide* she has not, nor has she had any government for some time; and as this will become known to the various parties there, no doubt great exertions will be made by the provincial and club party there in their cause, which is opposed to Don Miguel in any shape, or under any conditions; and all the officers of the army of any rank, and we may add all the civil authorities, being of their own nomination, they may be enabled to make confusion, though the great body of the nation is against them.

Be this as it may, I give you the information of this new and unexpected event, which strongly shows the unsteady mind of the Emperor. There is one thing certain, that if Don Miguel chooses, under whatever conditions he may go to Portugal, he may on his arrival be proclaimed absolute or constitutional King, or any other title.

I return to-morrow to Bedale.

Yours sincerely,

BERESFORD.

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*Sir Willoughby Gordon to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Horse-Guards, 6th September, 1827.

What I hear is this, that the King has completely carried all he wished in the recent arrangements; and having so done, he has been very civil personally to Lord Lansdowne and his friends, and that they boast very much of this graciousness to Lord L. In the mean time, how does Lord L. stand? His most intimate friends, Lord Holland and Brougham in particular, are proscribed by the King, and every new arrangement strengthening that part of the government to which he was formerly opposed. In this view of the matter it should seem that, in the case of no new event taking place between this and the next session, the government will find itself nearly in the same situation as at the close of the last session,



but with this difference, that Lord ~~Lambton~~ and his friends will have both King and aristocracy against them upon any pinch.

Lord Grey is at Wentworth, on his return to Howick. During Mr. Canning's life many attempts were made through Lambton to obtain his support, but without the least success. Since Mr. Canning's death, and very recently, a most curious correspondence has taken place between Mr. Brougham and Lord Grey, the substance of which I will impart confidentially to your Grace, and the result of which, although I was quite sure that no other result could happen, has given me very great pleasure.

Mr. Brougham wrote to Lord Grey to this effect, viz.: supposes the death of Mr. Canning to have removed the principal obstacle to Lord Grey's return to his old friends; states what has passed with regard to himself, that he has refused political office though pressed by Mr. Canning to accept of it, not only because he should diminish his income, but because he should lower himself in Parliament and the country were he to accept any office out of his profession; states that he declined a judicial station, and that nothing remains for him but those offices which the King will not, from personal objections, hear of his holding; states that he has agreed to support the leader of the House of Commons, whoever he may be, unconnected with government, or office of any kind; has adopted this resolution from the conviction that his help is necessary, not only to the support of the government, but to its very existence; complains that he has lost income by his promotion to a Silk Gown, and that he wished it to be delayed for a year, but that the government would not do so; considers himself as the head of the Liberal party, and that he has no opponent in the House of Commons except Mr. Peel.

Such a tissue of personal vanity, selfishness, and ostentatious display of independence and liberality, with so much arrogance, it has never fallen to my lot to observe in the correspondence of any public man, high or low.

The answer which Lord Grey has written is in effect this, viz. :—

That from long experience and observation of his conduct he had a rooted distrust of Mr. Canning, nor was there anything in the manner in which he had separated himself from his old colleagues, or joined his new ones, that could diminish that impression; that the difference of opinion which at that time had produced the dissolution of the party, and separated Lord Grey from those with whom he had spent the whole of his public life, could not fail to extend itself to the consequences of that unfortunate event; and at present Lord Grey sees no reasonable grounds for confidence on which he could give any assurance of general support; he must therefore remain in the same position in which he stood at the close of the session, approving or disapproving, as circumstances may appear to him necessary, but without the smallest inducement whatever to any forbearance. Lord Grey expresses his hope that their personal meetings may not be rendered less pleasant by "*their political separation.*"

I think your Grace will be pleased with this communication, and I owe it to your Grace to mark by every means in my power (and you may rely that I will do so) my sense of the kindness and confidence with which your Grace has been pleased to honour me.

Yours most humbly and faithfully,

J. W. GORDON.

*Le Comte Capo d'Istria to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

Londres, le 21<sup>me</sup> Septembre, 1827.

C'est avec bien de la peine que je quitte l'Angleterre sans avoir pu me procurer l'honneur de revoir votre Excellence, et de lui exprimer encore une fois les espérances que les braves Hellènes placent dans la continuation de la bienveillance éclairée du négociateur qui a signé le Protocole du 7<sup>me</sup> Avril de l'année dernière.

La grande pensée de cet acte a fait enfin entrevoir à la Grèce l'aurore de son salut, et désormais c'est de l'accomplissement du Traité de Londres, qui en est le développement, qu'elle attend sa restauration.

En honorant de votre suffrage les observations que j'ai pris la liberté de vous faire à ce sujet, vous avez bien voulu, Monsieur le Duc, m'engager à vous en entretenir encore, lorsque je serai sur les lieux, et lorsque la marche des évènements aura placé dans tout leur jour les phases de cette immense question.

J'augure si favorablement pour l'avenir de la Grèce de ce noble témoignage de votre intérêt, j'en suis si flatté moi-même, que je ne puis me dispenser, Monsieur le Duc, de vous rendre le dépositaire de ma profession de foi, tant sur l'état critique où la médiation trouvera ce brave et malheureux peuple, que sur les principes qui m'ont guidé et me guideront, si, à l'aide de Dieu, il me sera possible de justifier la confiance dont il m'honore.

Je partage avec votre Excellence l'opinion que la Grèce pourrait encore opposer aux Turcs une longue résistance sur mer. Mais je doute qu'elle eût pu longtemps survivre à ses propres malheurs, à l'anarchie qui est le plus grand de tous, à l'isolement et à la misère qui en sont la cause. Sous ce point de vue, le Traité du 6<sup>me</sup> Juillet est un véritable bienfait pour la Grèce et pour l'Europe. Les calamités qui auraient fini par anéantir infailliblement les Hellènes, loin de préserver le monde des conséquences d'une guerre générale dans le Levant, n'auraient fait que les rendre plus imminentes et plus graves. Plus votre Excellence voudra considérer cette vérité sous tous ses rapports, et plus elle se persuadera que l'Acte du 7<sup>me</sup> Avril et le Traité de Londres offrent un gage de plus au maintien de la paix dont l'Europe jouit heureusement depuis 1815. Sans doute que l'exécution du Traité peut amener des chances périlleuses, mais elles ne me semblent nullement à redouter si les Cours intervenantes (dans le cas où la Porte rejette la médiation) préfèrent à toute autre mesure coercitive celle d'exécuter complètement le traité en faveur des Grecs.

En laissant aux Turcs le temps de se convaincre que les Puissances Européennes ont résolu unanimement et invariablement de *conservier la paix par le salut de la Grèce*, et en accordant à celle-ci les secours sans lesquels elle ne pourrait ni se défendre plus longtemps, ni même exister, les Cours intervenantes placeraient la Porte dans l'alternative ou de déclarer la guerre à la fois à l'Angleterre, à la France, et à la Russie, ou de subir lentement et graduellement les nécessités de sa situation, et d'accepter plus tard les conditions que son orgueil rejeterait aujourd'hui.

C'est à St. Pétersbourg qu'en prenant connaissance pour la première fois de l'Acte du 7<sup>me</sup> Avril et du Traité de Londres, j'ai entrevu ce moyen de salut pour la Grèce. Les explications que sa Majesté l'Empereur Nicolas a daigné me donner sur la teneur de ces actes, et sur le but tout pacifique et

tout européen de la médiation, m'ont engagé à vouer les peu de jours qui me restent à vivre, à la sainte cause d'une patrie à laquelle je n'ai jamais cessé d'appartenir. Fort du sentiment de mes devoirs et de la pureté des intentions dans lesquelles je m'efforcerai toujours de les remplir, je suis arrivé à Londres, et je vais me rendre à Paris, afin de connaître de près sous quels auspices il me sera possible de justifier la confiance que les Grècs m'accordent.

J'emporte de Londres l'espoir de n'avoir pas tout-à-fait manqué mon but. Je croirai même l'avoir atteint, si votre Excellence, ainsi qu'elle a bien voulu m'en donner l'assurance, veut bien faire partager à ses amis la bonne opinion dont elle m'honore. Dites-leur, Monsieur le Duc, qu'à mon âge, et après avoir fourni avec loyauté et droiture une longue carrière publique, je n'en commencerai pas une nouvelle pour conduire les funérailles d'une nation qui a survécu miraculeusement à quatre siècles d'esclavage et à sept années de combats sanglants et destructeurs. Et ce serait l'enterrer pour tout jamais, que de vouloir la sauver par la protection exclusive de l'une ou de l'autre des Puissances intervenantes.

Je m'arrêterai ici pour ne pas vous fatiguer davantage. Laissez-moi espérer, Monsieur le Duc, que vous me conserverez un souvenir d'amitié, et veuillez agréer l'assurance de mon respectueux dévouement.

Monsieur le Duc,

de votre Excellence le très-humble et très-dévoué serviteur,

LE COMTE CAPO D'ISTRIA.

[ 755. ] REMARKS ON THE INTERFERENCE OF OFFICERS, AND ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF GENERAL OFFICERS FOR THE OFFICERS OF THE STAFF EMPLOYED UNDER THEM.

October, 1827.

This affair originated in a dispute between the respective officers of the Ordnance and the barrack-master at —, which it fell to my lot to settle, when I was Master-General, by dismissing the barrack-master from the service. It now comes before me in another shape, that of the interference of Major-General —, commanding at the station, in the original dispute; the mode of interference; and the letters written by the Major-General, and by Colonel —, the senior officer of Ordnance, to the Commander of the Forces in the West Indies. I cannot but disapprove of the original interference of the Major-General. The question between the respective officers of Ordnance and the barrack-master was upon mere official details, as between the respective officers and the barrack-master, with which the Major-General had nothing to do. They were refer-

able to a distinct authority, responsible for the expenditure of money and stores, which authority settled the matter without reference to the Major-General's authority or opinion; and I must here add, that no other authority could have settled it.

It is very desirable that General officers should consider these matters maturely before they interfere in them. They should study their instructions, and the rules and regulations of the service. They would therein find the limits of their authority; and, by acting accordingly, they would save themselves, and those placed over them, a great deal of useless trouble and correspondence.

In respect to the mode of interference, I regret that the Major-General should have forgotten that the officers of the Ordnance, although not commissioned by his Majesty, are considered as officers; and that he ought not to have ordered a court of inquiry to investigate their conduct without previous report to, and sanction from, superior authority. In respect to the correspondence between the Major-General and the Colonel respectively, with the Commander of the Forces, I cannot but find fault with the whole of it. It contains the assertion, on both sides, of principles and pretensions, for which there is no authority, either in the regulations or practice of the service; and it is written in a tone quite unbecoming officers of rank corresponding with the commanding officer, on the conduct of others, vested with authority independent of the writer.

The service cannot be benefited by such correspondence; and I would recommend to officers in authority not to allow themselves to be made the receivers and transmitters of such correspondence.

I cannot, however, avoid observing upon one point, viz., the charge of Colonel — against Lieutenant —, the Staff officer of the Major-General. Every Staff officer must be considered as acting under the direct orders and superintendence of the superior officer, for whose assistance he is employed, and who must be considered responsible for his acts. To consider the relative situation of General officer and Staff in any other light would tend to alter the nature of the service; and, in fact, to give the command of the troops to the subaltern Staff officer instead of to the General officer. If Lieutenant — has conducted himself improperly, Major-General — is responsible; and Colonel — has no more right to notice the deficiencies

of Lieutenant —, in the performance of his duty towards Major-General —, than the Major-General had to interfere in a matter of detail between the respective officers and the barrack-master at —.

I have only one more point to notice, and that is, the voluminous nature of this correspondence. If officers abroad will have no mercy upon each other in a correspondence of this nature, I entreat them to have some upon me; to confine themselves to the strict facts of the case, and to write no more than is necessary for the elucidation of their meaning and intentions. An attention to this request, and abstinence from interference, in which those who interfere have no authority, and in which they are not called upon to interfere by duty, will save the officers in command or authority abroad, and those placed over them at home, a great deal of unnecessary trouble; and leave much valuable time disposable for other purposes.

WELLINGTON.

*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Newbattle Abbey, October, 1827.

Many thanks for your letter. The silence about your northern tour was a gracious rebuke for having undertaken it. I found Lord Grey decidedly adverse to the Treaty of July, though in general favourable to the Greeks. His comment on Capo d'Istria's letter was that it was an attempt to involve you in the business by representing it to have been a part of your Protocol. I probably shall hear from him when he forwards your reply.

I heard him make the same observation to Lord Rosslyn, to whom he also showed the letter; whether he had any further conversation with Lord Rosslyn I do not know, but I found Lord Rosslyn afterwards very hostile to the Treaty.

Lord Grey told me that the King, by way of inducing Lord Lansdowne not to resign, assigned as a reason that his resignation would have the bad effect of occasioning a change of Mr. Canning's system of foreign politics.

My letter to Wilmot Horton, of which I apprised you, produced the enclosure of a correspondence, which I thought I could not in fairness return without explaining fully what I considered the system of communication between my late office and the Commander-in-Chief. I received for answer that my letter had unfortunately arrived a day too late, as Mr. Huskisson had written the day before, offering the command of the forces, as well as the government of Canada, to the Duke of Gordon. It is this which has occasioned Lord Goderich's letter to you. It was too early for him to have received the Duke's answer; but Lord Melville told me two days ago that he thought that the Duke would certainly not accept. The Duke denied to Lord Aberdeen his having had an offer of the Ordnance.

It is I think clear that Sir G. Murray is to have the Ordnance ; but I suspect he will have it without the Cabinet.

The Marquess of Cleveland's coldness towards you was (according to Crevy's report to Lord Grey) occasioned more from a personal than a political feeling. He resents your having never taken any notice of him, after you had dined with him in St. James's Square. I have not yet seen Lord Lauderdale ; but he writes me word that from what he is told by Sir G. Warrender, and from what he hears from Lord Holland, "the King's new friends" as he calls them, feel themselves under great difficulties. Lord Holland would not have written this if he had entertained any sanguine hopes of being included in the next move. The language at Raby Castle was that Brougham could not in *consistency*! accept office.

The ladies beg to be most kindly remembered to you.

Yours ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely,

BATHURST.

The victory of the Whigs in Lanark has offended the Buccleughs, who complain of the conduct of Lord Goderich, and the intended appointment of the Duke of Buccleugh to the Lord-Lieutenancy of Lothian will not pacify him. He seems a sharp lad.

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*Viscount Goderich to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Downing Street, 1st October, 1827.

I am very much obliged to you for your letter, and for the very valuable suggestions which it contains, and which are deserving of every consideration.

Upon the first point, viz., the supply of rations to the troops by the commissariat in certain of our colonies, I should conceive that in many of those (if not in all) which you have mentioned, it would be practicable for the troops to supply themselves with due facility and regularity ; and if it be found practicable to make that change, it would certainly (I apprehend) be a saving of expense. There is another point, analogous to this, which appears to me worth considering. I mean the island allowances to the troops in the Mauritius and Ceylon. They amount to a considerable sum, and, being paid out of the island revenue, contribute to force the governments of those colonies to throw expense upon the mother country, which otherwise they could themselves defray.

The Ionian government has always professed itself too poor to comply with the conditions of the treaty which binds it to pay for our troops in garrison there, and I believe that although their revenue is tolerably flourishing, they have large expenses for fortifications not yet completed ; but they certainly have never thought of regulating their general expenditure with any reference to having the means of complying with the obligations of the treaty. I will have this matter looked into, as I am sure we are fully entitled to urge them upon the subject.

I quite concur in the general view which you have taken as to the expense of the settlements on the coast of Africa. I believe that if every item of expense occasioned by the Slave Trade question were put together, they would not be less than 500,000*l.* per annum. I took this matter in hand when I was at the Colonial Department, where indeed some progress

132 NOMINATION OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IN INDIA.

had previously been made in curtailing the extent of some of our useless and isolated points on the coast of Africa; but Sir Neil Campbell does not (any more than his predecessors in that government) feel much for our pecuniary difficulties at home; and Lord Bathurst's repeated injunctions as to extravagance were never properly attended to, till at last Lord Bathurst was obliged to tell him that his drafts upon the Treasury would not be paid.

I am really greatly obliged to you for your hints, and whenever you come to town shall be most happy to have some conversation with you upon the details.

Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington, very sincerely yours,

GODERICH.

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*Sir Herbert Taylor to Lord FitzRoy Somerset.*

MY DEAR LORD,

Cadogan Place, 2nd October, 1827.

I return the Duke of Wellington's letter and the enclosures which you sent me this morning.

The nomination of a Commander-in-Chief in India, as well as that of the Commander-in-Chief at Bombay and Madras, has usually resulted from communication between the Commander-in-Chief and the government, and more especially with the President of the Board of Control, the command of the Company's troops forming a principal feature in the arrangement; and in general upon the latter ground the India Board has occasionally suggested the name of the individual, and occasionally objected to that proposed by the Commander-in-Chief. But the privilege of final approval or rejection has invariably been considered as resting with the Commander-in-Chief, who is responsible for the selection of individuals employed in military capacities; more especially when these are unconnected with civil functions, as in the case of foreign governments, unless the circumstance of the Commander-in-Chief in India being second in council should be viewed as placing him in that double situation. At any rate it is free to the Duke of Wellington to object to the proposed employment of Lord Dalhousie, or of any military officer, if he should think fit to do so. If his Grace should acquiesce, it will rest with him to take his Majesty's final pleasure *officially* on the subject, as regards the command of the King's troops, and with Mr. Wynn as regards that of the Company's army.

This question has been some time in agitation in consequence of letters which I received from Lord Combermere and Lord Dalhousie, and laid before Lord Palmerston, who communicated on the subject with Lord Goderich and Mr. Wynn, and the King's pleasure would probably then have been taken upon it if Mr. Canning's serious illness and subsequent death had not intervened. Hence arose Mr. Wynn's communication with Lord Hill; but I do not believe that anything has been said to Lord Dalhousie. I have recently replied to his letter that it had been communicated to Lord Palmerston and Mr. Wynn, but that the question remained unsettled.

Ever yours truly,

H. TAYLOR.

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*To the Hon. Mount Stuart Elphinstone.*

[ 756. ]

MY DEAR SIR,

London, 8th October, 1827.

I have received your letter of the 29th April, and I assure you that nobody can be more aware than I am of the inconveniences attending the execution of the different warrants and minutes of the Treasury regarding the Deccan prize money. Among these inconveniences I confess that I do not include those resulting from a comparison of the shares to officers of the same rank, or of different ranks, serving in different parts of the same general operation, because that is the natural consequence of a division of booty founded upon *actual capture*, whatever may be the mode in which the division is made.

But I must say that the fault is not entirely to be attributed to the Treasury, but to the General officers, and principally the Commanders-in-Chief themselves. The Commander-in-Chief, Lord Hastings, first established the principle of actual capture. Then Sir Thomas Hislop and the Army of the Deccan proposed to establish a general division of all the captures, but among themselves. To this Lord Hastings objected that if there was to be a general division, the division of the Grand Army, as it was called, must share. Here the dispute began, and none upon booty was ever carried on with more violence and party spirit. The question was referred home, and came to be decided by the Treasury; how, I can't tell; and I am surprised that Lord Liverpool should ever have undertaken even to consider it at the Board of Treasury, having the means of referring it for the consideration of the Privy Council. But it was discussed and argued at the Treasury, and that Board decided that the booty should be granted to the army, and that it should be divided upon the principle of *actual capture* as far as that principle could be carried into execution, and that in cases in which that principle could not be carried into execution it should be divided among the whole army. Not only was I no party to that decision, but I did not know that such a question was under discussion till some months after it was decided. If I had, I should certainly have advised Lord Liverpool not to make such a decision.

The first I heard of the Deccan booty was when it was proposed to me that I should be one of the trustees to carry into execution the minute of the Treasury and the King's warrant



upon this subject ; which trust I accepted, and I hope that God Almighty will carry to account in the measure of the punishment for my sins all that I have suffered in its execution. I have but one consolation, and that is in the reflection that if I had not undertaken the trust, and had not performed the duty which I undertook with firmness, not to be shaken by abuse in pamphlets, in the newspapers, in society and in Parliament, nor by influence in the very highest quarters, the money would now be in the coffers of the Mexicans or the Columbians, or of some mining company, or of God knows who, as not only the prize money but the whole private fortune of Sir Thomas Hislop is, and the army would not have got one shilling of it. When I came to examine the affair I found that, as usual, a very exaggerated and extravagant notion had been formed of the amount of the prize. In fact but little had been captured. The great booty had fallen into the hands of the Company's servants in consequence of the operations of the war ; and every claim on the part of the Crown was liable to be rejected by the Company, and to become the subject of a suit-at-law between the Crown and the Company. The Treasury therefore reserved to themselves the power of deciding in what cases claims should be carried to the extent of proceedings at law.

I very soon found that but a very small proportion of what had been originally believed to be prize could be claimed by the Crown as booty, and that of that proportion I could find but little that could be claimed by any body of troops as actual capture. The greatest proportion came into possession of the Company as the result of the general operations of the war, and according to the original minute of the Treasury ought to be divided among the whole army.

I confess that I then thought that this latter part of the booty ought to be divided among what had been called the Army of the Deccan exclusively. But upon examining the case more minutely I was clearly of opinion that the only fair mode of proceeding was to divide what were called here constructive captures among the whole army. I reported accordingly to the Treasury, and upon a review and rehearing of the case they decided in conformity with the Report of the trustees, which decision, it must however be observed, was in strict conformity with that of their original minute.

This is the history of this case. All that has passed since is mere matter of detail, very troublesome to those who are to conduct it, more particularly as it is quite clear that they cannot give satisfaction to the claimants, and very uninteresting to anybody else. But I must say that the trustees do not decide upon any case of importance without reporting fully to the Treasury.

Although but little acquainted with Sir Lionel Smith, I entertain a great respect for him, and I should be very sorry that he should think that I had acted in any part of this business without consideration. I assure you that I never took more trouble with anything, and that the only satisfaction I feel is in the reflection that if I had not consented to undertake it, and had not persevered firmly in the line which I originally chalked out for myself, the brave officers and soldiers entitled to share in this booty would never have got a shilling, whereas they will now get, if not all that those who would have plundered them taught them to expect, at least a fair division of what there is.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Viscount Goderich.*

[ 757. ]

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 9th October, 1827.

I did not answer your letter respecting Sir Thomas Hislop as soon as I received it, as it was necessary that I should first see some documents, which I could see only in Town.

Sir Thomas Hislop has received prize money on account of actual captures, 23,042*l.* 18*s.* 8½*d.*, and for law expenses due to Mr. Acheson, but claimed by and paid to Sir Thomas Hislop, 2731*l.* 16*s.* 3½*d.* These are the law expenses charged on the actual captures, of which there is still a charge admitted by the Solicitor of the Treasury in Mr. Acheson's accounts, amounting to 1237*l.* 4*s.* 5*d.* not paid, because the counsel employed have stated to the trustees that their fees had not been paid; and we did not think proper to authorise the issue of money on account of Mr. Acheson which Mr. Acheson had not paid, and we directed that that money should be detained till it should be settled between Sir Thomas Hislop and his counsel to which of the parties it was due.

Besides these sums, Sir Thomas Hislop has a claim to his share of the constructive captures, the amount of which I cannot at present state; but I hope that before the end of December next the trustees will be enabled to propose to the Treasury a scheme of distribution of the same. He has likewise a claim to 12,356*l.* 11*s.* 9½*d.*, being the amount of Mr. Acheson's admitted bills for law expenses on account of the Army of the Deccan regarding the constructive captures. From this sum must be deducted the sum of 3851*l.* 9*s.* 9*d.*, being the amount due to the counsel employed in this part of the case for their fees charged in Mr. Acheson's accounts, but not paid, leaving to be received by Sir Thomas Hislop 8505*l.* 2*s.* 1½*d.* on account of the law expenses due to Mr. Acheson on this part of the case.

I should have no objection to pay this sum to Sir Thomas Hislop, if the trustees could prevail upon the East India Company to advance it, but they have positively refused. I must observe to you, however, that if the law expenses on account of the Army of the Deccan on the constructive capture part of the case are to be paid to Sir Thomas Hislop, it will be absolutely necessary to pay to Lord Hastings' agents the expenses incurred on account of the Grand Army in the same part of the case, which they are not a little clamorous to receive.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 758. ]

*A. S. E. M. le Comte Capo d'Istria.*

Londres, ce 12<sup>me</sup> Octobre, 1827.

Je faisais un voyage dans les provinces du nord de l'Angleterre quand j'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre de votre Excellence du 21<sup>me</sup> Septembre; et ayant appris que votre Excellence allait passer par Bruxelles, je ne l'aurais pas cru nécessaire, vu mon caractère d'individu, de faire plus qu'en accuser la réception, si je n'avais pas aussi appris que votre Excellence en avait communiqué la copie à d'autres.

Je désire donc vous rappeler quelques circonstances de la conversation que j'ai eue avec votre Excellence, afin que votre Excellence puisse voir où je me trouve dans cette question grecque.

Votre Excellence a fort bien observé dans cette conversation que l'objet du Protocole du mois d'Avril, 1826, était plutôt de maintenir la paix de l'Europe, et pour empêcher que la question de la Grèce vienne la troubler, que pour avancer les intérêts particuliers de la Grèce. Il faut toujours se ressouvenir que sa Majesté Impériale l'Empereur de Russie avait, au commencement de l'année 1826, des questions difficiles à arranger avec la Porte ; et qu'il en avait commencé la discussion avec cette puissance en nommant un terme fatal pour leur solution. Il était important pour sa Majesté Impériale que ni les jalousies ni les craintes des autres puissances sur la question grecque puissent interrompre les négociations de sa Majesté Impériale. En cas que ces négociations eussent malheureusement menées à des mesures ultérieures, il était important pour la paix du monde, qui était l'objet du gouvernement de sa Majesté Britannique, de calmer ces mêmes inquiétudes, ces mêmes jalousies et craintes, afin d'empêcher l'interruption de la paix générale de l'Europe.

Votre Excellence a donc très bien vu le Protocole quand elle a prononcé que son objet était de maintenir la paix en Europe.

Le Protocole a désigné une intervention entre souverain et sujets révoltés, afin de les reconcilier pour le bien général, et il a posé les bases de l'arrangement pour la réconciliation des Grecs avec la Porte Ottomane, et de l'état futur des Grecs ; et cette intervention devait prendre la forme d'une médiation en commun, aussitôt que les deux puissances se trouveraient en état d'y co-opérer.

Le Traité du mois de Juillet de l'année 1827, que votre Excellence dans sa lettre prononce être basé sur le Protocole de l'année 1826, a pour objet de forcer l'exécution du Protocole par la Porte ; et il désigne les moyens par lesquels cet objet serait accompli. Ces moyens sont ni plus ni moins que des mesures de guerre ; ces mesures de guerre ont déjà été adoptées, et la guerre se trouve déjà faite ; et votre Excellence dit dans sa lettre qu'elle se trouve fondée sur le Protocole que votre Excellence avait prononcé avoir été adopté pour maintenir la paix de l'Europe.

Il est difficile et même impossible de prévoir les conséquences de cette guerre ; mais moi, l'individu qui a été le négociateur du Protocole du mois d'Avril, 1826, je dois protester contre l'idée que cette guerre, ou ses conséquences, soient les conséquences légitimes de cet acte.

Il m'a paru, que dans la conversation que j'ai eu l'honneur d'avoir avec votre Excellence à Stratfield Saye, elle a été, également comme moi, frappé de la dissidence du Traité avec le Protocole ; et surtout que votre Excellence pensait que les mesures de guerre indiquées ne pouvaient que nuire à l'affaire grecque ; puisque les secours que le Traité donnait étaient maritimes, dont les Grecs n'avaient pas besoin ; en même temps qu'il serait une conséquence inévitable de cette guerre que les Grecs, n'y pouvant jouer qu'un rôle secondaire, tomberaient dans la dépendance de l'une ou de l'autre des grandes puissances qui y co-opéreraient. J'étais et je suis entièrement de cette même opinion. Il est vrai que ce n'est pas la seule objection que j'ai à cette guerre. Mais puisque l'objet de cette lettre est seulement pour rappeler à la mémoire de votre Excellence ce qui s'est passé dans notre conversation, il est inutile d'entrer en discussion sur d'autres objets, qui sont d'ailleurs si peu intéressants que les opinions d'un individu sur les actes de trois grandes puissances de l'Europe.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Marshal Soult to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

St. Amans (Tarn), le 18<sup>me</sup> Octobre, 1827.

Etant absent de Paris, je n'ai pu recevoir qu'il y a deux jours la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire, le 20<sup>me</sup> Septembre dernier, pour m'annoncer la gravure de votre portrait, que M. le Général Lord William Bentinck avait eu la bonté de se charger de me remettre ; mais une lettre que j'ai reçue de lui en même temps m'apprend qu'il a laissé cette gravure en mon hôtel.

Je suis très empressé, Monsieur le Maréchal, de vous exprimer que je suis infiniment reconnaissant de cette marque de souvenir ; elle me confirme que votre Excellence a accepté avec le même sentiment la gravure de mon portrait, que Lord William Bentinck a eu l'honneur de lui présenter de ma part. Cet échange cimente à mes yeux l'estime et la haute considération que j'ai pour votre Excellence.

C'est dans ces sentiments que j'ai l'honneur d'être, Monsieur le Maréchal,  
votre très-humble et obéissant serviteur,

MARÉCHAL DUC DE DALMATIE.

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*Earl Grey to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Howick, 18th October, 1827.

I have had the honour of receiving your Grace's letter of the 13th, enclosing copies of the Protocol signed at St. Petersburg on the 4th of April, and of your answer to Count Capo d'Istria.

I beg you will accept my best thanks for this communication, which places in a clear light the difference between the Protocol and the Treaty of the 6th of July.

I now return these papers. Lord Bathurst had left this place before I received them. Not knowing certainly how to direct to him, I was afraid of an inconvenient delay if I had ventured to forward them.

I remain, with the highest respect,

your Grace's obliged and faithful servant,

GREY.

*The Marquess of Anglesey to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Beau Desert, 25th October, 1827.

Before I received your letter concerning the water communications of Canada I had made considerable progress in acquiring knowledge upon the subject, but since its receipt I have taken every pains to understand it more accurately. I am happy to be able to say that the result of the investigation I have made, and of the opinions I have obtained, fully confirm me in the conviction that the decision you came to, and the orders you gave relative to the various works that are carrying on, cannot be altered without infinite disadvantage to the public service.

Only two days previous to my receiving your letter enclosing the anonymous strictures upon the adopted method of forming the Rideau Canal, and which you appear to believe were written by Lieutenant-Colonel By, I received a letter from the real author, enclosing also the printed paper, and I rejoice in having the opportunity of removing from your mind the impression that it was the production of Lieutenant-Colonel By.

I enclose the author's letter, and send at the same time for your information the last report of Lieutenant-Colonel By upon the progress that has already been made, and of the prospects he has of forwarding these most important works, and I should think from the tenor of this document, that if ever he had any leaning towards the gigantic and (taking the impossibility of incurring the expense into account) the impracticable plan of Mr. Carey, he is now convinced of its inadmissibility, and is proceeding with due zeal and activity in that which you approved.

If any proof were wanting to show that Lieutenant-Colonel By has had no hand in framing this address, it will, I think, be found in the different views the Lieutenant-Colonel and the author take of the expense that would attend the enlarged construction of the locks, &c. Lieutenant-Colonel By puts it at 400,000*l.* for the Rideau Canal, and at 1,200,000*l.* for the whole line of water communication, whereas Mr. Carey in his address asserts that 15 per cent. (or about 28,000*l.*) would cover the

difference of expense between locks of 180 feet by 60, and those of 108 feet by 20, and of the corresponding enlargement of the canals.

You will receive at the same time plans that it may be convenient to look at on reading Lieutenant-Colonel By's report.

When you have done with these papers, I request you to return them to me in Pall Mall.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, very sincerely yours,

ANGLESEY.

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*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Scone, 27th October, 1827.

I received yesterday your letter of the 22nd, together with its enclosures, and as Melville was here, I showed them to him. We agreed in thinking that Capo d'Istria will not be as ready to show your answer, as he appears to have been to circulate copies of his letter.

On reading attentively over the Protocol I think it quite clear that there is nothing in any of the articles which gives it a compulsory character. Whether Mr. Canning has succeeded in his despatches to give it that appearance is more than I can say, but I am sure the stipulations are free from it.

In contemplating the possibility of the offer of mediation being rejected by the Porte, the contracting parties were not bound by the Protocol to enforce the conditions against the Porte, but they were bound to adhere to that basis, whenever by an intervention, either jointly or separately made, a favourable opportunity should occur of effecting a reconciliation, each disclaiming territorial or commercial advantages; and this was to be in force whatever might be the relations between Russia and the Porte.

Such stipulations could not have produced a war, and were best calculated to prevent it, or the extension of it if war were on other accounts inevitable between Russia and the Porte. For if the then pending negotiations had ended (as they did) with an amicable arrangement, the Protocol (without a compulsory clause) would not have disturbed the peace which had been recently made; and if the negotiations had ended unfavourably, the stipulations of the Protocol tended to allay the jealousies with which the Allies must have viewed the progress of the Russian arms, acting as they would have done in co-operation with those of Greece; for by those stipulations Russia stood bound to adhere to the basis detailed in the Protocol, whatever might be her success or her relations with the Porte. I have, therefore, always considered the Protocol more against Russian aggrandisement than for Turkish dismemberment.

We have had sad weather for our excursion, but Lady Bathurst has borne the fatigue full as well as I could have expected. They both beg to be kindly remembered to you. You are probably aware that the Duke of Gordon has declined the government of Canada.

Yours ever very sincerely,

BATHURST.

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IBRAHIM PACHA'S ACCOUNT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES PRECEDING THE  
BATTLE OF NAVARINO.

EXTRAIT d'un RAPPORT du Capitaine PUJOL, commandant la goëlette de  
S.M.T.C. *La Flèche*.

Navarin, le 29<sup>me</sup> Octobre, 1827.

Ibrahim Pacha m'ayant fait dire qu'il désirait m'entretenir, je me rendis près de lui à 6 heures du soir, accompagné de deux de mes officiers.

“ M. le Capitaine, je veux avoir un entretien, que je désire que vous rapportiez aussi fidèlement et exactement que possible à l'Amiral de Rigny ; je compte pour cela sur votre honneur. On me calomnie. Ibrahim, dit-on, a manqué à sa parole. Voici ce qui s'est passé :—Peu de temps avant la malheureuse affaire du 20<sup>me</sup>, j'eus une conférence avec MM. les Amiraux Anglais et Français ; plusieurs officiers étaient présents. Il a été convenu verbalement entre nous qu'il y aurait armistice entre les Grecs et les Turcs jusqu'à la réception de la décision de la Porte en égard aux propositions des puissances. J'ai demandé si je pouvais approvisionner Patras, qui manquait de vivres. On m'a répondu qu'il n'y avait aucune empêchement. J'ai demandé, en cas que les Grecs attaquaient mon convoi, si on s'y opposerait. On m'a répondu que non ; mais l'Amiral Anglais m'a proposé une escorte ou un sauf-conduit, ce que j'ai refusé comme contraire à mon honneur.

“ Peu de temps après le départ des escadres de devant Navarin, j'ai expédié un convoi pour Patras sous l'escorte de quelques bâtiments de guerre. Ayant appris que les Grecs étaient de ce côté, devais-je en agir autrement, et laisser périr de faim mes frères d'armes ? Peu après, sur de nouveaux avis que Cochrane menaçait Patras avec des forces considérables, je suis parti moi-même, accompagné d'une douzaine de frégates, pour aller assurer l'arrivée de mon convoi. Dans cette intervalle, le convoi avait été rencontré par les Anglais, et à la première sommation avait rebroussé chemin. Trouvant mon convoi à l'entrée du canal de Zante, après une conférence avec mes principaux officiers, je me décidai à poursuivre ma première résolution d'approvisionner Patras, ne pensant pas violer mes engagements ; mon but n'étant pas d'entreprendre rien contre les Grecs, qui d'ailleurs de ce côté n'ont plus aucune possession.

“ J'étais donc dans cette décision lorsque, rencontré de nouveau par les Anglais, je me décidai, sur une nouvelle sommation, à retourner à Navarin sans effectuer mon projet. J'étais de retour à Navarin, et j'avais quitté cette place depuis quelques jours, lorsque les escadres anglaise, française, et russe se montrèrent. Une frégate et un brig anglais entrèrent sans pavillon, et après avoir fait quelques bordées dans la rade, en sortirent sans avoir hissé pavillon ; conduite que je ne saurais justifier.

“ Le 20<sup>me</sup>, les Alliés faisant route sur Navarin dans un ordre qui menaçait des intentions hostiles, le Pacha qui commandait en mon absence envoya un embarcation à bord l'Amiral Anglais, pour lui observer qu'une partie de l'escadre pouvait entrer si on le désirait ou si les Alliés avaient quelque besoin, mais qu'il ne verrait pas avec plaisir entrer une armée aussi nombreuse, moi étant absent.



“ Je vous demande, M. le Capitaine, votre opinion : regardez-vous comme une offense une pareille demande ? N'est-il pas naturel de ne pas désirer l'entrée dans un port de forces deux à cinq fois supérieures, et qui inspirent de la défiance ?

“ L'Amiral Anglais renvoya l'embarcation, en répondant qu'il ne venait pas pour recevoir des avis, mais pour donner des ordres ; et continua à gouverner avec son escadre en ligne sur Navarin, où il entra à 2 heures après midi, et de suite s'embossa à portée de pistolet devant l'armée turque.

“ Pendant ce temps une de ses frégates s'était détachée, et avait mouillé par travers de deux brûlots situés à l'entrée du port, et les Français et les Russes, suivant près l'Amiral Anglais, imitaient sa manœuvre. L'Amiral Turc, ayant envoyé une nouvelle embarcation à bord l'Amiral Anglais, pour demander des explications sur ces mesures hostiles, elle fut repoussée d'une manière outrageante ; et dans le même moment la frégate embossée devant les brûlots a envoyé ses embarcations pour s'en emparer. Alors commença une fusillade qui fut comme le signal du combat, qui ne finit qu'à la nuit, et qui effectua l'entière destruction de notre escadre ; laquelle, composée de trois vaisseaux de ligne, d'une quinzaine de frégates, et de quantité de petits bâtiments, et n'étant pas préparée au combat, avait affaire à dix vaisseaux de ligne, et nombre de frégates et corvettes. Les Amiraux pensent-ils avoir fait un ample moisson de gloire en égorgeant ainsi avec des forces aussi supérieures ceux qui ne pouvaient s'attendre à une pareille attaque, qui n'y avaient point donné lieu, et qui pour ainsi dire n'avaient fait encore aucun préparatif de défense ? Maintenant dire qui a commencé l'attaque et tiré le premier coup de canon, c'est ce dont chacun se défend ; ce qu'il y a de certain c'est que la frégate anglaise a, la première, et sans raison, voulu s'emparer des brûlots, et que c'est la juste résistance de ce côté qui a occasionné le premier feu. Enfin, Capitaine, ma conscience ne me reprochant rien, j'avoue que j'ignore encore le véritable motif d'un pareil attentat. Les puissances ont voulu, disent-elles, faire cesser l'effusion du sang dans le Levant, et voici que leurs Amiraux viennent d'en rougir la rade de Navarin, et de la couvrir de cadavres. On accuse, dit-on, Ibrahim d'avoir manqué à sa parole ; mais j'irai à Paris et à Londres, s'il le faut, pour faire connaître la vérité ; et ceux qui ont versé le sang innocent en porteront la honte et le blâme. Les bâtiments sont faits pour devenir la proie du feu et de la mer ; ce n'est point eux que je regrette ; mais m'accuser d'avoir rompu mes engagements, c'est une infame calomnie.

“ Je compte sur votre honneur, M. le Capitaine, pour répéter, mot par mot, à votre Amiral, ce que je viens de vous dire.”

[ 759. ]

MEMORANDUM UPON THE GREEK CASE.

On the 2nd of August, 1826, Mr. Canning communicated to me certain queries put to him by Prince Lieven regarding the execution of the Protocol of the preceding April.

Some of these queries applied to the execution of a plan which had been in contemplation, and respecting which in-

structions had been given to Mr. Stratford Canning and Sir Frederick Adam, and to the Admiral commanding his Majesty's ships in the Mediterranean. This plan had for its object to prevent the execution, by Ibrahim Pacha, of a project imputed to him by the Russians to remove the Greek inhabitants of the Morea into Africa and to colonise Greece by Egyptians.

I had some discussion with Mr. Canning on that subject, the result of which was that Mr. Canning having informed Prince Lieven that upon inquiry having found that there was no ground whatever to impute either to the Porte or to Ibrahim Pacha a plan for the extermination of the Greek population, such as had been imputed to them, these queries were withdrawn ; and, on the 7th August, it was agreed to communicate the Protocol to the other Allied Courts, according to what had been settled at St. Petersburg in April, which was accordingly done in the end of August.

It appears that early in November, 1826, there was a renewal of the proposal from Russia, in a despatch or letter from Count Nesselrode, for the use of measures of force to obtain the consent of the Porte to the Protocol, to which Mr. Canning refused to listen.

I had no farther communication with Mr. Canning on the subject of these arrangements till February, when he sent me the project of a Treaty including France, which had been drawn up at Paris, and was sent to England by Lord Granville, in his despatch No. 24, of the 29th January, 1827 ; the first mention of France becoming a party to the arrangement of St. Petersburg being on the 12th January, 1827, and of the intention of converting the Treaty into a Protocol.

There was no mention of force in this project of a Treaty, but there was of commercial agents, which I urged Mr. Canning to strike out.

I heard no more upon the subject of this Treaty till the 19th of March.

But I see that in a despatch dated the 26th January, 1827, No. 64, Lord Granville mentions that the Russians were thinking of force.

On the 19th of March, 1827, Mr. Canning sent me the French draft of the Treaty, its amendments, the draft suggested by Russia, including as separate articles part of what the Treaty of the 6th July contains.

I stated to Mr. Canning my objections to the alterations in the Treaty from the Protocol in a letter which I wrote to him on the 20th March and a conversation I had subsequently with him in presence of Lord Granville; and I conceived he had given up the plan. In April I was out of office, and heard no more of it afterwards.

WELLINGTON.

*Sir J. C. Smyth to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD,

Nutwood, Reigate, 30th October, 1827.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Grace's letter of the 27th instant, together with that from Lord Anglesey of the 25th to your Grace. Your Grace had evidently not received the letter I took the liberty of addressing to your Grace, upon my return from Beau Desert. I was fully aware of Lord Anglesey's sentiments upon the subject. I believe, indeed, as far as his means will enable him, from what his Lordship said to me, it is decidedly his intention that your Grace's views, not only with respect to the Rideau Canal, but upon all the military points connected with his Majesty's North American Provinces, should be strictly followed. His Lordship told me that although the Ordnance estimates were to be very low, yet 10,000*l.* would be put in for Kingston, and the same for Halifax citadel. These sums are certainly very small, but still it is doing something, and will produce some effect upon the minds of the inhabitants of these provinces, as well as upon the Americans. No detailed plans, either for the Niagara or the Montreal fortress, have as yet been received.

From the plans and reports I have seen I think your Grace would be much pleased with the progress made upon the Rideau. Whatever may have been Lieutenant-Colonel By's original errors, he certainly is now getting on with very great zeal and activity. He certainly at first wrote home a great deal of nonsense, and formed the most unmilitary notions as to the defence of Canada, proposing to remove the Richelieu Rapids, and other obstacles, on which the safety of the province in a great measure depends. His estimate for 1,200,000*l.* was also very ridiculous. He has also, perhaps, been unguarded in his conversation in allowing these notions of his to become public. With all this, he appears however to deserve the character they entertain of him at General Mann's office, of being a very active and capable officer, and well qualified to execute the details of this work. I should hope your Grace will have no further cause of uneasiness or of reference; and that in the year 1830 this most useful work, as connected with the permanent security of Canada, will be entirely completed.

With respect to the impossibility of forming towing-paths, mentioned by Lieutenant-Colonel By in his report, and alluded to by your Grace in your letter of the 27th instant, I don't think it is of the least consequence, or need occasion the slightest regret to your Grace. In those parts of the water communication, which will be literally a canal, there will of course be a towing-path; where the water becomes broader there will be of course towing-steamers for hire. This is the case at present on all the lakes and

broad parts of the St. Lawrence and at La Chine. Vessels either sail or are towed by steamers to that end of the La Chine nearest to Montreal. They are then towed by horses through the canal, at the end of which there is another steamer which, if the wind does not suit them, they may engage to tow them to any part of Lake St. Louis, to the foot of the Cascades Rapids, or up the Ottawa to the foot of the St. Anne's Rapids, according as they are bound. There is already a steamer on the Ottawa above the Grenville Canal, which will tow any vessel from the Grenville Canal to the mouth of the Rideau; and I respectfully submit to your Grace that as the communication is opened, and in proportion as the want of towing means are felt, steamers will be built and be navigated wherever they are required.

I have reflected a good deal upon what your Grace said upon a former occasion with respect to the tolls and future management of the locks and canals. I have made some memoranda, but I have hardly as yet sufficient data to enable me to put anything satisfactory before your Grace. Two principles, however, I respectfully submit your Grace will probably think ought to be kept in view in the measures to be adopted. The first is to induce the Canadian boatmen to prefer and to make use of the Rideau communication in preference to the St. Lawrence, by making it a cheaper as well as a safer conveyance. The charge for pilotage through the St. Lawrence Rapids is very heavy: the expenses for going through the Rideau Canal ought consequently to be less. With a cheaper and safer mode of getting to Montreal, the St. Lawrence Rapids will be, of course, avoided, and they will remain a prominent military feature in the defence of the Canadas, and prevent a combined movement upon Montreal. The second point to which I think your Grace would probably wish to advert, will be to avoid an expensive establishment in taking charge of the locks and collecting the tolls. I should think that by letting them for a term of years, as turnpike-roads are in England, binding the lessee as to the tolls he is to collect, and to keep everything in order, under proper superintendence, would perhaps be the best plan. I will, however, ascertain how the Americans manage with their Western Canal, which is a very great source of revenue to the State of New York; as also how the La Chine Canal, which belongs to the Legislature of Lower Canada, is arranged. In a few years the amount of the tolls to be collected upon the Rideau will certainly be considerable, even keeping them at a very low rate.

I have the honour to be, my Lord, with the sincerest respect,  
 your Grace's most obliged and most obedient servant,  
 J. CARMICHAEL SMYTH.

*The Right Hon. Charles Wynn to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Llangedwin, 1st November, 1827.

Pray accept my best thanks for your communication of Lord Combermere's wish to delay his return from India for another year.

It is to be regretted that he did not finally make up his mind on the subject before he notified his desire to be relieved from his command in

146 UNAUTHORISED USE OF THE DUKE'S NAME.

1828, not only to the authorities in England, but to Lord Dalhousie, whom he knew to be a candidate to succeed him.

Believe me, with the highest respect, my dear Duke,  
ever most faithfully yours,  
C. WILLIAMS WYNN.

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[ 760. ]

*To Edward Wheeler, Esq.*

SIR,

Bretby Hall, 2nd November, 1827.

I send you the enclosed paper, as I see your name advertised as secretary, although it is just possible that there may be as little authority for the advertisement of your name as secretary as there is for that of mine as a president for the time being.

I beg leave to protest against such use of my name, and against my being supposed in any manner connected with the transaction, viz. the Grand Imperial Canal from London to Portsmouth.

If I should see my name in any other prospectus I shall think it necessary to publish this protest.

I have, &c.,  
WELLINGTON.

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[ 761. ]

*To General Lord Hill.*

MY DEAR HILL,

Bretby Park, 4th November, 1827.

You may rely upon it that I did not forget your wishes to be moved to a higher government upon the recent vacancy occasioned by the death of Lord Pembroke, and although I am not enabled to congratulate you upon your appointment in succession to him, I have been authorised by the King to tell you that it is his intention to appoint you to the next vacancy which will occur of governments of that description. Of course you will keep this to yourself.

Ever, &c.,  
WELLINGTON.

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[ 762. ]

*To N. W. Cundy, Esq.*

SIR,

Woodford, 8th November, 1827.

I beg to inform you that I never received any intimation whatever, whether by proof-sheet or otherwise, that it was

intended to make use of my name as a member of the Grand Imperial Canal, till I received the paper which I returned to Mr. Wheeler some days ago. It now appears that that paper was not the proof-sheet, but is a publication, and that my name is to be withdrawn *in future*. I therefore think it proper to give you notice that if it is not notified by you to the public, between this and Sunday next, that the insertion of my name was by mistake, a statement will appear in Monday's paper that the insertion was unauthorised by me, and that I have been obliged to make the statement myself, because those who, although unauthorised, inserted my name, have not made known to the public in a manner satisfactory to me that I did not belong to the Society.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Major-General Sir Jasper Nicolls to Sir Herbert Taylor.*

MY DEAR SIR HERBERT,

Calcutta, 10th November. 1827.

However this may find you, as Colonel of the 85th, Deputy to the Secretary-at-War, or as Secretary to a Commander-in-Chief (which last I sincerely trust it may do), I feel that to you my opinions ought to be addressed, not only as my best surviving friend, but as the channel through which they may be made useful. This letter follows naturally that of the 29th April, in which I observe this comparison was promised. You have now four of my productions before you : 16th August, 1826 ; 29th November, 1826 ; 29th April, 1827 ; and 27th October.

I am sure you will acknowledge the propriety of my addressing this last to Lord Combermere. It is not the less interesting to you, and as his Lordship has just set off on an extensive tour, he may possibly direct his inquiries to some of the circumstances I have mentioned. I shall go on, with diligence, in making such further inquiries as my new command at Meerut may enable me to do, and in the end I may do some good.

One circumstance has struck me forcibly lately. Gradually, since the days of Lord Clive, the call here has been for more European officers, from a Captain-Commandant, with the aid of a few subalterns ; this army has now 23 officers to each regiment, and I still say they require more, as long as there are so many absentees.

You will not fail to remember that Rogniat (in his treatise *Sur la Guerre*) condemns the excessive train of artillery which Napoleon brought into the field in 1813, although acknowledged by both to be meant to counterpoise the *inefficiency* of his infantry, both in number and discipline.

Are we in India come to the point when it is desirable to make up in officers what the Native infantry has lost in loyalty and morale? Few will

give this a willing affirmative; but I gather it from what we see done, and hear of very frequently.

Refer to Duff's 'History of the Mahrattas,' and see what he (a Bombay officer) writes of the sepoy's of Hindostan; you will find high tributes to their fidelity and valour in pages 207 and 256 of the 3rd volume.

Now, my dear Sir Herbert, if this army be still retrograding, officers alone will not counteract the depression. System alone can do it—well considered, liberally pursued, but enforced; and if the recruiting were altered, so as not to depend too much on a few districts and a few castes; if promotion for Europeans and Natives were more rapid, and encouragement more certain; and lastly, if discipline were better understood and attended to, the Bengal army ought to be the finest colonial army in the world.

A pursuit of these four would, no doubt, lead to the discovery of all other necessary amendments.

I shall endeavour to lay before you some opinions respecting the amalgamation of the Indian army with that of his Majesty's; but it really is a question which I approach with great hesitation and distrust of my own ability.

With warmest thanks for your kindness to me, and with every good wish,

I remain, &c.,

J. NICOLLS.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*Copy of a Letter to Viscount Combermere.*

MY DEAR LORD,

On board the *Guide*, 27th October, 1827.

I have availed myself of the uninterrupted leisure of my voyage from Vizagapatam to prepare some remarks upon the military systems of India, which, according to a promise long since made, I now beg to offer to your perusal.

I am aware that it is neither an easy, agreeable, nor unobjectionable task to draw a comparison between the native armies of Bengal and Madras. Had I remained longer with the latter, I should have postponed the attempt for another year, and possibly have succeeded better than I can now hope to do.

Nothing but active and severe service, which shows the intelligence of man, his vigilance, patience, loyalty, and valour, can enable any one justly and fully to appreciate all that ornaments and gives value to the soldier. Not having had an opportunity, since 1803, of studying the Madras sepoy, I must not enter upon these parts of the finished soldier, but confine myself to the composition, encouragement, and instruction of the two armies.

If I have not penetrated deeply, I have felt strongly. My desire is to avoid all prejudice or bias, and my humble hope is to do good.

The Madras sepoy is decidedly inferior in size to that of Bengal. He wants the strengthening food of the native of Hindostan; and, being born under a more even temperature, he is a stranger to the bracing effects of cold.

The standard is five feet five inches. It appears, however, that in seven native regiments in the Northern Division, there are no less than 1850 men below that height, occasioned by hasty recruiting during the Burmese war, by enlisting relatives, by taking sepoy boys into pay, and by disappointed expectations as to growth after enlistment. This is a decided evil, and it is corrected by discharging at every inspection; but it involves much expense, and labour

also, in teaching men who are unfit for the service. No man or boy should be entertained under 5 ft. 5 in.; indeed, while it was possible to get men of 5 ft. 6 in., *even slowly*, I should prefer it; 800 of that stature being, I think, equal to 900 of 5 ft. 5 in., who, if at all ill-made or badly formed, are unequal to bear the load of their arms, ammunition, and knapsack.

All this is, however, acknowledged by the attempts made to enlist the men of Hindostan for the Madras regiments.

The Bengal sepoy is more erect than those of the coast army. They have much finer chests, and originally a superior carriage. Their legs are not, probably, quite so good, owing to the common practice of squatting, by which the weight is thrown entirely on the calves of the legs.

When a slouching, awkward Bengal sepoy is seen, he exhibits merely a specimen of neglect, either in the recruiting officer or the adjutant of his corps; or perhaps he feels oppressed by some part of the system, and is not cheerful. A well set-up Madras sepoy shows that he has become so by pains and exertion, and continues so from pride, and the strong persuasion that he will be noticed and rewarded.

The personnel of the two services differs also exceedingly in caste. The Brahmans, who inundate the Bengal army, are not valued, and rarely admitted into the ranks of a Madras corps; whilst the Mussulmen are very numerous, and considered their best soldiers.

In these opinions, the last excepted, I think the Madras officers are right. The Brahmin wants many of the necessary qualities of a soldier, and very seldom, I think respects his officer, or the service, when compared with his caste, his idolatry, or his spiritual superior. I think too that Brahmans are not, in general, brave men.

From these two causes result their numerous and vile desertions when going upon service, and the odious, half-mutinous manner in which they demean themselves under difficulties. To cover their own shame they spread their disloyal whisperings, till the number of the discontented becomes too great for punishment. Their caste renders this easy. Adepts in persuasion, important from their numbers, seducing from their religious rank and supposed knowledge, they crown the evil by pernicious example.

The names of the mutineers of the 47th, who were tried, prove their high caste; and when the 15th misbehaved at Bhurtpore, though the disturbed feelings of the Mussulmen led to the disgraceful transaction, yet there was a Brahmin meddler implicated.

It always seemed to me that there was a feeling at that siege which was not drawn from a devoted allegiance to our government, but emanated from an impression that the place was beyond our power; and that if it fell, the last and chief hope and hold of the Hindoos was gone.

A deliberating soldier is a bad one. The essence of the profession is obedience. What can we think, then, of an army containing a third part of such deliberators? with influence over another equally large portion?

The truth or incorrectness of what I have stated might be ascertained by examining rolls of deserters, by perusing reports of disaffection amongst the Native army, and by soliciting the opinions of old and good officers.

It would be a wise measure, I think, to check their enlistment, at least as far as may, under my view of the case, appear to be safely practicable.

I do not value the Mussulman soldier as highly as he is esteemed in the Madras army, but I should be very glad to see the Brahmans in a great degree replaced by them in the ranks of Bengal. They are more profligate in some respects than the Hindoo, more careless, more impatient of discipline, but they are not so prone to combine under difficulty, unless their religion was assailed or openly slighted.



What the Rajpoot is in the Bengal service, its support and ornament, the Mussulman seems to be in the Madras army. This importance they derive partly from their numbers, and partly from the absence of the wily Brahmins. The partiality of the Madras officers to the Mussulmen had, at one time, raised so many of their sect to the rank of commissioned officers, that the government ordered promotion to be given equally, or nearly so. Even now, of 125 Native officers, in seven corps, at my inspection, 75 were Mussulmen and 50 Hindoos. There were 15 wanting or absent.

Even though the argument should weaken my own position, yet I must not pass over the Villore mutiny, where probably the Mahometan influence, acting on numbers, produced the same effects which I have ascribed to Brahmin craft.

Beyond doubt the Madras Mussulmen yield to discipline better than those of Bengal. The same remark may be made of the *Rajpoots* of Hindostan, thinly scattered over their ranks. *They adopt cheerfully the habits of the Coast Army*, except cooking with their clothes on, and either have not the wants of the Bengal troops, or suppress them.

The seven sepoy regiments before mentioned were thus composed in January last :—

Malabar men .. .. .	274
Pariahs .. .. .	16*
Mussulmen .. .. .	2191
Hindoos .. .. .	3736
Christians .. .. .	47
Bader .. .. .	30

6294†

Here, to balance 37 Hindoos, there are nearly 26 of other castes, and of these 22 are Mussulmen.

Bearing in mind that Brahmins are not admitted, this seems to be a safe and good composition.

In the returns received, the Rajpoots were only distinctly specified by one corps, of 684 Hindoos, but 51 were Rajpoots, or 1 in 13.

The absence of the Brahmin, and the want of the Rajpoot, give that consequence to the Mussulman which I have already mentioned.

In a word, I think the Madras army as much inferior to that of Bengal in size and personal appearance, as it is superior to the latter in composition and dress.

We must next, in order, come to the means whereby these armies are instructed and animated for the performance of those duties for which they are retained, and in what degrees, respectively, they understand and fulfil them.

In each Madras regiment thirty recruit boys and forty pension boys are entertained; they receive 3½ rupees per month. It is a most charitable institution, as it provides for the sons of old sepoya, and of those who fall in action, who are selected in preference to all others. When enrolled at four years old, and transported to the ranks at sixteen, they are very expensive recruits: 500 rupees has been the outlay. In return for this, the State at times obtains an excellent, smart sepoy—a soldier from the cradle—with very few prejudices; but if every corps should transfer six annually to the ranks (which is above the average) the charge of 3000 rupees has been incurred for it. Many do not attain the prescribed height, and are discharged. At my inspection I was compelled to select twenty-eight to be thus parted with.

Whether the satisfaction afforded to the men, and an occasional prize of a

\* Old soldiers possibly; now not admitted.

† Of which 322 were Hindostanees.

thorough soldier, be worth the heavy expense, is a question which should not be hastily answered. The families of Bengal sepoy do not generally accompany them; hence such a charity is not so necessary, and if, when a sepoy was killed, a son was called for to be enrolled, some poor relative would frequently be substituted.

Promotion, the great encourager and *agitator* of the soldier, is very differently managed at the two Presidencies. In Bengal seniority is far too rigidly adhered to. Some instances of rewarding merit in war do there appear, but in the Coast Army the selection begins very early, as the following extract will show:—

“Adverting to the Standing Regulations, confidential men are in the first instance selected by officers commanding companies, with the sanction of the commanding officer, but as the respectability of the Native officers depends so essentially on a judicious selection of men, in the first instance, to form non-commissioned officers, you will be pleased to direct in future that officers commanding companies point out six of the smartest of these men, of good caste, and respectable characters; from these men you will select those you consider most likely ultimately to become good subadars and jemadars; and the Commander-in-Chief wishes particularly to impress upon your mind, not only the justice but policy of bringing forward for promotion the sons of old and respectable commissioned officers, provided they are duly qualified, and worthy of distinction; preserving at all times equal preferment to the Hindoos (Rajpoots in particular) as well as Mussulmen.

“If the confidential men and *even the naigues*, after selection, do not answer the expectation which has been entertained of their fitness for the duties required of them, they should be passed over in future promotion, or reduced to the ranks. In the latter case, when it is deemed expedient to resort to a measure of such severity, a special report of the circumstance is to be made at the foot of the monthly return, but it will be deemed sufficient cause, should they manifest either incapacity, idleness, or disinclination to perform their duties, without being guilty of any specific crime. Acts of insubordination, neglect, or irregularity, must in every practicable case be submitted previously to a court-martial. A naigue is not a non-commissioned officer, and docs not fall under the same regulations.” \*

Four years is the general term of probation. After that, these confidential men (or lance-naigues) may be promoted according to their merits. I cannot positively quote an order establishing that period, but I called for a return of the havildars of a regiment, and found that three of them had only served five years each.

Here, then, is the mainspring of the Madras army, and it is founded on an accurate knowledge of man in all ages. From the moment he joins the ranks, a coast sepoy may, and a true soldier will, aspire to the consequence and hope for the pay of a Native officer.

The processes of selection, comparison, and of rejection have been already noticed. They may work their way to the grade of havildar, but the following rule bars them from further advancement:—

“A man may make a good naigue, and a very tolerable non-commissioned officer, but at the same time fail in many of the qualifications requisite to form a respectable Native officer, who ought to be a man of high spirit, respectable family connexions, good caste, and sufficiently advanced in years to claim respect, without being too old to exert his zeal, and show a good example.

\* Circular Letter of Adjutant-General to Commanding Officers of regiments. 25th February, 1824.

"Those men who may have attained the rank of havildar, and do not possess those energies and abilities requisite to form a commissioned officer, must not be advanced beyond the rank of colour-havildar, a situation they must be taught to consider ample remuneration, and to which situation they cannot aspire unless their conduct has been marked by zeal and attention to their duties, and strict fidelity to the service.

"In your future recommendation-certificates you will not hesitate to pass over any havildar you may consider unequal to the duties of a commissioned officer, giving opposite to each man's name '*not recommended*,' with your reasons for having done so." \*

This is the principle of the Madras service, and if a commanding officer has bad havildars, or inefficient Native officers, it is his own fault, or that of his predecessor. He may reduce the naigues if they do not do their duty well, and if the havildars or naigues be merely negatively good, he may pass them over. I consider that his hands are greatly strengthened by this power.

The same selection of the commanding officer, the same stimulating hope, attends the promotion of the two ranks of Native officers; and as far as the Native character allows, I suppose it does draw out their best exertions. Here I own I was disappointed; the Native officers were not much distinguished by superior carriage, or high external recommendation. I asked for men who had merited promotion by valour, or performed any marked service: few were brought to my notice.

On parade they commanded their companies with intelligence.

The Madras government pushes its anxiety to raise the Native officers much further than it is done in Bengal. To encourage them, instances of good conduct, though not exceeding the bounds of loyalty and steady attention to duty, are selected for reward; and a palanquin, with 70 rupees a month to keep it up, are frequently voted to them. Ten or twelve have been accorded for exertions during the Burmese war. Sometimes a sword is added; in the cavalry, a horse; and occasionally lands. Superior pensions are generally given to the heirs of Native officers thus honoured.

When I behold subadars so selected, so rewarded, and still so imperfect, I feel, with regret, that no exertion can raise them as a body. The want of education, and the thralldom of caste, with the paramount influence of habit, chain them down to mediocrity. Thus we found the natives, or we should never have conquered India; and thus I fully expect they will ever remain.

Still, their success animates all below, to whom 40 rupees a month promises every comfort and much importance; and this they know is open to them all.

But if these things be so in the Madras service, what can we look for in Bengal? Prejudice is stronger; there is no hope of early promotion; the old sepoy must generally await his first step twelve to sixteen years. After such dire delay, if *in mind* he ever rises beyond a sepoy, he is not a common man. He must feel that talents and education are not very advantageous to him, and his other qualities not more highly valued. Hence all that languor and apathy which are but too visible; hence, perhaps, that spirit of complaint, which, arising in disappointment at slow promotion and unnoticed exertion, runs into other channels, and makes the oldest sepoys the most discontented and dangerous men. Who have we to check these rising complaints? The Native officers chiefly, who have been bred up under similar privations, and many of whom, having attained the highest rank, care for nothing but its permanence, and its attendant advantages.

\* Letter before quoted.

How far it would be safe to make any innovation in this respect in the Bengal army, I am not prepared to say ; but I think it should ever be kept in view. We all know that an active-minded man is the very person most stung by neglect ; and it is often evident that men who yield to irritation, perhaps constitutionally, make very firm and good subjects, when they meet with reward and encouragement.

What do all the European officers complain of, but of the extreme tardiness of promotion, and of the spirit-destroying equality of a seniority service ?

These Madras havildars have a very stimulating prize, not yet mentioned. There is a Native adjutant, a jemadar selected from their roll.

“ But as the drill havildar must be always selected for that situation on account of his distinguished fitness for duties, not only laborious and important, but requiring good temper, smartness, and superior ability, the Commander-in-Chief recommends that such men should be brought forward for the commissioned ranks, without reference to their standing in the service as havildars, whenever they are found to merit the preference. It is to such men that you must look to form effective and intelligent adjutants, in preference to any other class.” \*

This is a great inducement. The recruit of five years may be a havildar ; if clever, with a little education, not having *forgotten* his drill, with all the pride of youth, and the elasticity of hope about him, he may, in three years more, treble his havildar's pay by displaying the necessary qualifications, supported by respect for superiors and attention to duty. It is a great prize, truly. Which of us would not be rejoiced to have it in view ? These jemadar adjutants are in general very smart men. They are strictly Native adjutants, for the sergeant-major is a mere clerk—often an ignorant half-caste who can write a good hand.

I have now mentioned the chief means by which the Madras sepoy's are roused to exertion and to emulation. The best passions of each individual are acted upon for the benefit of the State, and for the correction of what is useless or base in the same composition.

The Gentoos are low Hindoos, and the common Mussulmen are too frequently very debauched men. Were these two to be managed as Bengal sepoy's are, they would not be worth their salt. Vice of various kinds they are inured to, drunkenness is not uncommon, and if to these were added despair of promotion, and a want of the good examples now frequent amongst them, they would be almost useless.

As it is, punishments, especially on service, are numerous ; so much so as nearly to proclaim the absence of restraint, or the voluntary relaxation of discipline. In quarters, a few trials are necessary, chiefly for desertion.

When these means have failed, when the havildars hold forth little promise of any further supply of jemadars, the Biennial Invaliding Committees remove the oldest havildars. In one corps last year, when under my orders, the following sweep was made :—

	Invalided.	Pensioned.
Subadars .. .. .	2	2
Havildars .. .. .	20	2
Naigues .. .. .	11	—
Drummers .. .. .	1	—
Sepoys .. .. .	73	3
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	107	7
	<hr/>	<hr/>

\* Letter before quoted.

This was a wonderfully fine weeding, especially for a corps which had not served in Ava. But let us follow this into its consequences, or rather its immediate results. Four jemadars and four havildars were to be at once promoted: twenty-six of the smartest naigues *out of fifty* attained the next very desirable step, and thirty-seven sepoy (every twenty-first man in the corps) reached the envied rank of naigue. For each vacancy thus created amongst the confidential men, there were probably several competitors.

What would the Bengal Rajpoots be could they be raised to emulation in this manner? They would die in line with the Europeans, if well led, and would do or suffer anything that a great and generous government could desire or hope. This is my firm belief.

Of Brahmins I have not the same good opinion. They would succeed "*astutia non animo.*" The Bengal Mussulmen are too few in number to give the tone to their battalions. The lead is therefore decidedly in Hindoo hands, and they under Brahmin guidance.

Low caste men I fear. They can be taught easily, and attain an imposing smartness of air; but cowardice, infidelity, and treachery are ever the vices of those who are reared under the contempt of all around them.

I would equally avoid all endeavour to erect the discipline of Europe upon the wreck of caste. Whoever succeeds in such an attempt will, I think, deceive himself and the government he serves. To engraft the science of our own army in part, and the confidence which a close order and superior weapons give, upon the simple habits and native pride of a high-caste sepoy, is all we can desire. His weaknesses should be respected, not only as arguing principle, but as the ladder by which we have mounted.

I remember the Madras sepoy in 1803, and I saw a very fine detachment of Bengal troops at Bombay in 1802. Comparing the two services now, with the impressions of those days, I think the former are improved in many points, and the latter inferior in quality.

Closer observation, in 1815 and 1817, leads me to think that the Bengal Native army has even retrograded since the first-named year. There is a listlessness about the corps which argues the presence of anything rather than a military bearing, and a loyal, contented spirit; and there is a slovenly performance of all duties, which leads infallibly to the conclusion either that they do not know their duty, or will not do it.

I declare solemnly that when I landed, in 1825, I took a part of the grenadiers of the 5th Native infantry, on duty at the Commander-in-Chief's gate, for sepoy of the local militia.

Having given, though too briefly, my sentiments on the composition of the two armies, and on the means used to draw forth their exertions, I must now offer a few remarks upon the officers and the general Staff of the two Presidencies.

The former are, of course, at first exactly equal. From a certain appearance common to the Madras officers I expected to find the subalterns more highly instructed than I did. They commanded their companies tolerably, but in some cases not better than the Native officers. I ascribe this deficiency partly to the late return of the regiments from Rangoon, where little could be taught; but if their system of training young officers thoroughly were good, and acted upon, I never could have met with three uninstructed adjutants in nine corps: yet so it was.

It is pretty clear that more of the credit which I have given to the Madras army is due to the system itself than to the close and spirited attention given to it by the officers.

When reforms were urgently required in my division, as they were in two regiments, they were effected by a change of commanding officers. So easily

do men accommodate themselves to rule, provided that the hand which chastises will also uphold—that the lips which teach and reprove will also encourage and applaud—and that the same toleration and coercion are shown to all ranks.

The zeal and judgment shown by Lieutenant-Colonel Waugh in reforming the 1st European Regiment, I have never seen surpassed.

The same race for Staff appointment, and the same train of injurious consequences are evident in both. The absentees are not, however, so very numerous, as in Bengal. There is but one local battalion, no stud department, no irregular cavalry, no agents for clothing, no revenue surveyors, and but few barrack-masters.

I tried to ascertain in what degree the confidence of the sepoy was won from him by the affability of his officer. I do not think that this link is very strong. The latter do not speak the Hindostanee language nearly so well as the officers of Bengal, and the young soldiers at first can only converse in the language of their own province.

Personal attachment is the strongest tie in Asia, and I think it fully as strong in Bengal as on the coast, notwithstanding the undue proportion of Brahmins, who must have a stronger feeling of antipathy to us than the other classes have.

The manner of conducting the duties by the general Staff differs considerably under the two Presidencies; and much of the efficiency of the Madras troops may be traced to their system, even though followed up indifferently.

The General officers are the channels for every application: they know the smallest changes which are intended or asked for, and they are urged to a close and zealous superintendence of the corps under their command, by well-digested General Orders, occasionally repeated, by circular letters, and by particular admonitions when they do, tolerate, or authorise anything which varies from the principles which have guided the Commander-in-Chief and his predecessors in the control of the army.

The Inspection returns and reports are exceedingly minute, and every one of them is closely examined and commented upon by the Adjutant-General. The monthly return is extremely full and complete, and often excites similar attention.

All regimental codes of orders are now called in, in view, I understand, to the compilation of an improved general code at head-quarters. The messing and the amusements of the officers are seriously, and often, recommended to the anxious attention of commanding officers of division and corps. The former are desired to report *any* officer whose habits are not those of a gentleman, and throw discredit or disgrace on the service. Sepoys are occasionally ordered to Madras, completely dressed and equipped, and sent to their battalions as patterns; so that the clothing is in general well fitted, the packs serviceable, and the necessaries agree with the regulated number and quality.

The duties of the two great branches of the Staff are well defined. The Quartermaster-General's department has a full share of labour and responsibility.

The Judge-Advocate-General's department has just been ordered to adopt the system of examining all garrison and regimental courts-martial, and I think with much advantage. They were inferior to Bengal, I think, in the knowledge of military law.

In the promulgation of General Orders there is a great superiority on the Madras establishment. They do not much exceed half the quantity daily published in Bengal; they are sent in print to every corps; and at certain periods an epitome, *with an index*, is given.

Throughout all India I think the management of General Orders most

defective and faulty. As long as all that is serious is mixed up daily with all that is insignificant and fleeting, whilst promotions, appointments, and leaves of absence are mingled on the same sheet with admonitions and censures, we may easily understand which are read with attention and looked forward to with pleasure.

As they are conducted now they are little better than military newspapers, remembered only by those who profit by them.

General Orders, strictly so called, should be confined to subjects which tend to give the necessary feeling to the vast machine, to ensure its equipment, arming, recruiting, discipline, tactics, interior economy, and general efficiency; and such should be printed and bound separately. When cancelled, or modified considerably, to be struck out.

Government notifications, also important, should for the most part be kept apart, and *under another name*, as the necessary guides and authorities for expenditure.

Trifles need only be known to the corps or individuals concerned, and to the Pay and Audit Departments.

It seems a deep offence against discipline when, on the arrival of the General Orders, the first question asked is, "What news do they contain?" but it is very common. The essence of this branch of discipline consists in giving few orders, very well digested, forcibly expressed, clearly defining what must be done or avoided, and rigorously enforced.

Courts-martial constitute another distinct branch. Much is said of the advantages which the Madras army possesses over that of Bengal; some may still be unknown to me, but I have only discovered the following in the course of a year's experience.

1. The troops are only 15 days in arrear. The pay of August, for instance, is considered due on the 1st September, and is actually paid between the 10th and 15th of September.

2. If a detachment be ordered to march on or after the 24th, it may receive pay for the complete month before its departure.

3. After grain reaches a given price, the government assists in bearing the charge, both for sepoy, their families, and for authorised followers.

4. The pension-list, family certificates, registers of heirs, and other encouragements for old soldiers, their children and relations, are carefully attended to.

5. The recruit and pension boys already mentioned—a body of 4000 lads and children.

6. Palanquins, swords, horses, pensions, lands, and distinctions are conferred upon old and deserving officers by the government.

7. The greatest attention was paid by government to all the wants of the officers and troops employed in Ava. To such an extent was this carried that volunteers to any number were procurable, on account of the great saving which every individual was enabled to make.

8. Whenever the Native troops change quarters they receive hutting-money—eight rupees for the Native officer, and two, I think, for each sepoy. This, *I know*, the Bengal sepoy are aware of, and envy them accordingly.

9. Old Native officers are compelled to attend the Invaliding Committees, and thus promotion is accelerated.

10. They have a washerman to each company, an effective man, which reduces the expense of each sepoy to about one-and-a-half annas per month.

11. The Adjutant-General is very attentive to personal or written representations; perhaps too much so, but this was also a principle of his late Royal Highness the Duke of York.

12. The Adjutant-General receives all Native officers visiting the Presi-

dency, and, it is said, corresponds with them. This is not to be viewed without distrust and apprehension, but as good *may* sometimes arise from it, it is mentioned.

13. The men are far less harassed by civil duties, every collector and magistrate having a body of *sebundries* under his own orders.

14. Deserters do not escape unpunished.

There may be other advantages, but I do not, at this moment, remember them. In other circumstances the two armies are nearly equal. The hospitals are, I think, better regulated in Bengal; at least, the men are raised from the earth, which they are not upon the coast, unless where public cots can be *borrowed*; where rheumatism is very prevalent I consider this to be a defect.

Having twice mentioned the Adjutant-General of the Madras army, it may not be out of place to mention that the result of the system pursued there seems to be that he has more time to attend to the *real* business of his high office. He has leisure to look closely into the morale of the troops, and even into the conduct of individuals.

I have seen three Adjutants-General of the Bengal army, and they each and ever appeared to me to be merely staggering on under a load of business far too great for their strength, one half of which does not even fall within the knowledge of the Adjutant-General at the Horse-Guards.

Lieutenant-Colonel Fagan was a clever and most indefatigable Staff-officer; his mind grasped the high duties of his station, but he never during war should have been expected or allowed to bend lower. He fairly sunk under it.

The Madras officers have one advantage, which seems worth mentioning. The general and regimental Staff receive stationery, at cost prices, from the public stores.

The full *batta* of Bengal is looked upon there with an envious eye, and their Staff-officers are better paid than those of Madras. The allowances of commanding-officers of companies are also much superior.

I must say that the arms of the Madras corps are kept in much better order than those of Bengal; the monthly sum being considered in the latter army almost as a portion of the officers' pay. On the coast the Quartermaster has a fixed sum, and repairs for the whole corps. There are thus two checks upon the Quartermaster. I wish it were so in Bengal, taking only from an officer commanding a company a small part of what he receives.

It will not escape observation, I hope, that I have carefully avoided all allusion to their respective merits on service, and on the field of battle. It is there, and there only and fully, that either a soldier or a military system can be tried; but the subject is too delicate to be touched by any but a very good judge, who has frequently seen both troops in action, and in circumstances of privation and difficulty. He should be above being partial, and exempt from prejudice.

Of both armies I decidedly affirm that they never can be made what they ought to be whilst they are so badly officered; indeed, to maintain the heavy calls now and always made upon the corps, they should have six or eight captains and twenty subalterns to each, not including the Staff. I arrive at this by observations at Bhurtpore, where I never saw a company proceeding on duty with one officer without lamenting the absence of a second.

The return of officers from the Staff after a very long absence will not do. When a subaltern leaves his regiment and returns as a Major or Lieutenant-Colonel, in nine cases out of ten he is of no great value, and often obviously useless or injurious to the corps.

Many of the subjects thus briefly touched seem to me to merit attention and



inquiry. It is much wiser to discover the cause and stem the progress of evil, than it is to indulge a vague hope of checking it when it has overflowed the limits of security.

I hope your Lordship will tolerate the length of this paper, and excuse the freedom with which very grave subjects are noticed in it. Greater brevity, or a studied and formal manner, would have deprived my sentiments of all value. They and my best services are now and always at your Excellency's disposal and command.

I have the honour to remain, my dear Lord,  
your frequently obliged and faithful servant,

J. NICOLLS.

[ 763. ]

*To the King.*

13th November, 1827.

I saw last night the 'Gazette' account of the affair in the Levant, upon which your Majesty was graciously pleased to speak to me on Saturday.

It is not my duty, nor is it my wish, to give any opinion upon this affair, upon which indeed the 'Gazette' accounts do not enable anybody to form a conclusive opinion. But as it may be attended by important consequences, and the Admiral will be held responsible unless instructed by your Majesty's ministers, I should think that they ought to consider whether he should be rewarded by the favour which H.R.H. the Lord High Admiral recommended to your Majesty to confer upon him.

I should have said this to your Majesty if I had seen the 'Gazette' account before your Majesty spoke to me upon the subject; and I think it proper to lose no time in submitting the same to your Majesty after I have seen the accounts of the transaction.

Which is submitted for your Majesty's pleasure by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Alnwick Castle, 15th November, 1827.

I am delighted to find by your letter, which I received this morning, that the Duke of Gordon is to be the Governor of Edinburgh Castle. I am sure it will be an appointment universally popular in Scotland, where the manner in which he has been tied up by his father has given rise to a general interest in his favour, and will of course be particularly agreeable to the old party there.

I was at Howick when the news came of the Navarino victory; which

threw Lord Grey in a state of great irritation. Notwithstanding his hatred to the Turks, he thought the whole proceeding unwarrantable, as the Turks were fully justified in resisting our advance, which, by Sir Edward's own account, was for the express purpose of so stationing the Allied fleet as to be able to destroy the Turkish fleet if they did not submit to our terms. This was well stated in the 'Globe' of Monday last, which Lord Grey showed me yesterday. I came from thence yesterday to this place, where I found the Duke of Northumberland in high opposition at the whole business. He, however, is in favour of the Turks, and his opposition therefore is not alloyed by any partiality towards the Greeks.

Your advice for reinforcements was the best which could be given, for I am sure that nothing but our having a superior naval force in the Mediterranean will prevent the Russians and French from acquiring an ascendancy in public opinion there which it will require a war with these Allies to recover.

I left Lord Lauderdale at Dunbar House five days ago. He was by no means well, but I hope getting better. He was to go to Howick, if he was well enough, the end of this month, and was in high spirits at thinking that Lord Grey continued so keen.

Yours ever sincerely,

BATHURST.

*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Alnwick Castle, 16th November, 1827.

My letter of yesterday will have shown you that Lord Grey very much coincides with the opinion which I find by your second letter (which I received this morning) that you have formed on the rights of the Navarino attack.

As the King had mentioned to you the intention of granting the Grand Cross to Sir Edward Codrington, you did right to advise him to consult his ministers first, lest your acquiescence, when he mentioned it, might be stated by him afterwards as your having concurred in the granting that mark of approbation.

I see by the 'Gazette' that it was given on the day your letter was written. But as the notice is dated Whitehall, not the Admiralty, the appointment must be considered constitutionally as having the sanction of the government, particularly the Home Secretary of State. And indeed, I am much inclined to think that what has happened grows out of the Treaty of July, and that the blame ought in fairness to rest with those who directed its execution, unless the instructions have very carefully guarded against what has occurred.

The small sloops, although in an action at sea they ought not to be counted, are I believe very annoying in such a conflict as that which took place at Navarino; but still, the superiority of the Allies was too decided to make the victory as great a triumph as is claimed. It will, however, create jealousy if military people show an inclination to criticise.

When Lord Melville appointed Sir Edward Codrington to the command in the Mediterranean (by the suggestion of Sir George Cockburn), I told him that I was afraid he might be hasty, though a gallant and excellent

officer. Unless, therefore, his instructions on this occasion were very precise, it could not but be expected that one with such a character, and anxious as well as able to distinguish himself, should lend himself too readily to an exploit which it was the object of Russia should be achieved.

Yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

The Duchess of Northumberland's brother, R. Clive, has written word that he met Mr. Wynn one day at dinner, and Croker on another, and it was observed that neither spoke on the Navarino exploit, which shows that the ministry are puzzled as to the language they are to hold, until they hear from Constantinople and Egypt. If things turn out ill there, woe be to poor Sir Edward.

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*Sir Willoughby Gordon to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Chelsea, Saturday Evening,  
17th November, 1827.

On my return home just now, I found on my table a letter from Lord Grey, an extract from which I send for your Grace's perusal, as not uninteresting at this moment:—

“What you say as to the aggression is quite unanswerable. In matters of this sort the fairest way is to make the case your own. Should we have suffered a foreign fleet to anchor alongside of us, in a position to commence action with advantage if compliance with the terms offered by them should be refused?”

“I look to the consequences of this with great apprehension; the massacre of the Christians in the Turkish dominions, and the destruction of our Levant trade, are but too probable. Then comes decided war, and the execution of all the Russian schemes of ambition.”

I remain, always with the greatest deference,

your Grace's faithful servant,

J. W. GORDON.

[ 764. ]

*To Lord Howard de Walden.*

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 21st November, 1827.

The box containing the papers regarding the want of troops at Oporto was taken back before I had written to you upon them.

According to the accounts in the newspapers I judge that there can be no longer any apprehension for Oporto. But even if such apprehensions were still entertained I should not recommend that two British battalions should be sent there. They could not be detached from the force under Sir W. Clinton, as it is obvious that the best mode of providing for the

safety of Oporto would be by the vigorous and active attack of the deserters supposed still to be in Tras-os-Montes, and their pursuit till they should retire into Spain. To weaken Sir W. Clinton's force would deprive him of the means at his disposal to carry on such operations. I should doubt the expediency, under any circumstances, of sending two more battalions from England for the special purpose of guarding Oporto. I don't know that the British merchants, having kept their property at that place notwithstanding that the deserters have so long threatened to attack it, have any claim for more than the ordinary protection of his Majesty's fleet. But even if I felt that they had a claim to military protection, I should doubt the expediency of placing such a force as two battalions in a town like Oporto, without military defence of any description, and, according to the hypothesis of those who cry out for this additional protection, so exposed to attack by a superior force as that 2000 men already in Oporto are not equal to its defence.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM UPON THE SETTLEMENTS ON THE COAST OF [ 765. ]  
AFRICA.

December, 1827.

I understand that the government-general of his Majesty's colonies on the West Coast of Africa is now to be divided into two or even three governments,\* viz., Sierra Leone, the Gambia, the Island of Fernando Po.†

The latter is to be entirely under the navy, and the military departments have nothing to say to it.

We have, however, troops and a commanding officer at each, Sierra Leone and the Gambia, the commanding officer of the troops being the governor at the latter; but they are separate and independent of each other.

Am I right in this notion? ‡

If I am we must give to each commanding officer separate instructions. These should be drawn\* in conformity with those

\* By the enclosed note your Grace will see that Mr. Hay does not think he has any papers which would assist you.

† This is not decided, the Admiralty being unwilling to undertake the charge of the island at present.

‡ Yes.

of the Secretary of State, and I should wish to know whether there is any objection to communicate them to me.\*

Each commanding officer must have a separate detachment of troops allotted to his command, and the commanding officer in the Gambia at least must have some means of obtaining a reinforcement if necessary.

Are these officers to have warrants to enable them to try officers and soldiers by general court-martial? †

WELLINGTON.

[ 766. ]

*To Viscount Goderich.*

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 1st December, 1827.

Since I came to town I have heard it generally reported that Lord Clanwilliam, Sir Charles Stuart, and Sir William A'Court were about to be created peers, and I think it but justice that I should make you acquainted with what passed heretofore respecting Sir Henry Wellesley. He was appointed his Majesty's ambassador in Spain in 1809; and in the year 1814, when Lord Aberdeen, Lord Cathcart, and Lord Stewart were created peers for their diplomatic services at the courts of the Powers of the North of Europe, I mentioned his claims to the same honour to the late Lord Castlereagh: From a sense of justice to the services of Sir Henry Wellesley in his difficult situation of ambassador in Spain during the war, and from the relations in which that Power stood towards the British army employed against the common enemy, Lord Castlereagh admitted his claims; but said that if Sir Henry Wellesley was created a peer at that time, Sir Charles Stuart, who was a minister of the second rank, must be created likewise, and that that creation would open the door to claims which it would be very inconvenient either to satisfy or to reject.

Mr. Arbuthnot, who was the friend of Sir Henry Wellesley, had conversations with Lord Castlereagh and with Lord Liverpool upon the same subject and to the same purport. But I never spoke to Lord Liverpool upon the subject, and I interfered

\* There can be no possible objection to their communication, but no fresh instructions have been sent out since Sir Neil Campbell's appointment.

† Sir Neil Campbell had, and consequently Colonel Lumley has, a warrant empowering him to order general courts-martial; Major Findlay, having a distinct command, should have a warrant also.

only as the person most capable of giving testimony of Sir Henry Wellesley's services, and from a sense of justice.

You will recollect that subsequently I had, as well as yourself, some conversations with Mr. Canning respecting the elevation of Sir Charles Stuart, in one of which I told him frankly what had passed on this subject with the late Lord Castlereagh, and I intimated that when Sir Charles Stuart should be created a peer I should consider it my duty to submit to his Majesty's minister the claim of Sir Henry Wellesley, as his claim had been passed by in 1814 solely on account of the inconvenience attending the taking into consideration at that time that of Sir Charles Stuart.

I have no reason to believe that Mr. Canning would have attended to the claim of Sir Henry Wellesley, even if he had been disposed to attend to that of Sir Charles Stuart after the opinion delivered upon the reference made to certain of his colleagues. He made no observation upon what I communicated to him. Since the year 1814 the Earl of Clancarty and Lord Viscount Strangford have been created British peers for diplomatic services, in addition to the three noblemen above mentioned, and three more gentlemen now to be added, making in the whole eight creations of peers for diplomatic services to his Majesty since the Peace of 1814.

Sir Henry Wellesley has served his Majesty for eighteen years as ambassador, with the exception of about a year that he was unemployed, in consequence of the discontinuance of the diplomatic relations with Spain by means of ambassadors.

He was ambassador before any of those above mentioned were employed in that rank, before some of them were employed at all in the diplomatic service of the country, and he has been actively employed for a longer period than any of them, with the uniform approbation of his Majesty and his government. I will not enter upon the invidious task of comparing his services with those of others. But he performed one service in the year 1814, after the peace, that of prevailing upon the King of Spain to sign a treaty by which his Catholic Majesty relinquished for ever the Family Alliance with France, which was the complement of the operations of the preceding war. He thereby rendered a service to this country which would have been highly considered by the public, if political circumstances in France at the moment had not rendered it necessary to keep that treaty secret.

I am perfectly aware that I have no right to solicit any favour from his Majesty's government; but a sense of duty and of justice has induced me to inform your Lordship of these circumstances, and to request you to bring them under his Majesty's most gracious consideration.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 767. ]

*To the Earl of Eldon.*

MY DEAR LORD ELDON,

London, 1st December, 1827.

I have received your letter and wishes regarding Mr. Hawkins, who desires to have a commission in the Guards. I have a long list of applicants left me by my lamented predecessor in office, to which my brother colonels of the Guards, the Dukes of Cambridge and Gloucester, and his Majesty, are daily adding fresh names. I should only disappoint Mr. Hawkins therefore by holding out hopes that I should have it in my power to recommend him for a commission in the Guards; but I will for one in the cavalry or the infantry of the Line, if he pleases, as soon as it will be in my power after I shall know his wishes.

I quite agree with you respecting this melancholy affair of Navarino; as usual the blame is laid upon us, and principally upon me. But I think we are as far from having any concern in this transaction as the moon is from being like a cream cheese!

It is said this day that the Grand Seignior has taken a very good and moderate line upon the case. He has ordered a sequestration upon all British property on shore and afloat. Has ordered that all persons may be respected. Says that he does not care whether the ambassador goes or stays: that he will have no communication with him.

Pray present my best compliments to Lady Eldon, and believe me ever,

Yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

*Lord Ellenborough to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Roehampton, 3rd December, 1827.

I return your Grace many thanks for the communication you have been kind enough to make to me of the Protocol signed at Petersburg, and of your Grace's correspondence with Count Capo d'Istria on the Greek question.

The Protocol and the Treaty seem to have been conceived in a very different spirit, and to have been calculated to lead to very different consequences.

The Protocol seems to have been signed under the apprehension that war rather than peace would be the probable result of the existing differences between Russia and the Porte, and with the view of limiting the extent and danger of that war by a previous and concerted settlement of the future condition of Greece. I cannot but do justice to the ability with which your Grace made Russia pledge herself to the terms of settlement sketched in the Protocol, not only *pro hac vice*, but at all times and under all circumstances.

All the demands of Russia having been acceded to by the Porte at the conferences of Akerman, and all present danger of a war between the two Powers being at an end, to attempt to enforce the mediation which had been rejected was to open new subjects of difference and to endanger the general peace.

According to the best view I can take of the subject, the complete re-establishment of the Turkish authority in the islands and on the continent of Greece would conduce much more to the continuance of peace and to the interests of this country and of Austria, than the dismemberment of any portion of the insurgent provinces under the conditions agreed upon at Petersburg; but those conditions are more favourable than any which would arise out of a successful war carried on by Russia against the Porte, and we owe it to your Grace that in the latter event we can confine Russia to the terms of the Protocol.

I have the honour to remain, my dear Duke of Wellington,  
your Grace's very faithful servant,

ELLENBOROUGH.

*Viscount Goderich to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,      Downing Street, 3rd December, 1827.

I will not fail to submit what you have written to me upon the subject of Sir Henry Wellesley's claim to a peerage to his Majesty's consideration. In the mean time, however, I can truly say (which is all that at the present moment I can say), that I have not, and cannot have, any disposition to undervalue Sir Henry's services, which have certainly been connected with transactions closely interwoven with the interests and honour of the country.

Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington, most truly yours,

GODERICH.

*Sir Henry Wellesley to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR ARTHUR,

Vienna, December, 1827.

I received last night your letter of the 1st instant. I really cannot express how much I feel obliged to you for the trouble you have taken respecting my peerage, and for the very satisfactory manner in which you have stated my pretensions to that honour. You know that I have always thought, and still think, that I was entitled to a peerage at the termination



of the war in 1814. I arrived in Spain at the beginning of the year 1810, when almost every point was lost excepting Cadiz, and when, I believe, no one (with the exception perhaps of yourself) expected a fortunate issue to the war; and after more than four years' residence as his Majesty's ambassador, I witnessed a result which I am persuaded was looked for by no man in England, however sanguine he might be. I am far from taking any credit to myself for this result, I can only take credit for the zealous discharge of as arduous duties as ever fell to the lot of a diplomatist. One of these duties I may notice as of particular importance; I mean the having prevented your being deprived of the command of the Spanish army by the ultra-Liberal Regency and their friends in the Cortes, who thought your successes would terminate the war too soon for the accomplishment of their purposes. I do not mean to say that the depriving you of the command of that army would have made any difference in the results of the campaigns of 1813 and 1814, but it would probably have embarrassed your operations, would have given spirits to the enemy, and would have produced an unfavourable impression upon our Allies. At the conclusion of the peace I negotiated and signed the Treaty of Alliance, introducing an article by which our commercial relations were placed upon the footing on which they stood previous to the war of 1796; an arrangement which, if adhered to by the Spaniards, would be all that could be required by our merchants. Upon my return to Spain in 1817, I negotiated and signed the Treaty for the abolition of the Slave Trade, which, whatever may be thought of it now, was considered at the time of such importance, that it was noticed in the King's Speech to Parliament as one of the remarkable transactions of the year. I may add, that during the ten years I resided in Spain as his Majesty's ambassador, I received from the late Lord Londonderry repeated assurances of his Majesty's gracious approbation of my conduct; and I do not recollect, during the whole of that period, any one occasion upon which my conduct was disapproved.

I have now resided at Vienna in the same capacity for a period of more than four years, and I trust have discharged my duties with equal zeal. Since I have held the situation of his Majesty's ambassador at this court, there have unfortunately been great differences of opinion between our two governments upon many of the important political questions which have agitated Europe; and the personal animosity which existed between the two chiefs of our foreign departments has often rendered my situation here very embarrassing. I suspect (for he never told me so excepting upon one occasion, on which I believe I afterwards proved to him that I had judged rightly) that Mr. Canning was not always satisfied with my conduct. I am not conscious of having given him any just cause for dissatisfaction. If, indeed, to observe a conciliatory line of conduct, as far as I could do so consistently with my public duty, and thereby to maintain our relations in a decent state, be a fault in an ambassador, I certainly must plead guilty to that fault. Our relations are now upon a more cordial footing, and the conduct of this government in the affairs of Portugal is a sufficient testimony of its desire to cultivate the best understanding with Great Britain. With respect to the Greek question, you know that Austria has from the beginning of the disturbances in Greece maintained and acted upon the principle that no State had a right to interfere in the internal concerns of another State unless called upon by

the latter so to do. And if I were to be put upon my oath, I should say that she has, as far as she could consistently with the aforesaid principle, used all her influence at Constantinople in support of the negotiations of the Allies. I mention this, because I am convinced that the conduct of Austria, relative to the Greek question, is much misunderstood and misrepresented in England.

I come now to the title. I believe I mentioned to Lord Maryborough that I should like to take the title of *Cowley of Wellesley*, provided the name be *Cowley* and not *Colley*, and that Lord Wellesley has no objection to my retaining the family name. If the name be *Colley*, I should not like to take it. I think that Lord Wellesley told me once that the old name was *Cowley*, but that Lord Harburton had a better claim to the name than we had. In short, I leave the title to be settled by Lord Wellesley, Lord Maryborough, and you; begging only that you will bear in mind that I have a decided aversion to the name of *Colley*.

After all, I think it extremely probable that Lord Goderich's answer to your application will be unfavourable; and if so, what am I to do? Am I to continue serving a government which treats me with such manifest injustice? Would it not be mean on my part to do so? I wish very much that you would give me your advice upon this subject. This will probably be my last embassy, and it is important to me and to my family that I should hold it for some years longer; but it is still more important both to them and to me, that after having served his Majesty in different capacities for more than thirty years, I should not submit to what may be almost considered a degradation. No man can be less inclined than I am to stand in the way of the pretensions of Sir Charles Stuart and Sir William A'Court, but I cannot admit that their claims are superior to mine.

Believe me, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

H. WELLESLEY.

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*Viscount Strangford to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

Harley Street, 6th December, 1827.

I have not the paper which your Grace wishes. In point of fact, I never received any such from Mr. Canning. On the 26th November, 1822, I wrote to Mr. Canning from Verona, giving the details of a long conversation with the Emperor Alexander, on the 22nd, upon *Greek (not Turkish)* affairs; and in that despatch I represent myself to have stated to the Emperor, that "the only knowledge which I then possessed of the sentiments of his Majesty's government on the *Greek* question, was derived from a despatch to the Duke of Wellington, which his Grace had done me the honour to send to me." That despatch must have been the one of September 27, which your Grace showed me yesterday.

I went back to Constantinople without any instructions whatever, except those contained in the two *memoranda* which you sent after me to Venice. They turned, as your Grace may remember, upon three points. 1st. The *démarche de courtoisie*, as it was called, *i.e.*, the letter to be written by the Porte to the Court of St. Petersburg. 2nd. The *série des faits*, *i.e.*, such a course of conduct towards the Greeks, and such a distinction between the innocent and the guilty, as might enable Russia to send back her mission

without any risk of again witnessing the atrocities of 1821. 3rd. The arrangement of commercial matters, and the abolition of the newly-established restrictions which affected Russian navigation, &c., in Turkey.

These were all the instructions which I had from *you*. From Mr. Canning I received *nothing before the 25th of April, 1823*. I have not a copy of his despatch, but my answer to it (which I have, and of which, if you desire it, I will send a copy) shows very plainly what the nature of it must have been, and that he had *then* begun already to take up the Greek question on grounds totally distinct from the Verona arrangements.

Ever, my dear Lord Duke,  
your Grace's most faithful and obedient servant,

STRANGFORD.

I am not without hopes of getting, through other channels, a copy of Mr. Canning's No. 1 to me, of 1823. S.

*The Hon. Frederick Lamb\* to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Melbourne House, 14th December, 1827.

This ministry is broken up. Goderich yesterday intimated to the King that he cannot carry on the government. The step was concerted with Huskisson only, and concealed from all the other ministers. I doubt their knowing it even yet. The ground put forward is the incapacity of the heads of departments, and the strength of the Opposition; but I am inclined to look upon it as an intrigue of Huskisson's to be made Prime Minister, without which, he would rather be quit of a burthen which he feels to rest upon himself alone. My secret information tells me that Huskisson will probably fail in his object. He desponds about Russia, and from this feeling would follow in her wake, even into war. Upon this subject there is division in the Cabinet. The peace party are Bexley and Herries, and the Chancellor and Tierney rather lean to them. Thus far what I have written is certain; but I equally believe that some days back Goderich proposed to the King to admit Lords Wellesley and Holland into the Cabinet, and to give an appointment to Brougham, and was refused. I have not this from the same undoubted sources as the first part of my intelligence, but I make no doubt of it. If I learn more I will write again, but pray mention neither my name nor the facts, until you learn them from other sources. You will readily believe how anxiously I wish to see the government of this country placed upon a strong and respectable footing, of which I can see no possibility while you are removed from it.

Most truly yours,

F. LAMB.

The King is anxious to preserve peace. It is from this I anticipate Huskisson's failure.

\* A younger son of the first Viscount Melbourne. He was created in 1839 Lord Beauvale of Beauvale, and succeeded his brother, sometime First Lord of the Treasury, in 1848, as third Viscount Melbourne. He died in January, 1853, when all his titles became extinct.

*The Hon. Frederick Lamb to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

DEAR DUKE,

Sunday night, 16th December, 1827.

I am now at liberty to tell you that Lord Harrowby was the person sent for. His answer is arrived, though I am unacquainted with it. If he refuses (as is expected), it is probable that Lord Wellesley will be placed at the Treasury, and that Lord Holland will be admitted into the Cabinet without a department; so that your expectations will not be deceived.

Faithfully yours,

F. LAMB.

*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Cirencester, 19th December, 1827.

Many thanks for your letter. I know *for certain* that Lady Goderich denied, in the most positive manner, to her medical attendant on Monday last (the 17th), that Lord Goderich had resigned. It is, I think, clear that his Lordship will resume his office if the King will let him.

Lord Harrowby's advice, I am sure, will have been in favour of Lord Lansdowne being at the head, and the admission both of Lord Holland and Mr. Brougham; and I am persuaded that Huskisson will decidedly prefer Lord Lansdowne to Lord Wellesley; if for no other reason, to get rid of Mr. Herries, whose general opinions in no way coincide with his. You may be sure that Lord Wellesley will accept whichever may be offered him, either to be at the head or Home Secretary.

I shall be very glad to see the papers which you mention having collected; that of which I am most misgiving, is the despatch about this time last year, when Mr. Canning first attempted to give your Protocol a compulsory character. Have you got that among the papers you have collected?

Yours ever very sincerely,

BATHURST.

Lady Bathurst and my daughter beg to be most kindly remembered to you.

*Mr. Holmes to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Wednesday, 19th December, 1827.

I wrote my second note to your Grace in such a hurry, I fear I did not make myself intelligible. What I did intend to say was that the *clique* (Messrs. Huskisson, Tierney, and Lansdowne) commissioned Lord Lyndhurst to propose to the King to receive back into his service Lord Goderich, but coupled with a proposition that his Majesty should fix some period for allowing the Cabinet to resume the subject of Lord Holland and Mr. Brougham taking office. To the first the King has assented, and Lord Goderich is now in Downing Street, and quite happy at getting back. As to the latter proposition, I have not been able to ascertain how it was

received; but if I learn anything before the post goes out, I shall again write to your Grace. Should the King have assented to any approximation towards Lord Holland, Lord Bexley and Herries will instantly resign, and I know several other persons in minor situations will follow their example. This will of course lead to their places being filled by Whigs, which will make the government exclusively Whig fighting under a Tory leader.

The *clique*, I know from good authority, have impressed upon the King that an understanding subsists between your Grace, Mr. Peel, and Lords Grey and Lauderdale; and I fear they have succeeded in making him believe it. I shall finish this note at half-past six.

Your Grace's servant,

W. HOLMES.

An article in the 'Standard,' which is now called the Tory evening paper, has given the alarm to the persons about the King, and has I fear called to the aid of the *clique* all the petticoat influence at the Royal Cottage.

Half-past six.—Cabinet still sitting.

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*Lord FitzRoy Somerset\* to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD,

Horse-Guards, 20th December, 1827.

Frederick Lamb, whom I met to-day by accident, begged, as he had come out without writing to you, that I would tell you that Lord Goderich, at the Cabinet yesterday, made a statement of the circumstances which had led to its being considered by the King that he had resigned, and he professed his willingness to continue in office for the present, provided his colleagues should be of opinion that his remaining would tend to relieve them from the difficulty which had arisen from his proposed retirement. They are understood to have intimated their acquiescence in his proposal. Lamb did not seem to be certain whether Lord Goderich has himself written to the King to signify his disposition to remain at the head of his councils, or whether that communication had been made by a third person; but it has certainly been made. Nor could Lamb tell me whether the proposition regarding the accession of Lord Holland and Lord Wellesley had been again brought forward; but he said that the Cabinet in general thought that Lord Lansdowne and Huskisson had not again mooted that question with the King. Lord Lansdowne was thought at first not to have been a party to the letter which was written on that subject to his Majesty about ten days ago, but it now appears that he was implicated in it, and his friends are consequently furious with him for not telling them so; and they accuse him of being a liar, &c. It is altogether a pretty mess.

Your most faithful and affectionate,

FITZROY SOMERSET.

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\* Field Marshal Lord Raglan, G.C.B.



172 LETTER FROM THE KING OF SPAIN TO DON MIGUEL.

operation with whom I had served; and who, on account of particular circumstances connected with views of the public service at the time, was not recommended to his Majesty in 1814 for the honour then conferred, as it is now about to be conferred, upon others of his Majesty's diplomatic servants. I have not had for some years any communication with Sir Henry Wellesley upon this subject, and I don't know by what title he would wish to be called; but I will consult confidentially with my brothers, in order to ascertain whether any of them have any knowledge of his wishes, and as I shall be in London to-morrow I hope to be able to let you know on Tuesday or Wednesday.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most faithfully,

WELLINGTON.

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*The King of Spain to the Infante Don Miguel.*

[Translation.]

Barcelona, 26th December, 1827.

I have received with much pleasure the news which your Highness communicated to me by your esteemed letter of the 21st of October, of your having been appointed by your august brother to be Regent of the kingdom of Portugal and Algarve, and of your intention to set out for that country without delay. Your Highness cannot entertain a doubt of the great interest I take in your happiness, not only from the relationship between us, but also from the personal regard which I feel for you. With respect to the apprehensions—which, owing to information coming through apparently secure channels, your Highness has been led to conceive—that the leaders of the Portuguese refugees in my dominions may endeavour to compromise the tranquillity of their own country, a thing which would deserve the disapprobation of your Highness, and which you would wish to prevent, I can assure your Highness that proper measures had been taken beforehand to anticipate your wishes, and that they shall now be renewed. I take this opportunity of repeating to your Highness the assurances of my sincere friendship, and of the affectionate sentiments with which I am

Your Highness's much-attached uncle,

FERDINAND.

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*Lord Hill to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Hanover Hotel, 29th December, 1827, 5 p.m.

After having given every possible consideration to the purport of Lord Guderich's letter, I have come to a determination of declining the offer, in a letter of which I enclose you a copy. I cannot conclude the business with-

out expressing my grateful thanks for your kindness on this as on every other occasion. It is my intention to return to Hardwick to-morrow.

I remain your Grace's very obliged and faithful servant,  
HILL.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*Lord Hill to Viscount Goderich.*

MY LORD,

3, Hanover Square, 29th December, 1827.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter of the 24th instant, addressed to me at Hardwick Grange, announcing that you have received his Majesty's commands to offer me the distinguished post of Master-General of the Ordnance. My feelings of gratitude for so marked a proof of his Majesty's gracious favour are, if possible, increased by the very flattering terms in which your Lordship has been pleased to address me on the subject.

It will probably be in your recollection that when offered the Lieutenant-Generalship of the Ordnance some years ago, by my friend the Duke of Wellington, I assigned the following reasons for declining it, namely, that I had never been accustomed to office duty, that I feared I should ill perform the services required of me, and that a permanent residence in town would most materially affect my health.

As these objections still remain in full force, it would be inconsistent in me to accept an appointment of so *much greater importance*, the duties of which, I am informed, are not confined to the military profession alone, but are intimately connected with the financial expenditure of the country.

With this feeling, it only remains for me to request your Lordship will be pleased to convey my unfeigned regret at being obliged to decline his Majesty's most gracious offer.

I have the honour to be, &c.,  
HILL.

*Eurl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Cirencester, 30th December, 1827.

I believe that the best way of obtaining from you an answer to one or two questions contained in Lord Lauderdale's letter is to enclose the whole of it to you.

If the occasion on which it is proposed that you should apply for proxies were one of a political nature, I should have been inclined either not to have troubled you with such a proposition, or to have expressed my doubts of the propriety of your acceding to it, considering the station you are now filling, although I might have thought fit to have submitted it to you. But this attempt to oust Lord Shaftesbury is a personal question, to make him a martyr for having voted for your amendment in the Corn Bill, in which vote, it must be remembered, many of the friends of government concurred.

By letters which I am receiving from Lord Shaftesbury, he seems to have taken a good deal of alarm as to the result of the vote.

I have been waiting with much solicitude for the papers which you were good enough to promise me respecting your Protocol, as I find that this Protocol of yours is to be the grand point of defence; and from the confi-



dence with which the supporters of government speak upon the subject, I am afraid that Mr. Canning has, in some of his despatches not communicated to his colleagues, contrived to give it an interpretation which certainly was not intended at the time. Had not Austria given her adhesion to the Protocol?

I find that Lord Ellenborough is preparing an amendment to the Address. I very much doubt the policy of such a beginning. There are many well-meaning Peers, old Tories, who consider the Address as a compliment due to the Throne, unless there is anything in it which provokes opposition by compromising the opinions of the House; and it is certainly not likely that the Speech and the Address should be worded in a way to call for an amendment; but if the amendment be made, it would argue weakness not to divide upon it. Protests against the measure may be delivered as strongly as possible in speeches; but the first day does not appear to be that on which any opinion upon it ought to be taken.

Lord Wellesley seems to have been travelling prodigiously slow not to have arrived in London on Friday, after having landed the preceding Saturday at Holyhead. I suspect that this must have been occasioned more from a hint from the Lodge than from Lady Wellesley's ill health.

Yours ever very sincerely,

BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*The Earl of Lauderdale to Earl Bathurst.*

DEAR LORD BATHURST,

Dunbar, 24th December, 1827.

I have just got your letter; you may be sure I will be in my place if I am able to move, but I have been very unwell again; at present, however, there is every prospect of permanent good health.

To be sure there never was anything so ridiculous as this business of Lord Goderich's. He does not appear to me to be fit to manage a poultry-yard. I had yesterday an account of the whole from my friend Lady Holland, who assures me that there is the greatest cordiality amongst the ministers, and that this was all a mere mistake of Lord Goderich's, produced by his being reduced to such a state of agitation by Lady Goderich's health, that he does not know what he is doing. It was tender ground, and required to be touched very lightly, but I just gave her a hint of the inexpediency on her part of setting down to the account of the wife any little casual slips which the husband might make.

I have written to Grey about Lord Shaftesbury. I think he will go right from what he said to me when at Howick, but Auckland is the man he would least like to oppose. He will be in town at the meeting. I think it not improbable we will go up together, if he does not object to my going too soon.

The Duke of Wellington should lose no time in sending a blank proxy to Lord Tweeddale; he must direct to Geneva. I will write to Melville, and between us I think we will get a good number of the Peers in this country. The Duke of Wellington will be the best hand to write to the Duke of Gordon, and Lord Saltoun, and Forbes; but if he does not choose to do it, it can be managed.

Ever yours sincerely,

LAUDERDALE.

You never ought to write without telling me how Lady Bathurst and Lady Georgina are. Pray remember me to them.

*To the Marquess of Chandos.*

[ 769. ]

MY DEAR LORD CHANDOS, London, 31st December, 1827.

I have already had a correspondence with the Duke of Buckingham regarding the appointment to be justices of the peace of, I believe, the same gentlemen whom you have recommended.

The truth is that, whether right or wrong, I have hitherto refrained from calling upon the clergy in Hampshire to perform the duty of justice of the peace, excepting in a case of necessity, or unless the gentleman should be the proprietor of an estate in the county. This was the practice in the time of my predecessor in Hampshire, and I must adhere to the rule.

I hope that you and Lady Chandos are quite well. I beg you to remember me to her most kindly, and to believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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BARRACKS.—TO GENERAL OFFICERS COMMANDING AT HOME [ 770. ]  
AND FOREIGN STATIONS.

31st December, 1827.

The Master-General of the Ordnance having represented to me the difficulties which have been experienced by the officers of this department at several of the foreign stations, in carrying on the duties of the barrack-master, I deem it my duty to call your serious attention to this subject.

The orders for the regulation of barracks proceeded from his Majesty. They are the regulations of the service equally with those regulating discipline, or any of its branches, and must be obeyed by all in his Majesty's service. No deviation from them can be allowed, excepting in cases of emergency, which must be reported forthwith, for his Majesty's most gracious approbation, and for which the officer commanding in chief on the spot may think proper to take upon himself the authority; trusting that the circumstances under which he assumed such authority, which must be stated, will justify such assumption and the deviation from order and regulation.

This is the view which I have taken of these orders and regulations: and I must add, that unless the service is conducted according to this view; unless the barrack-master is supported by the officer commanding in chief, in carrying on his duties,

under the direction and superintendence of the principal officers of the Ordnance; and unless the officers and troops are obliged by their superiors to obey the orders and regulations, to limit their occupation and use of the barrack and barrack furniture to what is allowed by regulation, and what is directed by the barrack-master, under the authority vested in him, great as the expense of this department is, it must be vastly increased; and that, after all, the inconvenience to all must be immense, in order that a few may be able to enjoy advantages to which the regulations of the service do not entitle them.

As an example of the truth of these general observations, I see that the deficiency of stores, at one of the principal garrisons occupied by the troops upon the last general survey, arising chiefly from an undue and unnecessary interference with the duties of the barrack-master, contrary to regulation, and an improper use and application of stores, amounts to 3000*l*!

Having written thus much upon the subject in general, I will not enter into the detail of the different discussions which have been brought under my view; but I must say, that in all the Ordnance have been in the right.

The officers and troops must not have, at any station, more accommodation than the regulations allow them. The use of single iron bedsteads has diminished the number, in almost every barrack, which the same space would have accommodated under other circumstances; and it will not answer still further to diminish the number accommodated, after the diminution already caused by this arrangement.

The regulations of the service have fixed the number to be accommodated in each room; these numbers must be accommodated accordingly; and the surplus room and furniture must be at the disposition and under the care of the barrack-master.

In like manner, officers' quarters and stables, not occupied by the officers entitled to them under the regulations, must, under the regulations, be given over to the care, and be at the disposition, of the barrack-master: and I beg to observe, that my experience of the service, as well as in the office of Master-General of the Ordnance for eight years, has convinced me that the officers of the army in general suffer much more from these deviations from order and regulation than is at all compensated by any temporary convenience which any individual may thereby enjoy.

I have therefore to desire that his Majesty's orders and regulations, in respect to barracks, may be strictly carried into execution in your command ; and that the barrack-master may be allowed to take possession and charge of his barracks and stores, and allot them according to regulation, and without the interference of anybody.

There is one part of this subject, however, to which I am desirous of drawing your attention more particularly ; and that is, the order which several officers holding a foreign command have given, that they should be furnished with the reports which the barrack-master made to his immediate superiors, the respective officers of the Ordnance.

The intention in framing the regulations under which the duties of the barrack department are conducted was, that its officers should be guided by those rules and regulations alone ; and that they should be responsible for an obedience thereto, and for the care and expenditure of stores and money, to the Master-General and Board of Ordnance alone ; being the department of the State which is responsible to his Majesty and the Parliament for the due administration of the affairs of the barrack department, and the expenditure of the money granted by Parliament for its service.

The barrack-master, as well as the respective officers of the Ordnance, and every other authority in the station, are under the general superintendence and orders of the officer commanding in chief on each station, whose duty it is to see that they obey the orders and regulations for the conduct of the service entrusted to them ; and the barrack regulations direct that the barrack-master should produce to the officer commanding the troops, when required, all instructions or orders relating to the allowances or accommodation of the military. *Other subjects not belonging to the troops need not be produced.*

But the regulations do not contain a word respecting *the reports to the Master-General and Board, or respective officers, from the barrack-master* ; and I am convinced that you will see that such reports ought not to be called for.

If they are unfounded, if they are calumnious, it is not to be supposed that officers in such high stations as the Master-General and Board of Ordnance would not reject them ; or even communicate them to the officer commanding the troops, in order that he might take the steps he might think fit to punish

the falsehood or the calumny. But it is quite obvious that the barrack-master cannot perform his duty in the independent manner in which the regulations require he should perform it, and that the responsibility of the Master-General and Board is not secure, if there is not security that the reports of the barrack-master reach them. It cannot be expected that these reports will contain his real view of the transactions to which they relate, if they are liable to be called for by any other authority whatever.

WELLINGTON.

[ 771. ]

MEMORANDUM ON MAJOR ———.

[Letter from the Judge-Advocate-General returning the Proceedings of the COURT OF INQUIRY, held to inquire into and report upon certain circumstances and practices connected with the discipline and state of the depôt of the.—th Regiment, and particularly as to the manner in which MAJOR ——— had performed his duties as commanding officer.]

I have perused these papers and proceedings, and I will converse with the Adjutant-General respecting them.

Here is an officer in command of a body of men in a state of the most mutinous indiscipline; his life threatened, and even attempted. He is responsible for the discipline of these men; and his credit and his commission, as well as his life, are at stake if he does not bring them into order.

I don't approve of Major ———'s conduct in the abstract more than others do. But do we intend to keep our troops in order? or are they to be allowed to shoot their officers with buttons and pebbles till they can get ball cartridge to effect their purposes?

Surely the proceedings of these courts-martial, the severity of the sentences and the punishments, ought to be considered in reference to the state of mutiny of the corps and to the act of firing upon the commanding officer; and before we blame Major ——— we ought to consider what we would ourselves have done in a similar situation.

Major ——— is much to blame for not having reported the state of this depôt to his superiors, and consulted their opinions on the remedies to be adopted. But I cannot be the person to

censure him for conduct which, however irregular in abstract, was, I firmly believe, called for by the state of indiscipline in which he found the *depôt*.

WELLINGTON.

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MEMORANDUM.—COMPARISON BETWEEN MR. CANNING'S [ 772. ]  
GOVERNMENT AND THAT OF LORD GODERICH.

1827.

These were the grounds of separation from Mr. Canning. Those of some, the Roman Catholic question ; those of others, mistrust of Mr. Canning in the situation of First Minister, particularly when separated from others of his late colleagues ; those of others, the false pretences on which his government was formed : that in the presence of the King it was Protestant, in the presence of his Whig and other supporters it was Roman Catholic, and that upon the whole it was not calculated to conciliate the confidence and support of the gentlemen of the country.

There were other objections to Mr. Canning, principally of a personal nature : such as his temper ; his spirit of intrigue ; the facility with which he espoused the most extravagant doctrines of the Reformers and Radicals, although himself the great champion of Anti-Reform ; and his avowed hostility to the great landed aristocracy of the country. Indeed it was this disposition in his mind which rallied to his support all the Radicals in the country, and the discontented throughout Europe and the Press ; and occasioned, fostered, and augmented the mistrust and dislike of the great aristocracy of the country.

It will be curious to examine how far Lord Goderich stands in the same predicament. He does so in respect to the Roman Catholic question. Indeed I believe that Lord Goderich has been more in earnest upon this question than ever Mr. Canning was.

But there can be no mistrust of Lord Goderich's intentions : there may be of his talents and fitness for his situation.

His government is founded upon false pretences equally with that of Mr. Canning. There is in the Cabinet avowedly a majority of members of the Roman Catholic opinion ; and they tell the King that the Roman Catholic question shall not be

carried. How must they avoid it? by an agreement among themselves that it shall not be proposed. Will they proclaim this agreement to Parliament and the public? If they keep it concealed, as they must, they will be acting under a false pretence.

Such a government cannot conciliate the support of the public or of the gentlemen of the country. It must be weak. No man can avow his connection with those who are practising a deceit upon the public or acting upon a false pretence.

There will not be against Lord Goderich the same personal objections as against Mr. Canning. It is true that he will be supported, for a time at least, by the Radicals here, and applauded by the discontented all over the world; but this will be as the friendly successor, and because he lends himself to keep out of office those who resigned rather than serve with Mr. Canning, and whose position and strength in Parliament kept him in check.

WELLINGTON.

*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Fishburn, 6th January, 1828.

We accomplished our journey here much better than I had expected, and as we had the satisfaction of hearing that Lady Bathurst's sister had recovered her understanding and the use of speech surprisingly, it has given us great hopes that there will be a better restoration to health than could have been expected by the first account, and it has made Lady Bathurst much more comfortable.

If it had not been for the *December letter*, the case would have been complete; and even that letter would have made no difference if it had not been for the enclosure, which, as I understand it, is the remonstrance of Mr. Stratford Canning to the Porte in July, 1826.

The Cabinet letter of December repeats distinctly that the refusal to accept our mediation is not a cause of war; and though it points out the expediency of taking measures to enforce the acceptance, in the event of the Porte refusing to listen to any propositions, yet it expressly confines those measures for the present to two—the simultaneous withdrawing the ministers, and the acknowledgment of the independence of the Greeks; but that last is coupled with a qualification that the Greeks have established a government such as the late declaration of the admirals denies to exist.

There is nothing, therefore, in this which would in any way be considered as altering the case, except that to a given extent it admits the eventual expediency of using some compulsory measures to enforce the acceptance of our mediation; whereas there was nothing in your Protocol which countenanced such a proceeding. But by enclosing a copy of Mr.

Stratford Canning's remonstrance we sanctioned it; and that remonstrance contained menaces of an unqualified nature, founded on an assumed right to demand reparation from the Turks for the piracies committed by the Greeks. I am afraid that much advantage will be taken of this letter if produced; although it was certainly not written and never received any sanction from the Cabinet. It is, indeed, founded (that part which relates to the Greek piracies) on principles in direct opposition to what we have maintained in vindication of our having acknowledged the belligerent rights of the Greeks. The Austrian government complained in 1825 of an Ionian proclamation in which we acknowledged the belligerent rights of the Provisional Greek Government. Mr. Canning wrote a very able answer, in which he explained that we had but two alternatives—either to acknowledge those rights, or to make the Turks responsible for the piracies committed by the Greeks, and we had preferred the former. This defence is to a degree adverted to in the instructions to Mr. Stratford Canning, and I am inclined to think that one of the two enclosures referred to in that part of the instructions is a copy of the letter to which I refer. I shall be very much obliged to you if you can get a copy of those enclosures, for, according to my view of the question, the principle so clearly laid down in Mr. Canning's letter forms a material part of the case, particularly after the violent remonstrance of Mr. Stratford Canning.

It would, I think, be material to be able to prove that Austria acceded to the Protocol, and refused to accede to the Treaty, as being essentially different from the Protocol.

By a letter I received lately from Lord Aberdeen, who was a great Greek, and made a speech in the House of Lords about two years ago calling upon government to interfere, I find that he is decidedly adverse to the Treaty, and to the measures pursued in consequence. But as I collect from his letter that *one* of his objections to the Treaty is that the proposition for the Turks to evacuate part of Greece would be, in his opinion, impracticable, I think it would be desirable for him to be put in possession of the case, that he may not state his objections stronger than would be consistent with what those with whom I know *he is most anxious to act* would be able to go.

Your account of what is going on in the Cabinet is most interesting. Mr. Huskisson's object is to get rid of Herries, with whom I know he always essentially differs, and will be for Lord Holland's introduction for that, if not for other reasons.

The King will plead his gout as a cause of delay, and if the eager party will not allow of that excuse, he will try to move the Chancellor and Lord Anglesey not to quit him under such distress, and I think will persuade Lord Anglesey at least, if not Lord Lyndhurst, to remain.

Yours ever, most sincerely,

BATHURST.

What a capital hit to bespeak 'Killing no Murder' as the play for Don Miguel!

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*Sir Henry Hardinge to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Wilderness, Sevenoaks, 7th January, 1828.

Herries dined here yesterday; and, as his tone and observations were meant, I rather believe, to be reported in the proper quarter, I shall briefly state them.

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As to the Treaty, he believed Mr. Canning had been influenced by a desire to gain popularity, and by a pique against Metternich who had quizzed Canning's Greek diplomacy in a letter to Prince Lieven; that they know very well your Grace had nothing to say to the Treaty, nor had the old administration; that Peel had a fine field before him, but must do better than last session, when he allowed himself to be beaten and cut up by his eternal allusions in every speech to his law improvements; that he had no doubt things would come right, but that late events had worked contrary to his hopes, &c.

My intimacy with Herries is not great: your Grace can therefore judge of the interior state of a Cabinet where a colleague does not hesitate to use such language. This conversation was meant, I imagine, to be repeated to you and to Mr. Peel. The latter, by a note received this morning, will probably not be here on account of Mrs. Peel's indisposition; Sir E. Knatchbull is coming here for a few hours expressly to meet him. At the assizes, which Lord Camden attended, dining with the Judges Bailey and Vaughan, the general tone of all parties was unqualified disapprobation of the present dangerous and unintelligible state of things. Judge Bailey said that when Canning offered Brougham to be Chief Baron of the Exchequer, and observed that he would be only *one* stage from the Chancellorship, the lawyer retorted, "That is true; but, out of Parliament, where am I to get post-horses to take me that stage?"

Mr. Manning, Mr. Alexander, and Sir Edward East also dined here: all equally satisfied that the present state of things cannot and ought not to last; but more disposed to support than oppose, and looking out for events. They all admit Lord Goderich's great loss of character, and anxiously expect a reconciliation or change by which your Grace and Mr. Peel may be at the head of affairs. Still they evidently class themselves as adherents of the existing government.

Lord Camden is quite right and steady. Not long ago Lord Goderich, on the death of Lord C.'s daughter, wrote to him very affectionately, and, on receiving Lord C.'s answer, wrote again, throwing out the bait of some employment for Brecknock, which Lord Camden's sacrifices entitled him to expect, &c.

I return to town on Wednesday.

Very faithfully your Grace's obliged servant,

H. HARDINGE.

*Viscount Melville to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Melville Castle, Edinburgh, 8th January, 1828.

I received last night your collection of papers, and this morning your note of the 5th instant; and I now return the former under a separate cover, having carefully perused them. If I did not know that the government, through their subordinates industriously propagating the notion that their Treaty of last July and the battle of Navarino were the natural results of the course of policy adopted by the late Cabinet, and particularly of your negotiation at St. Petersburg, I could not have believed it possible, after perusing those papers, that any government could have ventured on any proposition so monstrous, or on an assertion so completely at variance with the truth. Can *they* really have taken the trouble to look back to all the antecedent correspondence?

I have been lately assailed by sundry members of both Houses, particularly of the House of Commons, anxious to know whether any decided and intelligible line is to be followed on various questions in which the conduct of the government, to say the least of it, requires explanation. I believe there is a very general feeling of indisposition towards them at the present moment, and much more so than previous to the close of the last session of Parliament. If that feeling is properly directed—and, if possible, not allowed to fly out in captious opposition and absurd cavilling—we shall probably do good to the country and we shall keep our friends together. But if no such system is adopted—I allude again to the House of Commons—we shall do no good, and our friends will gradually drop off or will keep aloof. Luckily, there was no division in the Commons to *commit* them during last session; and I know several who I suspect would then have supported Canning, who are now hostile to the present administration. The only answer I could give to inquirers has been that I could give them no information; and I presume, therefore, that they will stay at home till they are summoned to some regular conflict, or till they see what turn affairs may take. I hope that nothing will now be done till the ministers out of Parliament shall have been re-elected, which will give time to put matters *en train*. If our friends were distinctly to understand that it is intended to call the government to answer for their conduct on several of those points, there would be no lack of hearty support. In the mean time, and *en attendant*, I shall remain quietly at home, and, indeed, I am scarcely yet in a travelling condition.

Believe me, my dear Duke, ever yours sincerely,

MELVILLE.

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*To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.*

[ 773. ]

MY DEAR PEEL,

London, 9th January, 1828.

I enclose a letter which I received from Lord Lyndhurst this morning; in consequence of which, having received him shortly after eight o'clock, he told me that the government being dissolved the King wished to speak to me along with him.

I went to Windsor with him immediately; and his Majesty

told me that he wished me to form a government for him, of which I should be the head. I told his Majesty that I was so situated professionally that I could not say that I would form a government of which I should be the head without consulting with others; that I would not say I could form a government at all without such previous consultation; but that if he would give me a little time, and leave to go to town to consult with others, I would inquire and see what could be done, and report to him the result.

I then inquired what he desired: whether he had any wishes for particular persons, or objections to any? He said that he thought the government must be composed of persons of both opinions in respect to the Roman Catholic question; that he approved of all his late and former servants; and that he had no objection to anybody excepting to Lord Grey.

He afterwards expressed a wish to retain the Duke of Devonshire and Lord Carlisle in his service, and he spoke highly of Lord Lansdowne and Lord Dudley; but upon the whole he left me *carte blanche*, with the single exception above mentioned; and he repeatedly desired that I would form for him a strong government. The Chancellor was present.

Now, my dear Peel, I entreat you to come to town, in order that I may consult with you and have the benefit of your cooperation in the execution of this interesting commission. You will see that the whole case is before you for discussion. I have declined to make myself the head of the government, unless, upon discussion with my friends, it should appear desirable; and excepting Lord Lyndhurst, who it must be understood is in office, everything else is open to all mankind excepting to one person.

I have sent for nobody else; nor shall I see anybody till you come, which I hope you will do early in the morning. I send to your house, to desire that a room may be prepared for you in case you should come this night.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

The King said that it was to be understood that the Roman Catholic question was not to be made a Cabinet question; that there was to be a Protestant Lord Chancellor, a Protestant Lord-Lieutenant, and a Protestant Lord Chancellor in Ireland.

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*To the Earl of Eldon.*

[ 774. ]

MY DEAR LORD ELDON, London, 10th January, 1828.

You will have heard of the commission which I have in hand, upon which I will call to talk to you.

The King has been very fair, and has left me as unshackled as a person so employed has, I believe, ever been left. But such things as have occurred lately could not but leave impressions which require attention. But I hope to get through my task successfully.

Ever, my dear Eldon, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

I send you the papers about Greece, which, however, are now of less importance.

*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE, Goodwood, 10th January, 1828.

It is now ten o'clock when I have just received your letter, which went round to Wood End, where, indeed, I told you to direct to me; and this has of course delayed the messenger's arrival for more than an hour.

I will set off to-morrow morning, and hope to arrive at Apsley House by three o'clock, or sooner. I wish I could be of any assistance to you under the difficulties in which you will be placed: with respect to Lord Lansdowne and Lord Carlisle (certainly the first), an offer would be only received by a positive refusal; and though, on many accounts, Lord Dudley might perhaps be somewhat less inclined to refuse, the offer would compromise you *possibly* on the Navarino business too much. Of course the Duke of Devonshire might stay if he chose, but he is much too eager a politician to think of remaining.

Yours ever very sincerely,

BATHURST.

*The King to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR FRIEND, Royal Lodge, 11th January, 1828.

I have just received your letter. I can scarcely write. I hope in the course of *the evening* that you will be enabled to give me some outline as to the probable frame of your government.

Lord Goderich sent me the enclosed yesterday. I am, I suppose, pledged to make the new Peers; but you had better see Lord Goderich, as I put the matter in your hands.

Your affectionate friend,

G. R.

## [ENCLOSURE.]

Downing Street, 9th January, 1828.

Lord Goderich presents his humble duty to your Majesty.

He most respectfully but earnestly entreats your Majesty to be graciously pleased to consider the very peculiar situation in which he is placed with respect to the Peerages. He feels his own personal honour and character involved in the completion of those arrangements; and should the Peerages not be announced in the next Gazette, Lord Goderich knows not how he can escape the imputation of having violated his personal honour, and broken his faith towards those whose cases had, upon his humble recommendation, received your Majesty's gracious approbation.

He presumes, therefore, with all humility, to appeal to your Majesty's goodness, and to solicit your Majesty's permission and authority to give effect to these arrangements, and to acquaint the parties that he has done so. He would not venture to press this matter, under present circumstances, upon your Majesty, but for the urgency of the considerations which he has stated as bearing upon his personal situation. He has had, however, too many proofs of your Majesty's gracious disposition towards him, and knows too well the delicate sense of honour which has at all times actuated your Majesty's conduct, not to feel an humble but an earnest hope that your Majesty will be pleased to accede to his solicitation, and thereby to relieve both him and the individuals interested from a state of the most painful embarrassment.

[ 775. ]

*To Viscount Goderich.*

MY DEAR LORD GODERICH, London, 11th January, 1828.

The King has just now written to me respecting the Peerages which have been recently under consideration; upon which he has desired me to communicate with you.

It appears to me that in every case on which his Majesty's pleasure has been taken and has been communicated to the individual interested, the act ought to be completed as soon as possible; and you had better give directions accordingly.

I would have waited upon you to tell you that this was my opinion, only that I am obliged to go to Windsor; but I will inform his Majesty that I have given you this opinion.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[ 776. ]

*To the King.*

12th January, 1828.

I now submit for your Majesty's most gracious consideration the following arrangement for an administration, in conformity with your Majesty's commands communicated to me on Wednesday last:—

Lord Chancellor, Lord Lyndhurst.  
 First Lord of the Treasury, \*  
 Lord President, the Earl Bathurst, K.G.  
 Secretaries of State : Home, Mr. Peel.  
                                     Colonial, Mr. Huskisson.  
                                     Foreign, the Earl of Dudley.

I would humbly submit to your Majesty, that before your Majesty finally determines upon this last appointment you should wait till we shall have seen the instructions on the late affairs in Greece. This delay will be creditable to the government as well as to Lord Dudley.

President Board of Control, Viscount Melville.  
 President of the Board of Trade, Lord Ellenborough.  
 Secretary-at-War, in the Cabinet, Viscount Palmerston.  
 Master-General of the Ordnance, the Earl of Rosslyn.

The Lord Chancellor has, according to your Majesty's desire, seen the Earl of Carlisle, to offer him to retain his seat in your Majesty's councils. Lord Carlisle was much flattered by your Majesty's most gracious recollection of him, as well as by the mode in which I had executed your Majesty's instructions; but he desired to delay to give his answer till to-morrow. From the Lord Chancellor's report of the conversation I am apprehensive that he will decline to accept the offer. If he should accept, I humbly submit to your Majesty that he should fill the office of Privy Seal. If not, I would humbly submit to your Majesty that your old servant, the Earl of Westmorland, should be appointed to fill this office.

I would humbly submit to your Majesty that your Majesty would be most graciously pleased to grant a pension of the first class to Lord Bexley, that his Lordship should be called upon to resign the office of Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, that Mr. Herries should be appointed to that office, and that Mr. Goulburn should be appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer. This arrangement will greatly facilitate your Majesty's service.

Lord Palmerston to be Secretary-at-War with a seat in the Cabinet. I humbly solicit your Majesty's permission to make communications to the persons interested, in case these arrangements should obtain your Majesty's most gracious approba-

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\* Blank in manuscript.

tion ; and I will submit those which remain for consideration upon another occasion, the various claims upon your Majesty's favour having rendered it difficult to make them immediately.

All of which is humbly submitted for your Majesty's pleasure by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

[ 777. ]

*To the King.*

London, 12th January, 1828.

I informed Lord Goderich that I had submitted to your Majesty my opinion that those Peerages upon which your Majesty's most gracious pleasure had been taken, and upon which communication thereof had been made to the parties concerned, ought to receive your Majesty's formal confirmation as soon as possible.

I received in consequence the enclosed letter from his Lordship this day ; and I humbly solicit your Majesty's pleasure in respect to the dignity to which Mrs. Canning is to be elevated.

I humbly submit to your Majesty, in relation to the desire of Mr. Lambton to be called to the House of Lords by the title of Baron Durham, that the Lord Bishop of Durham may object to that title being granted to him. I have stated this objection to Lord Goderich, and have recommended that Mr. Lambton should be requested to suggest a title to which no objection nor claim can be made by any other person.

All of which is submitted for your Majesty's pleasure by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*Viscount Goderich to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,          Downing Street, 12th January, 1828.

I am very much obliged to you for your letter of yesterday upon the Peerages ; it has relieved me from a state of the most painful suspense and anxiety.

There are, however, two points upon which I should be very thankful if you would be so kind as to let me know the King's decision. They relate to the *rank* of Mrs. Canning and to the *title* of Mr. Lambton. I recommended to his Majesty to comply, under all the circumstances of the case,

with Mrs. Canning's desire to have the rank of Viscountess ; and I should be very glad to know whether his Majesty approves of that recommendation.

With respect to Mr. Lambton's *title*, I stated to the King that he wished for the title of Baron d'Arcy of Hanaton and Herrington. The Duke of Leeds felt, and stated to me, some objection to this proposal, upon the ground of his being the direct representative of the *last* Lord d'Arcy. I explained to the Duke that there were some circumstances connected with this title of D'Arcy which showed that it had, upon former occasions, been co-existent at the same time in different branches of that ancient family ; and the representation which I made to his Grace seemed to remove his difficulty ; this I communicated to the King at a subsequent period. In order, however, to prevent any unpleasant collision upon the subject, Mr. Lambton stated that he had no objection, under all the circumstances, to waive his wish for the title of D'Arcy, as the Duke of Leeds had waived his objection ; and he is therefore now desirous of taking his title from the *city* of Durham, where he has much property. When I saw the King on Tuesday last, I understood that his Majesty had no objection to that title being taken by Mr. Lambton. But before I give directions about the warrant, I am very desirous of learning whether I have rightly understood his Majesty's feeling upon the subject, and perhaps you will be kind enough to ascertain this for me, as you do not allude to it in your letter.

It is very desirable that no time should be lost in bringing these points respecting the Peerages to a conclusion : and I hope, therefore, that you may have an early opportunity of letting me know how these matters to which I have now referred are to be understood.

Pray pardon me for giving you all this trouble, and believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington, very sincerely yours,

GODERICH.

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*Viscount Melville to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Melville Castle, 12th January, 1828, 9 p.m.

Your messenger arrived here this evening ; but I suspect that he would not accomplish his return to London so soon as the post, and I shall therefore keep him till to-morrow morning. I shall only say that I am ready to lend my assistance in the government which you are forming ; at the same time, I wish you distinctly to understand that I am not at all anxious for office, and I only agree to accept it in the honest belief that I am complying with the wishes of yourself and other friends, and that I may possibly be of use to the public service.

You mention in your letter that you will apprise me "from time to time" of what is going on ; I therefore conclude that you do not expect me to set out for a day or two, and indeed it would not be in my power. I think, however, that I shall be able to proceed in a few days.

I remain ever, my dear Duke, yours most sincerely,

MELVILLE.

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*Viscount Goderich to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,      Downing Street, 13th January, 1828.

I thank you very much for what you have done about the Peerages. I own, however, that it does not strike me that the Bishop of Durham would have any just right to complain if Mr. Lambton's title were taken from the *city* of Durham. If it had been proposed to take it from the county, it would have been clearly liable to great objection. But there is scarcely an episcopal see in England which does not at the same time give a title to some nobleman—Winchester, Lincoln, Salisbury, Lichfield, Exeter, &c. &c. The same is the case in Ireland in many instances; and it does not appear to me that the Bishop of Durham can object, as *Bishop*, but solely on account of the county of Durham being a County Palatine, which gives a peculiar character to the Bishop of that diocese, independent of his episcopal dignity.

Perhaps these points may not have struck you; and I have thought it right, therefore, to tell you how the question points itself to my mind.

Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington, very sincerely yours,

GODERICH.

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*The Earl of Carlisle to the Lord Chancellor.*

MY DEAR LORD,      Grosvenor Place, 13th January, 1828.

If called upon to give a distinct answer to the communication which you conveyed to me in such obliging terms yesterday evening, I must say that unless I should be informed that some proposition has been actually made or intended to be made to Lord Lansdowne, I should be compelled, however reluctantly, to decline the offer that has been so graciously made to me. This preliminary step appears to me to be so essentially due to Lord Lansdowne that I will not touch upon any other points connected with the proposed arrangement. Whatever may be the result, you will I trust acquit me of any insensibility to the kindness of his Majesty, or any want of gratitude to the Duke of Wellington for his consideration of me.

Ever, my dear Lord, with great respect and esteem,

very faithfully yours,

CARLISLE.

I have had no communication with Lord Lansdowne since we met yesterday, but have seen Lord Dudley and Huskisson to-day.

[ 778. ]

*To the King.*

London, 14th January, 1828.

I enclose to your Majesty the answer of Lord Carlisle\* to the proposition made to him by the Lord Chancellor, which extinguishes all hope of obtaining his services. I have likewise to inform your Majesty that a difficulty has been started by Mr.

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\* See Letter above.

Huskisson to his acceptance of office, of which I may possibly be able to get the better before to-morrow. But, in the mean time, I have thought it desirable to endeavour to secure Mr. Grant for your Majesty's service ; and I am anxious to obtain your Majesty's permission to make an offer to Lord Aberdeen as well as to Lord Ellenborough.

I find that it will be absolutely necessary to prorogue the Parliament for one week. It is desirable that the Council should be held to-morrow, in order that the proclamation may be published in the Gazette of to-morrow night.

The Lord Chancellor and I will accordingly attend your Majesty at the Royal Lodge before twelve. His Lordship has sent notice to the officers of the Council to attend.

All of which is submitted for your Majesty's pleasure by your Majesty's most devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

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*The King to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

*From my bed.*

Royal Lodge, 14th January, 1828.  
Monday, 4 o'clock p.m.

MY DEAR FRIEND,

I have just received a letter from Lord Goderich which makes it quite necessary for me to see you to-morrow morning. Pray have the kindness to be here at ten o'clock.

With great truth, ever your sincere friend,

G. R.

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*Extrait d'une lettre du Prince de Castelcicala au Comte de Woronzow.*

Paris, le 14<sup>me</sup> Janvier, 1828.

Hier la maison de Rothschild a reçu un courrier de Vienne, par lequel on lui a mandé qu'on venait de recevoir à Vienne des nouvelles de Constantinople qui avaient fait monter les fonds autrichiens. Il paraissait qu'après le départ des ambassadeurs la Porte s'était adressée à l'Internonce Autrichien dans des vues conciliatoires. J'espère que tout ceci se réalise, principalement pour notre cher Michel.

Il y a ici depuis hier plus de chances pour l'accession au ministère des grands Royalistes.

*The Earl of Dudley to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

Foreign Office, 14th January, 1828.

These Portuguese are in great distress for some money by way of an outfit. Rothschild will not lend them a farthing without our *guarantee*. Two hundred thousand is therefore quite out of the question; but Herries (who has seen Palmella and Rothschild) and I are inclined to think that on such an urgent occasion, and in order to avoid sending Don Miguel home in distress, and in ill humour, we might go as far as 50,000*l.*, which will relieve him from his present difficulties and give him time to look round him. We do not, however, like to take any step without your sanction. Be so good, therefore, as to send back the messenger with a single word to say what you think best.

Believe me, my dear Lord Duke, yours sincerely and faithfully,

DUDLEY.

Palmella leaves town to-morrow at 12, and it is desirable to settle something before he goes.

*The Right Hon. William Lamb\* to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Phoenix Park, 14th January, 1828.

I have just received your letter of the 12th instant, and feel sensibly the friendly terms in which it is expressed. Both on account of your public character and the uniform kindness which I have ever experienced at your hands, there is no man either with whom or under whom personally I should be more happy to serve than yourself; but the reply to your proposal depends upon so many considerations, that I trust you will think it prudent that I should delay making it until I have the opportunity of conversing with you upon the whole of the intended arrangement and upon the proposed course of measures. For this purpose I shall leave this country as early as I possibly can, and hope to arrive in London by the end of the week at latest.

Believe me, my dear Duke, ever yours most faithfully,

WILLIAM LAMB.

[ 779. ]

*To Lord Ellenborough.*

MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH, London, 15th January, 1828.

You will have heard that the King had been pleased, upon the dissolution of Lord Goderich's government, to command me to give his Majesty my assistance in forming a government; and I have great satisfaction in acquainting you that his Majesty has been pleased to express his most gracious wish that your Lordship should become a member of his councils.

\* Afterwards Viscount Melbourne.

I hope that on to-morrow or next day I shall have it in my power to make you a further communication, and to inform you in what situation I shall propose to you to serve his Majesty, and who will be your colleagues.

I remain, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

P.S.—I ought to mention to you in this letter that the King desires that it may be understood that the Roman Catholic question should not be brought forward as a Cabinet question, in the same manner as during the existence of the late government.

W.

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*Lord Ellenborough to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,      Connaught Place, 15th January, 1828.

I shall have great satisfaction in giving my best support to your Grace's government, in the full conviction that its maintenance is essential to the preservation of peace, and to the safety of the domestic interests of the country.

I request your Grace will have the goodness to express to his Majesty, in the strongest terms, my deep sense of the gracious manner in which his Majesty has been pleased to command my services, and to assure his Majesty that, never having for an instant forgotten the many marks of regard and approbation with which his Majesty honoured my father, I shall serve his Majesty not only with the public zeal of a faithful subject, but with all the warmth and devotion of hereditary affection.

I am perfectly satisfied with the assurance that your Grace's administration will be neutral on the Catholic question. I can ask no more in common fairness, and I desire no more for the interest of the cause I espouse.

I cannot doubt that your Grace's government will endeavour to bring back the policy of the country with regard to Greece to the spirit of the Protocol signed at Petersburg.

I wish your Grace to feel that I offer my support to your government freely and unconditionally, and that, in the event of its being convenient in the general arrangement of your ministry that I should not hold any office, I am not only content, but for many personal reasons even desirous not to be included in the distribution of official situations.

I have the honour to remain, my dear Duke of Wellington,  
your Grace's very faithful servant,

ELLENBOROUGH.

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*To General the Earl of Rosslyn.*

[ 780. ]

MY DEAR LORD ROSSLYN,      London, 15th January, 1828.

You will have heard that his Majesty had been pleased, upon the dissolution of Lord Goderich's government, to desire me to

give him my assistance in forming a new administration, and I have great pleasure in informing you that the King has authorised me to offer your Lordship the situation of Master-General of the Ordnance, with a seat in the Cabinet.

The King is anxious that the Roman Catholic question should be considered as it was by the late Cabinet—one not to be brought forward by the Cabinet.

I hope to-morrow or next day to have it in my power to make known to you who your colleagues will be. But I have thought it best to lose no time in communicating to you his Majesty's gracious intentions in your favour.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 781. ]

*To the Earl of Aberdeen.*

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, London, 15th January, 1828.

You will have heard that, upon the dissolution of Lord Goderich's government, his Majesty had been pleased to direct me to give him my assistance in forming an administration; and I have great pleasure in informing you that the King is anxious that your Lordship should become a member of his Councils.

The King wishes that the Roman Catholic question should be considered as one not to be brought forward by the Cabinet, as during the existence of the late administration.

I hope to be able, on to-morrow or next day, to inform you in what situation his Majesty wishes to employ you in his service, and who are to be your colleagues.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 782. ]

MEMORANDUM.

January, 1828.

Every member of the government is at liberty to take such part as he pleases respecting the Roman Catholic question, whether in Parliament or elsewhere; but he acts upon this question in his individual capacity.

WELLINGTON.

*The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Priory, 15th January, 1828, 12 o'clock.

I have just received the communication which you have had the goodness to make to me; and I shall only say that I feel as I ought to do this evidence of your favourable opinion, in thinking that any services of mine can be useful to the administration which you are commissioned to form.

The manner in which it is proposed to treat the Roman Catholic question is precisely such as to coincide with what has always been my own view of that subject.

It is my intention to be in town to-morrow, and I shall be ready at any time to receive your further commands.

Believe me, my dear Duke, ever very sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

*The Right Hon. J. C. Herries to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

Downing Street, 15th January, 1828.

Lord Dudley has communicated to me your Grace's letter on the subject of the loan to Don Miguel.

I have since seen Lord Dudley, and agreed with him—1st, that we should refer the matter once more to your Grace in the view which I am about to state; and 2ndly, that I should let Palmella know that he should receive a final answer to his application this night, either in London or at Stratfield Saye, whither I understand he is going.

What we wish to submit to your reconsideration is the circumstance of Don Miguel's inability to give any other than a personal security at this moment. He is not yet in a condition to do any act *as Regent*, nor to pledge positively any of the revenues, whether of the crown or of the nation, for the repayment of the money which he desires to borrow. The utmost, therefore, which he can do is to give his personal bond to the lender to give him a good security as soon as he becomes possessed of the power of doing so.

May it not, therefore, be advisable that the British government should step in as guarantee, on the ground of this special inability, whereby the Infante is deprived of all power to borrow without it, the small sum which he appears to want so pressingly, and the obtaining—or not obtaining—of which through our assistance may be the means of materially promoting or diminishing our influence over him, and those who are about him?

I spoke with Palmella upon the subject of the nature of the securities which might ultimately be given. He is certainly not sufficiently acquainted with the details of the revenue collected at Madeira to be enabled at present to make a specific proposition.

If, therefore, the money be lent now, it must, I think, be upon a bond to be entered into by Don Miguel, countersigned by Palmella, binding himself personally to repay the money, and also to take the proper steps, as soon as

he is in a condition to do so, for securing the repayment by the appropriation of some specific revenues of Portugal for that purpose.

If your Grace should determine upon these grounds to give the guarantee required, you will perhaps communicate your determination to Palmella, and let me or Dudley know it in order that Rothschild may be apprised of it with as little delay as possible.

Believe me, my dear Lord Duke, your Grace's most faithful,

J. C. HERRIES.

*Viscount Goderich to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,      Downing Street, 15th January, 1828.

I have given directions for preparing the peerage warrants for the King's signature; but they cannot be completed of course until it is known what is his Majesty's pleasure respecting Mrs. Canning's *rank*, and the *title* to be taken by Mr. Lambton. Of course if both the titles proposed by Mr. Lambton, viz. D'Arcy or Durham, be objected to, he is ready to adopt another, but he would naturally prefer either of those which were in the first instance submitted to the King. If you have had an opportunity of ascertaining his Majesty's wishes upon these points, pray have the goodness to let me know. The suspense is a source of some anxiety to those concerned, or I should have been very unwilling to appear to trouble you so often about the matter.

Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington, very sincerely yours,

GODERICH.

[ 783. ]

*To the King.*

London, 16th January, 1828.

I now submit to your Majesty that the difficulties stated by Mr. Huskisson on Sunday have been waived.

I have proposed Lord Aberdeen for the office of Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, there being no commoner on the list who could be appointed to that situation without inconvenience.

Your Majesty is aware that there are circumstances which would render it desirable to avoid appointing Mr. Grant to that situation. Yet the office of President of the Board of Trade is the only one proposed to be held by a Member of the House of Commons which, under existing circumstances, it would be possible to confer upon a peer.

The Lord Chancellor found it necessary to delay making the communication to Lord Carlisle as ordered by your Ma-

esty till Mr. Huskisson should have made his decision. But when that decision was received, having examined the lists of the persons to whom communications had been made by your Majesty's gracious permission, it has been found that there is no vacancy for him.

All of which is submitted for your Majesty's pleasure by your Majesty's most devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Viscount Goderich.*

[ 784. ]

MY DEAR LORD GODERICH,

London, 16th January, 1828.

I spoke to the King again yesterday respecting the grants of the Peerages which you had recommended.

His Majesty consents to Mrs. Canning having the dignity of a Viscountess, and to Mr. Lambton's taking his title from the city of Durham. The King, however, wished that Mr. Booth Wilbraham's\* creation should appear in the Gazette at the same time. I could not talk to his Majesty on this subject, as I am entirely ignorant of what has passed upon it; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will send me the papers.

When I shall possess these papers I shall be better able to judge what I can do; but in the mean time I write to the King again to urge him to complete the creations of peers of which the list is now before his Majesty.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the King.*

[ 785. ]

London, 16th January, 1828.

I have informed Lord Goderich that your Majesty had been graciously pleased to consent that Mrs. Canning should be created a Viscountess; and that Mr. Lambton should take his title from the city of Durham.

I have requested Lord Goderich to transmit to me the papers regarding Mr. Booth Wilbraham; and, after communication with that gentleman, I propose hereafter to submit his case to your Majesty.

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\* Afterwards Lord Skelmersdale.



I would therefore humbly submit to your Majesty that the grants should be completed of the Peerages upon which your Majesty's pleasure had been taken by Lord Goderich.

Which is humbly submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Right Hon. Thomas Wallace\* to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD,

Portman Square, 16th January, 1828.

I have availed myself of the time your Grace was kind enough to allow me, to consider well the proposition you made to me in our conversation on Sunday morning. You will not I trust doubt of my being fully sensible of the value of the recommendation you offered as the alternative of my waiving any claim I felt I had to be restored to office in the arrangement you are employed in forming; nor do I deny that a seat in the House of Lords has been, on many accounts, an object of my wishes. It was not, therefore, from the want of justly appreciating the honour and advantages of the Peerage that I felt what I expressed in our interview; it simply arose from the expectation of being called again to the public service having been confidently entertained by me, whenever those with whom I concurred and with whom I retired, returned to it, and finding myself amongst those whose services on the present occasion were not deemed requisite. This, I own, at the moment, produced a sensation of severe disappointment, which, as I was not ashamed to feel, I did not hesitate to avow. Having stated this, with a knowledge your Grace gave me of the difficulties by which you were embarrassed in fulfilling the important duty assigned to you, I have only to add that the same sentiments which would naturally bind me to a government in which the principles and opinions held by you were likely to prevail, and I may be allowed to say also my personal attachment to yourself, forbid my permitting any desire or claim of mine to operate as an impediment to the formation of such an arrangement as in your contemplation is best calculated to secure to it the strength and firmness so necessary in a crisis like that in which we are placed. I therefore no longer hesitate to forego such pretensions as I may have to be at present replaced in office, and to receive with the gratitude and respect which becomes me, the honour that your Grace proposed to recommend to his Majesty to confer upon me. In doing this, however, I trust I was not intended, or that I shall be hereafter considered, to renounce all pretension to a return to office; and that when the difficulties of this season are passed by, and the administration (as I sincerely hope it will be) firmly established, I shall not be shut out from fair consideration whenever opportunities occur for recalling me to the public service in any of those situations which are compatible with a seat in the House of Lords. With the habits and occupations in which so large a portion of my life has been spent, I am persuaded your Grace will not wonder that on this point I should be very anxious.

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\* Afterwards Lord Wallace.

Your Grace was so good as to say that you would be disposed to give to the honour you were ready to recommend me to, all the credit in the public estimation that I could desire. What I have to request, then, is, that it should be formally announced with as little delay as possible, and in a way that, by *separating it from others*, may make it appear to be connected with the general arrangement of the government. This is the only wish I have upon the subject, and I am satisfied your Grace will feel and do justice to the motive of it. With this request, and with the explanation with which I have thought it necessary to trouble you, I place myself with the most perfect confidence in your hands, and with the most unfeigned and anxious wishes for the complete success and stability of the administration formed by you, and my disposition (in any situation in which I may be placed) to give it the most zealous support,

I have the honour to remain, my dear Lord,  
with the greatest truth and regard, most faithfully yours,  
T. WALLACE.

If your Grace wishes to see me, I shall be happy to call at Apsley House at any time you may appoint.

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*The Right Hon. W. Huskisson to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Somerset Place, 17th January, 1828.

Having now received the opinions of Lord Dudley, Lord Palmerston, and Mr. Grant, that, under all the circumstances of the case with which they are acquainted, there is nothing which should preclude me from accepting office with Mr. Herries in a new government consistently with a proper regard to my personal honour and public character, I lose not a moment in informing you that I am willing to abide by their decision.

I do so on the following understanding:—

That it is not your intention to continue Mr. Herries in the situation of Chancellor of the Exchequer.

That there is to be a Finance Committee.

That Lord Althorpe shall be proposed as a member of that Committee. Upon this last point Mr. Herries and I were, from the first, entirely agreed. The difference arose respecting the chair.

Believe me, dear Duke of Wellington, very sincerely yours,  
W. HUSKISSON.

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*To the Right Hon. W. Huskisson.*

[ 786. ]

MY DEAR HUSKISSON,

London, 17th January, 1828, 4 p.m.

I have just now received your note, and I am very happy to find that no difficulty exists to your becoming a member of the government about to be formed.

I mentioned to you yesterday that before I spoke to you on Thursday last, the day after I had been charged by his Majesty

with the commission which is in the course of execution, I had determined to propose to his Majesty to make an arrangement for the employment of Mr. Herries' services in some other situation in the Cabinet than that of Chancellor of the Exchequer. Upon this point, therefore, you correctly understood me.

I have always felt that a pledge having been publicly given in the House of Commons, in the last session of Parliament, by Mr. Canning that there should be a Finance Committee, and all financial measures having been postponed in consequence of that pledge, it is necessary to redeem it.

The selection of individuals to compose that Committee is a matter perfectly open, and to be considered in concert with those of your colleagues in the government who are members of the House of Commons.

I can have no objection to Lord Althorpe, nor have I heard one stated. You are at full liberty to propose him as a member. But I am sure you will see that his appointment had better stand on the same footing as that of every other individual, and not be the subject of any preliminary discussion in the formation of our government.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*The King to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Royal Lodge, Thursday night,  
17th January, 1828.

MY DEAR FRIEND,

I have just received your list, which of course I do approve; and I feel very sensibly the very arduous task you have undertaken; nevertheless, under your care and guidance I trust that it will all do well. I am really quite *heartbroken* respecting my friend the Duke of Devonshire and my friend Lord Carlisle. Can you suggest any means of keeping the Duke?

Yours affectionately,

G. R.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM.

Royal Lodge, 17th January, 1828.

It really is essential to my private affairs that Scarlett should be kept if possible. There is much depending in both my Duchies upon this gentleman's particular knowledge and talent.

G. R.

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*To the Earl of Westmorland.*

[ 787.]

MY DEAR LORD WESTMORLAND,      London, 18th January, 1828.

I quite concur in the sentiment expressed in your letter received yesterday by Arbuthnot, that it is better for a man to be destroyed by his enemies than by his friends; but this has not been exactly the alternative in your case. Your enemies would have destroyed you, and your friends have taken the course most consistent with your honour and station.

Situated as I am and have been, from the moment at which, for my sins, the King sent to me to give him my assistance to restore order to the chaos which has existed in the country for the last months, it is impossible for me to enter into details; but from that moment up to this, in which I may say the matter is concluded, I have not ceased to endeavour to be allowed to call to my assistance my old friend and colleague; but have found in all quarters the difficulties and objections insurmountable; and I have no doubt that if I had persisted I must have resigned the commission. You will tell me, perhaps, that the commission has been ill-executed, which is a matter of opinion; and that the best thing to be done would have been to form a government consisting exclusively of those who would not have objected to your being a member; or that I ought to have declined the attempt to form a government without you. I assure you that the first alternative was out of the question, as being impossible; and as to the last, I am convinced that you would yourself be the person to tell me not to take such a line in the existing state of affairs.

Arbuthnot has been with me since the first day that I was charged with this commission. He has been present at every conversation I have had with friends or others. He knows all of which I have been informed, and that I have done. He is connected with you and attached to you, but not more so than I am; and I am convinced that he will tell you that it was impossible for me to act otherwise than I have done, excepting by the adoption of the line of throwing up the commission with which I am charged.

I have now to recommend a proceeding to you which, in my opinion, will relieve you from much of the feeling which I am convinced that this arrangement is calculated to excite. Make the act your own. Admit the necessity which exists in the

present emergency of fresh admissions into the Cabinet, and all will be right and your honour safe. But at all events don't blame one who in this, as in every other case in which you have been concerned, has fairly and zealously done everything to secure for you an object which, I must say, you could not wish for more than he wished to obtain it for you.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[ 788. ]

*To Lord Bexley.*

MY DEAR LORD,

18th January, 1828.

You will have heard that upon the dissolution of the late administration the King had called upon me to afford him my assistance in forming a new one, and my efforts have been directed to attain that object.

The alteration produced by the events of the last nine months, and the loss which his Majesty has sustained of the two eminent men who were at the head of his councils at the time I had the happiness of being employed in those councils with you, have rendered it absolutely necessary to endeavour to collect in his Majesty's service as many persons as I may be able who have been in the habit and possess the talent of speaking in Parliament.

In this state of things, I have had to consider your situation, and have now to perform the very painful duty of communicating to you the result. Recollection of my intercourse with you as a colleague; of the usefulness of your advice and experience in his Majesty's councils; of your great exertions in the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer during the war and in the eventful times—with relation to finance and currency—in which we have lived since the peace; and, indeed, generally of the great services which you rendered to the public, and of the debt of gratitude due to you for those services by all, but particularly by me, would have induced me to seek and ask for your assistance upon this occasion; and to this I must add that the King feels and has warmly expressed his sense of those claims upon him, as well as other claims of recent date, which entitle you in the strongest manner to his Majesty's most gracious favour and protection.

I must, however, ask you to resign your office of Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster; and the King has desired me to inform you that it is his intention to grant you a pension of the first class; to which your services entitle you, and in manifestation of his good-will. I will conclude as I commenced, by assuring you that nothing could have induced me to take this step excepting the exigency of the King's service at this moment, for which it has fallen to my lot to endeavour to make provision.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Lord Bexley to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foots Cray Place, 18th January, 1828.

Ever since I quitted the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer, I have considered myself as holding the Seal of the Duchy of Lancaster as a testimony of his Majesty's gracious approbation of my past services, and as subject at any time to such arrangements as might best promote the strength and advantage of his Majesty's government.

In resigning it into his Majesty's hands, I have therefore only further to request your Grace to express my humble and dutiful acknowledgments to his Majesty for the repeated proofs of his gracious favour towards me, and especially for the provision he has been pleased to make for my retirement.

I will not deny that, having had the honour to be associated with your Grace in the Cabinet, and of having assisted, however humbly, in those exertions by which the deliverance of Europe was effected in the glorious period of your Grace's command, it would have been a gratification to me to sit again as your colleague; but I am fully sensible of the difficulties of your situation, and of the importance of obtaining the greatest practicable force of parliamentary support; and I have only to add my most sincere wishes for the success and prosperity of your Grace's administration.

Believe me ever, my dear Duke, yours most faithfully,

BEXLEY.

I shall expect to hear from your Grace when it may be his Majesty's pleasure that I should deliver up the Seal of my office.

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*Lord Ellenborough to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Connaught Place, 18th January, 1828.

I return the papers relative to the Treaty, and have made out a statement for your convenience of what seem to be the main points. I have added

no observations, as the subject requires much consideration, and there must be later papers in the Foreign Office essential to the maturing of the measures now to be adopted.

I have likewise taken the liberty of transmitting to you the sketch I made for my own amusement of that part of the King's Speech which must refer to the Treaty. I supposed the case of a government not approving of the Treaty, but bound by it.

The sketch, having been written on the 15th, is not exactly what I should have written after my interview with you this morning.

Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington, very faithfully yours,

ELLENBOROUGH.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

PRESENT STATE OF THE GREEK QUESTION, as far as it appears from the printed Papers, which are not of a date, in London, subsequent to the 12th December, 1827.

By despatches from Constantinople of the 11th November it appears that the Porte, on the 7th, refused passports to couriers and vessels, on the ground that the battle of Navarino had put an end to the treaties on which the right to ask passports was founded.

On the 8th the Porte desired answers to the following questions, before it would grant passports :

1. Veut-on se désister de la cause grecque ?
2. Veut-on payer des indemnités pour les dommages causés à la flotte Ottomane ?
3. Veut-on donner satisfaction à la Sublime Porte ?

On the 10th a note is delivered to the Reis-Effendi by the three ambassadors, declaring, as to the 1st question, that the Allies will persevere in the measures adopted for carrying into effect the Treaty. As to the 2nd question, No; because the aggression was on the side of the Porte. As to the 3rd question, the answer is vague. Mr. Canning says it was in the negative. The words used might lead the Porte to understand it in the affirmative.

In his despatch of the 11th November M. de Guilleminot says, in reference to the whole of the note : " Votre Excellence y remarquera sûrement le soin que, tout en repoussant les étranges prétensions de la Porte, nous avons mis à la rassurer sur des craintes qu'autorise depuis longtemps, aux yeux des Turcs, sans qu'il soit facile de les en guérir, le vague extrême du Traité de Londres."

The most remarkable expressions in this note are those which declare the proposed plan of pacification to be "*loin de porter atteinte à l'intégrité de l'empire,*" and which state one of the objects of the Allies to be "*conserver la Grèce à Constantinople.*"

On the 10th the Austrian Internuncio declared to the French ambassador " qu'il venait de déclarer à la Porte, que, ne pouvant rien ajouter à tout ce qu'il avait fait pour l'éclairer, il se mettait désormais hors de cause."

On the receipt of this despatch a conference was held in London, on the 12th December, 1827.

In the Protocol it is said " il paraît que le moment est arrivé où les trois puissances alliées peuvent se voir enveloppées dans une guerre avec la Porte Ottomane," and therefore the plenipotentiaries think it right to declare that if the measures adopted by the Porte should take a character of direct hostility.

the whole object of the war into which they should then be drawn would be the same that they had originally endeavoured to accomplish by negotiation.

They then renew the "renonciation de toute vue intéressée," and particularly "agrandissement de territoire."

"Enfin, qu'en tout état de cause, elles se promettent mutuellement une active et réelle co-opération."

#### INSTRUCTIONS TO THE ADMIRALS.

12th July, 1827.

In the event of the Porte not consenting to an armistice, the squadrons are to be united, "à l'effet d'empêcher tout secours turc ou égyptien, en hommes, armes, vaisseaux, et munitions de guerre, d'arriver en Grèce, ou dans les îles de l'Archipel."

The Greeks are to be treated as friends; but no part is to be taken in the hostilities between Greeks and Turks.

"Vous sentez que vous devez apporter un soin extrême à ce que les mesures que vous prendrez envers la marine ottomane ne dégèrent pas en hostilités."

Force is only to be used if the Turks "s'obstinent à forcer les passages qui seront interceptés."

However, as these "instructions ne sauraient prévoir tous les cas possibles, et qu'une certaine latitude vous est nécessaire, le Roi vous l'accorde pleinement."

If the Turks should accept, and the Greeks refuse, the armistice, the squadrons are instructed to "veiller au maintien de l'armistice," without taking any part in hostilities.

Under these instructions the Admirals acted. It seems doubts arose as to the application of some part of these instructions; but in the more detailed instructions, dated the 15th October, it is said "that the government observe with satisfaction that the construction the Ambassadors and Admirals appear to put upon these passages is agreeable to the spirit of the instructions themselves, and to the intention of those by whom they were framed."

In the first secret article of the Treaty it is said that the cessation of war, &c., in the Levant, "par les moyens à la disposition de la Sublime Porte, paraît encore éloignée," and *therefore* the Treaty. July 6th.

On the 10th of September Prince Lieven states that the successes of the Turks have been such as to expose the Greeks, who have neither *money, arms, nor provisions*, "chaque jour à la chance d'une destruction totale," and *therefore* he demands the blockade of Constantinople, both on the side of the Archipelago and the Black Sea, for the purpose of starving the capital, and thus forcing the Sultan to agree to the terms proposed.

This demand was made before the answer of the Divan was known to the first note presented.

On this ground Lord Dudley obtains the postponement of the discussion to the 17th, and on the 17th, on the same ground, declines adopting it; but on the 15th October, still not adopting the proposition, proposes clearer instructions to the Admirals, which are accordingly drawn out and sent.

These instructions are in the spirit of the first, but rather more in detail:—

"The Admiral is directed to concert with the Commanders of the Allied Powers the most effectual mode of preventing any movements by sea on the part of the Turkish and Egyptian forces."

"He will concert with the Greek authorities that the whole of their naval force shall be exclusively appropriated to the blockade of the ports of Greece now occupied by the Turkish or Egyptian forces," and the Greeks are to have the usual rights of blockade by belligerents.



II.

SKETCH OF THAT PART OF THE KING'S SPEECH WHICH MUST REFER TO THE TREATY.

I have ordered to be laid before you a copy of a Treaty contracted by me with his Majesty the King of France and Navarre and his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, with the view of putting an end to piracy in the Levant, and to the effusion of blood in Greece, by an arrangement which appeared to be as much called for by humanity as by the interests of the repose of Europe.

It is with much regret that I inform you that no progress has hitherto been made towards the accomplishment of the objects of this Treaty; and that in the attempt to execute its provisions a sanguinary conflict has taken place between the fleets of the contracting Powers and that of the Ottoman Porte.

I have thought fit to reward the brilliant valour and ability displayed by my naval forces in the battle of Navarino; but it will ever be a subject of deep concern to me that any circumstances should have brought my arms into hostile collision with those of a Power with which it must always be my desire to maintain the relations of amity.

You may be assured that no exertions will be wanting on my part to effect the benevolent objects of the Treaty, and to preserve everywhere a peace necessary to the interests and happiness of all the nations of Europe.

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*Viscount Goderich to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,                      Downing Street, 19th January, 1828.

I should be very much obliged to you if you would be so good as to let me know when you have kissed hands; as it would be proper that whenever that event takes place I should write to the King, to express to his Majesty my grateful sense of the kindness which I have, at all times, experienced from him.

Believe me, my dear Duke, very sincerely yours,  
GODERICH.

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*Viscount Sandon\* to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,                      Torquay, 19th January, 1828.

I feel myself placed in rather an awkward situation by my half-completed appointment to the Board of Admiralty, and I wish to explain myself clearly to your Grace to avoid any misunderstanding. I should have written earlier but that considerable domestic anxiety has really precluded me from the possibility of quiet consideration. My appointment was entirely of Lord Goderich's free offer to me, and his ministry being at an end, I consider mine as equally so. I should wish your Grace to consider my seat at the Board as completely at your disposal; perhaps you might have considered it so already, but in my ignorance of the usual methods of proceeding, and distant as I am from any advice from more experienced persons, I have thought it fairer to state at once what my views upon the subject are. In the present confusion of political parties, I must say that I should be unwilling to find myself engaged to any par-

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\* The Earl of Harrowby, K.G.

ticular course, and shall be glad to feel myself completely at liberty to give my individual humble vote as occasion may arise. I beg, my Lord, that you will excuse whatever may be informal or uncalled-for in this communication, which I have not a moment to reconsider, and will believe me your Grace's obliged and faithful servant,

SANDON.

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*The Right Hon. Thomas Wallace to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD,

Portman Square, 19th January, 1828.

Had I been at home when your Grace's letter arrived, I should not have delayed a moment to beg you to accept my most sincere thanks, not only for the intimation it conveyed, but much more for the very gratifying assurances of your Grace's regard and kindness with which that intimation was accompanied, and which I trust you will believe have not been addressed to one incapable of fully appreciating their value from such a quarter.

I cannot help fearing that on the subject of a future return to office I have expressed myself so inaccurately as to lead you into the misapprehension of my having sought from you a promise. Nothing, I assure you, could be more remote from my intention. What I ventured to say was, not to ask from *you* a promise, but merely to guard myself against the possible supposition that I meant to abandon all hope of again forming a part of the government, if circumstances favourable to my doing so should eventually occur.

I am truly sensible of your Grace's goodness in acquiescing in my request, both as to the time and manner in which the honour conferred on me shall be announced to the public. This I flatter myself will produce the impression I am anxious should be generally received, that, although not holding an official situation, I am identified with your Grace's administration.

The title by which it is my wish to be called to the House of Lords is Lord Wallace of Knaresdale, in the county of Northumberland. I have enclosed it on a separate paper, that your Grace might not be troubled by copying it.

May I be allowed to offer my congratulations to you on the termination of the most arduous duty you have been engaged in by the completion of an arrangement which I earnestly hope will have entire success, as I am persuaded any one known to have been formed by *you*, and in which *you* will preside, cannot fail to receive the ready confidence of Parliament and the country.

I have the honour to remain ever, my dear Lord, with the greatest sincerity and attachment, most faithfully yours,

T. WALLACE.

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*To the Marquess of Anglesey.*

[ 789. ]

MY DEAR LORD ANGLESEY,

London, 21st January, 1828.

You will have heard that the King, upon the dissolution of his late ministry, had called upon me to give him my assistance

in forming a new one; and that wish being now completed, I enclose a list of its members, and, at the same time, express the anxious wish of the King, my own, and that of Mr. Peel, and generally of all those whose names are in the list, that you should continue in your office of Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, and that your health may soon be so far re-established as to enable you to proceed to your post. I shall see Mr. Lamb this day, of whom I understand that you had approved as Chief Secretary of your government, and propose to him to remain.

I did not write to you before now, because I understood that the office which you preferred to all others was that of Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, and I wished to be able to let you know that the arrangements for the formation of the government were complete, before I should propose to you to undertake such a charge under its superintendence.

Peel and I will call upon you in the course of a few days, to converse with you upon the subject of Ireland, if you should be sufficiently well to receive us.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[ 790. ]

*To the Earl of Lonsdale.*

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 21st January, 1828.

You will have heard that, upon the dissolution of the late ministry, the King had sent for me, and had desired me to give him my assistance in forming a new ministry; and I enclose you the result of my endeavours.

I sincerely and anxiously hope that this arrangement will be found calculated to conciliate your confidence, than which nothing will contribute more to its stability and the prosperity of the King's affairs.

The difficulties in which we have been placed in consequence of the events which have occurred in this country since April last, had rendered it absolutely necessary to collect in the King's service as many men capable of leading public opinion as could be brought to act together. On this principle I looked to the re-union of those who, having been in the King's service previous to April last, then separated from us; and as there is in reality no difference of principle among us, to endeavour

to carry on the government with their assistance, and that of others who do not differ from the same opinions.

The execution of this plan has involved many painful sacrifices, particularly one which you will readily believe has been most painful to me. But it could not be avoided. The King's service must be carried on; and I am firmly convinced that I should have failed in executing the commission with which I was charged, if I had proceeded on any other principle, or had in the end refused to make that sacrifice.

I will not now mention other arrangements of minor importance, but in which I shall be very happy to attend to your wishes.

Ever, my dear Lord, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Earl of Carlisle.*

[ 791. ]

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 21st January, 1828.

In communicating to you that it is his Majesty's wish to appoint Lord Ellenborough to be Lord Privy Seal, and to deliver to him the seals to-morrow at the Royal Lodge in Windsor Park, and for this purpose to receive them from you at the same place at three o'clock on the same day, I cannot refrain from expressing to you my regret that the King is not to enjoy the benefit of your services in his councils.

I know how much his Majesty would have been gratified if you could have continued to serve him; and I must add that the loss of your services has very much aggravated the pain and vexation which these arrangements have given me.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Earl of Westmorland.*

[ 792. ]

MY DEAR LORD WESTMORLAND,      London, 21st January, 1828.

I cannot express to you how much my mind has been relieved by your letter.

There is one point, however, upon which I wish still to explain myself to you. I cannot mention names nor describe persons; but from the commencement I was informed that the

objections to your return to office were insuperable. For this reason I did not send for you ; and I did not write to tell you how the matter stood because I was determined to persevere; and did persevere to the last. Your presence in London would have done no good. Encouragement and support to me were not necessary, and you would have been exposed to the mortification of witnessing an arrangement made by which you would have been excluded.

I could not mortify you by telling you that there was a chance that you would be excluded till that result was quite certain.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 793. ]

*To Viscount Goderich.*

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 21st January, 1828.

I delayed to give you an answer respecting the time at which his Majesty would receive his intended servants till I should have received his commands upon the subject. It is to-morrow, at the Royal Lodge, at three o'clock.

I assure you that no man regrets more sincerely than I do that the necessity exists for making this communication, and particularly that it should have fallen to my lot to make it.

Ever, my dear Lord, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[ 794. ]

*To the Right Hon. George Tierney.*

MY DEAR SIR,

London, 21st January, 1828.

You will have heard that, upon the dissolution of the late ministry, the King had sent for me, and desired me to give him my assistance in forming a new one ; and that work having been performed, it is with much concern that I inform you that the arrangements which I have considered it my duty to suggest to his Majesty for the conduct of his government do not admit of my proposing to you on the part of his Majesty to continue to belong to his councils.

I assure you that I make this communication with sincere regret.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*To the Right Hon. George Tierney.***MY DEAR SIR,**

London, 21st January, 1828.

I hope you will not be displeased at my writing this note with the accompanying letter, and that you will attribute it to its true motive.

I am acquainted with your son, and I hope you will allow me to assure you that, if I can do anything to forward his views, I will do so with great pleasure.

I beg you to give me no answer to this ; but that you will desire your son to write to me to state what his wishes are ; and you may rely upon it that I will attend to them as far as may be in my power.

Ever, my dear Sir, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

*The Right Hon. George Tierney to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.***MY DEAR LORD,**

Savile Row, 21st January, 1828.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this date, and I beg your Grace will accept my thanks for the very obliging terms in which you have been so good as to announce to me my dismissal from his Majesty's councils.

I have the honour to be, my dear Lord,  
your Grace's most obedient and humble servant,

GEORGE TIERNEY.

*The Right Hon. George Tierney to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.***MY DEAR LORD,**

Savile Row, 21st January, 1828.

If I do not answer your letter of this day's date, marked private and confidential, it is because I avail myself of your permission to abstain from so doing.

I shall, as you desire, forward your letter to my son, and leave him to the free exercise of his own unfettered discretion. I know that his great object was to continue in the diplomatic line, but how far the change which has recently taken place may have altered his views I cannot tell. Of this, however, I am sure, that he will be much flattered by the notice your Grace is so good as to take of him, and fully sensible of your kindness towards him.

I have the honour to remain, my dear Lord, yours truly,

GEORGE TIERNEY.

*Sir Frederick Lamb to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Plymouth, 21st January, 1828.

Thank you, my dear Duke, for your few lines received this morning. I have got the authority I wanted from Dudley about the money. Lord W. Bentinck has not yet sailed, nor are there any signs of the wind changing. Miguel getting very impatient. Supposing the list I see in the papers to be nearly correct, you will have succeeded in forming a very strong government. If you can induce Russia to agree to the limitation of Greece to the Morea and the Islands (beyond which there is now not a pretence nor a possibility of extending it), you will probably be able to get the accession of Austria and Prussia to a document putting this explanation upon the Treaty, in which case the obstacle of neutral rights being mainly got rid of, its object may be fulfilled by naval blockades without leaving to Russia a pretence for marching her army. This is one way out of the question, and I therefore submit it to you.

Ever, my dear Duke, most truly yours,

F. LAMB.

What is to become of Greece in the end, or how it is to be governed at all, is more than I can foresee.

[ 795. ]

*To the Right Hon. J. C. Herries.*

MY DEAR SIR,

London, 21st January, 1828.

In answer to your letter of yesterday, I assure you that there never was an event comparatively so trifling in itself that will produce such important consequences on the destinies of this country, as will the premature disclosure in the newspapers of the names of the newly formed ministry, notwithstanding the precautions and pains I took to prevent it. I know that your experience in the Cabinet has shown you every minister having a newspaper as much as a secretary. But I assure you that such is not the prevailing 'practice; nay, that such practice is absolutely inconsistent with the first duty of a minister as prescribed by his oath of a Privy Councillor; and that it is absolutely impossible to transact public business in this country without secrecy. By secrecy I don't mean mystery. But I mean that a member of the Cabinet should understand it, and make it a rule of his conduct, never to mention or make known to any person whatever, much less to a person likely to publish in a newspaper, anything of which he has obtained a knowledge in his situation of a member of the Cabinet Council.

Having written this much on the subject, I will say no more upon it ; but to entreat you to bear in mind the rule to which I have above adverted, and to understand that the knowledge which you find exists in any quarter upon any subject, does not afford any excuse for talking of it, when you have obtained your knowledge of it as a member of the Cabinet.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Right Hon. Maurice Fitzgerald.*

[ 796. ]

MY DEAR SIR,

London, 23rd January, 1828.

I am very much concerned that I find myself under the necessity of asking you to resign your seat at the Board of Treasury. I sincerely wish that this disagreeable duty had fallen into other hands. It could not have fallen upon anybody who regrets it more than, my dear Sir,

Yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*To the Right Hon. Maurice Fitzgerald.*

MY DEAR SIR,

London, 23rd January, 1828.

Of the many irksome duties which have been imposed upon me in the last fortnight, there is not one that has given me more pain than that which I have just performed. It occurs to me that you would have remained in office from something you said to me some time ago ; and I must add that every private feeling would have induced me to wish to make you the offer, if the emergencies of the King's service, a sense of which has, in fact, involved me in these difficulties, would have allowed it.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the King.*

[ 797. ]

London, 24th January, 1828.

I beg leave humbly to submit to your Majesty the following arrangements :—

Mr. Frankland Lewis, now Secretary of the Treasury, to be



Vice-President of the Board of Trade, and to be sworn of your Majesty's most Honourable Privy Council.

Mr. George Dawson to be Secretary of the Finance Branch of the Treasury, vice Mr. Frankland Lewis.

Lord Granville Somerset to be a Lord of the Treasury, vice Mr. Maurice Fitzgerald, who has resigned.

Sir John Beckett to be Judge-Advocate-General, vice Mr. Abercrombie, who has resigned.

All of which is submitted for your Majesty's most gracious pleasure by your Majesty's most devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

[ 798. ]

*To the King.*

London, 24th January, 1828.

I enclose for your Majesty's perusal the copy of the answer which I have received from the Earl of Rosslyn to the offer made to him of the office of Master-General of the Ordnance. In consequence of the receipt of this answer I have made General Lord Viscount Beresford acquainted with your Majesty's most gracious intention that the office of Master-General of the Ordnance should be offered to him, and he has accepted the same with expressions of the utmost gratitude.

Lord Beresford is not anxious to have a seat in the Cabinet, although not unwilling to serve your Majesty in your councils if so required. But, upon the whole, I am inclined to believe that, at the present moment, it is desirable not to call Lord Beresford to the Cabinet.

I request your Majesty's permission to have him summoned to the Privy Council.

Which is submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

[ 799. ]

*To the King.*

London, 24th January, 1828.

I heretofore informed your Majesty of the conversation I had had with Mr. Wallace respecting the resignation of his office of Master of the Mint, and of his desire to be created a peer; to

which arrangement your Majesty expressed your willingness to consent.

Mr. Wallace has since in the handsomest manner resigned all claim to the office of Master of the Mint, to which Mr. Herries has been appointed; and I beg leave now to submit for your Majesty's pleasure that Mr. Wallace should be created a peer, by the title of Baron Wallace, of Knaresdale, in the county of Northumberland.

As Mr. Wallace is very anxious that his elevation to the Peerage should be coeval with the first appointment of the new administration, and your Majesty was pleased to express your willingness to consent to this arrangement, I have ventured to desire that the Warrant may be sent down with this letter, in order that your Majesty may execute it if you should think proper.

All of which is submitted for your Majesty's gracious pleasure by your Majesty's most dutiful subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Duke of Argyll.*

[ 800. ]

MY DEAR DUKE,

London, 27th January, 1828.

I don't know that any duty that I have performed since I have been charged with the task of reconstructing the administration, has given me half the pain which I feel in making this communication to you; and I most sincerely wish that the task had fallen upon somebody else. The King's service requires that I should ask you to resign your office of Keeper of the Great Seal of Scotland, and you may be assured, and what I have above stated will prove it to you, that if I were not convinced of the necessity for making this request I would not have made it.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Duke of Argyll to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

Upper Brook Street, 27th January, 1828.

I lose no time in resigning the office of Keeper of the Great Seal of Scotland, in consequence of your letter desiring me to do so.

Ever, my dear Lord Duke, your most faithful and obedient servant,

ARGYLL.

*Sir William A'Court to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Lisbon, 27th January, 1828.

Although we have no direct information from England of the change that has taken place in his Majesty's councils, yet as the information contained in the French papers will not allow me to doubt of the fact of your Grace's being at the head of the government, I take the liberty of writing these few lines to recommend to your Grace the young Marquis de Loulé, who has determined upon embarking for England immediately with the Princess Donna Anna Jesus, his bride.

He has convinced himself (a little late perhaps) that it will be most prudent to let the first moments of Don Miguel's anger pass over before he presents himself to him, and with this view he has freighted a vessel in which he will sail for England the very first instant the wind will allow of his departure.

I must beg your Grace to understand that I have neither counselled nor aided this flight; my object in writing this letter is merely to apprise his Majesty's government of the quality of the travellers, and to recommend them to such attentions as your Grace, in your better judgment, may think proper to show them.

It is probable that the Marquis de Loulé will forward this letter to your Grace from the port of his disembarkation.

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect, my Lord Duke, your Grace's most obedient humble servant,

WILLIAM A' COURT.

[ 801. ]

*To the Right Hon. William Huskisson.*

MY DEAR HUSKISSON,

London, 28th January, 1828.

Before I left town on Saturday I went with the Chancellor to the Lord High Admiral respecting the appointment to the office of Judge of the Court of Admiralty; when the Chancellor told me that Sir James Scarlett\* had come to him that morning, and had informed him that his communications with Lord Fitz-William and Lord Milton, particularly the former, would prevent him from remaining in the office of Attorney-General *as a political office*. I spoke consequently to the King upon the subject on that day, who had been very anxious to retain Sir James Scarlett in his service; but his Majesty felt that it would

\* Sir James Scarlett became Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer in December, 1834, and was created, in 1835, Lord Abinger, of Abinger, County Surrey.

be impossible that he should remain in his service otherwise than as in an office holding which the government were entitled to his political as well as to his professional services.

I consequently saw Sir James Scarlett yesterday, and I had a conversation with him, in which he repeated nearly what he had before said confidentially to the Lord Chancellor; and we separated very good friends, he saying that he could not expect to remain in office, not being able to give us his political support; and at the same time saying that he quitted his office leaving no arrear of business whatever.

As you very naturally felt an interest respecting Sir James Scarlett, I have given you this outline of what has passed. I therefore recommend Wetherell as Attorney-General.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*Sir Charles Wetherell to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Westminster Hall, 28th January, 1828.

I have the honour of expressing to your Grace the great satisfaction which I experience in accepting the office of Attorney-General, to which you have the goodness to inform me that his Majesty has been graciously pleased to approve that I should be recommended and appointed. Allow me to say that I cannot omit this occasion of assuring you that it is to me one of the most gratifying circumstances attending this appointment that it will connect me with an administration at the head of which your Grace has been placed with the universal approbation of the country.

I remain, my Lord Duke,

your Grace's most faithful and obedient servant,

CHARLES WETHEBELL.

*To the Right Hon. William Huskisson.*

[ 802. ]

MY DEAR HUSKISSON,

London, 28th January, 1828.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will let me know, by return of the messenger, what you have determined respecting taking Sir George Clerk as Under-Secretary of State, as I cannot make the arrangements for filling up either the

Admiralty or the Board of Control till I know your determination.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[ 803. ]

*To Viscount Melville.*

MY DEAR LORD MELVILLE,

London, 28th January, 1828.

Till Huskisson will decide whether he will take Sir George Clerk as his Secretary, I cannot finish my arrangements for filling either the Admiralty or the Board of Control.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[ 804. ]

*To Viscount Beresford.*

MY DEAR BERESFORD,

London, 28th January, 1828.

It has been mentioned to me that you propose to transfer the agency of the Artillery, &c., from the house of Greenwood to that of Macdonald and Co., which, as Master-General, you have a full right to do.

But allow me to speak to you before you do so.

As an old Master-General, I will tell you that Greenwood's accounts are so closed up and balances paid, that we have been obliged to give him an allowance for paying the pensions, &c.

Lord Hastings did a similar thing, but only in one branch of the service, and the public lost 40,000*l.*, not yet paid!

You may rely upon it that this arrangement will create a noise which will not be unimportant.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Sir Frederick Lamb to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

28th January, 1828.

I write in the expectation that we shall sail to-morrow. It has gone off very well here, and Miguel and all his people seem in very good humour. If we can keep him among gentlemen when he gets to Lisbon, it will do

very well. This is what I doubt and fear. He shows no cleverness, and a great facility of disposition. I am sorry for it. I wish he were more determined. We have been rather heavy upon the public functionaries here, particularly upon Sir John Cameron, who has done everything that could be agreeable to the Infant, though he has nothing but his pay. Mount-charles has mentioned it to the King, and we all hope that something may be done to make it up to him.

Adieu, my dear Duke, most truly yours,

F. LAMB.

30th.

To-day we really embark. I much distrust Palmella. He seems to me to have nothing in view but his private ends, which, God knows why, he unites in his own mind with the maintenance of the Constitution at all events.

Villa Real is a little alarmed at learning that the line-of-battle ships are ordered to sail, and hopes that a little latitude may be left about embarking the troops. For myself, I can't say that I care a fig about it, further than from the wish to show these people that we condescend to their wishes wherever we reasonably can.

F. LAMB.

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*The King to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Royal Lodge, 28th January, 1828.

Monday evening, 7 o'clock.

MY DEAR FRIEND,

I lose not a moment in forwarding to you a letter which I have just received, and which I must candidly acknowledge to you distresses me much. The Duke of Argyll's statement is perfectly correct. I therefore desire that you will see if anything *yet* can be done to remedy this very unpleasant business, as I cannot submit to the Duke of Argyll's conceiving that it was by *any desire of mine* that he has received his dismissal. Your sentiments coinciding so completely with mine, I am sure you will know how to appreciate my feelings upon this subject, and that you will do all you can to relieve me from my present embarrassment.

Always most truly yours,

G. R.

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*To the King.*

[ 805. ]

London, 29th January, 1828.

I lay before your Majesty the letter which I addressed to the Duke of Argyll;\* from which your Majesty will see that I did not use your Majesty's name, notwithstanding that your Majesty had previously consented to the arrangement which I had

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\* See page 215.

proposed for your consideration after stating your Majesty's gracious feelings for the Duke of Argyll.

Your Majesty's service cannot be carried on excepting by the cordial support of one or other of the great parties into which the country is divided. There is but little at the disposal of your Majesty's servants to flatter the vanity or to gratify the ambition of the great families in the country, and particularly in Scotland; and I am certain that this arrangement was necessary for your Majesty's service in that quarter.

I feel it as much as your Majesty. The enclosed letter shows what I feel; but I see no mode in which the arrangement could now be altered or could have been avoided.

All of which is submitted for your Majesty's pleasure by your Majesty's most devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

[ 806. ]

To Sir \_\_\_\_\_.

MY DEAR \_\_\_\_\_,

London, 29th January, 1828.

I was so much occupied all day that I could not till now answer your letter; nor could I receive you yesterday when you called, as I was just going to dinner.

In respect to your wishes to be created a peer, I conceive that, in the existing state of the peerage, and considering that the King has added twenty-six to the list of British peers since the summer of 1826, it is the duty of the person who fills the office in which I am placed to discourage and protest against any more being created unless some public service of magnitude or public emergency should require it. If this duty is not performed, either the House of Lords will become a democratic body and a nuisance, or contemptible and useless. In either case the constitution of the country will be overturned.

Entertaining these opinions, I could not recommend you for this honour with propriety, on the score of your being a friend of mine. Your claims of family, &c., are excellent, but those of fortune would fail you; and, at all events, I could not propose such an arrangement excepting on the most clear public grounds and emergency.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*The Marquess of Anglesey to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Uxbridge House, 29th January, 1828.

My motive for wishing to see you is that a perfect understanding may exist in regard to the government of Ireland.

I stated to Mr. Peel the system I had prescribed to myself to pursue. He approves it, and if it meets also with your approbation I will proceed to my charge as soon as the necessary arrangements can be made.

If it is convenient to you to come here to-morrow, I beg you to appoint the hour that will suit you.

I remain, my dear Duke of Wellington, very sincerely yours,

ANGLESEY.

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*The Earl of Westmorland to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

DEAR DUKE,

Tuesday, 29th January, 1828.

The defence set up by the Canning party was that their Treaty was a necessary step, consequent on your negotiation at St. Petersburg; and I suppose intentionally puzzling the two cases, they talked of a Protocol as if it had passed with you. I always have borne in my memory the expressions in the different despatches, that there should be no force, no right of war, &c.; but I was afraid there had been something done that had slipped my memory; but there does not appear any formal act of admission on either side in your papers; *we stand clear* I think till April, 1826. But then, what was done all the time from May to April, 1827? What was the language held at Paris when Mr. Canning was there? and will not despatches or conferences be produced, either at Paris or with Count Lieven, that will implicate us further than your negotiations? for however true and lamentable the case may be, I fear it is difficult for us to stand clear of Mr. Canning's despatches and proceedings; and even the admission of our ignorance of them would be but a bad set-off. Could you tell me, and have you the papers of what passed subsequent to May, 1826, to April, 1827?

Yours sincerely,

WESTMORLAND.

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*The Right Hon. W. Huskisson to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Eartham, 29th January, 1828.

My reason for wishing a little delay about the Under-Secretaryship was simply this.

I had a long interview with Lord Gower, either on Thursday or Friday evening, in which I laboured, through him, to bring Lord Stafford round to a more cordial disposition; and I let Lord Gower understand that, notwithstanding what had happened, it would be highly gratifying to me to have the assistance of Lord Francis as my Under-Secretary. Lord Gower was to see his father; but I now fear my explanations have not been so successful as I wished, having heard nothing from him since.



Failing Lord Francis, the other candidates I had thought of were Sir G. Clerk and Mr. Robert Grant. There are objections to both in different ways, with which I will not trouble you at present; but Robert Grant would be far the most effective in Parliament: his character for *sanctity* might, however, counterbalance his talents in the relations of my office with the West Indies. Upon the whole, therefore, I have only to say that, considering Lord Francis out of the question, I will, without further hesitation, decide for Sir G. Clerk, if the effect of this decision be to relieve your other arrangements from any difficulty.

I see by the enclosed that Denison does not go to India, and that (judging from the tone of it) he will be ready to remain at the Admiralty, should you make him the offer. He must have lost some ground by his vacillation; but he is clever, and popular among the young men.

I feel very much obliged to you for taking the trouble of informing me of what passed in your interview with Scarlett. I wish we could have retained him, but I see it was impossible. Nothing was omitted which could fairly be tried for the purpose.

Believe me, my dear Duke, yours very truly,

W. HUSKISSON.

Have you ascertained how far the removal of Keith Douglas from office may give umbrage to the Buccleuch connexion?

*The Right Hon. W. Huskisson to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Eartham, 11 a.m., 29th January, 1828.

It has just struck me, as the messenger was on the point of setting out, that Denison would be the fittest man for the Under-Secretaryship. He is free from nearly all the objections which I feel must apply to both the others, more especially as I have already *one Scotch* Under-Secretary.

He is more *répandu* and popular than either of the other two candidates, and will be a very willing labourer under me.

However, I will not press him if you dislike it, or have a difficulty in making some other arrangement for Sir G. Clerk.

I will be in town on Friday in time to wait upon you, if the matter can stand over till then.

Saturday I must start for Liverpool. I wish I could say that I had the consent of my physician to encounter the exertions which I shall be compelled to go through there.

Yours very truly,

W. HUSKISSON.

MEMORANDUM BY SIR HERBERT TAYLOR OF HIS COMMUNICATIONS WITH MR. CANNING RESPECTING THE PLAN OF THE KING FOR THE TEMPORARY COMMAND OF THE ARMY.

29th January, 1828.

The accompanying Memorandum contains questions which were put to me by Mr. Canning, and my answers, in which reference is made to the

enclosure. It was shown to Lord Palmerston before it went to Mr. Canning, and he added the remarks in pencil. It was then submitted by Mr. Canning to the King, and I learnt from both that his Majesty had decidedly objected to any arrangement which would confer superior rank upon Sir George Murray, or upon any junior officer, in order to give him authority over his seniors employed on the Staff.

Soon afterwards it was proposed from Windsor that a Board should be appointed, and that Sir George Murray should be placed at the head of it; and his Majesty ordered me to wait upon him at Windsor upon the subject. After receiving his instructions, I wrote a short Memorandum; of which I have no copy, as it was left at Windsor, and was to be copied by Sir Frederick Watson for the signature of the King, who meant to give it to Mr. Canning. But this was not done, owing, I apprehend, to Mr. Canning's illness.

The outline of the arrangement was that the Board should consist of Sir George Murray as Principal Commissioner, the Quartermaster-General, and Adjutant-General; that the business should continue, as at present, divided between the three departments, and that the Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General should receive and convey the King's commands in his Majesty's name in all matters connected exclusively with their own departments; that the Principal Commissioner should have the immediate direction of all matters relating to promotion, &c., as at present, and be assisted by a military Secretary, who should, however, be the Secretary of the Board.

That all questions of a general nature and importance affecting the general movements, regulations, and interests of the army, and requiring more or less the co-operation of the three departments, should be considered and determined upon by the Board; and that in such cases his Majesty's pleasure should be taken by the Board, and the communication with the departments of the government should be made by the Board.

These were, as far as I recollect, the heads of the proposed arrangement, and they were communicated to Lord Palmerston, Sir Willoughby Gordon, and Sir Henry Torrens, who seemed to think that the business might be carried on without inconvenience by a clear arrangement and understanding of the details. In fact, it would have differed little from that which existed under the Secretary-at-War, except that, in some matters, the authority of a Board acting in his Majesty's name would have been substituted for that of the Secretary-at-War.

Nevertheless, it could not be viewed in any other light than as an expedient (as was the nomination of Sir George Murray with superior rank) to obviate the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief or of a General on the Staff of *high rank*, to which both his Majesty and Mr. Canning invariably told me they objected, as throwing greater difficulties in the way of the Duke of Wellington's return to the command of the army than any measure which, being obviously of a temporary nature, might be easily annulled.

The appointment of an officer of inferior rank with the denomination of Adjutant-General, Principal A.D.C., or any other, but with the duties and authority of chief of the Staff, acting in the King's name, and superintend-

ing the business of the army under his Majesty's immediate direction, was objected to upon legal and constitutional grounds; nor did it occur to those consulted that the objection made by them might be removed by making the individual concerned a Privy Councillor. But such an arrangement would be objectionable upon other grounds; and it must be obvious that, under the present circumstances, the best arrangement would be the appointment of a General officer of sufficient rank and character to the Staff, who need not have the situation of Commander-in-Chief, but might, as the senior officer employed on the Staff, conduct the business at the Horse-Guards, as did Lord Amherst, as indeed did the Duke of York previous to the year 1798. I trust I shall not be considered as presuming too far in expressing a hope that such may be the arrangement, and that the individual selected may be one who will consider himself bound to conform to the instructions of the Duke of Wellington, and to defer most positively to his Grace's opinions and directions in all matters affecting the interests of the army and the maintenance of the regulations now established, whether they relate to the discipline or to the promotion of the army. The interests of the army will then be in safe hands, and its character and efficiency will suffer in a less degree than might otherwise be apprehended from the absence from the Horse-Guards of the present Commander-in-Chief.

H. TAYLOR.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

21st June, 1827.

*Mr. Canning's questions.*—1. Would it be possible to place Sir George Murray in the office of Commander-in-Chief, or in a situation in which he might discharge all the duties of that office without the title?

*Answer.*—Sir George Murray might be placed upon the Staff in England, and would be the senior officer employed in the United Kingdom; but as Lieutenant-Generals, senior to him, are employed in foreign commands, it would be advisable to give him the *temporary* rank of *General*.

It is not unusual to give superior rank, temporary or local, to officers employed on foreign stations, and Sir George Murray himself held such in America (in 1814), and on the continent in 1815, previous to his promotion to the rank of Lieutenant-General.

It has been frequently given to General officers employed in India; it was held by Sir James Kempt in Nova Scotia, and is actually held by Sir Frederick Adam in the Ionian Islands.

The appointment to the Staff, with the rank of General, would confer upon him the chief command without the name of Commander-in-Chief, as, with the exception of India, there is not any station in which officers are employed with rank above that of Lieutenant-General.

N.B.—I ought, however, to add that care has always been taken not to give local or temporary rank to officers where their seniors were serving; and a question arises whether Sir George Murray, being the senior *Lieutenant-General* employed in the United Kingdom, might not have the command at home, and his Majesty's authority to correspond, *in his Majesty's name*, with his seniors abroad, who would receive his directions, not as being their superior officer, but as being the direct channel of his Majesty's pleasure.

enclosures. It was shown to Lord Palmerston before it went to Mr. Canning, and he added the remarks in pencil. It was then submitted by Mr. Canning to the King, and I learnt from both that his Majesty had decidedly objected to any arrangement which would confer superior rank upon Sir George Murray, or upon any junior officer, in order to give him authority over his seniors employed on the Staff.

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Nevertheless, it could not be viewed in any other light than as an expedient (as was the nomination of Sir George Murray with superior rank) to obviate the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief or of a General on the Staff of *high rank*, to which both his Majesty and Mr. Canning invariably told me they objected, as throwing greater difficulties in the way of the Duke of Wellington's return to the command of the army than any measure which, being obviously of a temporary nature, might be easily annulled.

The appointment of an officer of inferior rank with the denomination of Adjutant-General, Principal A.D.C., or any other, but with the duties and authority of chief of the Staff, acting in the King's name, and superintend-

*Question.*—2. Could he by temporary rank (or any other contrivance) be raised to such a situation without giving offence to senior officers?\*

*Answer.*—2. Sir George Murray's military reputation and his character stand deservedly so high that I do not think his appointment to the chief command would give offence to any reasonable man, however superior his rank; and the army in general would approve it, as placing its superintendance in the hands of an individual whose abilities have been tried and are acknowledged. It may be added that Sir George Murray would be transferred to it from the command in Ireland, the next in military importance to that in India.

*Question.*—3. Who are the officers, Sir George Murray's seniors, who are now in active employment, and who would be superseded by his appointment?

*Answer.*—3. Answered in No. 1.

*Question.*—4. Supposing Sir George Murray recalled from Ireland, would it be possible (consistently with the practice since the Union) to combine the chief command of the army in Ireland with the Lord-Lieutenancy?

*Answer.*—4. There has been no Commander-in-Chief in Ireland since the Union. Previous to that period the military patronage was in the hands of the Lord-Lieutenant (although the appointments and promotions were published as made by his Majesty), and the Commander-in-Chief in Ireland was subordinate and directly responsible to his Excellency in all other respects.

In the person of Marquess Cornwallis the civil government and military command were united.

Subsequently to the Union the General officer commanding in Ireland was styled Commander of the Forces, and was so commissioned; \* but when Sir David Baird was taken off the Staff in 1822, the command in Ireland was placed upon the footing of a district, and Sir George Murray exercises it as *Lieutenant-General commanding*.

*Question.*—5. What would be the difficulties in the way of that arrangement?

*Answer.*—5. At present the officer commanding in Ireland is strictly responsible to the Horse-Guards; the superintending authority, the patronage, all questions of discipline, &c. &c., centre at the Horse-Guards, and the uniformity of principle and practice is thereby preserved. But, if the command of the army in Ireland were rendered independent of the Horse-Guards, the authorities and the consequent arrangements would clash, and the greatest confusion might ensue in the details, from the constant interchange and transfer of regiments.

This inconvenience has been heretofore experienced; the re-establishment of two distinct commands in the United Kingdom would be the revival of evils which have been gradually removed, and uniformity of system, one of the most essential improvements in the administration of the army, would soon cease to exist.

*Question.*—6. If that arrangement cannot properly take place, are there any candidates for the succession to Sir George Murray, whose probable recall must have been matter of conversation in the army?

*Answer.*—6. The candidates are numerous. Those senior to Sir George Murray are—Lieutenant-Generals Sir William Clinton, Sir John Hamilton, Sir Henry Montresor, Sir Miles Nightingall, Sir Charles Colville, Sir Henry Fane,

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\* *Remark by Lord Palmerston (in pencil).*—But was as much under the authority and control of the Commander-in-Chief in England as any General officer serving with the commission of Commander of the Forces in any of our colonies.

Lord Howard of Effingham, Sir John Oswald, Sir John Vandeleur, Sir Rufane Donkin, Sir Edward Stopford, Sir George Cooke.

Those junior to Sir George Murray are—Lieutenant-Generals Widdrington, Sir William Hutchinsohn, Sir John Byng, Sir Thomas Brisbane, Lord Edward Somerset, Sir John Lambert, and Lord Aylmer.

N.B.—The pay which his late Royal Highness the Duke of York received as Commander-in-Chief latterly was 16*l.* 8*s.* 9*d.* per diem, or 5999*l.* 13*s.* 9*d.* per annum, with forage for twenty horses.

But I believe it was originally 10*l.* per diem.\*

The pay of a *general* on the Staff is 5*l.* 13*s.* 9*d.* per diem, or 2075*l.* 18*s.* 9*d.* per annum, with forage for eight horses.

If the pay given to the General officer appointed to the chief command, as senior on the Staff, were made 10*l.* per diem, the annual amount would be 3650*l.*, with forage for ten horses.†

The General officer commanding in Ireland was allowed forage for ten horses.

His Royal Highness was allowed forage for twenty horses.

The ration may be averaged at 2*s.*

P.S.—I add copies of the instructions given in 1793 to Lord Amherst and to Lord Adam Gordon. The latter was commanding in North Britain as general.

II.

*George Yonge, Esq., to General Lord Amherst.*

MY LORD,

War Office, 21st January, 1793.

His Majesty having been pleased to appoint you to serve as a general with three aides-de-camp, I am commanded to acquaint you it is his Majesty's pleasure that you do obey such orders as you shall receive from his Majesty, the Commander-in-Chief, or any other your superior officer.

I have, &c.,

GEORGE YONGE.

III.

*George Yonge, Esq., to the Right Hon. Lord Adam Gordon.*

MY LORD,

War Office, 24th January, 1793.

It being his Majesty's intention that all matters respecting his military service, which are to be transacted at home, excepting what relate to the Foot Guards, shall pass through the hands of Lord Amherst, whom his Majesty has placed as a general on the Staff, I have the honour, by his Majesty's command, to acquaint your Lordship therewith, that you may be pleased to signify the same to the regiments and garrisons under your Lordship's command in North Britain, and direct the officers to govern themselves accordingly.

I have, &c.,

G. YONGE.

IV.

24th June, 1827.

I should like to know whether Lord Amherst, as *general* on the Staff in Great Britain, conveyed any and what sort of military orders to Sir Charles Grey and Lord Moira, or to the Duke of York.

\* Till 1813.

† The net pay of Commander of the Forces is 9*l.* 9*s.* 6*d.* per diem, and Lord Dalhousie and Sir Henry Warde receive it.—3458*l.* 7*s.* 6*d.* per annum.

228 ARRANGEMENT FOR THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY.

V.

List of Officers *commissioned* as Commanders of the Forces abroad, between 1790 and 1795.

The Duke of York, Commander-in-Chief in the United Provinces .. .. .	23rd February, 1793.
Sir Charles Grey, General and Commander-in-Chief in the West Indies .. .. .	2nd September, ..
Earl of Moira, General and Commander-in-Chief on a particular service .. .. .	20th November, ..
Major-General Alured Clarke, General and Commander-in-Chief on a secret expedition .. ..	2nd April, 1795.
Sir Ralph Abercrombie, General and Commander-in-Chief in the West Indies .. .. .	17th August, ..

Lord Palmerston called for this list to ascertain the rank of Lord Amherst relative to the General officers employed as Commanders of the Forces while he commanded the army as senior general on the Staff, the commission of Commander of the Forces being the higher commission.

Lord Amherst was senior to them all, but the appointment of the two last took place after the Duke of York had succeeded to Lord Amherst.

[ 807. ]

*To the King.*

London, 30th January, 1828.

Having, according to your Majesty's commands, conversed with Sir Herbert Taylor regarding the arrangement to be submitted to your Majesty for the command of your Majesty's army, and since consulted your Majesty's servants upon the subject, they are of opinion that the arrangement best calculated to satisfy the army and the public, and which would tend most to your Majesty's ease and convenience, would be that General Lord Hill should be appointed Senior General Officer upon the Staff in Great Britain and Ireland, &c., to perform the duties of Commander-in-Chief.

Which is humbly submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

Approved, G. R.

[ 808. ]

*To the King.*

London, 30th January, 1828.

I beg leave to submit for your Majesty's pleasure that Mr. Douglas, having resigned his seat at the Council of the Lord High Admiral, and Lord Sandon his claim to a seat at the same Council, and your Majesty having consented that Sir George Clerk should fill one of those seats, that Lord Brecknock should be appointed to the other; that Lord Ashley

may be appointed a Member of the Board of Control vice Sir James Macdonald, and the Marquess of Graham, vice Dr. Phillimore.

All of which is submitted for your Majesty's pleasure by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

Approved, G. R.

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*The King to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Royal Lodge, Wednesday evening, 7 o'clock,  
30th January, 1828.

MY DEAR FRIEND,

I thank you for the letters you sent me this day. I am perfectly satisfied with what you have stated respecting the Duke of Argyll; and I therefore enclose to you the Duke of Gordon's warrant, which I had delayed putting my signature to until I had received your answer to my letter. I congratulate you upon everything having apparently gone off so tranquilly and so well yesterday in both Houses of Parliament.

Always most truly yours,

G. R.

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*To the Marquess of Chandos.*

[ 809. ]

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 30th January, 1828.

I have received your letter of this day, and I assure you that it will give me great satisfaction to have it in my power to forward any view of yours; but I have scarcely taken possession of my office, and have really not had time to perform any duty, much less to look at the vacancies in offices, or those likely to occur.

I hope, therefore, that this state of things, and the real desire which I feel to do anything that can gratify you, and not to disappoint you, will plead my excuse for omitting to give you a more positive answer at this moment.

Ever my dear Lord, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Dean Phillpotts\* to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Jermyn Street, 30th January, 1828.

I have visited the individual whom your Grace desired me to see, and have had a pretty long conversation with him, taking care that he should

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\* The late Bishop of Exeter.



not have any notion that my visit was caused by any other wish than my own.

In the course of our conversation I asked his opinion on the point which your Grace allowed me to discuss so much at length this morning. That opinion was most decidedly in favour of the oath or engagement proposed by me. "It would be monstrous," he said, "to deprive the Church of the security which it enjoys in the Declaration against Popery, and to give us nothing in lieu of it." He further expressed himself of opinion that the engagement to the effect proposed would be of *much* service, in case concession of seats in Parliament to Roman Catholics be made: a concession which he deprecates and will resist to the utmost, and to which he is so averse that he does not like to contemplate measures with reference to the possibility of such concession taking place.

In the course of the day I have had occasion to converse with two or three persons of rank and consideration—men opposed to concession, but who think that if it be made, it must *of course* be accompanied with some such provision as I have mentioned.

In alluding to the opinions of these persons, I do so without ascribing to their judgment anything like the authority which I most sincerely ascribe to that of your Grace. But the strong concurrence of the opinion of all of them with my own is so far satisfactory to me, as it diminishes the pain with which I feel myself compelled to say that, after all the very able statement and argument with which your Grace this morning honoured me, I remain unconvinced.

It was the opinion of the most considerable of the persons whom I this morning saw—one who has great weight in the House of Lords—that such a provision could easily be obtained. "You (or the Church) will have no difficulty in getting *that*," he said.

I beg leave to add that no one of them had any notion that I have communication with your Grace.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke, with the greatest respect,  
your Grace's obliged and most humble servant,

HENRY PHILLPOTTS.

I may add that I have reason to know that the Duke of Norfolk, &c., are (or were, some months ago) ready and prepared to take an oath, founded on the writ of summons, in favour of the Church.

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MEMOIR ON THE AFFAIRS OF THE EAST, GIVEN TO THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON BY PRINCE LIEVEN, IN FEBRUARY, 1828.

*Mémoire sur les Affaires de l'Orient.*

*Division du Mémoire.*—Le présent Mémoire aura pour objet de prouver :

1. Qu'une intervention étrangère dans les troubles du Levant était indispensable.
2. Que l'Angleterre ne pouvait s'abstenir d'y prendre part.
3. Enfin, que cette intervention ne pouvait s'effectuer dans des formes plus conciliantes, et à la fois moins compromettantes pour la paix générale, que celles dont il a été fait choix par les Cours signataires du Traité du 6<sup>me</sup> Juillet.

## AD PRIMUM.

*Conséquences probables de l'insurrection à l'égard des Puissances dès son origine.*—Du moment qu'éclata la première étincelle de l'incendie qui dévore depuis sept années consécutives les plus belles provinces de l'empire ottoman, les Puissances Européennes dûrent prévoir que tôt ou tard il leur deviendrait impossible d'en rester les spectatrices immobiles. L'insurrection grecque prit dès l'origine un caractère entièrement particulier, entièrement différent de celui qu'avaient portées les révoltes arrivées à des époques antérieures en diverses parties de la Turquie. Il fut aisé de voir que celle-ci tenait à des racines profondes, à des causes accumulées par des siècles d'oppression et de souffrance; que la lutte qui s'engageait entre le peuple conquis et le peuple conquérant, ne serait pas celle d'un jour; que les dispositions de haine et d'animosité réciproque qu'y apportaient les deux parties contendantes rendraient impossible toute réconciliation, toute co-existence entr'elles; et que dès lors cette guerre d'extermination ébranlant avec une force irrésistible les fondements de la puissance ottomane, et par là même les bases du système politique européenne, les principaux Cabinets se verraient inévitablement appelés à y intervenir un jour.

*Position particulière de la Russie vis-à-vis les Grecs et la Porte.*—La Russie ressentit la première les effets de cette nécessité; sa position particulière à l'égard de la Turquie, les relations de voisinage aussi compliquées que nombreuses qu'elle entretenait de longue date avec cet empire, les rapports de clientèle et de commerce qui s'étaient établis depuis un demi siècle entre elle et les Grecs, par l'effet des droits de protection que lui accordaient les traités, enfin la conformité de culte qui rapproche ses sujets de la population chrétienne des états du Grand Seigneur, étaient autant de causes qui devaient se réunir pour ne lui point permettre de demeurer indifférente aux complications qui menaçaient d'embraser l'Orient.

*Faux soupçons contre la Russie. Sa conduite leur sert de réfutation.*—Aussi cette même position donna-t-elle lieu à cette époque au soupçon que la Russie n'avait point été étrangère à l'explosion éclatée dans les Principautés du Danube. Il serait aujourd'hui superflu de réfuter sérieusement ces rumeurs répandues par la malveillance et accueillies par la crédulité. Il suffira de rappeler ici la conduite tenue par l'Empereur Alexandre à la nouvelle des premiers troubles de Moldavie.

On n'ignore pas que le Prince Ipsilanti, qui y avait excité un soulèvement, ayant écrit à sa Majesté Impériale pour lui demander sa protection et des secours, l'Empereur lui répondit qu'il désapprouvait complètement son entreprise, le raya des contrôles de l'armée russe, dans laquelle il occupait le grade de Général-Major, et lui fit défense de jamais rentrer en Russie. Quant à Théodore Wladimiresu, qui de son côté avait arboré dans la Petite Valachie l'étendard de la révolte, il fut également rayé de la liste des Chevaliers de Wladimir, dont il était décoré. En même temps le ministre de sa Majesté Impériale à Constantinople recevait ordre de donner à la Porte communication de ces mesures, et de lui exprimer le vœu de voir l'insurrection étouffée dans son germe.

*Conduite spontanée du Baron de Stroganoff à Constantinople.*—Une preuve incontestable de la confiance qu'inspiraient les intentions désintéressées de l'Empereur à ceux qui par leur position étaient plus à même de les pressentir, c'est qu'avant même d'avoir reçu les ordres dont il s'agit, le

Baron de Stroganoff, par un mouvement spontané, les avait déjà remplis d'avance. A la nouvelle de l'insurrection il s'était empressé d'annoncer à la Porte l'improbation formelle dont l'Empereur Alexandre ne manquerait pas de frapper les auteurs de cet événement, et il avait adhéré à un envoi de troupes turques en Valachie, sauf les restrictions basées sur les droits d'intervention que les traités assurent à la Russie, dans l'administration intérieure des Principautés du Danube. Il avait même été jusqu'à offrir à la Porte la co-opération morale *et effective* de l'Empereur pour isoler le plus promptement possible le foyer de la contagion révolutionnaire, et lui avait proposé d'adresser, au nom de sa Majesté Impériale, une proclamation aux rebelles de la Valachie pour les engager à poser les armes. En attendant il fit publier une déclaration formelle destinée à prémunir les négociants et sujets russes établis dans les pays insurgés, contre la suggestion de la révolte ; et cette pièce fut circulairement transmise à tous les consuls de Russie dans le Levant.

*Conduite de la Russie à l'égard des Serviens.*—La Russie ne borna point à ces mesures de précaution ses bons offices envers la Porte. Elle déclara également aux Serviens qu'elle désapprouvait l'entreprise du Prince Alexandre Ipsilanti, et que sous peine de perdre tout droit à l'appui et à la protection de l'Empereur, ils devaient rester étrangers au mouvement révolutionnaire. Cette déclaration obtient l'effet que le Cabinet russe en désirait, et nonobstant les éléments de trouble et de mécontentement qui couvaient depuis longtemps en Serbie, et que tendaient à faire éclore les instigations des insurgés, cette province demeura paisible.

On voit donc que, loin d'avoir à se reprocher la crise qui menaçait l'Orient, la Russie faisait tout, au contraire, pour la prévenir et y apporter remède ; conduite d'autant plus méritoire de sa part que depuis cinq ans les relations diplomatiques entre elle et la Porte étaient d'une nature extrêmement épineuse, et que dans cet intervalle, durant les négociations que les deux Puissances avaient encore à régler ensemble concernant l'exécution de diverses clauses du Traité de Bucharest, la Russie n'avait vu aucun de ses vœux accompli, aucune de ses réclamations satisfaite. On aurait dû s'attendre qu'une conduite aussi loyale eût rencontré auprès de la Porte l'accueil qui lui était dû, et que cette Puissance s'empresserait d'adopter les mesures qui lui étaient indiquées dans l'intérêt de son propre salut, et du rétablissement de la tranquillité dans le Levant ; mais par un aveuglement qui n'a cessé de présider à toutes ses démarches, depuis l'origine des troubles elle aime mieux prendre elle-même à tâche de compliquer gratuitement une position déjà hérissée de difficultés sans nombre.

*Défiances injustes de la Porte, ses mesures contre la Russie, et contre les Grecs de Constantinople.*—L'insurrection allumée en Moldavie ayant simultanément éclaté sur divers points de la Morée, la Porte s'abandonne aux défiances les plus injustes. S'obstinant à supposer, malgré l'évidence des faits, que le brandon de la révolte était tombé en Grèce des mains de la Russie, elle adopte contre cette Puissance une série de mesures entièrement contraires à ses traités avec elle. Au mépris de toutes les stipulations, le pavillon russe est insulté en pleine paix, des matelots tués ou blessés, et cet attentat justifié par l'ardeur et l'allégresse des troupes musulmans. Tandis que les vaisseaux des autres nations jouissent du libre passage des Dardanelles, les vaisseaux sous pavillon russe, ou ayant des Russes à bord,

sont retenus par une injurieuse exception. On les visite exclusivement dans le Canal et dans tout l'Archipel, pour vérifier s'ils n'ont point de munitions de guerre destinées aux insurgés de la Grèce ; à Patras un courrier du consul russe est arrêté, fouillé, et dépouillé de ses dépêches ; à Constantinople le ministre de sa Majesté Impériale est entouré de gardes, privé de toute communication avec sa Cour, exposé à des offenses journalières. Cette série de provocations ayant forcé le Baron Stroganoff à suspendre ses relations, et à se retirer de Péra à Buyuedéré, on s'oppose formellement au transport de ses effets ; on va même jusqu'à menacer de mort ses domestiques, s'ils refusent de communiquer les détails de ce qui se passe dans l'intérieur de son hôtel.

En même temps, la Porte adoptait vis-à-vis des Grecs ce système aussi insensé que barbare, qui en confondant l'innocence avec la révolte, en fermant d'avance aux coupables toutes les voies du repentir, devait, loin d'éteindre en son origine la conflagration allumée en Grèce, en propager au contraire la flamme, et légitimer aux yeux des Grecs, ainsi qu'à ceux de l'Europe entière, les efforts et les excès mêmes, auxquels ils pouvaient se porter dans l'exaltation de leur désespoir. Est-il besoin de rappeler ici toutes les mesures extrêmes qui, durant le mois de Mars et d'Avril de l'année 1821, attaquant la religion chrétienne et l'existence de la nation grecque, répandirent dans le monde civilisé l'indignation et l'horreur ; les massacres de Constantinople, les pillages des Janissaires, l'arrestation des principales familles du Fanar et des négociants les plus riches, les uns déportés aux mines, les autres enrôlés sur la flotte, et attachés de force aux canons qu'ils devaient servir ; le supplice des drogmans de la Porte, et celui des premiers évêques ; l'assassinat du Patriarche, son cadavre odieusement profané, le symbole de la foi chrétienne insulté et traîné dans la fange ; presque toutes les églises démolies de fond en comble ; enfin, cette suite de hattis-scheriffs, inspirés par le fanatisme, qui, proclamant la guerre de religion, et déclarant la nation turque désormais en état nomade, appelaient tous les Musulmans sous les drapeaux de l'Islamisme ?

*Nouveau caractère imprimé à la Question d'Orient par les fausses mesures de la Porte. Droit d'intervention de la Russie, fondé à la fois sur ces mesures et sur ses relations à l'égard des Grecs.*—Dès lors la Question Orientale s'annonçait sous une face entièrement nouvelle. La position de la Porte changeait à l'égard des Puissances étrangères. Elle changeait avant tout vis-à-vis de la Russie, que le gouvernement turc avait prit soin lui-même d'isoler des autres dans ses mesures ; de la Russie lésée à la fois et dans ses rapports avec la Porte, et dans ceux que d'anciennes transactions lui avaient fait contracter avec les Grecs. Elle avait dès lors le droit d'intervenir dans les affaires du Levant ; pour elle-même, puisque les mesures exclusivement adoptées contre sa marine et contre son ministre blessaient son intérêt et sa dignité ; pour les Grecs, puisqu'il ne s'agissait plus pour eux d'une simple guerre politique, mais d'une guerre d'extermination hautement vouée à leur religion. Par les Articles 7 et 17 du Traité de Kalnardjé (1774), confirmé postérieurement par l'Article 2 du Traité de Jassy (1791), et l'Article 3 de celui de Bucarest (1812), l'Empereur Alexandre était strictement en droit d'exiger que le gouvernement turc protégât l'exercice de la religion chrétienne, la personne de ses ministres et l'inviolabilité de ses temples. Si les Puissances de la Chrétienté, ne pouvaient voir de sang-froid les atrocités

commises en Turquie, combien plus ces atrocités ne devaient-elles pas inspirer d'horreur en Russie, dont le peuple était lié aux Grecs par la conformité du rite? Pouvait-on exiger de l'Empereur Alexandre qu'en désapprouvant l'insurrection il approuvât des actes dont l'humanité frémissait? Fallait-il pour démontrer qu'il n'encourageait pas les troubles de la Grèce, qu'il tolérât la violation des traités, l'infraction du droit des gens, et de continuel outrage à la dignité de la Russie? Il l'eût voulu qu'il ne le pouvait pas, puisque de ses traités avec la Porte, dérivait pour lui non-seulement des droits, mais encore des obligations; puisqu'il ne pouvait séparer l'intérêt qu'il eût désiré témoigner au gouvernement turc de celui qu'il devait aux Chrétiens qui peuplent la Turquie européenne. Cette vérité n'a jamais été révoquée en doute. Les Puissances s'accordèrent à la reconnaître dès l'origine, et l'on peut citer en preuve l'opinion de la Prusse dans son Mémoire du mois de Juin, 1821, celle de l'Autriche dans une dépêche du Prince de Metternich au Comte de Nesselrode, sous la date du 20<sup>me</sup> Mai de la même année, celle enfin de l'Angleterre dans une lettre que le Marquis de Londonderry adressait le 16<sup>me</sup> Juillet à l'Empereur Alexandre, et dans laquelle il convenait "qu'il faudrait tout l'ascendant du nom et du caractère de sa Majesté pour réconcilier la nation russe avec les outrages faits à ses coréligionnaires."

*La Russie associe volontairement les autres Puissances à son droit d'intervention.*—La Russie avait donc le droit avoué d'intervenir dans les troubles de l'Orient, et qui plus est, d'y intervenir seule. Mais des considérations plus hautes et plus relevées que celles qu'elle pouvait puiser dans son intérêt exclusif, dirigeaient la politique de l'Empereur Alexandre, et il résolut d'associer volontairement à son droit les autres Puissances ses Alliées. Par des ouvertures sous la date du 22<sup>me</sup> Juin, il leur déclara que c'était de concert et d'accord avec elles qu'il voulait rétablir l'ordre en Orient, et les invita à leur faire connaître leurs vues sur les moyens d'arriver à ce résultat ainsi qu'à joindre leurs efforts aux siens auprès du gouvernement turc. Il déclara en outre que si, par l'obstination de ce dernier, l'emploi de mesures coercitives devenait indispensable, "les armées russes marcheraient, non pour reculer les frontières de l'empire russe, ou pour lui donner une prépondérance qu'il n'ambitionnait pas, mais pour ramener la paix, pour raffermir l'équilibre de l'Europe, pour l'asseoir sur des bases qui seraient réciproquement convenues, et pour accorder aux pays dont se compose la Turquie européenne le bienfait d'une existence politique heureuse et inoffensive." (Dépêche au Baron Nicolay, du 22<sup>me</sup> Juin, 1821.)

*La Russie demande à l'Autriche de garantir la pureté de ses intentions à l'égard de la Porte.*—Le Baron de Stroganoff avait eu l'ordre d'adresser enfin à la Porte des représentations définitives sur ses infractions aux traités, sous la forme d'une note à laquelle elle était tenue de répondre dans le terme de huit jours. Mais prévoyant le cas où cette démarche resterait sans effet, et où la Russie se verrait obligée à prendre des mesures de rigueur, l'Empereur Alexandre écrivit à l'Empereur d'Autriche, en date du 11<sup>me</sup> Juillet, 1821, une lettre, dans laquelle, répétant la déclaration qu'il avait déjà faite antérieurement de ne jamais tendre à un but exclusif, il demanda à sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique de garantir ses intentions aux autres Puissances. Certes, si la Russie eût dès lors nourri des projets d'agrandissement et de conquête, ce n'est pas l'Autriche qu'elle eût invité

à garantir ses vues. Cette Puissance étant à la fois limitrophe de la Russie et de l'empire ottoman, et devant se voir la première exposée à un danger réel si la Russie voulait rompre en Orient l'équilibre de l'Europe, la demande seule d'une garantie éventuelle de la part du cabinet autrichien était de nature à dissiper d'avance toutes les craintes.

*La Porte persiste dans ses refus de faire droit aux réclamations de la Russie, et dans ses mesures sanguinaires vis-à-vis des Grecs.*—Les instances des ministres Alliés à Constantinople, et en particulier celles de l'Inténonce d'Autriche, pour engager la Porte à faire droit aux demandes du Cabinet russe, ne furent pas couronnées de succès. La Porte laissa expirer le délai de huit jours qui lui avait été fixé pour sa réponse à la note du Baron de Stroganoff, et celui-ci se vit obligé à refuser de la recevoir, quand elle lui fut enfin remise. Le Grand Vizir la transmit alors directement au Ministère Impérial de Russie. Mais cette pièce ne renfermait que le rejet de toutes les propositions, et un arrêt proscrivant la nation grecque toute entière. "La Porte avait le droit," disait-il, "d'user de toute sa colère, et d'exterminer généralement toute la nation grecque qui se trouvait sous les griffes de sa puissance." Les faits répondirent aux paroles. De nouvelles exécutions ensanglantèrent Constantinople. Le Prince Callimachi, récemment nommé Hospodar de Valachie, fut destitué sans qu'aucun avis préalable fut donné, soit au Baron de Stroganoff, soit au Ministère Impérial, nonobstant les stipulations en vertu desquelles un Hospodar ne saurait être destitué sans le consentement préliminaire de la Puissance protectrice. L'agent du Hospodar, que les traités de Kainardjé, de Jassy, et de Bucarest devaient faire jouir de l'inviolabilité garantie aux agents des Puissances étrangères, fut emprisonné et décapité. En conséquence de tous ces actes, la Russie se vit enfin forcée de suspendre ses relations diplomatiques avec la Porte.

En attendant, celle-ci persistait dans son système. Les députés serviens envoyés à Constantinople pour y concerter les arrangements relatifs à l'exécution des clauses du Traité de Bucarest qui concernent la Serbie, étaient retenus en prison, et toutes les réclamations à cet effet de Milosch (chef de la nation serbienne) demeuraient sans effet. Une armée se rassemblait à Vidin et en Bosnie, et pour prix de son dévouement et de la fidélité qu'elle avait gardée à la Porte, la Serbie se voyait menacée d'une occupation musulmane. Dans ces conjonctures, Milosch s'adressa de nouveau à l'Empereur, pour solliciter, en vertu des traités, sa protection contre les Turcs. Quoique les circonstances eussent grandement changé pour la Russie depuis la première demande de Milosch, elle ne varia point dans sa réponse. Elle engagea itérativement ce chef à ne faire usage de son autorité que pour maintenir les Serviens dans l'obéissance.

*La Porte est attaquée par la Perse. Conduite du Cabinet russe dans cette circonstance.*—De nouveaux orages s'amassaient sur l'horizon de la Turquie. Elle se trouva tout-à-coup attaquée par les Persans sur plusieurs points de ses frontières d'Orient, événement qui eût pu avoir pour elle des suites fâcheuses, ne fut-ce qu'en l'empêchant de tirer d'Asie les troupes dont elle avait besoin contre l'insurrection de ses provinces européennes. Dans cette occasion la Russie lui donna encore une nouvelle preuve de sa modération. Loin de profiter d'un pareil incident pour lui susciter des embarras, elle demeura complètement étrangère aux entreprises de la Perse. Elle alla même plus loin. Elle employa ses efforts pour prévenir les hostilités, et

adressa dans ce but des représentations à la Cour de Téhéran. Les instructions données au Général Yermoloff, instructions que l'ambassadeur de Russie à Londres communiqua dans le temps au gouvernement britannique, loin d'autoriser ce général à encourager la Perse, le chargeaient au contraire d'exprimer à cette Puissance les vœux que formait l'Empereur pour le maintien de la paix.

Cependant la tranquillité était depuis longtemps rétablie dans les Principautés. L'insurrection y avait été éteinte dans des flots de sang, et rien ne s'opposait plus au départ des troupes ottomanes. Loin de là : la Porte y établit une administration toute militaire ; ces provinces devinrent le théâtre des exactions et des désordres les plus inouïs. Les prêtres y étaient massacrés, les couvents réduits en cendre. Mêmes rigueurs s'exercèrent dans plusieurs parties de l'Archipel. L'île de Chypre, qui jamais n'avait pris part à l'insurrection, fut inondée de sang chrétien. Les cruautés y furent telles que dans un moment de terreur plusieurs de ses habitants abjurèrent le Christianisme.

Tant d'excès et de provocations ne purent encore lasser la patience de l'Empereur Alexandre. Nonobstant le départ de son représentant, il ne voulut point déclarer la guerre à la Porte. Dans son désir de maintenir la tranquillité générale il alla même jusqu'à modifier son premier ultimatum. Inutile modération ! Les Turcs n'en mirent que plus de persévérance à se refuser aux demandes de la Russie, nonobstant les instances répétées de la Cour d'Autriche. L'expérience prouvait ainsi que ce peuple ne distingue jamais la condescendance de la faiblesse, et que les sacrifices qu'on lui fait ne servent qu'à augmenter sa présomption. Chaque preuve de longanimité provoquait des prétentions nouvelles ; chaque délai endurcissait la Porte dans son système ; chaque représentation, après être restée longtemps sans réponse, finissait toujours par demeurer sans résultat.

*Envoi de M. de Tatistcheff à Vienne.*—L'Empereur se décida donc à envoyer M. de Tatistcheff à Vienne, pour y régler, dans le cas d'une guerre, l'action de la Russie, et pour y arrêter les bases de la pacification de la Grèce. Des ouvertures semblables furent faites aux autres Cours. L'Empereur Alexandre déclarait qu'il n'accepterait point la médiation dans les affaires exclusivement russes, qu'il avait à traiter avec la Porte, mais que l'Europe entière étant intéressée à la pacification de la Grèce, il invitait tous ses Alliés à y intervenir. "Je ne veux point," disait-il à cette occasion, "que de nouveaux traités donnent à la Russie des droits de protection immédiate sur la Grèce. Je ne veux point attaquer la souveraineté de la Porte." (Rescrit à M. de Tatistcheff, du 14<sup>me</sup> Mai, 1822.)

Mais des événements d'une nature également importante occupaient en ce moment les Puissances, et les commotions révolutionnaires qui avaient ébranlé tous les trônes dans le Midi de l'Europe, appelaient avant tout leurs regards sur ce point du continent. Les affaires d'Italie absorbaient les soins de l'Autriche ; la France et l'Angleterre tenaient les yeux fixés sur celles de la Péninsule espagnole ; l'Empereur Alexandre y donnait lui-même une attention proportionnée au vif et profond intérêt qu'il attachait au maintien de la paix continentale. Les ouvertures à l'égard de la Grèce n'eurent donc point pour le moment de résultat immédiat. L'Autriche prit néanmoins vis-à-vis de M. de Tatistcheff l'engagement éventuel de rappeler son ministre de Constantinople, si l'Empereur déclarait que la voie des armes était nécessaire.

*Protocole signé avec la Prusse.*—La Prusse, dans un Protocole signé à cet effet le 2<sup>m</sup> (14<sup>m</sup>) Mars, 1822, entre M. d'Alopeus et le Comte de Bernstorff, déclara pour le même cas qu'elle romperait ses relations diplomatiques avec la Turquie. Enfin toutes les Puissances tombèrent d'accord sur la justice des demandes que la Russie articulait à la charge de la Porte, et sur la nécessité de pacifier l'Orient.

*Nouvelles mesures de la Porte contre le commerce russe.*—Quant aux Turcs, ils ne firent, suivant leur système, que puiser dans ces délais de nouveaux encouragements. En Juillet, 1822, parut un firman qui interdisait le passage du Canal de Constantinople aux vaisseaux qui pour le traverser empruntaient le pavillon des états auxquels leurs traités avec la Porte ouvrent la libre navigation du Bosphore. Cette mesure, dirigée principalement contre le commerce russe, offre une nouvelle preuve des dispositions hostiles qui animaient le Divan contre la Cour Impériale.

*Congrès de Vérone. Procès-verbaux signés à cette occasion relativement à la pacification du Levant.*—Sur ces entrefaites s'ouvrit le Congrès de Vérone. Pour les raisons indiquées plus haut les affaires de Grèce n'y occupèrent qu'une part secondaire dans l'attention des Cours. Mais tout en vouant ses soins aux intérêts immédiats de ses Alliés, l'Empereur Alexandre ne perdit point de vue la pacification du Levant. Les procès-verbaux du Congrès en font foi. En expliquant les conditions auxquelles l'Empereur Alexandre subordonne le rétablissement de ses relations diplomatiques avec la Porte, ils renouvellent expressément les réclamations de la Russie en faveur de la pacification du Levant.

Aux termes de ces pièces les affaires de la Grèce regardent tous les membres de l'Alliance, et il est convenu qu'elles y interviendront *collectivement*. C'est sur ces principes, et d'après les instructions recueillies à Vérone de la bouche même de l'Empereur Alexandre, que Lord Strangford, qui déjà depuis quelque temps employait son influence sur le Divan à obtenir l'aplanissement des griefs de la Russie, s'engagea, à son départ pour Constantinople, à y plaider la cause de la paix, et à préparer les voies au rétablissement des rapports diplomatiques entre les deux empires.

*Entrée de Mr. Canning au ministère. Son système à l'égard des Grecs.*—Le Marquis de Londonderry venait de mourir, et Mr. Canning avait pris les rênes de la politique extérieure de l'Angleterre. A son entrée dans l'administration la situation des choses en Grèce dut nécessairement se présenter à lui sous un aspect différent de celui qu'avait offert à son prédécesseur le berceau de la révolution hellénique. Les années s'étaient écoulées : l'insurrection avait pris racine. Soutenus par leur courage, et par les secours de la Chrétienté compatissante, les Grecs luttaient corps à corps avec la Porte, non-seulement sans revers, mais encore avec avantage ; en un mot, ce qui dans l'origine avait pu paraître au gouvernement anglais un accident transitoire, une complication passagère de la politique, était devenu pour elle *un fait* qu'il ne lui était plus permis d'anéantir. Ces considérations devaient guider et guiderent Mr. Canning. Il adopta vis-à-vis des Grecs un système plus complet de neutralité. Quant à la Russie, il reconnut (ce qu'au reste avait toujours fait son prédécesseur) tous les droits que les traités lui assuraient à l'égard de la Grèce, et il invita Lord Strangford, notamment par les instructions du 12<sup>m</sup> Juillet, 1823, à démontrer au Divan la nécessité de pacifier le Levant.



Les premiers efforts de cet ambassadeur à son retour dans la capitale de l'empire ottoman n'avaient point été heureux. Au mois d'Avril un nouveau firman de la Porte, interdisant aux vaisseaux d'Europe les moyens d'échanger entr'eux leurs cargaisons dans les échelles du Levant, et soumettant leur chargement à des difficultés inconnues encore, menaçait de frapper d'une stagnation absolue le commerce de la Mer Noire. De nouvelles infractions aux traités avaient lieu dans les Principautés. Le Boyard Vellarà fut arrêté par la Porte au mépris des stipulations qui garantissaient aux Valaques et aux Moldaves le droit d'être jugés par leurs propres tribunaux. Cependant, au mois de Septembre, Lord Strangford réussit enfin à faire admettre à la Porte la validité des réclamations commerciales de la Russie.

*Envoi de M. de Minciacky à Constantinople.*—Quoique le Divan eût satisfait ainsi, non à l'ensemble mais à une seule, des demandes du Cabinet Impérial, l'Empereur se décida à envoyer M. de Minciacky comme agent consulaire à Constantinople. Par une lettre sous la date du 28<sup>me</sup> Septembre, le Comte de Nesselrode remercia Lord Strangford, au nom de la Russie, mais en même temps il ne laissait pas de lui répéter encore que l'Empereur ne pouvait abandonner ses vues sur la pacification de la Grèce, vû que tant que cette question continuerait à demeurer indécidée, ses rapports avec le Divan seraient toujours précaires.

*Nomination de M. de Ribeaupierre.*—Les efforts de l'ambassadeur d'Angleterre continuèrent auprès de la Porte pour la décider à faire droit aux réclamations qu'élevait la Russie à l'égard des Principautés; et enfin, dans les premiers mois de l'année 1824, il annonça que le Divan avait reconnu en principe l'obligation d'évacuer ces provinces, et d'y tout rétablir sur le *statu quo* antérieur aux troubles de 1821. Sur la foi de ces promesses l'Empereur autorisa M. de Minciacky à déployer le caractère de chargé-d'affaires à Constantinople, et nomma M. de Ribeaupierre Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire près la Porte Ottomane.

Dans l'intervalle, le Cabinet de Russie, par des ouvertures en date du 21<sup>me</sup> Octobre, 1823, avait adressé à ses Alliés l'invitation d'ouvrir à St. Pétersbourg des conférences sur la pacification de la Grèce, invitation qui fut acceptée aussitôt par la France, l'Autriche, et la Prusse.

*Mémoire du Cabinet de Russie relativement à la pacification de la Grèce.*—Au commencement de 1824 un mémoire du même Cabinet, sous la date du 9<sup>me</sup> Janvier, présenta une première esquisse des clauses et des garanties que la Russie croyait les plus propres à assurer aux Grecs une existence heureuse, et à indemniser la Porte des concessions qu'elle aurait faites. Les bases de ce plan de pacification furent unanimement approuvées par toutes les Puissances, comme il appert du Protocole de la conférence tenue à St. Pétersbourg le 17<sup>me</sup> Juin, entre le Comte de Nesselrode et leurs représentants respectifs.

*Publication du Mémoire : protestation des Grecs contre les bases, et refus de l'Angleterre d'assister aux conférences de St. Pétersbourg.*—Mais bientôt par une indiscretion coupable, une publication du Mémoire cité plus haut s'étant répandue en Europe, publication qui altérerait les idées du Cabinet russe avec l'intention le plus évidemment malicieuse, qui en retranchait la majeure partie, et qui présentait les autres sous un faux jour, cette publication amena de la part du gouvernement provisoire de la Grèce une protestation solennelle.

Le secrétaire de ce gouvernement l'ayant envoyée au cabinet britannique, c'en fut assez pour engager celui-ci (qui depuis longtemps faisait attendre sa résolution de prendre part aux conférences de St. Pétersbourg) à y renoncer définitivement. Le gouvernement Impérial n'insista donc plus sur la coopération de l'Angleterre ; mais il se hâta d'ouvrir la discussion de ses vues à l'égard de la Grèce avec les représentants des Cours de Vienne, de Paris, et de Berlin.

*Premiers résultats des conférences de St. Pétersbourg.*—Il est superflu d'entrer ici dans le détail des conférences qui eurent lieu à Pétersbourg sur cet important objet au commencement de l'année 1825. Leur résultat ne répondit point aux vœux du Cabinet de Russie. Les instructions dont les plénipotentiaires Alliés avaient été munis, étaient évidemment contraires à toutes mesures coercitives, surtout à l'égard du gouvernement ottoman. La Russie, considérant que le principal objet de l'intervention devait être nécessairement d'arrêter l'effusion du sang, de rapprocher les parties, de connaître leurs vœux, et d'établir un point de départ fixe pour les négociations ultérieures, proposait avant tout la conclusion d'un armistice. Les Puissances, au contraire, paraissaient ne point attacher à cette mesure la même importance, et ne point la regarder comme un préliminaire indispensable. Convaincu qu'entreprises sous de pareils auspices les négociations que l'on consentirait à entamer n'auraient ni base solide ni résultat certain, l'Empereur aimait mieux ajourner pour le moment toute démarche publique et forte ; et il fut convenu qu'avant d'articuler officiellement à la Porte la proposition d'une intervention collective entre elle et les Grecs, on commencerait par sonder *confidemment* ses intentions à cet égard. Mais l'Empereur fit entendre en même temps qu'il n'abandonnait point pour cela la question aux chances de ces ouvertures préalables, et que si, comme il n'était que trop probable, elles demeuraient auprès de la Porte sans résultat favorable, il n'en regarderait pas moins comme un devoir de la résoudre, nonobstant tous les regrets qu'il éprouverait de ne pouvoir agir *collectivement*.

*La Porte viole les promesses qu'elle avait données à Lord Strangford. Suspension indéfinie du départ de M. de Ribeaupierre.*—Les appréhensions que sa Majesté Impériale exprimait à cet égard n'étaient que trop fondées. De nouvelles difficultés de la Porte arrêtaient encore jusqu'à ce moment l'exécution des promesses qu'elle avait faites à Lord Strangford relativement à l'évacuation des Principautés du Danube. Pendant près de trois mois après sa nomination au poste de chargé-d'affaires, M. de Minciacky fut obligé de différer la remise de ses lettres de créance. Il les remit enfin dans l'espoir d'aplanir ainsi tous les obstacles. Mais bientôt des renseignements incontestables apprirent à la Russie que l'occupation militaire de la Valachie et de la Moldavie, à quelques corps de troupes près qui s'étaient retirés, n'avait fait que changer de nom et de formes. Avant les troubles de 1821, les Hospodars avaient toujours eu à leur solde quelques Turcs chargés de maintenir la police parmi les Musulmans qui se rendaient dans les Principautés pour affaires de commerce, et ces gardes, appelés communément Bash-Beahlis, étaient sous la direction d'un chef, ou Bash-Beahli-Aga, que les Hospodars nommaient et destituaient à volonté, qui ne correspondait jamais avec la Porte, ne recevait jamais les ordres, et ne pouvait exécuter que ceux du Hospodar lui-même. Or les informations sus-mentionnées prouvaient que les Bash-Beahli-Agas actuels avaient été nommés par la

Porte, que son choix était tombé sur les chefs militaires qui avaient commandé dans les Principautés, que ces chefs continuaient à être investis d'un pouvoir discrétionnaire; qu'ils tenaient les Hospodars sous leur dépendance; qu'au lieu de Beshlis ils commandaient de véritables troupes ottomanes, et que les mêmes abus, les mêmes désordres se renouvelaient de leur part dans les malheureuses provinces du Danube. Un tel état de choses, une violation aussi manifeste des privilèges de la Valachie et de la Moldavie, des traités qui en sont garants, et des promesses dont le Vicomte de Strangford avait été l'organe, ne pouvaient que donner lieu aux plus justes comme aux plus vives réclamations. Celles de M. de Minciacky continuant à demeurer sans effet, la Russie s'était vue forcée, vers le mois d'Août, 1825, à suspendre indéfiniment le départ de M. de Ribaupierre.

*Résultats des insinuations confidentielles faites à la Porte relativement à une intervention collective. Conduite des Puissances. La Russie rompt toute délibération avec elles sur les affaires du Levant.*—Bientôt arrive de Constantinople la nouvelle de l'accueil qu'y avaient trouvé les insinuations confidentielles des Puissances relativement à une intervention dans les affaires de la Grèce. La Porte s'était péremptoirement refusée à cette proposition. Les Cours Alliées déclarèrent alors d'une manière plus explicite, qu'elles ne pouvaient consentir pour leur part à l'emploi des moyens coercitifs, et qu'elles ne se croyaient permis de suivre que la voie des insinuations amicales. Ainsi, d'un côté, la Russie apprenait que les mesures concertées aux conférences de St. Pétersbourg n'avaient pas réussi, et de l'autre que ces mesures étaient pourtant les seules que ses Alliés voulussent adopter. Il devenait évident que leur résolution était de se refuser à tout plan positif, et de traîner l'affaire en longueur jusqu'à ce que la Porte, dont la diversion opérée en sa faveur par les troupes égyptiennes avait doublé les forces, eût éteint la révolution par ses propres moyens, c'est-à-dire eût consommé l'extermination des Grecs. L'Empereur n'avait plus d'alternative. Il rompit toute négociation avec les Puissances, et se résolut à terminer seul la grande crise de l'Orient.

En même temps les démarches qui avaient été prescrites à M. de Minciacky auprès de la Porte pour obtenir la libération des députés serviens, et réclamer contre le séjour et les attributions des Beshli-Agas venaient d'échouer. En vain avait-il présenté sur cette objet une note officielle au Divan; en vain l'Autriche, alarmée des conséquences que pouvait entraîner l'obstination des Turcs, s'était-elle employée à Constantinople pour obtenir le redressement des griefs de la Russie. La Porte, après s'être bornée à donner sur ce point à l'Internonce de vagues déclarations verbales, qu'elle déclina ensuite de consigner dans un Protocole, avait enfin refusé catégoriquement aux Hospodars le droit de nommer les Beshli-Agas, affirmant, en opposition aux traités, qu'ils n'avaient jamais possédé ce droit. Elle avait également refusé de retirer ses troupes des Principautés, d'y rétablir le *statu quo* antérieur à 1821, de libérer les députés serviens, et de satisfaire aux demandes que le Cabinet Impérial réclamait en faveur de leur patrie. En conséquence M. de Minciacky déposa au Protocole une protestation formelle contre ces déterminations, prévenant le gouvernement turc que la Russie ne répondait plus des conséquences qu'elles pouvaient avoir.

*Mort de l'Empereur Alexandre.*—Tel était l'état de choses, et l'avenir de l'Orient prenait chaque jour des couleurs plus sombres, quand par un coup

inattendu de la Divine Providence l'Empereur Alexandre fut enlevé à ses peuples. Le dernier nœud qui pouvait encore retenir le Cabinet impérial dans les limites de l'Alliance européenne avait été rompu par les Alliés eux-mêmes, et la Russie, abandonnée de tous, avec des droits à soutenir, et des injures à venger, se trouvait seule en face d'une situation qu'elle avait tout fait pour conjurer, mais devenue plus impérieuse et plus pressante que jamais, depuis que le peuple dont ses obligations les plus saintes lui commandaient d'assurer le salut, écrasé par des forces supérieures, livré à des influences étrangères, et déchiré par des convulsions intestines, marchait chaque jour plus rapidement à une extinction totale.

*L'Angleterre se rapproche de la Russie.*—L'Angleterre sentit qu'il était d'une politique éclairée et prévoyante de ne point laisser, pour ainsi dire, la Russie dans la solitude de sa puissance et de ses griefs. Déjà même avant la mort de l'Empereur Alexandre, elle avait fait quelques démarches pour se rapprocher du Cabinet impérial dans les questions de l'Orient. Dans ce but M. Stratford Canning, qui, au commencement de l'année 1825, avait été envoyé à St. Pétersbourg pour y régler la question de limites relative à la côte nord-ouest de l'Amérique, s'était rendu à Varsovie au mois de Juin de la même année, pour essayer de reprendre avec le Cabinet de Pétersbourg la discussion des affaires du Levant. Quoique ses ouvertures n'eussent point encore paru de nature à être acceptées par la Russie, elles annonçaient de la part de l'Angleterre des dispositions conciliantes, et comme telles elles avaient été accueillies avec les égards qui leur étaient dûs. L'avènement du nouveau souverain au trône de Russie parut à l'Angleterre une occasion naturelle d'imprimer à ses démarches un caractère plus marqué. Cette considération décida l'envoi à St. Pétersbourg de M. le Duc de Wellington. Il y arriva au commencement de l'année 1826, pour complimenter l'Empereur Nicolas, et communiquer en même temps au Cabinet Impérial les vues et les propositions du gouvernement britannique concernant les mesures les plus propres à terminer la guerre qui ensanglantait l'Orient.

*Conférences à St. Pétersbourg entre le Cabinet russe et le Duc de Wellington. Signature du Protocole.*—C'est à la suite des conférences qui eurent lieu sur ce sujet à St. Pétersbourg entre le Cabinet impérial et le Duc de Wellington, que furent pour la première fois arrêtées les bases de la pacification de la Grèce, par le Protocole signé à cet effet le 4<sup>me</sup> Avril, 1826.\*

Mais avant que les deux Puissances pussent travailler au développement de leurs vues bienfaisantes avec tout l'accord et l'efficacité qu'en nécessitait l'accomplissement, il était indispensable qu'elles se plaçassent sur la même ligne vis-à-vis de la Porte Ottomane, et en conséquence que les relations diplomatiques de la Russie avec elle, suspendues indéfiniment par les circonstances rapportées plus haut, fussent rétablies d'une manière stable; c'est-à-dire, que non-seulement la Porte accomplît les promesses qu'elle avait faites à Lord Strangford, mais encore qu'elle réglât avec la Russie, d'une manière définitive, les questions relatives à l'exécution du Traité de Bucarest, qui, même avant les premiers troubles de 1821, avaient depuis l'année 1816 excité plus d'une fois des discussions fâcheuses entre les ministres turcs et le Baron de Stroganoff. Le Duc de Wellington reconnut lui-même que tant que ces questions resteraient à résoudre, les rapports entre les deux empires ne pourraient jamais être d'une nature réellement

\* See page 57.

pacifique, dans l'hypothèse même où tout différend concernant les Principautés et les députés serviens aurait été aplani. Il admit également l'obligation où se trouvait la Russie de parler au Divan le langage le plus péremptoire, et désirant éviter une guerre entre la Russie et les Turcs, il invita M. Stratford Canning à déclarer au Divan qu'il ne lui restait plus d'autre parti à prendre que d'adhérer sans hésitation à toutes les demandes que M. de Minciacky allait lui présenter au nom de l'Empereur.

*Ultimatum de la Russie à la Porte, et rétablissement définitif des relations diplomatiques entre les deux empires.*—Il n'est point nécessaire d'entrer ici dans le détail de ces demandes, entièrement étrangères à la pacification de la Grèce, et fondées sur des intérêts exclusivement particuliers à la Russie. On se rappelle que la Porte, obligée de céder enfin, consentit à envoyer des plénipotentiaires sur la frontière des deux empires, et qu'à la suite de la Convention signée le 25<sup>me</sup> Septembre, 1826, à Akerman, les relations diplomatiques entre la Russie et la Porte se trouvèrent rétablies définitivement par l'arrivée de M. de Ribeaupierre dans la capitale de l'empire ottoman.

*Communication du Protocole aux Cours Alliées, et sa conversion en un Traité formel.*—Dès lors le Cabinet Impérial ne s'occupa plus que de hâter de tout son pouvoir la pacification de la Grèce, en concertant avec l'Angleterre les moyens d'assurer l'accomplissement des stipulations renfermées dans le Protocole. Cet acte fut officiellement communiqué par les deux Cabinets co-signataires aux trois Cours d'Autriche, de France, et de Prusse, qui adhérèrent unanimement aux principes qui lui servent de base. Le gouvernement français proposa même, dans le but de leur imprimer un plus haut degré de force, de convertir le Protocole en un Traité formel entre les cinq Puissances, ou entre celles qui voudraient en faire partie. Cette proposition était trop conforme aux vœux de l'Empereur pour qu'il ne s'empressât pas d'y donner son assentiment. Mais comme le Protocole, rédigé dans un moment où les relations futures de la Russie et de la Porte étaient encore livrées aux chances d'un avenir précaire, n'avait pu que poser les bases éventuelles de la pacification, sans arrêter les mesures propres à l'effectuer, si l'une ou l'autre des deux parties contendantes dans le Levant s'obstinait à se refuser aux propositions qui leur serait faites, il devenait nécessaire de combler cette lacune dans le nouvel acte. Sa Majesté Impériale proposa donc, à son tour, pour le cas dont il s'agit, l'insertion de plusieurs clauses, auxquelles l'Autriche et la Prusse n'ont pas cru pouvoir donner leur adhésion, et qui ont depuis formé la teneur de l'article additionnel du Traité signé à Londres le 6<sup>me</sup> Juillet entre les trois Cours de Russie, d'Angleterre, et de France.

*Résumé des faits précédents.*—Il est temps de terminer ici cette longue énumération de faits, et de la résumer en tirant de leur ensemble les conséquences nécessaires pour démontrer l'évidence du premier point posé au commencement de ce Mémoire.

On se flatte d'avoir suffisamment fait ressortir des événements dont l'exposé qu'on vient de lire a successivement présenté la chaîne, que l'insurrection grecque n'a point été un de ces faits isolés produit du hasard, étranger à l'Europe civilisée, et tout au plus lié à l'intérêt de telle ou telle Puissance en particulier, ainsi que le furent les révoltes antérieures à l'année 1821; mais qu'au contraire, par une invincible fatalité, elle entraînait après elle des

complications qu'aucune des Puissances ne pouvait contempler d'un œil indifférent, et qu'en conséquence dans l'impossibilité où elles étaient d'enchaîner le cours des évènements, elles étaient au moins en droit d'en régler le marche, et pour ainsi dire, de creuser un lit au torrent qu'elles ne pouvaient arrêter.

*Nécessité de l'intervention de la part des Puissances.*—On s'abstiendra de rechercher ici, si la religion, si l'humanité pouvaient permettre à des Puissances, dont tous les actes depuis 1815 ont eu pour but le maintien de la tranquillité en Europe, d'en laisser une partie se constituer sous ses yeux en état de guerre éternelle ? On ne demandera pas si l'Angleterre en particulier, après avoir d'un côté interposé son influence en faveur de la population *idolâtre* de l'Afrique, pouvait de l'autre, sans une contradiction palpable, lâcher les rênes à la barbarie, armée pour exterminer un peuple *chrétien*, et s'asseoir autour du foyer qui dévorait l'Orient pour en observer froidement les progrès ? On se contentera d'examiner la question sous les simples rapports politique et commercial, et sous ce point de vue on ose avancer (en s'appuyant à cet égard des propres paroles de l'Autriche contenues dans l'aperçu présenté en 1825 par son plénipotentiaire aux conférences de St. Pétersbourg) "que la conservation de la paix en Europe, et la crainte qu'elle puisse être troublée par les déchirements de l'Orient, constituent pour les Puissances un droit légitime d'intervention." Ainsi que l'a dit encore le Cabinet de Vienne (Instructions du Baron d'Ottensfels au dragoman autrichien, en date du 28<sup>me</sup> Mai, 1825), "la sûreté, la liberté du commerce et de la navigation n'existent plus dans les pays, dans les îles, et dans les mers, où l'insurrection a étendu ses ravages, et où l'autorité de la Porte est méconnue. Ce n'est que par les soins assidus, et la vigilance non interrompue d'une marine militaire nombreuse, entretenue à grands frais dans ces parages, que les Puissances peuvent protéger leurs navires marchands, sans toutefois se trouver à même de les mettre toujours à l'abri des pertes et dommages qu'entraîne pour elles cet état de choses." L'expérience ayant prouvé depuis sept années consécutives que le gouvernement ottoman ne possède pas les moyens d'empêcher les pirateries, pouvait-il exiger que les Puissances étrangères se soumissent pour un temps indéfini aux dépenses qu'exige l'entretien des forces maritimes qu'elles sont obligées de déployer dans le Levant ?

*Motifs d'intervention particuliers à la Russie.*—A ces motifs généraux d'une intervention étrangère, s'en est joint, comme on l'a prouvé, de *particuliers* à la Russie. Sans revenir ici sur tous ceux qu'on a développés plus haut, c'est-à-dire qu'elle aurait pu puiser dès l'origine de la lutte, dans sa position géographique à l'égard de la Turquie, dans les griefs que lui avait fournis la Porte elle-même, dans les droits de protection que lui assuraient les traités envers les Grecs, enfin dans l'agitation qu'entretenaient parmi ses peuples les souffrances de leurs co-réligionnaires, on se contentera comme on l'a fait pour les autres Puissances d'examiner la question sous le double point de vue commercial et politique. Or, sous le premier rapport, les Grecs étant depuis trente ans les agents les plus utiles de son commerce dans la Mer Noire, si la révolution se prolongeait, ces relations étaient paralysées ; si les Turcs triomphaient, elles étaient détruites. Quant au second, les motifs de la Russie ne sont pas moins concluants. Et pour le démontrer on en appellera encore une fois à la Cour de Vienne. "De toutes

les Puissances," observe-t-elle, dans l'aperçu confidentiel cité plus haut, "de toutes les Puissances, la Russie était celle qui exerçait sur les Grecs une influence continue. Cette influence lui procurait beaucoup d'avantages, et ceux-ci se trouvant liés au système général du midi de la Russie, devinrent bientôt des *nécessités*. L'insurrection bouleversait tout, mettait en scène de nouveaux acteurs sans antécédents. Les hommes attachés à la Russie par leur état, leurs principes, ou ses bienfaits, ont été en grande partie victimes des premières alarmes des Musulmans. La Russie," ajoute le Cabinet de Vienne, "a un intérêt bien naturel à ressaisir ces avantages." En effet ils disparaissaient sans retour dans la double alternative qu'on vient de poser. Si les Grecs étaient vaincus et exterminés, la Russie eût vainement redemandé son ancienne influence aux débris et aux déserts de la Grèce ; si, au contraire, ils étaient victorieux, si leur indépendance se consolidait, la Russie aurait-elle pu sanctionner, sans mot dire, les suites d'une révolution qu'elle avait désapprouvée ? aurait-elle pu se résigner à quitter la position où elle était à l'égard du Levant depuis plus de 50 ans, abandonner à d'autres tous les avantages que lui avaient garantis ses plus glorieuses transactions, et reconnaître un pouvoir qui peut-être en se développant serait un jour en état de lui fermer à son gré l'issue du Bosphore ? La solution de ces questions semble ressortir d'elles-mêmes.

*Conclusion du premier point.*—On voit donc, pour se résumer, que dès la naissance des troubles du Levant la Russie a dû et voulu n'y point demeurer indifférente ; qu'elle a pu momentanément, et toujours pour des raisons puisées dans l'intérêt général, suspendre à cet égard l'exercice de ses droits légitimes, mais qu'en aucun temps elle n'en a fait l'abandon ; que durant tout le cours de la crise, elle n'a cessé d'appeler ses Alliés à y intervenir avec elle ; que lorsque le Cabinet anglais crut devoir se refuser à prendre part aux conférences de St. Pétersbourg, cette circonstance ne l'a point empêchée de poursuivre, avec les autres Puissances, les délibérations relatives à la pacification de l'Orient ; qu'enfin, lorsque une divergence d'opinions la força de les rompre avec ces mêmes Puissances, elle s'était déterminée à trancher *seule* et sans assistance la grande question dont il s'agit.

C'est d'après ces considérations, et surtout d'après la dernière, qu'il convient maintenant d'aborder le *second* point, en examinant quelle devait être, dans de pareilles circonstances, la politique de l'Angleterre.

#### AD SECUNDUM.

*Anciens rapports de la Turquie avec l'Europe.*—Les relations de la Grande Bretagne avec la Turquie étaient réglées depuis longues années par des principes, pour ainsi dire, *traditionnels*, que s'étaient légués l'un à l'autre les hommes d'état qui administrèrent successivement les affaires extérieures de l'Angleterre. Sans se dissimuler l'espèce d'anomalie que présentait l'empire ottoman, par ses loix, ses mœurs, et sa religion, dans la grande famille des nations civilisées par le Christianisme, le gouvernement anglais s'était habitué à considérer les Turcs comme occupant une place indispensable au maintien de l'équilibre général.

"La Turquie," observe le Marquis de Londonderry, dans sa lettre à l'Empereur Alexandre du 16<sup>me</sup> Juillet, 1821, "la Turquie constitue dans le système européen *un mal nécessaire* ; c'est, si l'on veut, dans la politique, une sorte *d'excroissance*, mais qu'on n'en saurait retrancher sans attaquer tout le reste."

*Changements insensibles de ces rapports par la décadence de la Turquie. Opinion du Cabinet de Prusse à cet égard.*—Nous n'examinerons pas jusqu'à quel point cette opinion pouvait encore être fondée, à l'époque où l'énonçait le ministère britannique. Aujourd'hui il est permis de douter qu'elle fût applicable à l'état présent de la Turquie et de l'Europe. Dès cette même année 1821, presque au moment où le Marquis de Londonderry s'exprimait dans les termes qu'on vient de citer, le Cabinet de Prusse, comme il appert de son Mémoire du 9<sup>me</sup> Juillet, n'hésitait point à croire que la Porte n'était plus capable de présenter au maintien de l'équilibre européen les garanties qu'elle lui avait jadis offertes. "L'empire turc," dit-il, "fondé par la valeur, la discipline, l'obéissance, n'est plus qu'une ombre de lui-même. La valeur s'est enrouillée, la discipline relâchée, l'obéissance perdue, et la paresse, la lâcheté, l'apathie des Sultans et des Vizirs ne peuvent être comparées qu'à leur ignorance et leur incapacité. La puissance absolue des Ottomans a baissé par les vices internes du gouvernement, et fût-elle restée la même, la puissance relative des états voisins ayant fait des progrès immenses, la Porte n'est plus qu'un grand nom, qui n'en impose à personne. Depuis longtemps l'empire turc, déchiré par des convulsions intestines, meurt par les extrémités, paraît vivre bien plutôt qu'il ne vit."

En effet, depuis la date du Mémoire dont il s'agit, nous avons vu la Porte réduite à un tel point de faiblesse qu'elle a combattu en vain durant cinq ans une poignée de Chrétiens, et que sans le secours d'un de ses vassaux elle n'eût essuyé dans cette lutte que les plus honteux revers. Nous avons vu le souverain de la Turquie se lançant à travers des flots de sang dans une carrière périlleuse, tenter des réformes qui ébranlent l'empire jusque dans ses fondements, qui détruisent ses anciennes forces sans en créer de nouvelles, et menacent entraîner les plus terribles réactions. On peut donc le dire, la Turquie, dans son état actuel, supposé même qu'elle triomphât des Grecs, serait plus nuisible qu'utile à l'équilibre des Puissances, et deviendrait plutôt pour l'Europe un embarras qu'une force réelle.

*Système de temporisation adopté par le Marquis de Londonderry.*—Quoiqu'il en soit de cette opinion, on ne disconvient pas qu'à l'origine des troubles du Levant, elle pouvait n'avoir pas aux yeux du gouvernement anglais le même degré de plausibilité. Les événements de la guerre n'avaient point encore imprimé à l'insurrection le mouvement progressif qui depuis accéléra sa marche; le résultat de plusieurs campagnes consécutives n'avait point démontré l'impuissance de la Porte à dompter les Grecs par ses seules forces; et la prolongation de la lutte, ainsi que l'animosité qui en fut la conséquence, n'ayant point encore fermé la voie à toute réconciliation sincère entre les deux parties contendantes, on pouvait à la rigueur ne point désespérer de l'avenir, et se flatter qu'en abandonnant les choses à elles-mêmes, le temps pourrait les rétablir encore dans le même état qu'auparavant. Il était donc naturel que le gouvernement britannique éprouvât de la répugnance à aborder prématurément une question encore enveloppée de nuages; et en effet nous voyons le Marquis de Londonderry, dans la lettre citée plus haut, engager l'Empereur Alexandre à *préférer une attitude d'observation à toute ingérence, à temporiser, à laisser s'apaiser l'orage.*

*Continué par M. Canning.*—L'orage ne s'apaisa point; il prit, au contraire, de nouvelles forces; mais les éléments rivaux qu'il mettait en lutte établirent par degrés entr'eux une sorte d'équilibre, qui dut maintenir



l'Angleterre dans son attitude expectante. Le Marquis de Londonderry avait *temporisé*, dans la probabilité que la Porte parviendrait à rétablir la paix dans ses provinces ; la probabilité précisément contraire devait engager M. Canning à adopter le même système. En effet, comme on l'a observé plus haut, les Grecs soutenaient la guerre pour le moins à parité d'avantages. Quoique chaque année leurs adversaires redoublâssent d'efforts pour les soumettre, chaque année le flot de la puissance ottomane venait se briser contre leur courage ; les flots maintenaient leur résistance ; la Morée semblait soustraite à l'empire du cimeterre ; tout enfin annonçait que l'heure de la délivrance avait sonné pour la Grèce. L'Angleterre n'avait donc qu'à attendre, en observant à l'égard des belligérants une stricte neutralité ; l'indépendance se serait établie *de fait* en Grèce ; le temps et la prescription en auraient, comme pour l'Amérique espagnole, amené la sanction définitive ; et ce grand problème politique se serait ainsi résolu par la seule force des choses, sans intervention étrangère, sans conflit d'opinions divergentes, sans danger pour la paix générale. Si les conjectures et les probabilités peuvent suppléer à cet égard aux informations positives, il est permis de supposer que tel dut être le motif qui engagea M. Canning à différer si longtemps sa résolution de prendre part aux conférences établies à St. Pétersbourg pour la pacification du Levant, et finalement à y renoncer tout à fait.

*Changement amené dans la Question Orientale par la diversion opérée par les troupes égyptiennes.*—Mais bientôt la scène change. Le Pasha d'Egypte est appelé au secours de la Porte, convaincue d'impuissance à réduire ses sujets par ses seules forces ; de nouvelles milices joignant les arts militaires de la civilisation européenne aux fureurs de la barbarie orientale, viennent prêter au Sultan l'appui de leurs armes, et bientôt le glaive d'Ibrahim fait pencher la balance en sa faveur. Déchirée par la discorde, affaiblie par l'indiscipline, ne pouvant opposer que le courage à la puissance réunie du nombre et de la tactique, la Grèce sent chaque jour expirer ses moyens de résistance, et enfin elle vient tomber d'épuisement aux pieds de la Grande Bretagne, lui demandant sa médiation, implorant le secours du bras qui durant tant d'années n'avait jamais failli aux nations victimes de la force et de l'oppression.

*Changement qu'elle devait produire dans la politique de l'Angleterre.*—Ici se présente une situation entièrement nouvelle, et en l'examinant dans ses conséquences, il sera facile de prouver qu'elle devait tirer l'Angleterre du cercle des temporisations, et l'entraînait de nécessité absolue dans une sphère d'action quelconque.

*Conséquences inévitables du triomphe de la Porte.*—Et d'abord, on démontrera que permettre la prolongation de la guerre du Levant avec le nouveau caractère que lui imprimait l'entrée en lutte des troupes égyptiennes, c'était laisser se consommer un résultat qui ne tendait à rien moins qu'à l'extermination totale de la population grecque, et par suite à un changement complet des rapports politiques de la Turquie avec l'Europe, rapports dont le maintien était, comme on l'a vu, précisément le motif de l'inaction du gouvernement anglais.

Pour se faire une juste idée des conséquences qu'eût entraîné le triomphe des Turcs dans la Grèce de terre ferme et dans les îles de l'Archipel, il suffit de se rappeler la nature de cette funeste querelle, les dangers qu'avant l'arrivée d'Ibrahim elle avait fait si longtemps courir à l'empire ottoman, le

caractère féroce de Mahmoud, et la manière dont il a accompli l'extinction du corps puissant des Janissaires, les motifs qui lui auraient commandé de profiter de sa victoire pour éloigner à jamais du trône des Sultans le retour des mêmes périls, les massacres de Constantinople en 1821, les suites de la campagne de Kourschid Pasha en 1822, les ruines d'Ipsara, les événements de la Servie en 1812, et enfin la nature et l'intérêt des auxiliaires dont la Porte s'était ménagé l'assistance.

En réfléchissant à ces antécédents, en pesant les considérations qui s'y rattachent, on voit que si les Turcs, après une victoire définitive, eussent laissé subsister la population grecque du continent et des îles, ils n'auraient fait que conserver le germe de nouveaux troubles et de nouvelles révoltes ; qu'ainsi ils devaient, dans ce cas, forcément, l'exterminer, ou du moins la changer, en dispersant ses restes sur d'autres points ; que ce résultat était dans leur politique, comme dans leurs mœurs, et qui si le Pasha d'Égypte prêtait sa co-opération à la Porte, c'est parce que le sort des contrées dont il eût fait la conquête lui avait été abandonné d'avance, et parce que sur les débris d'un peuple chrétien, détruit ou emmené en esclavage, il aurait pu asseoir une Puissance toute musulmane, qui l'aurait eue pour fondateur et pour chef.

*Possibilité de l'établissement d'une Puissance maritime égyptienne dans la Méditerranée.*—Ces considérations ne reposent point sur des bases fictives. Elles avaient vivement frappé le gouvernement anglais lui-même, et la possibilité de voir la Grèce et les îles de l'Archipel conquises par le Pasha d'Égypte, la population grecque remplacée par des colonies égyptiennes, et les Musulmans formant une Puissance maritime au sein de la Méditerranée, lui causait de sérieuses inquiétudes.

Il y a plus : on avait des raisons de croire que la colonisation dont il s'agit avait été en effet arrêtée en principe entre Ibrahim et la Porte, et que le Pasha d'Égypte n'avait consenti à prêter son assistance au Sultan qu'en vertu d'un arrangement préalable, par lequel ce dernier contractait vis-à-vis de son Allié l'obligation de lui céder la Morée et les îles de l'Archipel. Il sera peut-être impossible de jamais acquérir la preuve irrécusable de l'existence d'un pareil arrangement ; mais qu'importe sa conclusion réelle, si la nature seule des choses devait conduire au même résultat ? Or il était notoire, que partout où les troupes turques et égyptiennes remportaient des avantages, la population chrétienne disparaissait aussitôt. Par son extermination, par l'enlèvement des enfants, par les efforts faits pour les convertir à l'Islamisme, par la manière dont tous les prisonniers étaient emmenés en Égypte, quand ils échappaient au massacre, le projet en question marchait chaque jour à son accomplissement, quelles qu'eussent été à cet égard les intentions primitives de la Porte et du Pasha d'Égypte. Ainsi l'ancienne marine grecque, cet intermédiaire si utile d'un commerce devenu très important, eût été remplacée par une marine musulmane semblable à celle de Tunis ou d'Alger. Les pirateries se seraient multipliées à l'infini ; car peu de parages les favorisent autant que ceux de l'Archipel. *De fait*, le Pasha d'Égypte aurait pris pied en Grèce, et une nouvelle Puissance barbaresque se serait formée en Europe. On le demande, l'Angleterre pouvait-elle demeurer plus longtemps indifférente à un état de choses qui menaçait d'entraîner des conséquences aussi graves ? Pouvait-elle, comme nation maritime, contempler de sang-froid l'accroissement de puissance que l'Égypte

ajoutait à ses moyens actuels, en s'établissant ainsi à la fois sur les rives opposées de la Méditerranée? Était-ce là le *statu quo* que tous ses efforts tendaient à conserver? Était-ce la base sur laquelle reposaient, en 1814, les relations de l'Europe chrétienne avec l'empire ottoman?

Jusqu'ici, comme on voit, nous avons fait abstraction entière de la Russie; nous l'avons en quelque sorte effacée de la carte politique du Levant; nous avons raisonné dans l'hypothèse où elle serait demeurée passive à l'aspect de la ruine d'un peuple auquel elle est unie par tant de rapports; et nous avons montré que même dans cette hypothèse l'Angleterre était forcément obligée, pour l'intérêt de l'Europe, comme pour le sien propre, d'intervenir dans la question du Levant.

*La Russie ne pouvait consentir à l'extermination des Grecs.*—Mais comme l'ont démontré les faits exposés dans la première partie de ce Mémoire, il était d'une impossibilité absolue pour la Russie de rester paisible spectatrice de l'anéantissement de ses co-religionnaires. De tout temps elle avait fait clairement connaître ses droits et ses intentions à cet égard, et les souffrances des Grecs augmentant chaque jour en proportion des provocations que les Turcs lui adressaient à elle-même, elle était évidemment arrivée au dernier terme de la patience. L'abandon de ses Alliés ne l'avait point fait dévier de son inébranlable résolution. Pour la dernière fois elle offrait à l'Angleterre de s'associer à elle dans la pacification du Levant; mais elle déclarait ouvertement que le refus du Cabinet de Londres ne l'empêcherait pas d'y travailler seule.

*Quel parti devait prendre l'Angleterre, placée entre les offres de la Russie et les prières des Grecs?*—Dans une situation pareille, placée ainsi entre les offres de la Russie et les supplications de la Grèce, quel parti devait prendre l'Angleterre? Accepter les unes, et exaucer les autres, n'était-ce pas celui que lui indiquaient à la fois et l'intérêt bien entendu de la paix générale et le sien, et surtout celui de la Turquie, que son propre avenglement exposait en ce moment à tous les dangers d'une lutte inégale? N'était-ce pas accorder en même temps les nécessités de la politique et les vœux de l'humanité?

*L'Angleterre pouvait-elle laisser la Russie intervenir seule?*—Si, fermant l'oreille au cri de détresse que les Grecs avaient poussée vers elle, l'Angleterre avait pu consentir à les repousser de son sein, était-il prudent, d'un autre côté, d'abandonner à la Russie le soin exclusif de les sauver? Refuser de prendre part à l'intervention proposée par cette Puissance, n'était-ce point s'interdire d'avance le droit de statuer sur ses résultats, délier le Cabinet russe des obligations qu'il offrait de contracter lui-même, et le constituer, *de fait et de droit*, seul modérateur des destinées de l'empire ottoman? Ne valait-il pas mieux, au contraire, assurer le salut des Turcs en contribuant à celui des Grecs, s'associer à l'intervention pour avoir le droit d'en régler la marche, et se ménager les moyens de surveiller les vues de la Russie, si, comme le criait la malveillance, il était vrai qu'elle en eût conçu d'ambitieuses?

*L'Angleterre ne pouvait se défer de la Russie. Garanties morales qu'elle possédait à cet égard.*—Mais à cet égard, pour calmer les craintes que des défiances injustes pouvaient exciter, il suffisait au Cabinet de Londres de jeter un coup d'œil sur les six années qui venaient de s'écouler, et de repasser la conduite que la Russie n'avait cessé de tenir vis-à-vis de la Turquie depuis l'origine des troubles.

Si le Cabinet impérial nourrissait des vues ambitieuses, il n'aurait joint, dès le commencement de l'insurrection, indiqué lui-même au Divan les moyens de l'étouffer dans son germe ; indépendamment de ses conseils, il ne lui eût point offert, comme il l'a fait, sa co-opération effective.

S'il s'occupait d'intérêts *particuliers* ; s'il voulait augmenter encore son *influence* ou son *territoire* ; s'il désirait *la guerre*, et la désirait dans des vues *exclusives* ; il n'eût point de son propre mouvement avancé l'idée d'une intervention *collective* ; au contraire, dès les premières provocations qu'il avait reçues de la Porte, il eût fait sur-le-champ entrer ses troupes dans les Principautés du Danube ; il eût profité des embarras que créaient alors aux Puissances les complications politiques du midi de l'Europe, et marché *isolément* à la poursuite de ses *droits*, qu'aucun Cabinet n'avait révoqués en doute.

Loin de là : pour ne point aggraver les difficultés où l'insurrection plongeait la Porte, il a suspendu durant six ans les négociations épineuses, qu'antérieurement à l'année 1821 il avait encore à régler avec elle. Quand la Perse attaqua les Turcs, au lieu de souffler la guerre entr'eux, il s'est employé pour en étouffer la flamme ; quand les Serviens exaspérés ont voulu à plusieurs reprises briser le joug des Ottomans, au lieu de chercher ainsi à étendre le foyer de l'insurrection, il a tout fait pour maintenir ces peuples dans l'obéissance. Il a rétabli avec la Porte ses relations commerciales, quoique le Divan n'eût satisfait qu'à une seule de ses demandes ; et plus tard, ses relations diplomatiques, quoique, d'après les actes de Vérone, la Question Grecque se trouvât liée à toutes les autres, et dût être décidée quant au mode des négociations ultérieures avant la nomination d'un ministre russe à Constantinople.

*Garanties effectives que l'Angleterre s'est assurée en outre.*—Le passé offrait donc à l'Angleterre toutes les garanties *morales* qu'elle pouvait désirer à l'égard de la sincérité des intentions du Cabinet russe ; mais, au reste, ce dernier proposait encore de lui en donner *d'effectives*. En invitant l'Angleterre à intervenir avec lui dans les troubles du Levant, il s'engageait solennellement à renoncer d'avance à toute vue exclusive, à tout agrandissement de territoire ou d'influence, à tout privilège de commerce. Ces engagements ont été consignés en effet dans le Protocole du 4<sup>me</sup> Avril, 1826, répétés dans le Traité du 6<sup>me</sup> Juillet, 1827, et enfin confirmés d'une manière plus explicite encore dans le Protocole du 12<sup>me</sup> Décembre de la même année.

*Conclusion du deuxième point.*—Ainsi c'est en pleine confiance que l'Angleterre est entrée dans la grande entreprise de la pacification du Levant. Elle a du le faire, parce que, comme on l'a montré, le temps de l'inaction était passé pour elle ; parce que la Grèce et la Russie s'unissaient pour la lui demander ; qu'à défaut de sa co-opération, le Cabinet impérial n'en était pas moins décidé à intervenir isolément ; parce qu'enfin, dans l'hypothèse même où il serait resté passif, l'extermination des Grecs par la Porte entraînait inévitablement un état de choses, qui ne se conciliait ni avec le *statu quo* européen, ni avec les intérêts commerciaux de la Grande Bretagne.

#### AD TERTIUM.

On s'est efforcé de prouver dans les deux paragraphes précédents, que dans les troubles de l'Orient une intervention étrangère était inévitable, et que, ce point admis, l'Angleterre ne pouvait se dispenser d'y prendre part. Peu

de mots suffiront maintenant pour démontrer que cette intervention ne pouvait être fondée sur des arrangements plus conformes au véritable intérêt de la Porte, et qu'elle ne pouvait s'effectuer sous des formes moins acerbes, moins compromettantes pour la paix générale, que celles qui ont été adoptées par les Puissances signataires du Traité du 6<sup>me</sup> Juillet.

Ce Traité à sa publication a donné lieu à plus d'une objection. On a prétendu que par les stipulations qu'il renferme en faveur des Grecs, les Puissances intervenantes portaient atteinte à la souveraineté de la Porte, et à l'intégrité de l'empire ottoman. Pour ce qui concerne ce dernier point, on se contentera de répondre par les termes mêmes du Traité qui stipulent expressément que la Grèce et les îles de l'Archipel continueront comme par le passé à relever de la Porte Ottomane. Quant au premier, il suffirait d'observer que longtemps même avant les troubles de 1821 la *souveraineté* de la Porte sur les contrées auxquelles devra s'appliquer l'exécution du Traité de Londres n'était que purement *nominale*, et que le Grand Seigneur n'y exerçait en réalité qu'un simple droit de *suzeraineté*. En effet, avant la guerre l'administration dans la Morée appartenait à des primats choisis dans les familles grecques les plus considérables. Les Pashas, quelles que fussent trop souvent les vexations et la tyrannie auxquelles donnaient lieu leur présence et celle de leurs troupes, n'étaient censés y résider que pour maintenir l'ordre, et pour prélever les impôts ; mais du reste, ils n'entraient en rien dans les affaires intérieures dirigées entièrement par les Grecs eux-mêmes. Dans les îles le régime était le même. Le gouverneur turc y paraissait uniquement destiné à constater par sa présence les droits de la Porte. Dans plusieurs de ces îles il n'y avait pas même de représentant du gouvernement turc. Les primats gouvernaient seuls, et sans contrôle, et ils administraient militairement et civilement à la fois. Que demandent donc à la Porte les Puissances intervenantes ? De donner sa sanction à un ordre de choses qui n'a rien de nouveau pour elle ; de consacrer seulement *en principe* ce qui depuis longtemps existait *en fait*. Si elle met en balance les peines infinies qu'elle avait à faire rentrer au Trésor les contributions remises à ses agents dans les îles et dans la Morée ; la guerre presque continuelle qu'il fallait entretenir dans ces contrées ; si elle calcule combien de trésors dispersés, combien de sang répandu, pour maintenir une autorité toujours chancelante, elle se convaincra qu'au moyen des arrangements qui lui sont proposés, elle conserve tous les avantages qu'elle retirait de ces pays, sans avoir les charges qu'entraînait leur administration ; et qu'au lieu de faire des frais immenses pour ne percevoir qu'une partie de l'impôt, le tribut qu'elle recevra des Grecs lui assurera une somme régulière et probablement plus considérable.

Quant au reste des arrangements stipulés par le Traité, on peut dire qu'ils n'ont rien d'absolument nouveau pour la Porte, et qu'ils ne sont pas éloignés de ceux qu'au temps même de sa puissance elle avait conclus avec les contrées dont elle est suzeraine. Ceux de ses Sultans qui se sont jadis acquis le plus de gloire, les Mahomets, les Solimans, se contentèrent d'un simple droit de suzeraineté sur les provinces du Danube ; ils y conservèrent des Principautés *civilement et administrativement indépendantes* ; ils leur accordèrent des privilèges dont la nature et l'utilité attestaient à la fois leur modération et leur politique.

Si les considérations qu'on vient d'exposer paraissent encore susceptibles de discussion, il en est une qui ne saurait admettre de doute. C'est que les

causes sans nombre d'incompatibilité qui existait entre les Turcs et les Grecs, l'exaspération qu'a produit la guerre, le ressentiment des injures mutuelles qu'elle a occasionnées, ont élevé désormais entr'eux des barrières insurmontables, et qu'en conséquence la *séparation territoriale* stipulée par le Traité de Londres est commandée par la nécessité la plus évidente, la plus absolue, la plus indispensable. En effet, aperçoit-on un moyen quelconque de faire cohabiter ensemble deux peuples si envenimés par la haine ? Peut-on raisonnablement espérer que dans l'état où la guerre les a laissés, l'un veuille se placer à la discrétion de l'autre ? Les Turcs ne seraient-ils pas dans une défiance continuelle des Grecs, auxquels sept années d'indépendance ont révélé le secret de leurs forces, et les Grecs, à leur tour, ne seraient-ils point fondés à redouter plus que jamais les exactions et les vengeances ? Dans cette position menaçante, où trouver des gages de paix et de sécurité ? Reconcilier les deux parties contendantes sans *séparation territoriale*, ce serait les constituer en état de guerre éternelle, et qu'on ne l'oublie pas, tant que cette guerre pourra se renouveler, les relations de la Russie avec l'empire ottoman seront toujours précaires, l'existence de cet empire se verra constamment menacée.

Si donc, au moyen des arrangements stipulés, et de la garantie qui en sera la suite, on arrache pour jamais la Porte aux dangers de cette position incertaine ; si cette garantie anéantit ainsi la cause des guerres désastreuses que les Turcs ont soutenues depuis un demi-siècle ; si elle les fait participer à l'inviolabilité politique dont jouissent les autres états en vertu des grandes transactions européennes ; loin d'avoir, comme le prétendent les adversaires de l'intervention, porté atteinte à l'intégrité de l'empire ottoman, n'aura-t-on point, au contraire, consolidé son existence au moment où tout semble conjurer sa perte ? Et, comme on l'a dit plus haut, en consentant à sauver les Grecs, l'Angleterre n'aura-t-elle pas avant tout assuré le salut des Turcs, raffermi l'équilibre européen sur ses bases chancelantes ?

*Motifs de l'Autriche et de la Prusse pour refuser de prendre part à l'intervention.*— Ces raisons ne sauraient être invoquées en doute ; elles ne l'ont jamais été ; même par les deux Puissances qui n'ont point jugé à propos de prendre part à l'intervention. Le refus de l'une d'elles ne serait peut-être point difficile à expliquer, si l'on considère que tout le commerce dont jusque là les Grecs avaient été les agents, tendait par leur extermination à tomber entre ses mains ; qu'en effet, dans les derniers temps, sa marine marchande est devenue la rivale de celle des Grecs ; qu'elle a couvert de son pavillon presque tous les transports des troupes ottomanes, et l'a même donné à la majeure partie des vaisseaux qui naviguaient auparavant sous pavillon russe. Cette observation qui n'a peut-être pas assez généralement frappé, expliquerait également les mesures rigoureuses que l'escadre autrichienne a plus d'une fois adoptées vis-à-vis des Grecs, et l'indifférence avec laquelle le Cabinet de Vienne a si longtemps assisté aux souffrances d'un peuple dont l'avenir lui léguait, pour ainsi dire, la succession mercantile.

Quant à la Prusse, si elle n'a point pris part à l'intervention ce n'est point non plus qu'elle désapprouvât le principe ; mais ayant déclaré dès l'origine que, vu le peu d'importance de ses rapports avec l'empire ottoman, elle n'interviendrait dans la Question Orientale que pour ne point se séparer des cinq grandes Puissances. Du moment où l'Autriche s'en détachait elle-même, le motif qui leur aurait attaché la Prusse, cessait d'exister.

*Nécessité que l'intervention fût au besoin coercitive.*—Les objections ne sauraient donc tomber que sur *les formes* seules dans lesquelles il convenait de faire agréer à la Porte les arrangements stipulés par le Traité de Londres. Dira-t-on qu'il eût été préférable d'engager le gouvernement turc à les offrir aux Grecs de son propre mouvement ? Si une telle opinion a pu dans le temps paraître plausible, l'évènement a prouvé depuis combien elle reposait sur une base fragile. La résistance que la Porte oppose encore jusqu'à ce moment aux intentions bienfaisantes des Puissances en sa faveur, a démontré de la manière la plus irréfutable, qu'une attitude énergique de leur part était seule capable de la faire consentir à son propre salut, et que le principe de l'intervention une fois admis, cette intervention devait être *comminatoire* et au besoin *coercitive* : qu'en effet, il y allait de la dignité des Puissances intervenantes de poursuivre jusqu'au bout la résolution qu'elles avaient prise, et que la Russie, en particulier, n'aurait pu reculer devant ses conséquences, sans compromettre les résultats que lui avait valus la négociation d'Akerman, et renoncer à la considération que cette négociation lui avait acquise tant auprès de la Porte Ottomane qu'aux yeux de l'Europe entière.

C'est donc encore une absolue *nécessité* qui après avoir légitimé le Traité de Londres, a de même légitimé les clauses comminatoires qu'il renferme et les mesures coercitives qui en ont été la conséquence. Mais ces clauses et ces mesures ont été conçues dans les intentions les plus conciliantes ; graduées avec ménagement l'une après l'autre ; tenues en réserve jusqu'à la dernière extrémité ; et si l'on parcourt les annales de la politique, on trouvera difficilement une circonstance où l'emploi de la force ait eu lieu avec plus de modération.

*Conclusion.*—Nous voici parvenus au terme de la tâche qu'on s'est proposée dans ce Mémoire ; et l'on espère avoir prouvé que l'intervention dans les affaires du Levant, et les formes adoptées pour sa mise à exécution, offraient les seuls moyens par lesquels il fut donné aux Puissances d'éviter la guerre si elle peut l'être, et de conjurer les périls d'une situation qu'elles n'ont point cherchée, mais que les siècles tenaient depuis longtemps en réserve, et qui a été imposée à la politique moderne par la plus inévitable des lois, celle de la *nécessité*. L'avenir est dans les mains de Dieu. Si, malgré les mesures arrêtées par la prévoyance, des complications inattendues devaient éclore dans le Levant, le Traité de Londres aurait du moins servi à en circonscrire la sphère, à en limiter la durée, à en concentrer l'action sur un seul point de l'Europe, et cet évènement n'aurait servi qu'à donner une nouvelle preuve de cette vérité de tous les temps. C'est qu'il est pour les gouvernements, comme pour les individus, des positions indépendantes de la volonté humaine, où n'ayant que l'option des maux, c'est encore un prix glorieux que d'avoir su choisir le moindre.

[ 810. ]

*To Lord Hill.*

MY DEAR HILL,

London, 1st February, 1828.

You will have heard that, in consequence of my being employed in the government, I have been under the painful necessity of resigning my office of Commander-in-Chief. I certainly

did not contemplate this necessity as being paramount when I undertook for his Majesty the service of forming his government. But even if I had, I don't think that I could have declined endeavouring to perform the service, and it is useless to regret that I did not make the retention of my office a condition without which I would not serve his Majesty as he desired I should.

In consequence of my resignation I have been under the necessity of considering of an arrangement to fill the office which I have held; and I have naturally turned towards you. There is no doubt that your appointment will be highly satisfactory to the country as well as to the army; but it has occurred to some members of the government, that considering the place in which you stand on the list, it is better, in relation to the senior officers of the army, some of whom have high pretensions, that you should be Senior General upon the Staff, performing the duties of Commander-in-Chief, than Commander-in-Chief. The only real difference is in the pay, which is not of much importance to you. The late Lord Amherst was never Commander-in-Chief, but always Senior General on the Staff. The Duke of York filled the same situation during the first year of his command.

If this proposition should be agreeable to you, let me know by return of post, and come to town as soon as possible, keeping the matter secret until I shall have seen you.

I need not assure you that if you should accept this offer, I will give you every assistance in my power to facilitate the performance of your duties.

Believe me ever yours sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the King.*

[ 811. ]

London, 2nd February, 1828.

Mr. Peel will write to your Majesty respecting the desirableness that your Majesty should name an early day for receiving the Recorder's Report.

I have likewise to submit to your Majesty the necessity that there should be a council between this time and Tuesday next, in order that Mr. Frankland Lewis may be sworn of your Majesty's Privy Council, previous to his re-election to the House



of Commons. If, therefore, your Majesty should fix upon a later date than Tuesday for the Recorder's Report, I request your Majesty's permission to assemble a Privy Council at Windsor on Tuesday, for the purpose to which I have above referred.

Which is humbly submitted for your Majesty's pleasure by your Majesty's most devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

[ 812. ]

*To the King.*

London, 2nd February, 1828.

Your Majesty is aware of the bad state of the health of the Marquess of Anglesey, and of the relief which he receives from the attendance of Dr. Laffan. It is very desirable that this physician should accompany him to, and attend him in, Ireland; to which I am informed that he would not object, more particularly if such an interest was manifested on the part of your Majesty for his continued attendance upon the Marquess of Anglesey as would justify him in withdrawing himself from his attendance upon his other patients in this country.

Under these circumstances it is humbly submitted for your Majesty's most gracious pleasure that Dr. Laffan may be created a baronet,

By your Majesty's most dutiful subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

*Dean Phillpotts to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

British Hotel, Jermyn Street, 2nd February, 1828.

After the decided opinion expressed by your Grace, I should be ashamed to trespass on your very valuable time by a single sentence more on the subject of my last note.

I take the liberty of enclosing a string of documents to prove that Roman Catholics may, without any violence to their conscience, engage to maintain the civil rights and privileges of the Church of England.

To-morrow morning, I will take my chance of finding your Grace disengaged during your breakfast, and I will bring with me some documents to establish the wisdom and necessity of your Grace's intended measure to prohibit the assumption of the titles of sees, &c., by the Roman Catholic hierarchy and priesthood.

I am, my Lord Duke, with the greatest respect,

your Grace's obliged and most faithful servant,

HENRY PHILLPOTTS.

## [ENCLOSURE.]

ON THE AMENDED OATH, and the requirement of an engagement from the Roman Catholics to defend the temporal rights of the *Established Church*.

If any difficulties or objections be anticipated, it may be well to remember :—

1st. The offer made by the *English Roman Catholics*\* in 1791, previous to the passing of the bill for their relief, as cited in Bishop Horsley's speech in their favour, May 31, 1791.

"They say that they think themselves 'bound by an oath, which they have already taken, and that they are ready to strengthen the obligation by a new oath, to defend, to the utmost of their power, the civil and ecclesiastical establishment of the country, even though all the Catholic Powers in Europe, with the Pope himself at their head, were to levy war against the King, for the express purpose of establishing the Roman Catholic religion.'"

2nd. The declaration of the *Irish Roman Catholics*† put forth in 1792, at the time petitions were presented to Parliament, for the concessions that were made at that time.

"We desire that no Catholic shall be permitted to vote at any election for members to serve in Parliament, until he shall previously take an oath to defend, to the utmost of his power, the arrangement of property in this country, as established by the different acts of attainder and settlement." (In this, I apprehend, the Church property must be included).

Again, "we are ready, in the most solemn manner, to declare that we will not exercise that privilege" (the elective franchise) "to disturb and weaken the Protestant religion, or Protestant government in this country."‡

3rd. The petition§ of the principal *Irish Roman Catholic laity* in 1805, subscribed by six peers, three baronets, and a numerous body of the first commoners.

In this petition,|| they take credit for having "solemnly sworn, that they will not exercise any privilege, to which they are or may become entitled, to disturb or weaken the Protestant religion or Protestant government in Ireland."

They further "most explicitly declare, that they do not seek or wish, in the remotest degree, to injure or encroach upon the rights, privileges, immunities, possessions, or revenues, appertaining to the bishops and clergy of the Protestant religion, as by law established, or to the churches committed to their charge, or to any of them."

All these precedents and documents show, that there is no objection, in principle, on the part of the Roman Catholics, to the enactment of the strongest oaths to be taken by them in defence of the civil establishment of the *Protestant Church*.

But, unfortunately, the history of Ireland, during the last few years, shows how utterly worthless such oaths are, as restraints on the *Irish Roman Catholics*. To the petition of 1805, cited above, which takes credit for the petitioners, on account of the oaths already taken by them for the defence of the Church, and which makes such ample promises, to the same effect, is subscribed the name of "*Daniel O'Connell, Dublin*," a man, who, in spite of all his vaunted oaths and promises, has laboured incessantly for years past to disturb and weaken the Protestant religion, and to bring destruction on the Protestant Church esta-

\* Offer of *English Roman Catholics* in 1791.

† Declaration of *Irish Roman Catholics* in 1792.

‡ This is cited from Dr. Majauri's evidence before Commons, 1825, p. 269.

§ Irish petition of 1805.

|| The petition was printed, with notes, by Keating and Brown, 1805.

ishment. In one of his very last speeches before he left Ireland, he vaunted *the example of America, as a country without a Church establishment.*

I repeat, therefore, that proper and decent as it is to amend the oath of Roman Catholics, it is, so far as the Irish are concerned, a provision of very little value.

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*The Earl of Westmorland to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

DEAR DUKE,

Hastings, Sunday, 3rd February, 1828.

I have sent you the papers with many thanks; I hope you had no inconvenience from the delay, but there was no post yesterday. I think the papers perfectly satisfactory to prove that in our Cabinet there was no idea of force, and Mr. Canning's last letter to Count Lieven is as corroborative as any other of the papers. There is an observation in Lord Bathurst's handwriting on your Memorandum at Petersburg, which says: "This will be argued as a support of the Treaty." But in my judgment Lord Bathurst sees that in a wrong view; the words are "the acceptance of the mediation, as the single and indispensable condition by which a war with Russia may be avoided." This was during the negotiation at Akerman; but I do not see how telling the Turks that such was the determination of Russia previous to the adjustment of the differences at Akerman at all implicates you or us in the approbation or countenance of such a result, when the whole tenor of your correspondence is to avert it.

Yours sincerely,

WESTMORLAND.

[ 813. ]

*To the King.*

London, 4th February, 1828.

I submit to your Majesty a letter which I have received from Lord Hertford, in which he recites one which he had received from the Duke of Devonshire, informing his Lordship that your Majesty had written to his Grace and informed him that your Majesty had obtained for him the Order of St. Andrew of Russia.

It likewise appears from Lord Hertford's letter that the Emperor had intimated to his Lordship that his Imperial Majesty was disposed to confer that honour upon him, and was prevented by your Majesty's regulations, which had likewise prevented his Imperial Majesty from offering it to the Duke of Devonshire.

There is no doubt that your Majesty's regulations do prevent the grant of permission to any of your Majesty's diplomatic

servants to accept of honour or reward from any Sovereign or Power ; and it is desirable that this regulation should be strictly adhered to and enforced.

The Duke of Devonshire might as well have avoided to communicate to Lord Hertford in what manner the honour was obtained by his Grace. But this communication having been made, and an intimation having been given to Lord Hertford at St. Petersburg, that his Imperial Majesty was disposed to confer that same honour upon his Lordship, I would beg your Majesty's permission to speak to Prince Lieven upon the subject, in order to obtain the Order of St. Andrew for Lord Hertford.

I would then submit to your Majesty that your Majesty's regulations should be circulated to your Majesty's missions at foreign Courts ; and that your Majesty's determination be declared to carry its provisions strictly into execution on all future occasions.

All of which is humbly submitted for your Majesty's gracious pleasure by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Duke of Newcastle to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

Clumber, 4th February, 1828.

Most certainly I should have answered your Grace's former letter, but that I considered it to be more in reply to mine than one which required a distinct answer. I received it also so nearly before my departure for London, that I expected to have been able to have communicated personally what I should otherwise have written to you.

I only received your Grace's letter of the 1st as I was about to step into my carriage, and I thank you for it. I regretted exceedingly that I was so unfortunate as not to have been able to speak with you, for although the result of our conversation might not have placed matters between us in a different situation from what they are at present, yet I should have had the satisfaction of assuring your Grace of my personal esteem and respect, and of the deep regret which I feel at separating myself from that alliance with you which has hitherto been to me a source of pride and pleasure. It may be in your recollection that on the first announcement of the King's commission to your Grace, I wrote to you in the fullest confidence that no exceptionable means would be resorted to in forming a ministry, and if that had been the case, you would have had me heart and soul with you ; as it is, I have no choice ; I cannot surrender my conscience or my consistency, and as I opposed Mr. Canning's government on account of the pernicious

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formation of it, so must I do the same now, seeing that the present ministry is formed on the same principle, and of mainly the same ingredients; those ingredients, too, being the most noxious in the whole materia politica.

Your Grace should not deceive yourself, nor must I deceive you, "what has been done has (not) been approved of." I will take upon myself to inform you, however unpleasing the task, that in our House as well as out of doors, disappointment and distrust is general. What above all things most excites popular reprehension is the idea that your Grace holds the command of the army with the Treasury, and the opinion is that putting the Commanding-in-Chief in commission does not mend the matter. Might I, as a sincere well-wisher, take the liberty of suggesting that placing such a man as the Duke of Gordon at the head of the army would at once remove all objection and suspicion? It is right that those in power should know the truth, and it would be base to the country and to the individual in authority to withhold it, even at the risk of his displeasure; the times are difficult and dangerous, and a false move may be pregnant with infinite mischief.

I cannot express how much pain and grief it has caused me to be driven to differ from your Grace, but at the same time I shall inflexibly adhere to what I conceive to be my duty, too happy if I should find myself enabled to support instead of to oppose the measures emanating from your government.

Believe me to remain, my dear Lord Duke,

your Grace's very sincere and faithful,

NEWCASTLE.

[ 814. ]

*To the King.*

London, 8th February, 1828.

I beg leave to submit to your Majesty that Lord Goderich has stated to me his concern that he has not had an opportunity of paying his respects to your Majesty, since the day on which he informed your Majesty that the government was dissolved; and he entreats your Majesty to permit him to attend your Majesty on any day that may be most convenient.

Would your Majesty be pleased to allow Lord Goderich to attend your Majesty at the next Council day, Tuesday?

Which is humbly submitted for your Majesty's pleasure by your Majesty's devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the King.*

[ 815. ]

London, 8th February, 1828.

I before informed your Majesty that General Lord Hill was in town, and that the arrangement for delivering to him the command of the army was delayed only till the form of appointment could be settled according to precedent.

I find that it will be necessary that Lord Hill should be a member of the Privy Council; and I beg to receive your Majesty's pleasure whether I shall desire him to attend on Tuesday to be sworn of the Privy Council; after which the arrangement will appear in Orders.

Which is humbly submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Viscount Melville.*

[ 816. ]

MY DEAR LORD MELVILLE,

London, 9th February, 1828.

I return the enclosed. I knew that it was intended to remove Sir George Murray from Ireland to some office in this country as late as November or even December last, as I had a conversation with Lord Goderich and Lord Lansdowne respecting his successor, I think in December.

It is perfectly true that Sir George Murray was to have had a government. I know it because I was the person who spoke upon the subject to the Duke of York.

Situated as I am, I cannot now do more than leave a note with my successor of that which my predecessor and I intended. But I will do that.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Le Prince de Metternich to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MON CHER DUC,

Vienne, ce 10 Février, 1828.

Vous êtes resté le vainqueur dans une grande lutte, et certainement en aucun lieu ne saurait-on apprécier plus le triomphe que vous avez emporté que chez nous. Ce triomphe est celui de la vérité sur l'erreur, du bien sur le mal, de la raison sur les passions; comme nous nous vouons au premier de ces cultes, votre triomphe est le nôtre.

Je me flatte que les deux dernières expéditions à M. le Prince Esterhazy auront obtenu votre approbation. Je lui en adresse une aujourd'hui que je

recommande sous tous les rapports à votre attention bien particulière. Le moment est d'une gravité extrême, et les complications qu'il serait difficile de ne pas entrevoir pour le très-prochain avenir exigent une entente bien claire entre nos deux Cours. Vous nous trouverez fort disposés à nous livrer à l'examen sévère de toutes les nécessités ; le jeu depuis les dernières années s'est dirigé vers le soutien de la thèse que l'Autriche était ou trop stupide ou trop *Turque* pour pouvoir même être entendue, et bien moins encore pour pouvoir être consultée. L'esprit qui a été fait sans nous n'a pas conduit à des résultats bien heureux ; je crois même qu'ils ne peuvent plus guères satisfaire ceux qui s'étaient flattés de résultats différents, et je mets à la tête des *surpris* le Cabinet russe lui-même. Parlons-nous clairement et simplement, et les plus mauvaises affaires prendront pour le moins une tournure plus pratique.

M. le Prince Esterhazy vous parlera, mon cher Duc, de quelques scrupules de ma part. C'est à vous à les lever ou bien à guider notre conscience dans les voies utiles.

Veillez agréer l'hommage renouvelé des sentiments de haute considération et d'impérissable amitié que je me fais gloire de professer pour vous.

METTERNICH.

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*The Duke of Clarence to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

DEAR DUKE,

Admiralty, 10th February, 1828.

The enclosed memorial from Sir Edward Codrington reached me at the moment of the dissolution of the late government, on which account I then kept it back. Since that time I was not inclined to trouble your Grace, because I clearly saw the many and conflicting difficulties which existed in the arrangement of the present administration, which I trust in God is now formed. Under this persuasion I now send your Grace the memorial of Sir Edward Codrington, in behalf of himself and his brave companions in arms at the battle of Navarino, for head-money, and also stating the value of the loss of ships and vessels to the Turkish empire. Though I had the good fortune to agree with your Grace in every sentiment expressed in the House of Lords by yourself respecting the Grand Seignior being the ancient and natural ally of Great Britain, I must call your Grace's attention to the memorial, and earnestly entreat a favourable consideration of this extraordinary and novel case, where his Majesty's officers and men have conducted themselves with such honour to their King and country, and with such credit to themselves. Being now on the subject of naval, and of course of military achievements, I wish to call your Grace's mind to the propriety of re-establishing in *both* services the medals again, as from the statutes of the Military Order of the Bath, till officers become in either army or navy, generals or admirals, they are most properly not entitled to become K.C.B.s. Another point I wish to mention to your Grace, and on which as on these I shall converse when your Grace is less occupied, is the expediency of enlarging and of introducing the three classes into the civil part of the Order of the Bath.

I remain, dear Duke, yours truly,

WILLIAM.

[ENCLOSURE.]

The memorial of Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Codrington, G.C.B., Commander-in-Chief of his Majesty's ships and vessels in the Mediterranean, in behalf of himself, the officers, seamen, and Royal marines of the squadron under his command, to his Royal Highness the Lord High Admiral.

Showeth,—That having entered into the Port of Navarino in the Morea, in conjunction with the French and Russian squadrons under Rear-Admirals the Chevalier de Rigny and Count Heyden, on the 20th of October, 1827, for the express purpose of carrying into effect the Treaty and Instructions founded thereon, they being denied all other means of communicating with the Ottoman chiefs, and their intentions being by no means hostile, a general battle ensued in consequence of a Turkish fire-vessel firing on the Dartmouth's boat and killing an officer and part of her crew.

That according to the nearest calculation which could be made, and from information received from the Secretary of the Capitana Bey, one of the Turkish Admirals, the fleet consisted of the following number of ships and vessels, manned and armed as herein described.

Ships and Vessels.	Guns.	Men.	
3 Ships of the line .. .. .	84	850 each.	2550
	74		
	76		
	64		
5 Double-banked frigates, Egyptians .. .. .	64	550 and 500 average.	2700
	60		
	60		
	54		
	50		
15 Turkish frigates .. .. .	and 48	435 average.	6525
	26		
26 Corvettes (18 Turks and 8 Egyptians) .. .. .	and 22	200 each.	5200
	20		
	and 18		
11 Brigs (4 Turks and 7 Egyptians)	and 18	150 and 130 average.	1540
	..		
5 Fire ships .. .. .	..	12 each	60
51 Armed transports .. .. .			
116	2,082	..	18,575

That the whole of these men-of-war, with the exception of one double-banked frigate, and a few corvettes and brigs, were either burned, sunk, or driven on shore totally annihilated.

That the loss in men cannot be calculated at less than six thousand.

That the value of ships and stores destroyed is immense, added to which the batteries at the entrance of the harbour were also much damaged and silenced.

Your Royal Highness's memorialist therefore humbly prayeth that the usual head-money and other rewards may be granted to himself, the officers, seamen, and marines of the squadron under his command upon the occasion before mentioned.

And your Royal Highness's memorialist will, as in duty bound, ever pray.

EDWARD CODRINGTON, Vice-Admiral.

His Majesty's ship *Asia*, at Malta, 9th December, 1827.



[ 817. ]

*To the King.*

London, 11th February, 1828.

I have the honour to submit to your Majesty the report of a motion by Lord Carnarvon in the House of Lords this night.

The debate turned principally upon a speech lately spoken by Mr. Huskisson upon the hustings at Liverpool. Upon which topic having been introduced by Lord Carnarvon, Lord Goderich and Lord Lansdowne explained, the former in much detail, the circumstances which had broken up the late administration; and the latter a material part of a conversation between Mr. Huskisson and himself, of which Mr. Huskisson had stated only a part to the electors of Liverpool.

I availed myself of that same opportunity of stating to the House of Lords that I had given no guarantee to Mr. Huskisson of the nature of that which he had been represented, as I believe erroneously, to have stated to the electors of Liverpool that I had given.

All of which is humbly submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

*The Duke of Cumberland to Colonel Cooke.*

DEAR COOKE,

Berlin, 12th February, 1828.

Last Saturday I received a letter from you, but without a date, therefore am not able to say when it was written. However, I feel equally thankful to you for all your details respecting the late changes in the government, which are most highly interesting. I look upon it as a most fortunate event for the country, that his Majesty has made the choice of the Duke of Wellington for the place of Premier; for, if you remember, when I had the pleasure of seeing you here last summer, I then ventured to say that had I been in England this time last year, when that calamity befel our country of Lord Liverpool's illness, I would have exerted every possible means to have persuaded the Duke then to have accepted his present situation, which, depend on it, *he* is completely able to fill; for, though not so *eloquent* as Mr. Canning, still, believe me, he is in everything else far his *superior*, and I know no man who possesses the faculty of expressing his ideas in a clearer, more distinct, or smaller compass than he can, which, to my taste, is far superior to the flowing speeches of Mr. Canning. Besides, he will never commit himself or the country by any false chimerical ideas of the sort that that poetical politician favoured us with, and which has done more mischief to our country than at the time was foreseen. I have so much confidence in the Duke, that, though

I own I should have liked to have seen his Cabinet otherwise composed, still I feel perfectly assured that he found it *necessary* to constitute it as he has done; and, though there may be persons that may agree with me in this opinion, yet I doubt not that they will cordially support him in his laudable endeavours, after the sacrifices he has *personally* made; for I am certain it cost him much to take the decision of resigning the Commandership-in-Chief and saddling himself with the toils and labour he will have to encounter. I own I do not like the idea of the command of the army being submitted to a Board; 1st, for this must ultimately lead to the utter ruin of the army, as I never knew anything succeed where there was more than one person to take the management and responsibility; only see how the Austrian army is degenerated, since the command has been administered by a Board. 2ndly. You may depend upon it that such an arrangement will ever be considered as a humbug, and that the country will suppose that the Duke has reserved the patronage of the army in his own hands; and finally there will be those who will construe this, as if there was a doubt on the Duke's mind as to the stability of his government, and therefore he has made this arrangement in order that, if his government should not stand, he might resume his office. You see I give you fairly my views of the subject, sincerely, as I figure to myself what may be started by those who are not the honest supporters of the present government. The Duke's speech, the first night, I highly approve of; but must equally condemn those of Lord Londonderry in the Lords and of Mr. Jenkinson in the Commons. Anything that showed worse taste I never remember to have read in my life; besides, I believe all that the latter stated of his brother to be a perfect fabrication of his own, as I understand that to this hour Lord Liverpool is not in a state of mind to judge or think, and that he did not even know that Canning was *dead*. Young Seymour told me he had met him, a short time before he left England, driving out with his lady, and that he looked completely as an automaton; but supposing even this were not the case, and admitting all to be gospel that he stated, still there is no denying that it was very bad taste and false policy saying one word of his brother on the occasion. I wish our friend Hertford was named the Lord Chamberlain, if he would not take a more efficient situation in the government, such as the Lord-Lieutenancy of Ireland, for which he possesses every talent, and with his princely fortune could do an immensity of good there. I own, had I been in the place of the Duke of Devonshire, I certainly would not have resigned; for he need not give himself up to politics, never having in his life shown any talents that way; and after all it is a sorry profession. I am expecting a letter from the Duke, as he sent me a message he should write to me very shortly. Do you continue to write to me all that passes, as you know no one feels more interested for the welfare of his country than

Yours very sincerely,

ERNEST.

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[ 818. ]

*To Viscount Beresford.*

MY DEAR BERESFORD,

London, 13th February, 1828.

I have received your letter this morning regarding the agency of the Artillery, which I take the opportunity of a moment's leisure at Windsor, after the Council, to answer.

The agency of the Artillery is not and never was exactly like that of a regiment, and it has become less so than ever it was.

No change of agents has been made for the last nearly thirty-five years, I believe, excepting partially; and such changes have, in every instance, involved delay in the settlement of accounts and losses to the public.

The whole of the agency is now for a sum of not less than 700,000*l.*, and there are accounts with storekeepers, as paymasters of artillery and detachments from Ceylon, with North America, Africa, the West Indies, Mediterranean, &c.

Greenwood has lately paid in all his balances, and settled his accounts, up to the last moment required by the Regulations; and it was only a year ago that I was obliged to give him an allowance for performing part of the business, which act was founded upon our having drawn all the balances out of his hands.

All this is well known in Parliament, as well as that the Ordnance have lost 40,000*l.* heretofore by the transfer of part of the business to Ridge's; and more recently a considerable sum by a similar transfer to Mr. Wray.

We are going to have a Finance Committee, before which all these things will come out. You have the undoubted power of removing the agents from the whole or any part of the concern. The question for you to decide is whether it is prudent at present to exercise that power, considering the circumstances of the case, as they have been above represented to you.

It cannot be considered a case of private interest. Mr. Campbell may have claims upon you, but the public interests and those of the government must be considered; and you could not expose the government to the charge of the public interests having been forgotten in this arrangement, and great losses risked in order that you might provide for Mr. Campbell.

I think likewise you should consider what others will think of this affair, who will have to protect it in the Finance Committee and to defend it in Parliament after it will be adopted.

I here close this letter and the subject altogether. I assure you that I have not heard one word from Greenwood, or from anybody connected with them, upon the subject. I spoke or wrote to you originally because, as I told you, I had heard the report that you intended to remove Greenwood casually mentioned. I have heard it frequently since, and I would earnestly recommend you not to do it.

But I feel no interest in the case, excepting on public grounds, and to avoid for yourself and the government the trouble which the discussion will occasion. Hardinge told me this morning that you would be the security for Mr. Campbell, which I earnestly entreat you will not be, on any account. This would make you liable to every description of misrepresentation.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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MEMORANDUM ON THE REDUCTION OF THE KING'S TROOPS [ 819. ]  
IN INDIA.

14th February, 1828.

The following arrangement must be adopted respecting the King's infantry in the East Indies:—

The bargain between the King and the East India Company sanctioned by the Act of Parliament is, that the East India Company are to have the service of 20,000 men, including officers of the King's troops, of which 3076 have been cavalry.

These were composed as follows, by an arrangement made in the year 1824:—

4 regiments of cavalry	.. .. .	3076
11 regiments of infantry at	.. .. .	1000
5 regiments of infantry at	.. .. .	800

exclusive of officers.

In the year 1825, the Company required an augmentation in consequence of the Burmese war, and four regiments were sent out, it was agreed that none should come home, and that the whole of the King's infantry in the East Indies should be of 1000 rank and file each; thus making the establishment of the King's troops in the East Indies, including officers and non-commissioned officers, 26,016.

The East India Company have the power, and are likely to exercise it, of calling upon his Majesty's government to reduce

the establishment of his Majesty's troops in the East Indies to the number fixed by Act of Parliament, viz., 20,000 men, including officers; and the mode in which I proposed to reduce the number of troops in the East Indies to the establishment was by reducing the numbers in each regiment of infantry to 740, being the amount of a regiment in the King's service in all parts of the world.

In order to bring the expense of these twenty regiments as nearly as possible to that of sixteen, I propose that, in future, the regiments going to the East Indies should leave the number of officers equal to that of one company recruiting in England.

Of the regiments now in India, no officers should be promoted without purchase until the officers of one company of each should be reduced.

This arrangement will reduce the expense of the 20,000 men to nearly what it would cost for the maintenance of the same number according to the arrangement of 1824; and it will be a great convenience not only to the service in the East Indies, but likewise to his Majesty's service in general.

WELLINGTON.

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MEMORANDUM BY SIR WILLOUGHBY GORDON UPON REDUCING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE KING'S TROOPS IN INDIA.

Horse-Guards, 18th February, 1828.

The intention of the late Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of Wellington, having been, for the reasons expressed in his Grace's Memorandum dated February 14th, 1828,\* copy of which is herewith annexed, to reduce the establishment of his Majesty's infantry in the East Indies to the numbers fixed by Act of Parliament, viz., 20,000, including officers; and his Grace having proposed, as the best mode in his opinion of doing this, to reduce the establishment of every regiment of infantry in India to the same numbers of men as every other regiment in the King's service, viz., 740, so that the expense of 20 regiments of infantry upon the reduced establishment may be, as nearly as possible, equal to that of the expense of 16 regiments upon the former establishment of 1000 men; it may be useful to make the following observations upon the whole of this subject:—

*Observations.*

The ordinary annual expense of a regiment of infantry in India, of 1000 rank and file, or, as including officers and non-commissioned officers, of 1128,

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\* See page 265.

as estimated in the Army Estimates for the year 1827, is 32,712*l.* 16*s.* 11*d.* ; and to this must be added the ordinary annual expense of the whole of the recruiting company in England, and which, according to the same authority, is estimated at the number of 19, including officers, non-commissioned officers, and rank and file, 1060*l.* 16*s.* ; thus making the whole of the ordinary annual expense of a regiment of infantry of the above establishment in India, 33,773*l.* 12*s.* 11*d.* ; and this sum multiplied by 16 (the number of regiments) will give the whole ordinary expense, annually, of the whole of the King's regiments of infantry serving in India—in round numbers—viz. 540,378*l.*

Now to compare this establishment of 16 regiments, with that which is proposed in the paper of the Duke of Wellington, of 20 regiments, the same mode of calculation will be resorted to, and taken from the same authority.

The ordinary annual expense of one regiment of infantry of 740 rank and file, or, including officers and non-commissioned officers, 835, is estimated in the Army Estimates for the year 1827 at 25,094*l.* 14*s.* 2*d.*, and which multiplied by 20 will give 501,894*l.* as the whole ordinary expense, annually, of 20 regiments of like numbers and charge. To this must be added the expense of the additional officers, of *one* lieutenant-colonel, and *ten* lieutenants per battalion, and which may be estimated, for the whole 20 regiments, at between 8000*l.* and 9000*l.* annually ; so that it is manifest the ordinary expense of 20 regiments of 835 men, including officers and non-commissioned officers, will be less by the sum of about 30,000*l.* than the expense of 16 regiments of 1128, including officers and non-commissioned officers ; (and this expense is inclusive of the recruiting company).

As far, therefore, as the money part of this business is concerned, the East India Company will be gainers to the amount of this sum.

But this question has other considerations, and of equal importance to those of finance, bearing upon the interest of the King's army, and which must therefore form a material part of the discussion of this arrangement.

It is understood that the East India Company are by Act of Parliament to have the constant service of 20,000 men (as stated in the paper of the Duke of Wellington), including officers and non-commissioned officers of the King's army, and of which 3076 have been cavalry ; and the practice has always been, and must be continued, that whenever the exigencies of the East India Company require a reinforcement of the King's troops, such demand has been and must be complied with, the East India Company having the power of calling upon the government to reduce the additional numbers, when no longer wanted, to the numbers established by Act of Parliament, viz. 20,000, as in the instance now under discussion.

But see the effect which this fluctuation must produce upon the King's army.

The establishment of the King's army is voted annually by Parliament upon a very close consideration of the numbers actually required at home and abroad throughout the whole extent of our colonial possessions, the East Indies always excepted ; and whatever fluctuation there may be in the annual numbers so voted, the calculation is made without any reference to the circumstances of the affairs of the East India Company. So that if a reinforcement be demanded and sent to India, the numbers so sent must

be considered to be over and above the actual wants of the King's service elsewhere, and which must be provided accordingly in the estimate annually submitted to Parliament. If, therefore, the East India Company shall refuse to maintain this additional force after the duties required of it shall have been performed (as in the instance now under discussion), and that it shall be returned to Europe, the greatest inconvenience and expense must fall upon the King's army and upon the country.

Because it must be evident that if a proportionate reduction of regiments be made in the King's army, and that this reduction should take place, as it must do, in the junior corps of the army, most of whom may be serving in our colonial and distant possessions, not only must the military service of the King be very seriously inconvenienced, and great damage be done to the interests of individuals; but a very large expense must be entailed upon the country at large, in the reliefs necessary to be made for this purpose.

The measure, therefore, now proposed by the Duke of Wellington appears to combine, as nearly as circumstances will permit, the interest of the two services, as far as the general concerns of the East India Company and of the King's government are implicated; because, while it has the double effect of reducing the King's army in India, and in the most efficient and economical manner to the East India Company, and without prejudice to the King's army employed in other parts of the world, it will enable the government of England to supply the future and uncertain demands of the East India Company, by the simple process of an augmentation to the establishment of each corps, without sending out additional regiments to India.

It must not, however, be forgotten, that while this arrangement operates to the advantage of the interests of the East India Company, and generally upon the whole formation of the King's army, it will fall with some severity upon the interests of the individual colonels of the regiments whose establishments are thus unexpectedly though unavoidably reduced, and this should be kept in view, in the event of any discussion arising hereafter between the East India Company and the King's government upon points where the interests of these officers are concerned, so that the most favourable construction may be put upon them.

J. WILLOUGHBY GORDON.

[ 820. ]

*To the Rev. W. Groves.*

SIR,

London, 18th February, 1828.

I have just now received your letter; and I am really very much concerned that when you did me the honour of calling here on Saturday I had public business to transact which prevented me from receiving you.

Now that I know on what business it was that you wished to converse with me, I do not regret that I did not receive you on any grounds excepting that you imagine that my not

receiving you is to be attributed to personal disrespect towards you.

I know nothing of you ; nor ever heard your name. Therefore I could feel no disrespect towards you.

I have nothing to say to the person respecting whose affairs it was your wish to speak to me, and upon which affairs you have written to me.

Whenever those affairs will come regularly under the consideration of his Majesty's government, it will be my duty to give my opinion upon them. Till then, I beg leave to decline to have any communication upon them with anybody.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the King.*

[ 821. ]

21st February, 1828.

Your Majesty's most gracious commands of the 16th instant were sent to me by Sir W. Knighton on Saturday night ; and I should not have thought it necessary to trouble your Majesty upon the subject to which your Majesty's letter relates if your Majesty had not adverted to the fixtures and furniture of Carlton House removed to Windsor Castle ; and I have delayed to write to your Majesty upon that subject, till by communication with the Lord Chancellor and Mr. Herries, I could learn exactly in what manner that affair stood.

There is no doubt whatever that those fixtures and that furniture are your Majesty's private property, and that they might have been sold by your Majesty when Carlton House was dismantled, or might now be sold. But, adverting to the circumstances of the times, and to all that has passed, and is likely to pass, upon the expenses incurred at Windsor Castle and Buckingham Palace, I should not perform my duty by your Majesty, and I should act in a manner very inconsistent with that affectionate attachment by which I am bound to your Majesty, if I did not entreat your Majesty to refrain from making your claim for this furniture and these fixtures.

I shall not trouble your Majesty with all the arguments in favour of this recommendation ; but of this I can assure your Majesty, that the claim for payment could not be brought forward at present excepting through the Commissaries for furnishing



Windsor Castle, and that it is absolutely necessary to close in this Session of Parliament our demands on account of Windsor Castle.

Which is humbly submitted for your Majesty's pleasure by your Majesty's most devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

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*Le Comte de la Ferronnays to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MILORD,

Paris, ce 21 Février, 1828.

Votre Grâce permettra-t-elle qu'au moment où elle vient de prendre la conduite des affaires de la Grande-Bretagne, et où la bonté du Roi a daigné m'appeler moi-même au ministère, j'invoque le souvenir des relations que j'ai eu le bonheur d'avoir précédemment avec elle ? Les sentiments de confiance et de haute estime que votre caractère, Milord, inspire à l'Europe entière, et ceux que vous avez bien voulu me témoigner, m'encouragent à renouveler ces relations dans des circonstances où les grands intérêts du repos et de l'équilibre de l'Europe réclament de la part des hommes d'état l'attention la plus sérieuse et les plus vives sollicitudes.

Je vous ai vu, Milord, placer les premières bases du Traité qui unit si heureusement les trois Cours, et qui garantit de toute atteinte la bonne harmonie qui règne entr'elles. Nous savions bien qu'arrivé à la tête du gouvernement, l'homme le plus loyal d'Angleterre n'hésiterait pas à remplir les engagements qu'elle a souscrit, et notre juste confiance avait devancé l'assurance que vous avez jugé convenable d'en donner au Parlement.

Vous connaissez, Milord, les intentions du Roi mon maître. Il veut, ainsi que sa Majesté Britannique, exécuter pleinement les stipulations du Traité du 6<sup>me</sup> Juillet. Il veut la pacification de la Grèce, et le maintien du système politique fondé sur les grandes transactions qui ont rétabli la paix générale.

Si la Porte eut consulté ses vrais intérêts, sa connaissance du Traité, l'attitude des trois Cours, auraient suffi pour la décider à accepter leurs propositions ; mais elle s'est fait, quant à leurs résolutions, des illusions funestes, et que diverses circonstances qu'il est inutile de rappeler ont continué à entretenir. Aujourd'hui elle pousse l'aveuglement au point de se déclarer en état d'hostilité vis-à-vis d'elles ; et même elle ne craint pas d'avouer dans son manifeste qu'elle n'est entrée en négociation, et n'a fait naître des délais, que pour avoir le temps de faire ses préparatifs.

Je dois dire que si cette brusque levée de bouclier est faite pour causer de la surprise, elle a cependant, selon moi, l'avantage de simplifier à beaucoup d'égards la question qui, jusqu'à présent, se trouvait étrangement compliquée.

En prenant une résolution si contraire à ses intérêts, la Porte justifie complètement l'emploi des moyens de *coaction* réservés par la Traité pour vaincre sa résistance. Sous ce rapport, Milord, nos gouvernements sortent d'une position assez difficile, pour en prendre une qui est claire, précise, et déterminée.

Maintenant je déclare avec franchise que je regarde comme nécessaire, je dirais même comme indispensable, l'emploi immédiat de mesures énergiques vis-à-vis de la Porte Ottomane. Ces mesures sont prévues par le Traité ; déjà elles sont en délibération devant la Conférence de Londres ; leur adoption ne peut plus étonner personne, elle ne peut trouver de contradicteurs quand on sait que les Turques jettent le gant, et chassent de leur capitale les sujets chrétiens qu'ils avaient feint de prendre sous leur protection.

Une considération frappera sans doute votre esprit sage et éclairé, car elle est grave. La Porte dans ses intentions se montre plus hostile à la Russie qu'à nos deux gouvernements. Dans son manifeste c'est à cette Puissance qu'elle s'attaque particulièrement. Elle déclare rompus les engagements d'Akerman. Il est hors de doute que l'Empereur Nicholas, son Cabinet, son armée, son peuple, auront éprouvé, en apprenant cette circonstance, un sentiment qui doit les disposer à se jeter seuls dans la lice qui vient d'ouvrir l'imprudencence de la Porte. Une telle résolution ferait perdre en un moment le fruit de tous les soins que les trois Cours se sont donnés pour éviter les dangers d'une action isolée, dans une affaire qui intéresse tout le monde, et qui ne peut se terminer convenablement sans un accord complet entre les trois Cabinets. Ce sont ces dangers qu'il faut conjurer de nouveau ; et je crois, Milord, que le seul moyen que nous en ayons, est de suivre sans hésiter la ligne du Traité en adoptant toutes ces mesures propres à frapper d'une crainte salutaire le Divan et la population turque. Ces mesures prises par les trois Cours, et sous leur direction commune, auront une plus grande efficacité, et répondront aux nécessités de la Russie, sans qu'elle ait à se départir des principes nobles et désintéressés qu'elle a, de même que nos deux Cours, pris pour règle de sa conduite.

Je le dis sans détour, Milord, toute autre voie à suivre est à mes yeux pleine d'écueils, toute hésitation me paraît dangereuse, et l'Angleterre, qui a le même intérêt que nous à ce que l'affaire d'Orient se termine promptement et sans complications, acceptera ainsi que nous, j'aime à l'espérer, les conséquences du Traité.

Je vous ai parlé, Milord, avec la confiance et la franchise dont je me fais un devoir envers un des hommes que j'estime le plus au monde, et dont l'opinion doit avoir une si grande influence sur les événements qui se préparent. Je vous demande, au nom des nobles intérêts auxquels nous sommes voués l'un et l'autre, de me faire connaître de même votre pensée entière sur l'opinion que je soumets à votre sagesse et à votre expérience. J'ai une telle conviction de la nécessité de suivre la route que j'indique, que je ne l'abandonnerais qu'avec peine ; mais je ne puis vous dire combien je serais heureux si ma manière de juger la grave question qui nous occupe recevait votre assentiment.

En tout état de cause, croyez, Milord, que je saisis avec un bien grand plaisir l'occasion à vous renouveler l'assurance de la profonde estime et de la très-haute considération avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être, Milord,

Votre très-humble et très-obéissant serviteur,

COMTE DE LA FERRONAYS.

[ 822. ]

*To the Marquess of Londonderry.*

MY DEAR CHARLES,

London, 22nd February, 1828.

I shall be very sorry to see such a document as you describe, for the sake of those who may sign their names to it. As far as I or the government may be concerned, the effect of it will be to rally round us men of all parties and descriptions, excepting those who may have signed such a paper.

It would be ridiculous for any minister to come down with a profession of his principles every night, in answer to every block-head who chooses to find out and state reasons for supporting him. If the Duke of —— and others do not feel confidence in the government on account of what Lord Morley says, and notwithstanding what others have said, let them oppose it; but for God's sake and for their own let them avoid a paper.

The Duke of —— was very near destroying the characters of us all last year.

I don't recommend to anybody to follow his example at present.

Believe me, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 823. ]

*To the Earl of Radnor.*

London, 22nd February, 1828.

The Duke of Wellington presents his compliments to Lord Radnor, and begs leave to acquaint his Lordship, with reference to the toll proposed to be established for repaying any public money that might be advanced for the completion of Folkestone Harbour, that it appears that the harbour, when completed, would only be capable of affording shelter to vessels of small draught, and that the toll so to be levied would affect all vessels of whatever burthen, passing through the channel, upwards or downwards, a very small portion of which could ever derive any benefit from the harbour.

The Duke, therefore, is of opinion that, independent of the difficulty of collecting the proposed toll, it would be extremely unequal and partial in its operation, and, under these circumstances, inexpedient to be adopted.

*To the King.*

[ 824. ]

London, 23rd February, 1828.

I beg leave to submit to your Majesty that the gentleman recommended by the Lord-Lieutenant to be appointed Dean of St. Patrick is the brother of Mr. George Dawson, the member for the county of Londonderry, in Ireland, and Secretary of the Treasury.

I am not acquainted with the gentleman, but he is strongly recommended by the Lord-Lieutenant; and I believe him to entertain those opinions upon the Roman Catholic question which your Majesty prefers.

I beg, however, to submit to your Majesty that the Roman Catholic question being a neutral one in the Cabinet, must be equally so among the friends and supporters of the government, and that the merits, pretensions, and claims of individuals must be considered without reference to opinions upon this political question.

This has long been the practice of your Majesty's government, and I beg leave to remind your Majesty of the recommendation by Lord Liverpool to your Majesty of Bishops Kaye and Coplestone, and of the recent appointment of others to dignities in the Church.

I hope, therefore, that I have not mistaken your Majesty's intentions in the explanations which I have given upon this subject.

Which is humbly submitted for your Majesty's pleasure by your Majesty's most devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

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NOTES ON NOTE FROM PRINCE LIEVEN.

[ 825. ]

24th February, 1828.

1. The *Hatt* is directed to the *ayans* or *notables* assembled at Constantinople. It contains a great deal of truth in very impudent language; and complains of the conduct of the three Powers; and calls upon the Mussulmen to arm.

The *Hatt* is not properly even a proclamation; it is not even a written document. It may fairly be questioned, even if it were, whether the Porte would have been justified in not taking some measures for its defence.

2. The language is *impudent* and *imprudent* ; but it is that of a government smarting under very severe discipline.

3. This is an exaggerated statement of the case. Some have been ordered away ; others have been allowed to stay.

4. The Netherland minister is *not* the protector of the subjects of the combined Powers. The Porte refused to allow of his interference previous to the departure of the ambassadors. We must bear for a season the inconvenient consequences of our own measures.

5. It is not true that any order has been officially given for closing the Bosphorus.

The Porte have delayed to issue the firmans, but the interdict has not been given.

I notice these circumstances just to point out the spirit in which all these papers are written by the Russian agents.

We must perform our engagements ; but we must not be led into measures of which the results cannot be calculated, by exaggerated representations of facts.

WELLINGTON.

826.]

*To his Excellency le Comte de la Ferronnays.*

MONSIEUR LE COMTE,

London, 26th February, 1828.

I have had the honour of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 21st instant,\* by the hands of Monsieur le Chevalier de Roth ; and I am much flattered by your Excellency's favourable opinion. I assure your Excellency that it is likewise highly gratifying to me to renew my communications upon the service of our respective Sovereigns with your Excellency, with whom I have been so long acquainted, and for whom I entertain the highest respect and regard.

You do his Majesty's government justice in believing that they consider themselves bound, and are determined to carry into execution the Treaty of the 6th of July, 1827. Since they have been in office they have been occupied by the review of all that has passed, and they have prepared a project, which they have submitted to the consideration of the Allied ministers.

The adoption of this project will, in their opinion, in a short period attain the objects of the Treaty without war, or those

\* See page 270.

risks of confusion and mischief which would have attended any project not directly applicable to the country the pacification of which was immediately in the view of the Allies when they executed the Treaty of the 6th of July.

In the mean time accounts have been received from Constantinople of a communication by the Porte to the Ayans, or military feudatories of the empire, to which I imagine your Excellency refers as a manifesto; of the sending away from Constantinople certain of the subjects of the three Powers; and of the delay of the Porte to give passports to the Black Sea. As far as I am informed, there had been no refusal when the last accounts came away.

Each of these acts may afford to the Allies ground for grave remonstrance; and, in the event of such remonstrance not being attended to, for considering the propriety of adopting measures of a hostile character. But I am much mistaken in the nature of the power of the government of the Porte, and of its ordinary exercise, if these acts ought to be considered as necessarily leading to war.

I have reason to believe that the communication referred to is not a manifesto or proclamation, but a verbal address, by order of the Grand Signior to the Ayans, of which no authentic copy is communicated. Foreign Powers can have no official knowledge of its existence; and I have seen in London two versions of this communication, both coming from the *corps diplomatique* at Constantinople, and essentially differing from each other.

In the course of the last eight years there have been other communications to the Ayans of the same description, but no notice was taken of them even in the way of complaint.

The call to arms of the followers of Mahomet has its recent precedent, as well as the communication itself; and has probably been resorted to in the present instance in consequence of the apprehensions which the government of the Porte have reason to entertain of the formidable extent of the preparations of the Allies—not for the limited object of the pacification of Greece, but, as that government believed, for the destruction of the Ottoman empire.

The sending away from Constantinople of the subjects of any of the Powers, and the delay to grant firmans for the navigation of the Black Sea, if persevered in, are breaches of treaty; but I would beg leave to submit for your Excellency's consideration

these questions: Was it ever considered possible to carry into execution the Treaty of the 6th July without exciting the animosity of the Porte? Could it be believed that the ambassadors of the Allied Powers could withdraw from the Porte, particularly after the occurrence of such an event as the battle of Navarino, without occasioning some breach on the part of the Porte of those relations of amity which had existed between the three Powers and the Porte for some time?

What has occurred at Constantinople might naturally have been expected, and may be remedied without resorting to the extremity of war, when the pacification of Greece shall have been effected.

But this is not the only view which I take of this case. I consider it to be the interest of the three Powers engaged in this Alliance to take care to leave the Porte in a state of independence after these transactions shall have been concluded. The Count Nesselrode has positively declared himself to this effect in his despatch to Prince Lieven, which has given rise to our recent discussions; and in the opinion which I have just expressed, I believe that I do not form an erroneous judgment of the interests of the King, your Excellency's master, or of those of my own Sovereign.

I confess that it is this view of this affair which has induced me to prefer the project for the attainment of the objects of the Treaty of the 6th of July, proposed by this Cabinet, to that suggested by the *chargé-d'affaires* of France, or that by Prince Lieven.

The project proposed by the Chevalier de Roth, viz., to occupy the Principalities on the Danube by the Russian army, while the combined fleet should blockade the Dardanelles, would be ineffectual with a view to prevail upon the Porte to give its consent to the measures proposed for the pacification of Greece. The influence and power of the Porte over the Principalities are now so much reduced as to render the military occupation of these provinces by a Russian army nearly a matter of indifference, and experience has proved that the blockade of the Dardanelles, although equally with the military occupation of the Principalities a measure of positive war, would be inefficient, as the subsistence of Constantinople does not in ordinary seasons depend upon the communication with the shores of the Mediterranean. Both measures therefore, in

themselves measures of positive war, would have led in the end to the adoption of those proposed by the Russian Cabinet; and these would have tended directly to the total subversion of the Ottoman government in Europe. Those measures were neither more nor less than the invasion of the Turkish provinces in Europe by a formidable Russian army, while a fleet from the Mediterranean should force the defences of the Dardanelles, and another from the Black Sea those of the Bosphorus, and the two should join under the walls of the Seraglio, and, with the aid of the army, dictate the terms of peace.

The invasion of the Turkish dominions in Europe and the occupation of Constantinople must not be viewed in the same light as other invasions and occupations which we have witnessed in our days.

In all these invasions and occupations the invaders were the enemies of the invaded, and every inhabitant of the invaded country considered each day's delay of the departure of the invaders as an injury to himself. The restoration of the power of the invaded government, and of order and regularity in the country, was not difficult after the departure of the invading troops. In many of these cases, however, an occupation of the country by a body of the invading troops for a certain period of time has been necessary for the restoration, support, and consolidation of the power of the invaded government.

But in the case of the invasion of the Turkish dominions, we may be assured that no declaration, no power of remonstrance, of influence, nor of action on the part of the Allies will prevent a general insurrection of all the different people subjected to the Turkish government in Europe, as soon as it is known that it is the fixed design of the three governments of France, England and Russia to make war upon the Grand Signior. No man in his senses will doubt the result of that war. Every man will raise his hand against his neighbour, and all nations will arm for the purpose of protecting each its own interests in the expected wreck of the Ottoman empire in Europe.

Such wreck must be the consequence of the invasion suggested in the Russian project. No power that the Allies could exert could settle the government of the Turkish dominions in Europe again in the hands of the Grand Signior. All the consequences of this invasion ought to be well weighed and considered by the Allies before they embark in so portentous an undertaking.



In this manner a course of measures commenced with the view of pacifying Greece, and of preventing the warfare which has existed there for seven years from spreading to the rest of Europe, would expose all to the risks, nay to the certainty, of a war of indefinite duration and of the most sanguinary character.

I have entered into some detail in the course of my reflections on the subject of these projects, because they all apply to the existing state of affairs at Constantinople.

I am convinced your Excellency feels as strongly as I have already expressed it, that we are all interested in the continued existence, in a state of independence, of the power of the Porte in Europe. We are not prepared for its destruction. In considering these affairs we ought to take no precipitate step. We ought to direct our efforts steadily to attain our original object, the pacification of Greece, without injury, or at least as little injury as possible, to the power of the Porte, according to the plan upon which the Allies have acted.

It will not have a good appearance to the world for the Allies to allow themselves to be diverted from the steady prosecution of this plan by the language of the Grand Signior to his Ayans, or by conduct which it is not immediately necessary seriously to notice. Even if the want of wisdom and moderation in the councils of the Divan should, notwithstanding all our precautions and efforts to maintain peace for the Allies, force war upon us, the previous attainment of the objects of the Allies in Greece will enable them in some degree to control its consequences. If ultimately compelled to resort to war, the Allies will be enabled to consider and adopt the means of rendering its consequences as little subversive as possible of the general interests of Europe.

I have the honour, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[ 827. ] DRAFT OF MEMORANDUM FROM THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON  
TO THE CABINET.

26th February, 1828.

The perusal of these papers and of the accounts from Corfu points out how necessary it is that we should immediately turn our minds to the operations to be carried on with a view to attain our objects in Greece.

1. The three squadrons ought to be ordered to proceed immediately into the Archipelago, and to take up their stations for the purpose of the blockade of the Morea from one side of the Isthmus of Corinth round to the other.

2. A detachment from the fleet should be sent to Alexandria to cruise off that port, informing Mahomet Ali that it is there stationed for the purpose of preventing the communication with the army of Ibrahim at all by Egyptian or Turkish ships as long as this army will be in the Morea.

A Greek ship might attend this detachment for the purpose of preventing the sending provisions in neutral ships.

3. The Greek government should be called upon to name their ships and vessels of war; and to give to the commander of each a commission of the kind proposed by Admiral Rigny.

4. These to be employed in aid of the blockade by the combined fleet, to prevent the supply of provisions to the Morea by neutral ships.

5. As many of the combined fleet as can be spared from the effective blockade of the Morea and Alexandria to be employed, first in the active pursuit and destruction of Greek pirates; and secondly, in enforcing the observation of the neutrality by the Greeks on all points, excepting the Morea and the islands thereunto adjacent.

6. The warfare in Scio and Candia ought to be put an end to.

7. I beg the Cabinet to peruse with attention the despatches written in December and January by Mr. Consul Meyer, from Prevesa. They will therein see the consequences of General Church's operations in Western Greece, and of Colonel Fabvier's in Eastern Greece, even upon the Greeks themselves.

8. The Greek government should be called upon to withdraw both expeditions, and to confine its attention to the prevention first of the communication with Egyptian and Turkish troops in the Morea by the Isthmus of Corinth; and secondly, of the communication for the introduction of provisions and stores into such of the ports as are still occupied by the Egyptian and Turkish troops in the Morea.

WELLINGTON.

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COPIE d'une DÉPÊCHE de M. le Comte de NESSELRODE à M. le Prince de LIEVEN.

MON PRINCE,

St. Pétersbourg, le 14 (26) Février, 1828.

Un incident grave, qui change la situation particulière de la Russie à l'égard de l'empire ottoman, nous met dans le cas d'expédier aujourd'hui à votre Altesse un courrier extraordinaire, d'ordre exprès de sa Majesté l'Empereur.

Dans nos dernières dépêches nous avons appelé votre attention, mon Prince, sur les indices des dispositions fâcheuses que la Porte montrait relativement à l'observation de ses traités avec la Russie, depuis le jour où elle avait, par ses refus et son langage, obligé les représentants des trois Puissances signataires de la transaction du 6<sup>me</sup> Juillet à quitter Constantinople.

Les articles 31 et 35 de notre Traité de Commerce avec la Turquie, articles renouvelés par le Traité d'Akerman, stipulent que tous les navires marchands sous pavillon russe pourront librement traverser le Bosphore, se rendre de la Mer Noire dans la Méditerranée, et réciproquement. Nous prévenions votre Altesse, le 25<sup>me</sup> Décembre, et l'extrait d'un rapport de M. de Ribeaupierre attestait l'exactitude de notre assertion, que ce privilège si essentiel avait été de nouveau suspendu sans motif, que tous les bâtiments sous pavillon russe, venant de la Mer Noire, ou s'y rendant, étaient arrêtés dans le Canal de Constantinople, et qu'ils ne pouvaient continuer leur voyage. Les mêmes articles de ce Traité et de celui d'Akerman déclarent que dans aucun cas la Porte n'exercera le droit de préemption, et par conséquent, n'obligera les capitaines ou patrons des navires que le pavillon russe protège à vendre à Constantinople les cargaisons dont leurs bâtiments se trouvent chargés. Vous aurez vu, mon Prince, que malgré cette stipulation si positive et si claire, toutes les cargaisons leur étaient enlevées; que la Porte en fixait arbitrairement les prix, ne les payait pas, ou promettait de les acquitter plus tard avec une monnaie dont elle se réservait, en attendant, de détériorer le titre. Finalement, notre Traité de Commerce avec la Turquie établit, art. 1 et suivants, que nos sujets feront le négoce dans toute l'étendue de l'empire ottoman, sans subir aucune des formalités qui pourraient les soumettre à la juridiction exclusive du gouvernement turc; et mes dépêches auront convaincu votre Altesse que la Porte les forçait à s'inscrire sur des registres dont nos traités n'avaient jamais admis l'existence; que déjà elle méditait leur expulsion; que déjà elle cessait de respecter leurs propriétés et leurs droits. Les trois principes de nos transactions avec la Turquie, dont nous venons de faire mention, sont tous de la plus haute importance. Sans le premier, celui qui ouvre à notre marine marchande la navigation du Bosphore, il n'y aurait pour nos provinces méridionales ni commerce, ni communication maritime avec le reste du monde. Sans le second, celui qui interdit à la Porte l'acquisition violente des cargaisons qui remplissent les navires sur lesquels flotte le pavillon de Russie, le commerce permis de droit serait impossible de fait; aucune transaction ne pourrait se faire avec sécurité entre nos négociants et les négociants étrangers; aucun capitaine de nos vaisseaux ne pourrait avoir la certitude de conduire à leur destination les chargements qui lui auraient été confiés. Sans le troisième, enfin, qui consacre les prérogatives accordées aux sujets de l'Empereur, ces derniers seraient contraints de descendre à la condition de sujets de la Porte quand leurs affaires commerciales les appelleraient dans le Levant; et certes,

il est inutile d'assurer que jamais la Russie n'admettra pour eux une telle obligation. Nous n'avons pas besoin d'ajouter non plus que les droits dont nous parlons ont été acquis au prix du sang Russe ; qu'ils sont fondés sur d'honorables Traités, et qu'en souffrir la violation, ce serait oublier tout ensemble notre gloire et nos plus chers intérêts. L'inspection de la carte suffit d'ailleurs pour prouver que sous ce rapport notre position ne peut se comparer à la position d'aucune autre Puissance ; qu'il n'en est aucune pour qui le Bosphore soit l'unique débouché d'une portion de ses domaines ; aucune qui voie, quand ce passage se ferme devant sa marine, se fermer aussi pour des provinces entières de son empire toutes les sources de leur prospérité. Du jour où la Porte, méconnaissant notre longue modération, et manquant à ses récentes promesses d'Akerman, a osé interrompre la navigation de la Mer Noire, attenter aux privilèges de notre commerce, saisir les propriétés de ceux qui s'y livrent ; en d'autres termes enfreindre d'une part les traités solennels, et de l'autre causer à nos possessions méridionales des pertes incalculables, l'Empereur était pleinement autorisé à réprimer de tels actes, et à en prévenir la continuation et le renouvellement, par l'emploi de la force que la Providence a placée entre ses mains. Il le devait à son honneur. Il le devait au bien de ses états. Cependant, nos dépêches du 25<sup>me</sup> Décembre auront démontré que toujours ami de la paix, toujours prêt à épuiser les sacrifices qu'un gouvernement peut faire aux désirs de ses Alliées, notre auguste maître avait suspendu les mesures que des considérations du premier ordre l'engageaient à adopter sans autre délai, dans l'espoir que pour être retardées, elles deviendraient européennes, et que peut-être aussi la Porte, sentant enfin le danger qui la menace, se hâterait encore de réparer, autant qu'il serait en elle, les désastreux effets de cette aveugle politique, qui semble prendre à tâche de nous fournir, tous les jours, de nouveaux et trop légitimes griefs. Malheureusement, mon Prince, l'évènement est loin d'avoir justifié notre attente, et la Porte a, pour ainsi dire, franchi de plein saut les bornes que l'Empereur pouvait mettre à sa longanimité. Non-seulement aujourd'hui, comme à l'époque où nous vous adressions nos dernières dépêches, notre pavillon est dépouillé à Constantinople de ses anciennes prérogatives ; non-seulement les Turcs s'emparent de force, et à vil prix, des cargaisons qu'il couvrait autrefois ; non-seulement Odessa et nos autres villes maritimes du midi nous annoncent et nous prouvent leur ruine ; non-seulement nos sujets ne jouissent dans l'empire ottoman d'aucune des stipulations de nos traités, et y cherchent en vain une protection étrangère ; mais comme si tant de motifs de plainte, et tant de malheurs n'eussent pas suffi, en se prolongeant, pour imposer à l'Empereur l'obligation de les faire cesser, la Porte en a encore aggravé le poids. Nous voyons maintenant la navigation de la Mer Noire interdite aux vaisseaux de presque toutes les nations qui fréquentent nos ports, et par conséquent notre commerce anéanti. Nous apprenons que tous les sujets russes sont expulsés des domaines turcs, et réduits à accepter le sort des Rayas ou à fuir dans un espace de quinze jours ces contrées inhospitalières. Bien plus ; nous venons de recevoir presque à la fois la nouvelle que la Porte engage la Cour de Perse à ne pas conclure la paix avec nous, lui promettant sous peu une assistance efficace, et un manifeste du Grand Seigneur, publié à Constantinople et dans toutes les villes de ses états, qui déchire le Traité d'Akerman, annonce que la Porte n'a jamais eu l'intention de l'exécuter, représente la Russie

comme l'ennemie jurée du nom Mussulman, et appelle aux armes contre nous tous les peuples qui professent le culte de Mahomet. C'est avec le plus vif regret que nous sommes forcés de vous transmettre ci-joint, mon Prince, l'extrait d'une dépêche où le Général Paskewitch rend compte de la communication qu'Abbas Mirza lui a faite de la démarche ottomane qui invitait les Persans à prolonger la guerre, et le manifeste par lequel les Turcs nous la déclarent eux-mêmes. De semblables provocations ajoutées aux mesures dont nous avons ci-dessus retracé le tableau, ne nous laissent plus d'alternative sur le parti que nous devons prendre. Puisque la Porte s'obstine à fermer à notre commerce les seules voies qu'il puisse suivre, il faut bien que la Russie l'oblige à les rouvrir. Puisque les sujets russes qui se trouvent en Turquie sont attaqués dans leurs propriétés et dans leurs privilèges, il faut bien que la Russie prenne leur défense. Puisque la Porte annule le Traité d'Akerman, en faisant connaître qu'il n'est jamais entré dans des desseins de le remplir ; puisqu'elle annule par là même tous ceux qu'il a renouvelés, c'est-à-dire, tous ceux qui depuis 50 ans ont existé entre les états de sa Majesté et le Divan de Constantinople ; il faut bien que la Russie les rétablisse ou qu'elle en obtienne de nouveaux. Puisque la Porte attise le feu de la guerre sur toutes nos frontières orientales, il faut bien que la Russie lui fasse sentir les conséquences de cette politique. Puisque, finalement, elle nous déclare la guerre à nous-mêmes, en armant contre nous la totalité des Musulmans, il faut bien que la Russie accepte la lutte, et se hâte même de l'accepter, afin d'en accélérer le terme, de n'être pas forcée à la rendre trop décisive, et de pouvoir diminuer les difficultés de la paix qu'il s'agira de conclure. Nous ne connaissons pas d'état qui puisse permettre que son commerce soit ainsi arrêté, ses sujets maltraités, son honneur insulté, ses traités foulés aux pieds. Nous ne connaissons pas d'état qui puisse laisser des actes pareils impunis, et ne point chercher, dans des mesures de répression, la garantie d'un avenir moins contraire à ses intérêts. Les droits de la Russie à cet égard sont incontestables, indépendants de toute transaction avec des Puissances tierces, et ils ne sauraient provoquer leur opposition, de même qu'ils ne demandent pas leur concours. "Nulle part on ne pourra soutenir que le manifeste du Grand Seigneur soit dirigé contre tous les états chrétiens, aussi bien que contre la Russie." C'est en effet "la Russie qui (d'après la proclamation ottomane) est principalement l'ennemie jurée du peuple musulman et de l'empire de Mahomet." C'est donc contre la Russie que doivent s'armer tous les sectateurs de l'Islamisme. "C'est la Russie" (toujours aux termes de la même proclamation) "qui a excité la révolution de la Grèce," accusation sans preuves, et qu'il serait même indigne du Cabinet russe de relever. C'est enfin "la Russie qui, par ses artifices, est parvenue à rétablir un accord avec l'Angleterre et la France dans la Question Grecque." Quelles que soient, au reste, les intentions qu'on nous suppose à nous ou à nos Alliés, la Porte s'est chargée de les justifier par son manifeste. Elle y publie que dans les négociations récentes de Constantinople elle n'a pour but que "de gagner le printemps," pour se mesurer ensuite avec les Puissances qui les avaient entamées ; qu'en signant la Convention d'Akerman son seul objet a été d'attendre une occasion pour la rompre, et que même dans l'état actuel des choses jamais elle n'a entendu exécuter les clauses de cet acte relatives aux Serviens, et aux indemnités des sujets de sa Majesté Impériale. En nous faisant connaître, avec tant de

précision, ses véritables desseins, en publiant qu'elle ne regarde pas la Convention d'Akerman comme obligatoire, la Porte nous replace, malgré nous, dans la position où nous nous serions trouvés si cette même convention n'avait pas été conclue. Ainsi, mon Prince, l'Empereur prendra envers la Turquie les mesures qu'il eût prises dans le cas où les conférences d'Akerman se seraient terminées par le rejet de ses demandes. Nos troupes vont entrer dans les Principautés de Moldavie et de Valachie, comme elles y seraient entrées alors, dans les mêmes vues et avec les mêmes droits, fortifiés encore de toute la perfidie dont la Porte donne un si triste témoignage. Elles seront précédées d'une déclaration énonciative de nos griefs, et qui fondera les déterminations de sa Majesté Impériale sur les faits exposés dans la présente dépêche. La Porte nous accuse d'être les ennemis de la religion musulmane, la Russie déclarera qu'elle n'en veut nullement à la foi que les Mahométans professent, et qu'une guerre religieuse est bien loin d'entrer dans ses projets. La Porte prétend que nous ne travaillons qu'à la chute de l'empire ottoman. La Russie déclarera et prouvera, comme nous l'avons souvent répété, qu'au contraire, elle en souhaite la conservation; car dès que l'empire ottoman respectera nos traités, dès qu'il aura accédé aux arrangements de paix que son propre bien réclame, nous ne saurions avoir de voisin qui nous convienne mieux dans cette portion de l'Europe. Il y a plus : la Russie est assez puissante pour n'avoir pas besoin d'étendre outre mesure ses possessions territoriales. Elle agira donc sans désir de conquêtes. La Russie attache trop d'importance au maintien de la paix générale pour la troubler par des pensées ambitieuses. Elle ne renoncera donc en aucune manière à cette utile modération qui caractérise sa politique. Mais d'autre part, attaquée aujourd'hui dans des intérêts essentiels, elle ne posera point les armes avant d'avoir obtenu pour ces mêmes intérêts toutes les garanties qu'ils exigent; pour son commerce, toute la liberté et la sécurité qui lui est nécessaire; pour les peuples chrétiens qu'elle protège, toutes les prérogatives dont la jouissance leur a été promise; pour elle-même, toutes les indemnités auxquelles les pertes de ses sujets et les frais de guerre qu'elle va subir lui assureront des titres irrécusables.

Nous n'avons point parlé jusqu'à présent du Traité de Londres, parce que les décisions de l'Empereur, dont nous informons votre Altesse, ne découlent pas de la teneur de cet acte, et que sa Majesté les aurait adoptées, quand même le Traité de Londres n'existerait pas. Cependant, la position où nous allons nous trouver sous ce rapport n'offre rien qui n'ait été prévu. A la signature du Protocole du 4<sup>me</sup> Avril les parties contractantes prévoyaient, en effet, le cas d'une guerre entre la Russie et la Porte, et il était resté entendu entre elles qu'alors la Russie ferait servir les mesures qu'elle prendrait à la réalisation des arrangements dont le Protocole arrêterait les bases. Les communications du ministère anglais, en date du mois d'Août, 1826, prévoyaient aussi le cas où les négociations d'Akerman ne se termineraient pas à l'amiable, et nous invitaient également à donner pour objet à nos opérations militaires la pacification de la Grèce, d'après les clauses dont nous étions convenus. Il ne tient aujourd'hui qu'à nos Alliés d'établir encore une fois le même principe. Dans tout ce qui concerne le redressement de nos griefs particuliers et distincts à la charge de la Porte, tels que nous les avons développés ici, l'Empereur ne saurait changer ni ralentir la marche qu'il s'est tracée; mais dans tout ce qui a rapport à l'exécution du Traité du

6<sup>me</sup> Juillet, il renouvelle aux Cours de Londres et de Paris les propositions que renfermaient nos dépêches du 25<sup>me</sup> Décembre. Si elles sont agréées, sa Majesté réitérera solennellement toutes les déclarations qui les accompagnent, sera prête à envoyer au gouvernement turc l'ultimatum dont nous avons indiqué les termes, quant à la pacification de la Grèce, empressée de le soutenir à l'aide des mouvements de ses troupes, heureuse de le voir accepté, et d'ouvrir des négociations qui puissent assurer aux Grecs la paix dont le Traité du 6<sup>me</sup> Juillet leur offre l'espoir, et à la Russie la satisfaction que les actes hostiles des Turcs, leurs provocations directes, et leur manifeste de guerre, la forcent aujourd'hui de demander les armes à la main.

Notre loyauté nous impose le devoir d'ajouter que la Russie n'arrêtera pas ses opérations militaires sans avoir reçu cette satisfaction dans sa plénitude, et contraint en même temps la Porte à exécuter le Traité de Londres. Quoique les déterminations actuelles de l'Empereur ne soient pas motivées par les affaires de la Grèce, comme il est évident qu'une paix solide entre la Russie et l'empire ottoman ne pourra se rétablir tant que cette question subsistera, sa Majesté est décidée à la résoudre, en ajustant ses différends spéciaux avec le Grand Seigneur. Sur ce point le Traité de Londres sera notre seul guide, et plus nos Alliés imprimeront de vigueur et de franchise à la co-opération que nous attendons de leur amitié et de leur bonne foi, plus ils seront sûrs, que nous ne profiterons pas de notre situation particulière pour prolonger la lutte ou dévier d'un système de désintéressement fondé sur notre union avec eux, et sur l'assistance qu'elle doit nous offrir. Enoncer nos propositions du 25<sup>me</sup> Décembre, c'était donner la meilleure preuve des intentions de l'Empereur à cet égard ; les accepter, ce sera en avoir la meilleure garantie.

En résumé, mon Prince :

1°. Des circonstances indépendantes du Traité de Londres, la clôture prolongée, et tous les jours plus rigoureuse, du Bosphore, la ruine dont notre commerce de la Mer Noire et nos provinces méridionales sont menacés, la violation ouverte de toutes les stipulations des traités qui les protègent, les mesures arbitraires prises contre nos sujets, et leur expulsion soudaine de l'empire ottoman, les encouragements accordés à la résistance de la Cour de Perse, la déclaration positive que la Porte ne regarde pas comme obligatoire la Convention d'Akerman, et qu'elle n'a pas le dessein de l'exécuter, en d'autres termes qu'elle rompt ce Traité, et par conséquent tous ceux qu'il a renouvelés ; enfin, l'ordre donné à tous les Musulmans de prendre les armes contre la Russie, obligent l'Empereur de répondre à la guerre par la guerre, et ses armées franchiront incessamment le Pruth.

2°. Une déclaration publique précédera cette grande mesure, et en développera les motifs. Toutes les Puissances européennes y retrouveront la modération accoutumée de sa Majesté Impériale. La Russie ne se proposera ni des conquêtes ni la chute de l'empire ottoman. Elle ne cherchera que les moyens de pourvoir à la sûreté et à la liberté de son commerce, au renouvellement des traités que la Porte ne respecte plus, aux besoins des peuples chrétiens que ces mêmes traités placent sous la protection de sa Majesté Impériale, et aux indemnités que les pertes de ses sujets et les frais d'une guerre qu'elle évitait de tout son pouvoir, lui imposeront l'obligation d'exiger. En abrégeant la lutte les Turcs en atténueront les effets ; en la prolongeant ils les aggraveront.

3°. Dans cet état de choses la Russie propose à ses Alliés, ce qu'ils lui ont proposé eux-mêmes au mois d'Août, 1826, savoir, de faire servir à l'exécution du Protocole du 4<sup>me</sup> Avril et du Traité du 6<sup>me</sup> Juillet, les mesures que d'autres raisons l'obligent d'adopter envers l'empire ottoman.

4°. Si les Alliés de la Russie y consentent, sa déclaration ci-dessus mentionnée, ou une déclaration supplémentaire, fera connaître cette intention commune.

5°. Dans cette hypothèse la Russie ne changera rien aux propositions consignées dans nos dépêches du 25<sup>me</sup> Décembre, ni aux promesses qui s'y trouvent jointes. Il sera procédé, d'après la même mode, à la réorganisation de la Grèce, les *mêmes ordres* seront donnés aux Amiraux respectifs, le même ultimatum sera envoyé à la Porte, afin qu'elle puisse encore accéder, le plutôt possible, et aux conditions que demande l'œuvre de paix commencée par le Traité du 6<sup>me</sup> Juillet, et aux stipulations qui redresseront les trop justes griefs directs qu'elle a fournis à la Russie. Le mouvement de nos troupes, que l'envoi de cet ultimatum n'arrêtera point, hâtera, il semble permis de l'espérer, un résultat conforme à nos vœux.

6°. Dans tous les cas la Russie, une fois contrainte d'avoir recours à la force des armes, croit son honneur et sa bonne foi engagés à amener l'exécution du Traité de Londres. Elle y travaillera franchement, et saura parvenir à ce noble but.

7°. La Russie laisse la plus grande latitude à ses Alliés. S'ils veulent adopter, sans réserve, le plan développé dans nos dépêches du 25<sup>me</sup> Décembre, les mesures que l'Empereur va prendre seront motivés tout ensemble sur le Traité du 6<sup>me</sup> Juillet, et sur le manifeste, ainsi que sur les actes hostiles de la Porte à notre égard. S'ils le préfèrent, la Russie, autorisée par ces actes et ce manifeste, sera censée prendre seule les mesures en question, et ses Alliés s'y associeront, en les approuvant et en suivant du reste la marche indiquée dans nos dépêches du 25<sup>me</sup> Décembre, pour l'envoi d'un ultimatum au gouvernement turc, les secours à accorder aux Grecs, la délivrance du Péloponnèse, les opérations des flottes combinées, &c., &c. Si enfin ses Alliés n'adoptent ni l'un ni l'autre de ces deux partis, la Russie n'exécutera pas moins le Traité de Londres, à l'aide des moyens coercitifs que la Porte la force d'employer; mais, abandonnée à elle-même, et ne recevant désormais aucun appui, elle ne pourra consulter, dans la mode d'exécution de cet acte, que ses intérêts et ses convenances.

Votre Altesse voudra bien donner lecture et copie de la présente dépêche au Comte Dudley, la consigner au Protocole des Conférences de Londres, et nous faire part, dans le plus bref délai possible, des réponses qu'elle provoquera.

Recevez, &c.,

NESSÉLRODE.

[ENCLOSURE.]

EXTRAIT DU RAPPORT DU GÉNÉRAL PASKEWITCH, Commandant le Corps des Troupes contre la Perse, en date du 24 Décembre, 1827.

Abbas Mirza vient de me donner l'avis que le Pasha de Vau lui a fait connaître que la guerre entre la Turquie et la Russie était de nouveau déclarée, en offrant en conséquence des troupes à ce Prince. Il vient de poster mille hommes sur la frontière de la Perse, vis-à-vis Salmas.



Abbas Mirza prétend lui avoir répondu qu'il n'en était plus temps, ayant déjà signé les conditions préliminaires de la paix.

Cette dernière circonstance m'a été confirmée par Mr. Macdonald, ministre d'Angleterre, qui m'a dit en même temps qu'il y avait plus de deux mois qu'il n'avait reçu de courriers de Constantinople, ce qui lui faisait croire qu'on les interceptait en Turquie.

COPIE d'une DÉPÊCHE du Comte de NESSELRODE au Prince de LIEVEN, en date de St. Pétersbourg, le 14 (26) Février, 1828.

MON PRINCE,

Il nous est infiniment pénible de devoir ajouter à notre dépêche principale de ce jour, que les nouvelles qui nous arrivent de Perse, en diminuant l'espoir où nous étions d'apprendre la signature de la paix avec la Cour de Téhéran, nous donnent tous les détails des préparatifs hostiles que font contre nous les pashas turcs du voisinage depuis la publication du manifeste de la Porte Ottomane. Informés des retards que le Schah met à l'accomplissement de ses promesses, de la manière même dont il les élude, et de l'obligation malheureusement probable qu'il nous imposera de poursuivre nos opérations militaires, leur activité redouble et leur satisfaction éclate de toutes parts. Nous ne possédons pas encore la preuve positive que ces intentions si évidentes de la Porte aient influé sur celle du Souverain de la Perse, mais nous avons lieu de la craindre. Dans toutes les hypothèses la réaction n'en peut avoir été favorable à nos vues pacifiques, et nous appréhendons que bientôt la responsabilité de deux guerres excitées à la fois contre la Russie ne pèse sur le Divan de Constantinople.

Recevez, &c.,

NESSELRODE.

*Viscount Strangford to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

Wednesday, 28th February, 1828.

May I beg your Grace to cast your eye over the enclosed, and to forgive my impertinence in troubling you with my crude notions on such important matters.

Ever your Grace's most faithful servant,

STRANGFORD.

[ENCLOSURE.]

It might be advisable to relieve the Porte from those apprehensions which secretly prevent her from acceding to the Treaty, and to substitute others which would I think induce her to agree to it.

Looking at Turkish feelings and suspicions, and accustomed to find in them the springs of Turkish policy, I am quite sure that the main causes of the rejection of the Treaty were, the belief that it was meant hereafter to go beyond its avowed stipulations, and the want of a security that further encroachments are not intended.

The *true* fears of the Turks point to *Asia*, their "own soil—and that of the Prophet and the Faith"—as they emphatically term it.

Those fears have been powerfully excited by the progress of the Russians on the side of Persia, &c. Let us try to operate upon them by bringing *Asia* into the question. Let the Porte be *assured* that if she agrees to the Treaty, as it now stands, the Allies will be satisfied, and that they will guarantee her Asiatic dominions from any aggression on the part of European Powers,\* and from any attempt by them to interfere with the political condition of her Greek subjects in Asia Minor.

Let her be told that if she does not agree to the Treaty, or only agrees to it *after war*, the Allies will *not* be satisfied; and that the valuable guarantee offered to her would not only be withheld, but that the Allies would probably insist that the *Asiatic* Greeks should be comprehended in the arrangement which is now confined to those of Europe.

I think I know enough of Turkey to be quite entitled to suppose that these propositions put (as propositions *ought* to be put to Turks) with temper, as well as with firmness, would go a great way towards the settlement of the present difficulty, and prove not only a more effectual but a safer course than either a blockade of the Dardanelles, which, *quoad* Turkey, would be a farce—or a Russian military operation, which, *quoad* Europe, would be a folly—since it must be paid for, sooner or later, out of *Turkish territory*.

\* I say, "on the part of *European Powers*," because a guarantee against Persia would be absurd and impracticable.

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*To the Earl of Dudley.*

[ 828. ]

MY DEAR LORD DUDLEY,

London, 29th February, 1828.

I think it advisable that your proposition to the Conference should, in addition to what I proposed in my Memorandum\* sent in circulation on Wednesday with the letters received from the Admiralty, contain orders to the Admirals to intercept the communication between Mehemet Ali and Ibrahim Pacha; but that any letter from the former to the latter, directing or authorising the evacuation of the Morea, should be forwarded to Ibrahim Pacha; that any offer or proposal by Ibrahim Pacha to withdraw his troops from the Morea should be accepted by the Admiral; and that every facility should be given by the combined fleet to enable him to effect this purpose.

It is possible that he may make conditions for leaving garrisons behind him in certain of the fortresses in the Morea. The question whether or not he should be allowed to do so might be left to the decision of the Admiral, if he had any sense. That question would be decided by the knowledge of the degree to which the blockade would have proved effectual in reducing Ibrahim Pacha to difficulties.

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\* See page 278.

But this case requires judgment. I am certain that it is best for the cause to get Ibrahim Pacha himself out of the Morea with two-thirds of his force; leaving the remainder in the forts to be blockaded or besieged by the Greeks. These forts must soon fall.

Ever yours, &c.,  
WELLINGTON.

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*The Earl of Dudley to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Saturday Night, 1st March, 1828.

Some of these papers are worth attention. It appears to me that Lord Ponsonby, or whoever is at Buenos Ayres, should be instructed to keep up an official intercourse with the government *de facto*, so long as he is satisfied that any such government exists.

I do not see that we are possessed as yet of sufficient "data" to pronounce positively that the blockade of the Plate is not a valid one. The Brazilian ministers, however, should be made to understand that we suspect it, and that we shall cease to regard it the moment we have evidence of its insufficiency. When you have looked over the papers, please to send them to Backhouse.

Yours most sincerely,  
DUDLEY.

[ 829. ]

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*To the Earl of Dudley.*

MY DEAR LORD DUDLEY, 2nd March, 1828.

I do not know what passed when first this blockade was established.

If it was originally deemed irregularly established and enforced without due notice, and that fact was complained of at the time, I would now tell the Emperor of Brazil that he must comply with the reasonable request of the merchants; and that if he will not consent, Admiral Otway will have orders to give them protection in carrying their property from Buenos Ayres.

The object of our force in those seas is to give protection to our merchants against the irregular proceedings of these new governments. And, in my opinion, we ought to give notice of a determination to resent every infraction of the laws of nations; and the Admiral should receive orders accordingly. If we do not adopt these measures, we are not on a par with other nations.

I see that the French minister is waiting, to commence his negotiations for compensation for captures made upon merchants of his nation, till the French squadron shall have arrived.

Ever yours, &c.  
WELLINGTON.

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*To the Earl of Dudley.*

[ 830.]

MY DEAR LORD DUDLEY,

London, 3rd March, 1828.

If you will look at Enclosure No. 2 in this despatch, you will see that Admiral Sir Edward Codrington has mistaken his instructions.

He says he feels himself "authorised" in "preventing any blockade from being violated by any vessels which shall be established by the Greeks."

The laws of nations do not allow us to interfere by force to oblige others to obey them.

We may by influence induce the Austrians not to violate the Greek blockades. But I should think we cannot by force.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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MEMORANDA RESPECTING MEASURES NECESSARY TO BE [ 831.]  
ADOPTED UPON THE WITHDRAWAL OF SMALL NOTES  
FROM CIRCULATION.

29th February, 1828.

It is to be feared that, as the time approaches for the total cessation of the circulation of small notes in England, a severe pressure will be felt by the public in general, and by country bankers in particular, by whom those notes have been issued. This pressure will induce country bankers, for their own security, to withhold that accommodation to manufacturers, tradesmen, and agriculturists, which they even now afford, although the restrictions which they have already imposed upon their circulation is probably one of the causes of the fall of prices and of wages which has already taken place.

After July, 1829, no country banker in England can put into circulation any small notes, and he must provide before that time for paying off all those notes which he has now in circulation. This must

VOL. IV.

4th March, 1828.

My opinion is that the mischief of our monetary system does not consist in the law of 1826, which has finally prevented the circulation of bank notes of a value less than five pounds, but in the difficulty of carrying that system into execution. The system is that gold is the only representative of value; silver counters are used only for the purpose of facilitating the circulation of gold coin, and these counters are considered a legal tender of payment only to the amount of forty shillings.

Bank notes, whether of the Bank of England or country Banks, circulate only upon credit; and it must be the duty

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be done by realising those securities, upon the credit of which he issued these notes, and it follows that he cannot make advances upon any similar securities to an equal amount, and the manufacturer, tradesman, or farmer, who have hitherto depended upon this resource for the payment of their workmen, or rent, will be exposed to much inconvenience, and must raise money upon a different description of security, and from a different description of lender. In whatever way money is raised to replace the small notes now in circulation, it must have a tendency to cause a depression of price in the public securities, and a consequent increase in the rate of interest, as well as a reduction generally in the amount of circulation, which can only be gradually replaced by the importation of the precious metals; and those cannot be obtained unless the value of our exports in the shape of merchandise shall exceed those of our imports in the same shape.

The small notes now in circulation are mere credit, for granting which the country banker receives 5l. per cent.; but when, instead of advancing his own notes to manufacturers, tradesmen, or farmers, he is required to advance gold, it cannot be worth his while to make such advances, if he is to employ his own real and accumulated capital, for he can in general make as much of that capital by a permanent investment in securities not liable to those risks which always must attend discount, &c.

If a country banker, therefore, has not large sums of money deposited with him at a low rate of interest, or if he cannot issue his own notes to a great extent, it cannot be worth his while to continue his business, and he must reduce his accommodation to manufacturers and others within the limits which these two sources may supply.

of the Bank of England, as well as of the country Banks, not to extend the circulation of their bank notes, or, in other words, not to increase the issue of them beyond the necessarily limited sum which their credit will bear.

These are the simple elements of our monetary system.

Gold being our only representative of value, it is very difficult and very expensive to retain in the country a quantity sufficient for the transactions in which coin is necessarily required. The Bank of England have, very reasonably, no confidence in the theories which pretend to define with certainty the modes by which the quantity of gold required for circulation can be kept in the country, or, if required, can be brought in. They feel that a sudden demand for a great foreign expenditure, whether on account of commerce or political circumstances, or any war by any foreign Power, would occasion such a demand for the precious metals abroad and the adoption of such extraordinary measures to obtain the necessary supply of those metals, as to derange all the theoretical calculations of the effect of the means to be adopted to retain gold in circulation in the country, or to bring the necessary supply of that metal into the country when required.

It is now in vain to consider this subject with any view of retarding the operation of the law which has been passed for bringing a metallic circulation into general use. Country bankers cannot urge such a measure without creating a suspicion that they are unable to meet their engagements; and an extension of time would only retard or render more gradual the pressure which must be sustained whenever the measure is carried into effect.

Though it is by no means probable that any measure which can be adopted with respect to our currency and standard of value will relieve us from the pressure we are likely to suffer between this and the 5th July, 1829, yet an alteration in the law which declares gold to be the only standard of value would perhaps alleviate the pressure, and enable us to recover the more rapidly from its effects.

The standard of this country was for many years gold or silver, and until our silver coin became very much worn a debtor might pay his debts in either description of coin; but in consequence of this decrease of weight of the coin in circulation, an Act was passed limiting the tender of coined silver by tale to 25*l.*; but beyond that amount the debtor had still the privilege of paying this coin by weight at the rate of 5*s.* 2*d.* per oz.

By the Act which passed in 1819 a seignorage of near 6 per cent. was taken upon the coinage of silver, that is, a pound troy of standard silver was coined into 66*s.*, instead of 62*s.*, as theretofore, and the sum for which this coin was made a legal tender was reduced to 40*s.*

It has by many been considered to have been a great mistake to have declared silver no longer a standard of value, inasmuch as it restricts the

The Bank of England, then, with the example of the events of 1825-1826 fresh in their sight and memories, are naturally cautious in extending their issues of bank notes. The example of their caution influences the conduct of the country bankers, and the country is suffering the greatest inconveniences, not from the want of a quantity of coin sufficient for circulation, but from the want of confidence, first of the Bank of England, and secondly of the country bankers, in the means of carrying into execution the monetary system of the country, as established by law, and their consequent fears of extending the issues of their bank notes beyond the very narrowest limits.

It is impossible to consider of the extent of the responsibility of the Bank of England and not admit the justice of the want of confidence which they feel.

The question is, Where is the remedy?

It is impossible to alter our measure of value from gold alone to gold and silver. The effect of this would be immediately to raise prices higher than they ought to go. Neither could we expect that sovereigns and ten-shilling silver pieces would circulate together, as they do in France, with an *agio*, without occasioning dis-

use of that metal so considerably, and moreover because silver is in almost every other part of the world one of the standards of value, and passes with gold at the option of the debtor; gold in general bearing a small agio with reference to silver, which, in fact, renders silver the general practical standard.

It is conceived that our recent coinage regulations with regard to silver would not interfere with any measure for restoring silver to that state in which it formerly was a standard of value. Our present coinage is admirably adapted to internal circulation, and the seignorage upon the coinage will at all times indemnify the public for the expense of the recoupage which must from time to time take place; but it is conceived that some relief may be afforded in the coming crisis by extending the sum for which it is a legal tender from 40s. to 5*l*. And with a view of making silver a legal tender to any amount, it is submitted (as in the case of gold) that any person taking standard silver to the Mint should have it coined into double crowns or some similar description of coin (none of which are now in existence), at the rate of 5*s*. 2*d*. per oz., and that silver coin of this description should be a legal tender in common with gold for any amount whatever.

It is believed that silver in the shape of coin would be much more available than ingots as a measure of value, because coins bear an impress and mark on every side, and cannot be debased without much greater chance of discovery than ingots. In ingots metals of inferior value might be introduced by the ingenuity of man, which could only be discovered by remelting and re-assaying the ingots.

A measure of this description would give the public the full benefit which

turbances of the public peace. All our transactions are not superintended by an armed police, as they are in France.

There would be great dissatisfaction and discontent by the probable substitution of silver ten-shilling pieces for sovereigns in the hands of those who are under the necessity and in the habit of carrying money about their persons.

It appears to me, then, that this system will not answer. It will be considered as a fresh meddling with the monetary system for the purpose of raising prices; and unless the Bank will incur the odium of forcing the circulation of the silver ten-shilling pieces upon the country, it will not have the effect of relieving the Bank of England and the country Banks from the apprehensions under which they labour.

The foundation of these apprehensions is demands from abroad.

What I would recommend is, that there should be a coinage of silver in ounces, and that this silver, thus coined in pieces of an ounce each, should be a legal tender for payments of above one thousand pounds, at the rate of the value of silver in relation to gold, as published in the 'London Gazette' on the Friday preceding the tender.

All foreign payments might

would arise by the increased quantities of either of the precious metals which might be produced from the mines, while by limiting our standard to gold only, we not only limit the quantity of that which represents value, but we derive no benefit whatever, nor is our circulation increased by any increase which may take place in the quantity of one of these metals; and it is conceived it must be admitted that an increase of circulation, if it be real and not founded upon credit only, must be beneficial, since it affords a stimulus to all useful undertakings, and tends to decrease the pressure of national burthens.

be made in this silver, and the Banks would be relieved from their apprehensions.

The gold would be left in circulation in the country. As a further relief it might be possible to allow the silver tokens to be legal tenders for payments up to three, or even to four pounds.

Along with these measures I would propose the adoption of another, viz., the payment to the Bank of the advances made to government on account of Exchequer Bills.

It must be obvious that, in proportion as the funds of the Bank are invested in the securities of the government, they must be less capable of applying them to give reasonable aid to the commerce of the country.

For instance, if they have ten million invested in Exchequer Bills, it is quite obvious that that sum cannot be employed to aid the merchants of the country. Nay more, that sum being invested in Exchequer Bills, and the Bank feeling, as they ought, that in case of any panic they could not realise the advances on those Bills without loss, must be more cautious in giving accommodation than they would be if their funds were not thus locked.

WELLINGTON.

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*The Right Hon. Sir Robert Adair to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD,

Jermyn Street, 4th March, 1828.

I take the liberty of sending your Grace some considerations on the future views of Russia, which were suggested to me by what I had occasion to observe at Paris immediately after the event at Navarino. They are, in part, the substance of my letters to Lord Grey and Lord Holland at that time. To the first, they were addressed in the intimacy of friendship, and under the persuasion that I was agreeing with him in sentiment; to the second, with similar feelings also, but with a view, at the same time, of guarding him against a course of policy which it seemed to me the government he supported was about to pursue. If they have anything in them worth attending to in the way of information, it is right that they should be in your Grace's possession.

I have only to request that your Grace would consider this paper as confidential, except to Lord Dudley, for reasons which will occur on its perusal.

I have the honour to be

your Grace's most obedient and humble servant,

R. ADAIR.

[ENCLOSURE.]

In considering the difficulties which press at this moment upon the foreign policy of England, the affair of Greece becomes of but secondary importance. As the accident, indeed, which has thrown the world into disorder, and which serves to keep alive the pretensions of Russia in that quarter, the termination of it is certainly of moment; otherwise the mere question of giving a government to the Greeks, especially if the evacuation of the Morea be in progress, might, it is presumed, be left very much to adjust itself. It is to the projects of Russia in the East that we must now direct our attention.

The passage of the Pruth, however justifiable after the avowal by the Porte of her intention to annul the Treaty of Akermann, must alter entirely the nature of our relations with Russia as arising out of the Treaty of London. Her occupation of the Principalities, whenever it takes place, will now be under a double pretext; first, as the ally of England and France, and to enforce the execution of the Treaty; secondly, on her own account, and as a separate belligerent.

This new situation of affairs must open again the question, settled as it was thought by the Peace of 1815, of the balance of territorial changes in Europe, resulting from the wars of the Revolution. True it is that Russia denies to other nations the right of intervention in her disputes with Turkey; but we never have acquiesced in that pretension to the extent of allowing her to appropriate to herself whatever portion of the Ottoman dominions she might please.

It may be prudent, therefore, for a time to accept her explanation, whatever it may be, of a step so decisive as that of entering the Principalities; but we can neither blind ourselves to her ulterior views, nor, admitting them, to a certain point, to be just and fair, can we dissemble the dangers to which Austria, and Europe through Austria, must be exposed by their completion.

To those who from their official correspondence must be conversant with the

condition, both foreign and interior, of Austria, it will be needless to state the utter hopelessness of her being able to resist them successfully by her arms; and to many reflecting men, who have no means except by their observations of arriving at just conclusions on public affairs, it seems equally hopeless to oppose them at this moment by a continental coalition.

On the other hand, there never was a time since the commencement of the Russian greatness, at which that Power was so thoroughly sensible as she is at present of her own strength, and the comparative weakness of Austria. The report received at Paris from a late embassy to St. Petersburg \* states her effective force in readiness to march to be 400,000 men. The peace with Persia, besides securing her frontier on that side, gives her a point of departure for offensive operations against Turkey within two months' march of Smyrna.† To this must be added a general and a national eagerness for war with the Porte, of which the late Emperor became sensible before his death, and which his successor may find it dangerous, perhaps, to attempt to repress.

To gain time, to profit by circumstances and events, to humour the pretensions of her more powerful neighbour, and thus if possible to restrain and bind him through considerations of a more generous ambition than that of conquest, must continue therefore to be the endeavour of Austria; and the question for us will be, how we may assist her in this course of policy, or contribute to her security, in the event (should that become unavoidable) of the final annexation of the provinces to the Russian empire.

As the best, and perhaps the only means of effecting this object, will be through remonstrance, on the one hand, accompanied on the other by a series of negotiations conducted on principles in which the rest of Europe may concur, the mere fact of the occupation of the Principalities would consequently not be viewed by us as a departure from the Treaty of London.

It would be considered that it is of the first importance that England should obtain the direction of these negotiations, and that this she can never do if she should withdraw herself too suddenly from the Alliance. Russia just now is better disposed towards England than towards France, and this vantage ground, it is presumed, ought to be kept.

Retaining, therefore, our hold on Russia through the Treaty, the first use to be made of it would naturally be that of engaging her in a joint proposal for peace to the Turks as soon as she arrives on the banks of the Danube.

In this case, the peace to be negotiated could hardly fail of covering in some way or other the interests of Austria, if not of admitting her as a party to it. It would then become a general settlement of the affairs of Eastern Europe, and Russia would thus find herself obliged to desist from her pretension of not suffering the intervention of other Powers in her transactions with Turkey.

Or if, through the obstinacy of the Turks, peace should be rejected, we shall still reserve to ourselves, under the Treaty, the means of influencing the final settlement of the quarrel, and of either moderating the demands of Russia, or of balancing her acquisitions.

And if the negotiation should fail through the fault of Russia, the way out of our engagements with her is clear and open.

A new situation of affairs would then present itself, in the division of our interests from those of Russia, the first consequence of which would be her exclusion from all further concern in the settlement of, and superintendance over, the State to be created for Greece. She could have no pretence for

\* Marmont.

† Sault.

holding us to a treaty which *permits* her to co-operate with us and France in the Mediterranean, where she has no interests of her own to protect, and consequently no right to show herself as an influencing Power, when at the very same time she would be pursuing a war against Turkey for her own separate purposes on the Danube. We should thus recover the advantage of keeping Russia out of the Mediterranean and the Archipelago by a method of exclusion far more effective than could be devised by the stipulation of any treaty.

Then would come the question, whether to consent to the annexation of the Principalities to Russia, or to endeavour by combined operations to make her renounce them.

The decision on a matter involving so many complicated interests would, of course, be taken after duly weighing the value of the object and the means of success. But we cannot stop here. We must look forward to new pretensions on the part of Russia, even if the Principalities should be ceded to her.

One of these pretensions—there may be more behind, but of this one we may be sure—is the acquisition of a free military passage, at all times, to Constantinople. Russia, *as now advised*, never will lay down her arms without obtaining by an express article free ingress and egress to and from the Black Sea and the Archipelago for her ships of war. This will be the condition of her foregoing any further advantages which the events of war may throw into her hands.

If those events should finally put her in possession of that capital, she never will evacuate it without establishing there a government immediately dependent on herself.

Were it possible to find a compensation for Austria equal to her danger from the annexation of the Principalities to Russia, it will scarcely be so under the vast preponderance which that Power will then have reached. That danger must be met in a different manner: by the union of Europe as far as it can be effected, but at all events by the immediate adoption on the part of Austria of a bolder line of policy than has hitherto characterised her councils.

A power in any way dependent on Russia in possession of Constantinople can never be tolerated by her: but she can no otherwise prevent its establishment than by putting forward her own claims to the establishment of a power of an opposite character, intermediate between herself and Russia, independent, and secured by the general guarantee of Europe.

On this course she must resolve; and provisionally, no doubt, but immediately, on the means of doing so with effect. No such power as the above, it is true, is now in existence, but the danger must create it; and a chief must be found for it among some of the Sovereign houses through whose connexions, aided by an efficient guarantee, he may maintain himself in his perilous post.

The most eligible head for such a State would probably be an Austrian Archduke. But to this France might object, and without France all plans for counterbalancing Russian ascendancy must fall to the ground.

The mention of France will call up serious reflections with regard to the increasing influence of that Power in the affairs of Europe. We must no longer consider her as struggling for the stability of her monarchy with the help of a great confederacy of Sovereigns. All that could be done by them, all that can ever be done by them, has already been done to restore and to secure it, and, left to itself, the Bourbon government must now depend on its own resources. Whoever will take a practical view of the internal condition of that country must see that, of those resources, public opinion is daily

becoming the most important, and he will not confound this sentiment with a tendency to new revolutions. Quite the reverse. Before the elections, their Chamber of Peers, and their higher magistracy, constituted that species of mediatorial power to which all people naturally look up before going to extremities with their rulers; and by the elections they have obtained a Chamber of Representatives on which their confidence seems to repose without anxiety. France, therefore, must henceforward be considered as a balanced government like our own, and as such, the public opinion there must enter into all our calculations as to her conduct. Unfortunately it is just now wide as the poles asunder from goodwill towards Austria.

There exists, however (and this notwithstanding the offence given to the French Marshals, so extensively taken up by the army) one tie between Austria and France, the value and the possible usefulness of which may be worth considering in the impending crisis of Europe. This tie is the young Duke of Reichstadt.

To weigh the objections (and they are great and many) against the advantages of bringing forward such a name, or, if eligible, to inquire how Austria might be led to consent to it, are foreign to the purpose of this memoir. All, indeed, that is intended by the writer, in this as well as in his foregoing suggestions, is to invite attention to the means of defeating dangerous projects, of the existence of which, from what he has observed, he is morally convinced. Those projects are no longer the reveries of the age of Peter and Catherine II. They are designs, matured under the direction of some of the ablest statesmen in Europe, and the execution of which, in whatever manner we may resolve to deal with them, we must prepare ourselves to see attempted. As such they are offered to your Grace's consideration, in the spirit of respectful but earnest warning, not of presumptuous advice.

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*To the Earl of Dudley.*

[ 832. ]

MY DEAR LORD DUDLEY,

London, 5th March, 1828.

In the conversation which I told you I had yesterday with Prince Polignac, he urged strongly that we should come to a conclusion on all the points referred to in our Note in answer to the despatch of Count Nesselrode to Prince Lieven. Unfortunately I am not well, and cannot go to Downing Street this day to attend the Cabinet or to see you.

The first point to be settled is the mode in which the Treaty should be explained. The best mode for us would be a Note by which we should be enabled to place upon the Protocol our own plan.

The next point is the limitation of Greece. We ought to propose the Morea and adjacent islands only.

In a paper which Mr. Grant read us lately at the Cabinet, there was a very strong argument in favour of a more extended boundary for Greece, founded upon the implied engagement that we have been supposed to enter into with all those districts

north of our now proposed boundary whose deputies attended at the assembly which accepted our mediation and agreed to an armistice.

This argument would in honour be irresistible if the Greeks had performed their engagement, and had observed the armistice. But I refer the Cabinet to their attacks upon Scio and Candia, which are quite decisive in relation to engagement.

In regard to the expediency of involving the Allies beyond the Isthmus of Corinth I refer you to Mr. Meyer's last accounts, as well as to my reasoning regarding the expediency of our proposing any plan of which we cannot find the means of executing.

My opinion is, then, that our Note ought to contain the proposition that Greece should be confined to the Morea and the islands adjacent, naming them.

The amount of the tribute might be, say, 200,000 pounds sterling.

The Porte might have the power of choice of one of three lists of candidates for the executive government; or that of rejecting lists till one according to its good will should be sent; or the power of nominating one Greek to be a member of the executive government.

The Greeks should pay to the Porte, as indemnity for the property of Turks in the Morea and the islands, one million and a half sterling.

These appear to me to be all the points mentioned in the Treaty which require to be referred to in our Note.

There is besides, however, a very important point not noticed in the Treaty; that is, the relation in which this Greek dependency is to stand towards foreign Powers, which ought to be defined.

My opinion is that, excepting commercial relations, Greece should have none with foreign Powers. This Greek dependency must follow the fortunes of the Ottoman Porte. Its government must have a power of appeal to the guaranteeing Powers of the transaction. But this ought to be its only relation with foreign Powers.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Mansfield Street, Wednesday evening,  
5th March, 1828.

I hope you were not prevented by indisposition from dining at the Chancellor's to-day.

Lord Dudley read to us after dinner a draft of a circular Instruction to the three Admirals, which he was to propose to-morrow (Thursday) to our two Allies. It directed the larger blockade in a most unqualified manner. To this it was objected that it appeared to give up the question of confining our operations to the Morea. Lord Dudley, Lord Palmerston, and Mr. Huskisson contended that the larger operation might be necessary for the more limited object, but the more limited operation would be decisive against the larger boundary.

Mr. Huskisson also read to us his Instruction to Sir Frederick Adam. That part which referred to the blockade was more guardedly worded; the rest was for the most part unobjectionable, but it will require to be attentively considered. I doubt whether, under it, we might not be considered as instructing the Admirals to assist the Greek land forces with ammunition, provisions, &c., in an attack on Athens, as well as in cutting off all communication with the Morea by land; though it would not be the correct interpretation according to the context. But Lord Palmerston, who is the great advocate for the larger boundary, let out to me that he had seen Huskisson's despatch.

Lord Dudley will, I believe, somewhat qualify that part of the despatch which related to the blockade. Both of the proposed instructions will be sent to you to-morrow morning, and we are to have a Cabinet at two.

Yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

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*To the Earl of Dudley.*

[ 833. ]

MY DEAR LORD DUDLEY,

London, 6th March, 1828.

I return Prince Metternich's despatches.

That of the 12th February might be considered hereafter when we shall have brought the Allies to consider of and agree upon our *projet* of arrangement.

It is quite obvious that Prince Metternich is not aware of the extent of the Russian proposition, or even of that of France.

That of the 29th January, however, requires immediate consideration.

The success of our *projet* depends, in a great measure, either upon the efficiency of the Greek blockade or upon the Austrians giving a check to their commerce in provisions to the Morea; probably mostly upon the last.

I recommend to you, then, to communicate our plan to Prince

Esterhazy as soon as you can ; and to urge him so far to give his assistance in carrying it into execution.

You might show him your last instructions to Admiral Codrington, to prove to him that we were not disposed to push our blockades to an extent that would be deemed illegal by ourselves if exercised towards us.

We trust however that, for the sake of the peace of Europe, the Austrian government will give us their aid in preventing the supply of Ibrahim Pacha's army in the Morea by Austrian ships.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 834. ]

To ——.

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 8th March, 1828.

I have received your letter regarding your son Lord ——, who I conclude is very young, and has only lately been ordained.

As far as I have any knowledge of the Church preferment for which I am allowed to recommend the candidates to his Majesty, it consists in dignities of the Church and benefices of the higher value, for which I am necessarily obliged to select those who have distinguished themselves by their professional merits.

Under these circumstances I would recommend to your Lordship to apply to the Lord Chancellor, who recommends the candidates for the description of livings which are generally held by those who have but just entered the profession ; and, if your Lordship wishes it, I will add my application to yours.

Ever, my dear Lord, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*Mr. Knowles to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Malvern Wells, Worcester, 8th March, 1828.

I should not have written to your Grace, though at the head of his Majesty's government, unless you had been a military man ; and being one myself, I beg leave to inform you that a war between Great Britain and Turkey has often occupied my thoughts, with a view to bring it to a speedy conclusion. The island of Lemnos has two harbours, and the

island of Rhodes one good harbour. One island is in the vicinity of the Dardanelles.\* If the French take possession of one with 12,000 soldiers, and the English with 12,000 soldiers occupy the other, and fortify both, then to leave a garrison of 2000 men in each, and the rest to be re-embarked; the French army to be landed with a week's provisions on the European side, and the British army on the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles at the same time, the two armies of 10,000 men each will meet with no opposition, and all the batteries of the Dardanelles be taken and destroyed. The squadrons could then anchor there, re-embark the armies, and with all the bomb ketches proceed to Constantinople. The Grand Signior would immediately make peace; for if he did not, all communication with Asia would be cut off, and the several pachas set up for independency. In the year 1771 my father, Admiral Sir Charles Knowles, by the desire of the Empress Catherine II., went to the Russian army on the Danube, as his going would procure her a peace, which she much wanted. When he was with the army her Imperial Majesty wrote to him, "Les Turcs sont dans une horrible peur depuis qu'ils ont su votre arrivée sur la Danube." The Russian army at that time was subsisted by Field Marshal Romanzow at 1200 miles distant from his dépôt of provisions. For this reason my father recommended the Empress to get possession of those countries (she afterwards obtained), and to colonise them; to have a strong squadron of ships of the line, frigates, and a flotilla (a plan of which I have) to supply the Russian army coastways in its march for Constantinople. As the Russians are individually slow in their movements, the plan I have had the honour to propose to your Grace will anticipate them.

I am, with the greatest respect and esteem, my Lord Duke,  
your most devoted and obedient humble servant,

CHAS. HENRY KNOWLES.

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\* The best maps are those of Arrowsmith; one of the Dardanelles and Sea of Marmora, and the other of the canal and harbour of Constantinople.

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*To the Right Hon. Sir John Newport, Bart., M.P.*

[ 835. ]

London, 13th March, 1828.

The Duke of Wellington having understood at the conference which he had the honour of holding with the gentlemen interested in the communication with Ireland by way of Milford Haven, that they had received from Mr. Canning, when Chancellor of the Exchequer, a positive promise that a pier should be erected at Hobbs's Point at the public expense; and it having been further, for the first time, brought under the notice of the Duke that a considerable sum of money had, on the faith of that promise, been expended by them in the repair of the roads leading to it; the Duke does not consider himself at liberty now



to depart from that assurance, although the expense of the pier is likely far to exceed that which was originally represented.

The Duke has, therefore, given directions for the preparation of an estimate, which will in due time be submitted to Parliament.

[ 836. ]

*To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.*

MY DEAR PEEL,

London, 14th March, 1828.

The King has consented to Sir Herbert Taylor being Surveyor-General of the Ordnance; to the Bishop of Rochester being Dean of Worcester; to Dr. Phillpotts being Dean of Chester; to Dr. Spry, rector of Marylebone parish, being Prebendary of Canterbury; to the Rev. William Canning being Canon of Windsor; to the Rev. George S. Penfold, rector of Christ Church, in the parish of Marylebone, being appointed to the rectory of Trinity, in the same parish; and to the Rev. Robert Walpole being appointed rector of Christ Church.

I shall be much obliged to you if you will order that warrants may be made out and sent to his Majesty for signature accordingly.

Ever yours, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 837. ] MEMORANDUM ON MEASURES TO BE DISCUSSED IN CONSEQUENCE OF THE DECLARATION OF WAR MADE BY RUSSIA AGAINST THE PORTE.

15th March, 1828.

The preamble of the Treaty of the 6th of July recites that the three Powers had resolved "to combine their efforts by a formal treaty, with the object of re-establishing peace between the contending parties" in Greece.

The three first articles state the mode of proceeding, the nature of the arrangement to be proposed to the contending parties, and the mode of settling thereafter the countries and islands to which such arrangement shall be applicable.

The fourth article states, "Les Puissances Contractantes s'engagent à poursuivre l'œuvre salutaire de la pacification de la Grèce, sur les bases posées dans les articles précédents; et à munir sans le moindre délai leurs représentants à Constantinople de toutes les instructions que réclame l'exécution du traité qu'elles signent."

In the third section of the additional article it is stated that, if the measures proposed should not induce the Porte to accept the propositions of the contracting parties, or if the Greeks “renonceroient de leur côté aux conditions stipulées en leur faveur, les Hautes Parties Contractantes n’en continueroient pas moins à poursuivre l’œuvre de la pacification sur les bases dont elles sont convenues entre elles, et en conséquence elles autorisent dès à présent leurs représentans à Londres à discuter et arrêter les moyens ultérieurs dont l’emploi pourrait devenir nécessaire.”

The Allies have proceeded accordingly, and the Allied Ministers in London have at this moment under their consideration different *projets* for the mode of proceeding to be adopted.

In the mean time the Emperor of Russia considers that the Porte has given to his Imperial Majesty just ground for war; and his Imperial Majesty has announced his intention of commencing hostilities against the Porte, on the ground of the offence given to him by that Power. In announcing this intention his Imperial Majesty has offered to merge the offences against his own government in the general cause of the Allies, and to carry into execution the Treaty of the 6th of July, provided the Allies will adopt the plan of operations proposed by his Imperial Majesty in a despatch from Count Nesselrode, dated the 26th of December, and will send orders to the combined fleets in the Mediterranean accordingly; but that if the Allies should not consent to adopt that plan of operations, his Imperial Majesty will consider himself at liberty to propose on his own account, at the conclusion of the war and as terms of peace, such measures for the pacification of Greece as will suit *ses convenances et intérêts*; or, in other words, to take the Greek affair into his own hands.

It is not necessary here to question the right of the Emperor of Russia to make war upon the Turks. It is not necessary that we should now give our opinion upon that question further than we have given it already. But his Imperial Majesty having bound himself to discuss and settle with his Allies the ulterior measures to be adopted in case of the refusal of the Ottoman Porte to accept the propositions of the Allies, has no right to dictate those measures to the Allies, and to tell them that he will settle the pacification of Greece *selon ses convenances et intérêts* in case those measures should not be adopted by the Allies; more particularly adverting to the engagement into

which his Imperial Majesty entered in the fourth article of the treaty above quoted. Whatever this government may determine regarding ulterior measures, the first question for its deliberation should be, whether we will take any and what notice of the unjustifiable pretension thus put forward.

In respect to the case in general, I earnestly recommend that we should proceed without loss of time to decide upon all the points of the Treaty remaining in a state of doubt and uncertainty; that we should endeavour to bring the government of France to concur in our views of these questions; that we should communicate *in extenso* all that has passed to the King of Prussia and Emperor of Austria.

That, in concert with France, we should immediately open a communication with the Porte, and make known our final determination on all the points remaining uncertain in the Treaty; and that we should call upon the Austrian and Prussian governments to support us in our measures with the Porte, as well as to obtain a settlement in Greece as a cessation of those measures which give just ground of complaint to the Emperor of Russia.

WELLINGTON.

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PROPOSED MEASURES FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF GREECE.\*

1. It appears to me that the measures to be proposed by his Majesty's government to the Conference should be founded upon the French Note of the 20th December, as well as upon the Russian Note. We should refer to a necessity for devoting all our measures to the settlement of Greece as our object, rather than to other measures which will tend to augment the confusion in the east of Europe, and must end in war.

2. With this object in view, his Majesty has already taken measures for prevailing upon Ibrahim Pacha to withdraw from the Morea, and upon Mehemet Ali to recall him. These instructions should be placed upon the Protocol.

3. A proposition should be made to the Conference to instruct the Admirals forthwith to repair with their squadrons into the Levant, for the object, first, of assisting in carrying into execution the evacuation of the Morea if it should be acceded to by Ibrahim Pacha; secondly, of occupying the whole circumference of the Morea from the Gulf of Corinth round to †

The Greeks should be called upon to assist in this blockade, in order to

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\* This and the following memorandum are supposed to have been written by the Duke of Wellington.

† Blank in manuscript.

prevent provisions from being passed in cases in which the ships of the combined Powers could not, upon principle, prevent the introduction of provisions. These measures would manifest to Ibrahim Pacha and to Mehemet Ali the determination of the Allies to obtain the evacuation of the Morea.

4. The evacuation of the Morea by Ibrahim Pacha once obtained, whether by negotiation or the use of the naval force, it is supposed that there will be no difficulty in expelling the proper Ottoman troops from the Morea by means of the Greeks themselves; and, in the mean time, it should be recommended to General Church to second this proposed operation of the combined fleet by the occupation of the Isthmus of Coriath, keeping in communication with the ships on each side of it. This will be a real operation directed to a practicable object, which must have an early and decisive result upon the real and only object in view.

5. Greece being once evacuated, the object of the combined Powers will have been attained. The settlement of the country can go on, if practicable, under the protection of the fleet of the Allied Powers, and the countenance of their commercial agents, who might in this case be sent to the Greeks. Piracies will have been put an end to, and the peaceful commerce of nations will revive.

But there will still remain the recognition by the Ottoman Porte of the arrangement, which is essentially necessary to the final settlement of tranquillity in the East.

6. In order to attain this object, it is necessary to bring to bear upon the Porte the opinion of all Europe.

It is not sufficient that the combined Powers should be convinced themselves that their objects, and the means which they adopt to attain them, are just; but it is necessary that they should convince the rest of the world that they are so.

These measures would likewise have the effect of convincing the Porte, and Mehemet Ali, and Ibrahim Pacha, that no intention exists of proceeding farther upon the system adopted than is absolutely necessary for tranquillity and the general safety.

7. The French ambassador has very properly complained that the neutrality of the Greeks should be enforced by the combined fleet and some Proclamation, or other authentic Act, made public, ordering that neutrality, and defining that it must and shall be enforced upon all points excepting the Morea and the Islands; and hostilities to be allowed in these solely with a view to their defence.

8. The communication to be made to the Conference might express our regret that the ministers had withdrawn from Constantinople. It is true that they were authorised and directed to withdraw by the letter and spirit of their instructions. But the battle of Navarino had made a great alteration.

It is now impossible that the Porte can reconquer Greece. The object *now* must be to settle the affair as soon as possible. The ambassadors having, in the commencement of the Conference with the Reis Effendi, obtained from him the concession that the battle of Navarino did not alter the diplomatic relations of the combined Powers with the Porte, and subsequently the consent, however qualified, of the Porte to a suspension of

hostilities for fifty days, ought to have accepted that concession without its qualification. They must have seen, and it appears that General Guilleminot did see, that this however limited suspension of hostilities would have attained *quoad* Greece all that was required. We ought to concur, therefore, in opinion with the Emperor of Russia in lamenting that the ambassadors had withdrawn from Constantinople.

9. But although we cannot do otherwise than lament that they have withdrawn, and that his Imperial Majesty's interests should suffer from the absence of his Imperial Majesty's ambassador, we cannot think it expedient to involve Europe in the consequences of the confusion in the East, which will be the certain result of the measures proposed in the Note of his Imperial Majesty.

10. We must deny, as I believe we may with safety, that his Imperial Majesty ever told us that the consequences of interfering at all in this case must be that he was to invade the provinces on the Danube.

11. In respect to the blockade of the Dardanelles, we must object to it as a measure of war not in our opinion necessary if the other measures proposed are adopted.

12. In respect to the advance of money or the guarantee of a loan, my opinion is that we ought to decline both. I think that we cannot give money without interfering to ascertain in what manner it is expended.

We must insist that it is expended in paying for real military services of a particular description, that is, by a regular army. We may advise the Greeks to have a regular army.

Our laws may permit them to borrow money in this country, but to lend them money or to guarantee a loan of theirs would be *war*, which is inconsistent with the course of proceeding proposed.

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#### OBSERVATIONS ON A NOTE RELATIVE TO THE AFFAIRS OF TURKEY AND GREECE.

*Observations on the Proposed Note, No. 1, sheet 4, page 1.*—I do not recollect to have seen the proceedings of the Conferences at St. Petersburg upon Turkish affairs; but as well as I recollect what Mr. Canning told us of them from a confidential communication which he had of them from Prince Lieven, the Austrians did not then propose the withdrawal of the ambassadors of all Christendom.

The proposition to which Mr. Canning referred in his Note of the 4th September, 1826, as having been made by Prince Metternich, referred to the recognition of Greece as an independent State.

*Observation No. 2, sheet 4, page 3.*—The proposition for naval operations was contained, not only in a Memorandum produced at Paris by Count Pozzo di Borgo, but in a *contre-projet* of a Treaty produced by the Russian ambassador at Paris or in London.

*Observation No. 3, sheet 6, page 3.*—You may say, "Did not alter the nature of the Treaty nor the intentions of the Allies, of which a renewed declaration has been made by common consent at Constantinople, *nor the pacific relations between the Allied Powers and the Porte.*"

*Observation No. 4, sheet 7, page 1.*—In the preceding page, instead of

the word *war* I would use the word *hostility*, and the same in the first part of this page.

The way I should put this proposition would be as follows:—*If we should at last find ourselves in the painful necessity of engaging in measures of coercion, we should in the choice of such measures prefer those which, &c., &c.*

*Observation No. 4a, sheet 7, page 3.*—The words *Greek nation* include a great deal. *Those whose unsubdued revolt had excited the apprehensions of all Europe.*

*Observation No. 5, sheet 8, page 2.*—The proposal of Russia is not a blockade of the capital, but *an attack by sea on two sides upon the capital, each attack co-operating with the other, and both with that to be made by land.*

*Observation No. 5a, same sheet, page 3.*—Might we not put this query, *Could it be expected by other Powers that such operations would not occasion expenses requiring claims of compensation from the Porte, the satisfaction of which claims must occasion the destruction of the Porte as an independent Power in Europe?*

This paragraph will contain a very useful Memorandum to France.

*Observation No. 6, sheet 9, page 1.*—I think that we might, in reference to the suggestion of the ambassadors at Constantinople, recite that their opinion was not unanimous.

*Observation No. 7, sheet 9, page 1.*—This is the way in which I view this case.

The Protocol states, first, that the contracting Powers would take measures to settle the limits of the territory, &c. The Treaty states that the limits of the territory shall be settled in a negotiation between the three Powers and the contending parties.

In a discussion with the Reis Effendi the ambassadors of the Allied Powers suggested the line as stated in the proposed Note as that which should be finally adopted in the negotiations contemplated by the Treaty.

We are now proposing a final arrangement of that which the third article proposed should be hereafter settled in negotiation.

The question is, Can we do so in good faith?

The battle of Navarino and the withdrawal of the Allied ministers from the Porte has exhausted all the means put forward by the Treaty and its secret articles. They have had no effect upon the Porte. The Allies are under the necessity of having recourse to *ulterior measures* adverted to in the third section of the secret article.

In the mean time, notwithstanding the defeat of the Turkish fleet, and the destruction of so many men, the Greeks have done nothing for themselves on the continent. They have procured a cessation from hostilities; they have been ordered to refrain from hostilities; yet they have attacked and obtained possession of the Island of Scio, of which it will be impossible for the Allies to allow them to remain in possession.

Is then the consent of their Assembly to a cessation of hostilities, which cessation has never taken place, to bind us to include in the word *Greece* all those districts which had representatives in the Assembly when that consent took place? I should say certainly not, unless it is contended that one party is bound to an implicit engagement to all eternity, while the other party is not bound to a positive engagement for one moment.

We have a right now to look at the affair as we did on the 6th of July. We are in search of *ulterior measures*, and we must take care in making our *contre-projet* to Russia, that we do not propose that which they will know at once cannot be executed by the means by which we propose that it should be executed.

We must take care likewise not to bind ourselves so far to a strict delimitation of the frontier proposed as that we may not adopt the larger delimitation if we should find that other Powers, Russia particularly, is disposed to adopt the measure of settlement proposed by our *contre-projet*.

But if Russia rejects our *contre-projet* altogether, we must be prepared to stand by it *in toto*.

*Observation No. 8, sheet 9, page 2.*—I would omit the words beginning *If the treaty*, in the first page of this sheet, and ending *as well as the letter of their engagements*, at the top of the second page.

As you will observe, I am of opinion that we should perform our engagement.

But others are not of that opinion, and the words are not necessary.

*Observation No. 9, sheet 9, page 3.*—A few words might be inserted here proposing the blockade of Alexandria.

838.]

*To Viscount Beresford.*

MY DEAR BERESFORD, London, 15th March, 1828. At night.

I had mislaid your letter of the 13th instant, and did not read it till this night, after I had received that of this day.

The steamboats of the St. Lawrence cannot be brought into the canal of the Rideau till we can make a canal or canals for them from Montreal to the entrance of the Rideau Canal into the Ottawa. The canals on this communication from Montreal are some of them finished, all in progress and nearly finished; and it would be hopeless to expect that Parliament, in expectation of a contingent advantage, would grant money to reform works which have already cost so much, notwithstanding that their construction is not so perfect as might be wished, in order to derive from the works all the advantage which they are capable of affording.

If, then, we cannot get the steamboats of the St. Lawrence into the Rideau, it is useless to make the Rideau Canal of a size to navigate them. Let us make the Rideau Canal of a sufficient size to navigate steam-vessels: that is, the size proposed and estimated for by Lieutenant-Colonel By. This will give us the complete use of the Rideau. Lower down we must use the smaller boats till we reach the Montreal; until the public

will pay the expense of altering these canals; and then we can alter those on the Rideau.

In the mean time Lieutenant-Colonel By might be desired to keep this object in view, and, wherever he can do it without additional expense, he might lay his foundations, make his excavations, &c., accordingly.

Upon the whole, therefore, I think it best not to communicate your letter of the 13th to Mr. Huskisson, and that you will do well to send off the Committee without further loss of time.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Right Hon. Sir Frederick Lamb to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Liabon, 15th March, 1828.

If I had had any discretionary power this would have been done differently, and not a man should have gone from hence except those for Corfu, which perhaps you may want there; but the orders to Clinton were so positive that I was forced to take the only mode which he could concur in. It is not that we have not force enough, but that you may feel some awkwardness about increasing it again. This, however, may be done under a seeming acquiescence in the Infant's wish of our force remaining. Should you determine upon really taking this country in hand and setting it to rights, it would be a great facility to have the same man Commander-in-Chief and ambassador; and if you can find the man, I will willingly make room for him. In this case, the Queen and the Infant should both go to the Brazils, which they might easily do under an order from Don Pedro. Miguel is here much more accessible than he was at Vienna. In this case, our force should be increased so as to put all notion of the possibility of resistance out of the question. If, on the contrary, you determine not to interfere, letting the affairs of this country take what course they will, and only keeping your force here for a short time to let the present agitation subside and prevent the effects of panic, in this case I think you owe it to yourselves not to have an ambassador looking on as a mere cypher, but that you must recall him directly, marking in this way your disapprobation of their course, and the principle upon which your troops are still permitted to remain. Should this be your line, the cavalry and artillery, and the infantry from Gibraltar, had better, I should think, return. Should you take the first and more decided line, there would be great advantages in employing Beresford upon it, but I fear he is too prejudiced both about the Royal family and about individuals in the country to be fit for the job. Such a set of cowards as both parties have shown themselves I had never beheld before. My belief is they are all to be managed by a horsewhip, and by nothing else.

I hope you are well, and am, my dear Duke, most truly yours,

F. LAMB.

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[ 839. ] MEMORANDUM UPON THE NOTE IN ANSWER TO THAT FROM  
RUSSIA.

16th March, 1828.

Our answer to the Russian Note should refer to Lord Dudley's Note to Prince Lieven, dated the \* . This Note mentions all the topics of complaint against the Turks referred to by Prince Lieven in his last Note, excepting in regard to their interference in the Persian war, upon which topic the Russian Note does not speak very positively.

We should then express our resolution not to become parties to the war into which the Emperor is about to enter. This topic is fully discussed in our Note upon Count Nesselrode's despatch to Prince Lieven of the 26th of December. The discussion of this topic will bring us to the decision announced and repeated in the Note last received from the Russian government: that in case his Imperial Majesty's Allies should not consent to become parties to the enterprise which he is about to undertake, his Imperial Majesty will consider himself at liberty, at the peace, to make such arrangement with the Porte for the pacification of Greece as will suit *ses intérêts et convenances*.

We must express our regret that this decision, which is neither more nor less than one to break a treaty, should have been thus unnecessarily adopted by his Imperial Majesty.

The origin of our interference in this affair was the application of certain Greeks to his Majesty to interpose his mediation in order to reconcile them to the Porte. His Majesty, aware of the interest which the august predecessor of the Emperor Nicholas felt for the Greeks, and of the nature of the right of interference in their favour given to his Imperial Majesty by the Treaty of Kainardgé; and being, moreover, desirous of preventing those misfortunes which would most probably be the consequence of a renewal of the war in Europe, expressed his desire to concert his measures upon this mediation with his Imperial Majesty. At this period his Imperial Majesty had two important questions to settle with the Ottoman Porte: the one respecting the Principalities on the Danube; the other regarding the unsettled points of the Treaty of Bucharest, which were subsequently settled by the Treaty of Akermann. Either of these discussions might have led to war, but the instrument by

\* Blank in manuscript.

which the two Powers were associated for the purposes of peace provided for the possibility of that event ; and the two Powers agreed, by the second and third articles of that instrument, that even the occurrence of war between Russia and the Porte should not dissolve their union or interrupt their efforts to obtain their end ; and that they *considéreront toujours les termes de l'arrangement mentionné au premier article comme la base de la réconciliation à effectuer par leur entremise, soit en commun, soit séparément, entre la Porte et les Grecs.*

The desire to associate the King of France with the two Powers parties to the Protocol occasioned the alteration of the form of the instrument which united them ; and the Treaty of the 6th of July was adopted. It is quite clear that the additional and secret article was the proposition of the Emperor of Russia by his minister at Paris ; and we have no documents in this office to show by what means the fourth article of the Treaty was substituted for the third.

But still the fourth article of the Treaty, and the third section of the additional and secret article, sufficiently bind the three Powers à *poursuivre l'œuvre salutaire de la pacification de la Grèce sur les bases posées dans les articles précédents.* And, according to the third section of the secret article, à *poursuivre l'œuvre de la pacification sur les bases dont elles sont convenues entre elles.*

It must be concluded that the first article of the Protocol, and the second article of the Treaty, contained the statement of that basis of the arrangement for the settlement of Greece which was consistent with the views and interests, not only of the Greeks themselves, at whose solicitation it was brought forward, but likewise of each and all of the Allied Powers.

The different circumstances in which the three Allies may find themselves at this moment do not justify a departure from the letter or spirit of the engagements thus entered into. The Emperor of Russia finds himself under the necessity, on account of the peculiar situation in which he is placed, to make war upon the Turks. The necessity for this war has not been occasioned by any act of the other Allies, nor by any omission of theirs. They have manifested no disinclination to perform their engagements, nor to make every sacrifice to attain the common object. They have at different times made, and they would again make, every effort in their power to persuade the

Porte to do justice to his Imperial Majesty ; and they sincerely lament that his Imperial Majesty has found himself under the necessity of making war upon the Porte, and of thus separating himself from the counsels and action of the Allies to obtain the objects of the Treaty.

But as long as the other Allies persevere in their endeavours to attain the objects of the Treaty, we cannot conceive that such necessary separation, nor that our refusal to make war upon the Porte in a quarrel purely Russian and so admitted to be, or to adopt measures for executing the Treaty of the 6th of July which are measures of war and are inconsistent with the spirit if not with the letter of the Treaty and with the motives and principles on which it was founded, and would entail miseries upon Europe such as those from which it has only lately been delivered, can be a reason for which his Imperial Majesty can be justified for a departure from his engagement, and in announcing to us that in any peace to be made with the Porte he will arrange the Greek Question *selon ses intérêts et convenances*.

We take the earliest opportunity of protesting against this decision ; and hope that this protest will be taken into consideration when the decision can be carried into execution.

We have no right to interfere with the decision of the Emperor of Russia to make war upon the Turks ; and we willingly give credit to and accept his Imperial Majesty's declaration that he has no intention of aggrandizement.

But as a Power interested in the maintenance of the peace of Europe, and the state of possession and security of each Power, we must watch over the performance of these engagements in the same friendly spirit towards the Emperor of Russia which has dictated all the measures of his Majesty's government towards his Imperial Majesty.

WELLINGTON.

*The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Argyll House, Monday, 17th March, 1828.

I venture to inflict on you, and a great infliction it is to add to your reading, a few very hasty thoughts thrown on paper this morning, respecting the present state of our Greek Question.

Ever most truly yours,

ABERDEEN.

[ENCLOSURE.]

## MEMORANDUM FROM LORD ABERDEEN ON THE TREATY OF JULY, 1827.

The situation of this country with respect to the tripartite Treaty of the 6th of July is unprecedented in history. The complication is so great, from the nature of the relations of the contracting parties to each other, and to the Porte itself, as well as to the insurgent Greeks, that it is difficult to direct our course according to any known principle of public law.

Does the Treaty, or any part of it, exist as obligatory on us?

It may be argued, in the first place, that the declaration of war by one of the contracting parties virtually dissolves the Treaty, inasmuch as it renders that party disqualified as a belligerent from concurring in its execution. Further, it may be maintained that had one of the parties been engaged in actual war with the Porte on the 6th of July, the Protocol of St. Petersburg would never have been converted into a Treaty imposing such conditions as that in question contains; and therefore that it is to be interpreted *rebus sic stantibus*.

But Russia herself does not appear to entertain any doubt, in Count Nesselrode's despatch to Prince Lieven, about the abrogation of the Treaty. The whole statement, and the reasoning contained in it, proceed on this assumption. Russia must know and feel that an act, the very essence and principle of which entirely depend on the most perfect concert, is *ipso facto* annulled when one of the parties lays down, for the guidance of the others, a line of conduct which they are peremptorily required to adopt without any reservation—*sans réserve*.

It is true that Russia engages to regulate her proceedings according to certain conditions and limitations, in the event of her Allies following the course prescribed: but these are new and voluntary engagements, more or less binding perhaps, but they are not the obligations of the Treaty. The Protocol of the Conferences at London is virtually closed, when mutual concert is at an end.

It remains to consider what part we ought to take in this new state of affairs. Not ostentatiously to denounce the Treaty; which could only add provocation to Russia, and liberate France from the slender ties which perhaps still bind her. Expostulation and remonstrance we owe it to our own consistency to employ: they may possibly still not be without weight; but as we rejected the Russian propositions when we imagined that we possessed an option, and supported that rejection by strong reasons, we cannot think of accepting them when they are offered to us as conditions *sine quibus non*.

If, however, the object of the Treaty be just, we are not freed from the moral obligation to execute it, in consequence of the conduct of one of the contracting parties, especially if the other should not renege from it. The great desideratum, therefore, is to hold France to her declarations, and if possible to carry her with us. M. de Polignac speaks of consenting to the advance of the Russian armies as far as the Danube; but he does not say what means he would adopt to prevent their further progress. It would be most desirable to come to some understanding with the French government on this subject. Some explanations are the more necessary with a view of ascertaining the possibility of proceeding honestly and sincerely with the French government in attaining the objects of the Treaty, because it is not perfectly certain that France may not have already contracted new engagements, and placed herself on a line on which it would be impossible for us to advance with her.

The practical question of operations in Greece may shortly be attended with still greater difficulties than at present. Suppose the Russian forces on the Danube ;—whether a forward movement on Constantinople should be attempted or not, suppose a force directed through Servia, to advance by the line of communication between Vienna and Salonica and to occupy this city, communicating with the whole of Greece. It is clear that all the northern provinces would be in immediate insurrection ; and it would then scarcely be in the power of Russia herself to restrict the limits of Greece to her own line, but she must almost necessarily adopt that of Count Capo d'Istria, and include everything to the south of Salonica and Durazzo. If, during these operations, our measures for effecting the liberation of the Morea became more active and energetic, would it not be a *mauvaise plaisanterie* to talk to the Turks of our neutrality ?

Perhaps a communication with Constantinople might shortly be opened with advantage, especially if undertaken in concert with France. The advance of the Russian armies may render our intervention more welcome, and the Turkish government more reasonable. It cannot be imprudent, and it may be useful, to place in every possible point of view the extraordinary appearance exhibited by the three Powers, parties to the Treaty of 6th of July. The difficulties of our situation, and the complication attending the nature of our relations with Russia, increase at every step.

From the last despatch of Count Nesselrode to Prince Lieven, it appears that Russia is determined to make the settlement of the Greek question contemporaneous with the termination of hostilities on her part ; and in point of fact, that it shall form a portion of that transaction which may re-establish peace in the Levant. Here, then, we are at the mercy of Russia ; as long as she shall have new conditions of peace to prescribe, or fresh indemnities to exact, so long will it be impossible to accomplish the pacification of Greece. It is clear, too, that she must possess the terms of this pacification entirely at her disposal, for as she will employ the *ultima ratio*, it is impossible that we can ever use arguments of equal cogency. This difference in her position gives her practically the power to dictate to her Allies, as well as to the Porte, with respect to the terms of the pacification of Greece. Let us suppose that we had succeeded in clearing the Morea of Turkish and Egyptian troops, and that we were disposed to be satisfied with the acknowledgment of its qualified independence ; should Russia think differently, she has the means of making her opinion prevail in this, as in every other respect, by giving the necessary character to her operations in the north ; both with respect to hostile movements and to the conditions of peace to be exacted from the Porte. The truth is, that Russia is no longer co-operating with us to establish the qualified independence of Greece and fulfil the Treaty of London ; but England and France are, to a certain extent, and practically, co-operating with Russia in the prosecution of her war with Turkey, and aiding the accomplishment of those very designs of which we deprecate the existence.

Whether the Treaty be still *trilateral* or not, at least it must be admitted that it is no longer *equilateral*. Now, this equality of position seems essential to its very existence ; for it is idle to talk of Russia *keeping within the Treaty* ; the expression is not intelligible ; but at all events, it is, in the nature of things, absolutely incompatible with her actual position. Russia may declare that she will accomplish the objects of the Treaty ; or she may limit her designs in any other manner ; but all this will now depend on her own discretion, for she possesses entire freedom of action. She may think it expedient to act in this manner with reference to a certain portion of the Turkish empire ; but this will now form a part of the general plan on which she prosecutes her hostilities against the Porte, and will be subservient to the principles by which she

may be regulated. The pacification, and qualified independence of Greece, will no longer afford the substantive ground of interference by the three Powers in the affairs of the Levant, but will henceforth form an episode in the Russian war, and must be regulated accordingly.

It cannot but excite some uneasiness to observe that Russia in the declaration of war, and again in Count Nesselrode's despatch, affects to exclude Turkey from the benefits of that general settlement of Europe in 1814 and 1815 to which treaties she was not a party. Although possessing sentiments of great moderation, it does not appear that Russia, according to the reasoning of this despatch, would consider the balance of Europe as justifying any interest on the part of other Powers, so long as the *political existence* of Turkey was preserved.

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MEMORANDUM.

[ 840. ]

The proposition in the Note of Monsieur de Roth and that of Count Nesselrode's despatch are different. They both indicate measures of war as those to be adopted to force the Porte to consent to the proposals of the Treaty of the 6th of July. These measures are very different in extent; but it is quite obvious that the intention of both will be misunderstood, and that in the existing state of the government of the Porte in Europe and of the countries under its dominion, the adoption of either would be followed by the same fatal consequences.

The Treaty of the 6th of July does not exclude in terms measures of war from the *ulterior measures to be discussed and settled by the representatives of the combined Powers in London, of which the adoption might become necessary*. But the principle and spirit of the Treaty; the instructions to the negotiators of the Protocol and the Treaty on which those instruments were founded; those to the admirals of the combined fleet; those to the ambassadors of the combined Powers at the Porte; and the interests of all Europe, and most particularly those of Russia, whose minister has declared himself upon this point, require that, if within the power of possibility, there should be no war; and that whatever is done should be limited in point of locality, and be applied solely to the attainment of the object in view. The propositions that the Russian army should enter the Principalities on the left of the Danube in the name of the three combined Powers, and that the combined fleet should blockade the Dardanelles, if practicable as thus limited and efficient to produce this purpose, would be understood, and must be understood by all Europe, but most particularly by the subjects of the Porte in the countries ex-

tending from the Adriatic to the Black Sea, as neither more nor less than war for the purpose of sustaining an insurrection against the Porte, by three of the most powerful monarchs in Europe : the very three who from their geographical position and the nature of their power were the most capable of overturning the dominion of the Porte in Europe.

But the application of this measure thus limited is, in truth, impracticable. A Russian army, of the magnitude of one to produce any effect upon the Porte, could not remain for any length of time in the Principalities of the Danube unless sustained by an enormous expense of money.

This, indeed, must be the reason for which this limited measure has not been proposed by the Russian Cabinet. In the same manner the blockade of the Dardanelles would be useless for any purpose of annoyance to Constantinople. The navigation of the Mediterranean and the communication by sea with Egypt are not, as is supposed, necessary for the supply of food to Constantinople.

This occupation of the Principalities and the blockade of the Dardanelles, as proposed in Monsieur de Roth's Note, would produce nothing but general alarm and distrust in Europe, and those consequences in the Turkish dominion which will be discussed more fully presently.

I now come to consider the proposition made by Count Nesselrode, viz. : That the Russian army is not to occupy the Principalities on the Danube alone, in the name of the three Powers, but is to continue its march across and its operations on the right of that river. That this operation is to be attended by an attack by the combined fleet on the Dardanelles, co-operating with one by the Russian fleet from the Black Sea ; and that these fleets are, under the walls of the Seraglio, to dictate the terms of peace.

These are, certainly, really efficient military operations, to which it is obvious that those proposed by the French minister must have tended and ultimately have come. But no man in his senses will believe that the combined Powers can have any object in view by such operations excepting the overthrow of the Ottoman dominion in Europe, the maintenance of which dominion is stated and avowed to be the object of some, and to be consistent with the interests of all. It is impossible that three such Powers as England, France, and Russia can make

war upon such a Power as the Porte without shaking it to its foundations. But when that war is made avowedly to force a settlement of the insurrectionary contest in Greece, and that its operations are of a nature and extent to tend to the dissolution of the government, it is obvious that every people submitted to the government of the Porte along the frontier of the Austrian dominions will be in a state of insurrection. The shedding of human blood, which it was one of the objects of the Treaty of the 6th of July to prevent, and the evils of all descriptions which must be the consequence of the prolongation of the state of things supposed to exist in Greece, for which it was another object of the Treaty to find a remedy, would become general throughout the dominions of the Porte in Europe; and for these evils there would be no remedy excepting the interference of the combined Powers by means of their armies and fleets.

The application of this remedy is founded upon the hypothesis that in such a state of things it would be possible for the combined Powers, or that they would think of maintaining the dominion of the Porte in Europe. This is not probable. The most probable result would be that, contrary to their now declared views, intentions, and interests, they would be under the necessity of annihilating the Ottoman government in Europe. Whether the combined Powers should determine to leave the government of the Porte in existence in Europe, to suppress all insurrectionary movements by means of their own armies, or to destroy the government of the Porte and to dispose of its dominions, either by the establishment of another dynasty at Constantinople, or to partition those dominions, it is quite obvious that these measures must occasion a general armament throughout Europe, even if it can be hoped that such events would not give fresh grounds for general war.

Surely it cannot be wise to adopt measures which must place the combined Powers under the necessity of making the choice among such extreme difficulties.

WELLINGTON.

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*Dean Phillpotts to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

16, Clarges Street, 18th March, 1828.

In presuming to obtrude the accompanying volume on your Grace's notice, I am well aware that I may not hope that time so valuable will be wasted



in a regular perusal of it. At p. 176 your Grace will find the general principle which has guided me in the composition of the whole volume. Perhaps there may be some particulars brought together relative to the Irish Roman Catholic prelates not wholly undeserving of attention, especially at p. 258 onwards. I am also myself induced to ascribe more importance to the considerations adduced in the chapter entitled, 'Case of the 40s. Freeholders,' at p. 274, than it is, I fear, in the power of my pen to impress on others. The claims of morality and religion seem to me imperiously to demand that something be done on that great particular; and it is gratifying to think that what is demanded by the most sacred principles, would, perhaps, be found one of the most efficient measures of political expedience.

When I had the honour of seeing your Grace at Wynyard, you were pleased to direct my thoughts to the question of communication with Rome. I have not failed to obey your Grace's commands; and, in the course of a very few days, I shall venture to transmit my poor thoughts on the subject, unless, in the meanwhile, I understand from your Grace, that you would rather I should forbear.

I beg leave to add, that I am not so unreasonable as to hope or desire that your Grace should think it necessary to trouble yourself with acknowledging the receipt of any papers which I may presume to offer. But should any of them appear of sufficient moment to need elucidation, I shall be proud to receive your Grace's commands, however communicated.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke,  
with the truest respect and gratitude,  
your Grace's most obliged and most humble servant,  
HENRY PHILLPOTTS.

[ 841. ]

*A son Altesse le Prince d'Esterhazy.*

MON CHER PRINCE,

A Londres, ce 19<sup>me</sup> Mars, 1828.

Je vous renvoie les dépêches incluses.

Je voulais vous indiquer mes pensées sur les conséquences de ce que ferait l'Infante en Portugal, en égard à son propre pays et la conduite de l'Empereur son frère. C'est-à-dire l'insurrection certaine et permanente de l'un, et l'encouragement de l'autre.

Pour ce qui regarde ce pays-ci, je n'ai pas parlé; quoiqu'il soit certain que ce pays-ci regardera de très-mauvais œil un système renversé par la populace parce qu'on a peur de s'y opposer!

Toujours à vous bien sincèrement,

WELLINGTON.

*To the Hon. G. Agar-Ellis.\**

[ 842. ]

MY DEAR SIR,

London, 19th March, 1828.

I have heard a good deal about pulling down Marlborough House, &c., but I have no reason to believe that any serious intention exists, much less that any plan has been agreed upon and sanctioned by the Treasury for pulling the house down and building a street upon the ground.

I should think that the experience acquired at Carlton House would be of some use in guiding the decision of the Treasury upon this measure, considered as one of finance. However, I have considered the subject but little, and it is not pressing. I have postponed the consideration of it, in order to attend to others of more importance just at present.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. William Huskisson.*

[ 843. ]

MY DEAR HUSKISSON,

London, 20th March, 1828.

I have looked over the enclosed papers, and have referred to what passed before upon the subject of the Rideau Canal.

	£
I believe there was a vote for this canal in 1826 for	15,000
There was one in 1827 for . . . . .	40,000
Total . . . . .	£55,000
Expended between September, 1826, and	
January, 1828 . . . . .	61,236
Deficiency . . . . .	£6,236

I do not see the estimate for the works which are to amount to 140,000*l.* in the year 1828. Supposing the whole to cost 420,000*l.*, and that a full third has been contracted for, to be completed in the year 1828, still from the whole amount 61,000*l.* should be deducted. This will leave 120,000*l.* as the third for each year.

But this is a very idle way of doing the business. The Engineer department should be called upon to compare this

\* Mr. Agar-Ellis was a son of the second Viscount Clifden. He was created Lord Dover in 1831, and died in 1833, during his father's lifetime.

report with Lieutenant-Colonel By's estimate of the expense of performing each service, for which he reports that he has contracted ; and they should set down opposite to each service the sum which he estimated it would cost. You will then see with tolerable exactness what the total estimate for this year's service will amount to, and can apply to Parliament accordingly.

It is very unfortunate that Lieutenant-Colonel By should not have waited for an answer before he proceeded so far in the execution of his works, as I am afraid that we must consequently go before Parliament with the whole case this year.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 844. ]

*To the Earl of Dudley.*

MY DEAR LORD DUDLEY,

London, 21st March, 1828.

I have been looking over the Portuguese treaties in regard to the guarantee of the succession, about which I see that we must be very cautious. There is a note on the subject from Mr. Canning to the Marquis de Palmella of the \* February, 1826, which is very well deserving of attention.

I think we ought to do no more than recognise the family treaty to be made between the two branches.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*Lieutenant-Colonel Pasley † to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Chatham, 22nd March, 1828.

I hope your Grace will pardon me for a brief intrusion on your valuable time.

I have long been of opinion that a considerable saving might gradually be effected in the pay of the British army, by a plan not to my knowledge before suggested, but which, as it affects Guards, Line, and Ordnance Corps generally, it would be useless to submit to the chief of any one military department ; and which, although a measure of retrenchment, might, by the method I propose, be effected without exciting discontent, with great benefit to the government, and without injury to the recruiting of the army.

\* Blank in manuscript.

† General Sir Charles Pasley, K.C.B.

If your Grace should deem the subject worthy of consideration, I will draw up the plan alluded to in detail; and, waiting your commands,

I have the honour to be, with the highest respect,  
 your Grace's most obedient humble servant,  
 C. W. PASLEY, Lt.-Col. R. Engineers.

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*To Lieutenant-Colonel Pasley.*

[ 845. ]

MY DEAR SIR,

If you were to see the number of plans which I receive every day upon every description of subject, all of which I am obliged to peruse, you would admit that there was no necessity for having any scruple about sending me your plan for diminishing the pay of the army.

I have long considered the subject, and I have come to the conclusion that the thing cannot be done. But I should be happy to find myself mistaken.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Admiral Sir Sidney Smith.*

[ 846. ]

MY DEAR SIR SIDNEY,

London, 24th March, 1828.

I have received your letter of the 21st instant, enclosing one which you have written to the Lord High Admiral, expressing your wish to be employed on the Lisbon station.

In answer I have to inform you that I have no reason to believe that any intention exists of employing any force, whether naval or military, in Portugal or on its coasts.

Ever, my dear Sir Sidney, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Right Hon. Sir Frederick Lamb.*

[ 847. ]

MY DEAR LAMB,

London, 24th March, 1828.

I have received your letter of the 15th instant, and you will have seen from the orders sent from hence, in answer to your despatches up to the 12th instant, that the government are of opinion that, in the existing crisis at Lisbon, our troops ought to be away.

You will recollect that I entertained the opinion that they

ought to have been brought away when the Spaniards withdrew their cordon. Having been allowed to remain after that opportunity of withdrawing them, it does not follow (I admit) that they ought to be withdrawn now. But it must be observed that it was announced to Parliament and to the world that they had received orders to withdraw; and it would not answer to leave them in Portugal, and to reinforce them, in order to maintain the Portuguese constitution, much less to support a particular party in the government of Portugal.

The troops were sent out to protect Portugal against a foreign invasion; and with positive orders not to interfere in the domestic contest going on at the same time. It is true that, incidentally, their presence has given protection to the constitutional party. But that is no reason why they should be left there. If the constitutional party are the stronger, they do not require our protection. If they are not, the other party must have the upper hand; and it will not answer for us to involve this country in a contest to maintain the government in the hands of the Constitutionalists. Although you judged correctly, therefore, in detaining the troops till government could have an opportunity of deciding upon the case, I think we could not have done otherwise than order the troops to embark and come away.

As far as I can judge of the state of affairs at Lisbon, both parties are frightened out of their senses. On the one hand Don Miguel has listened to the tales of all the old women, who have told him that the house of every nobleman contains a Freemason's lodge, or is the place of meeting of a secret society, whose object it is to concert plans to assassinate him, and to overturn his government; and, on the other, the constitutional party believe that Don Miguel must intend to overthrow the charter, and to usurp his brother's kingdom; that the changes of government, and that of the officers commanding in the provinces, and of certain regiments in Lisbon, are the evidence of such intention; and that the next step will be to arrest, imprison, and murder them.

Don Miguel has behaved very ill by some of his omissions, and very foolishly by some of his actions. I will begin by the last mentioned. His selection of an exclusively ultra ministry; his dismissal from his service of such men as Villa Flor, Alva, Caula, Lumiars, &c., &c., &c.; his premature dissolution of the Chambers, which would have expired in the end of March, are

acts of folly approaching to madness, to which he must have been instigated only by his apprehensions of a secret danger of which he was ignorant of the magnitude. Then his omission to take the oath like a man, or, as I believe, at all, his omission to issue the proclamation promised at Vienna, and his omission to punish those who disturbed the public peace within the precincts of his own palace in order to terrify the constitutional party, are breaches of faith or of duty as a sovereign prince which are calculated to excite the mistrust of all mankind; and, coupled with his acts, to render that mistrust a certainty of danger in the minds of those exposed to his power who belong to the party which he is supposed to dislike. We have certainly a right to remonstrate upon his omission to issue the proclamation promised; and you will see that we have gone even farther than is consistent with strict rule in desiring that you should remonstrate respecting the formation of his ministry, and advise him respecting the pardon of the rebels, and the intention of his sister to come to Portugal. Our relations towards Portugal, his peculiar situation, and the engagements into which he entered in the Protocol at Vienna, are our excuse. We must wait for the result of our advice, and for the progress of events after our troops shall have been withdrawn. If matters go on quietly, if there should be no act of cruelty or violence, I confess that I do not see that we have any right to complain of Don Miguel preferring to employ one party in his service instead of another; more particularly if he calls together a new Chamber of Deputies. But if there should be any violence or cruelty, I should then be of opinion that we ought to withdraw our countenance from the Court of Lisbon; and that we should order our ambassador to withdraw, leaving a chargé-d'affaires to transact the business which must always exist between the two countries.

In replying to your letter I have thought best to give you my view of the whole case, that you may see exactly where we stand. You will judge whether I am well or ill informed. But I think I know both sides of the question; and I hope that we have come to a decision which is consistent with the honour and interests of this country.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*The Right Hon. William Lamb to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Irish Office, 24th March, 1828.

With reference to our conversation of this morning, I send you an extract of a letter which I received yesterday morning from Lord Anglesey, and which gives in his own words the opinion he is at present inclined to form upon the question of the re-enactment of the Roman Catholic Association Bill.

Yours faithfully,

WM. LAMB.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Do keep matters quiet in Parliament, if possible; the less that is said of Protestant and Catholic the better. It would be presumptuous to form an opinion or even a sanguine hope in so short a time, yet I cannot but think that there is much and reciprocal inclination to get rid of the bugbear and to soften down asperities.

Amongst the more moderate I am certain this is the case, and I am by no means sure that even the *most violent* would not be glad to have an excuse for being *less violent*. Even at the Association they are at a loss to keep up the extreme irritation they had accomplished, and if they find that they are not *violently* opposed and that there is no disposition on the part of government to coercion, I do believe that they will dwindle into moderation. If, however, we have a mind to have a good *blaze* again, we may at once command it by re-enacting the expiring Bill, and when we have even improved it and rendered it *perfect*, we shall find that it will not be acted upon. In short, I will back Messrs. O'Connell's and Shiel's, &c., *erasions* against the crown lawyer's *lases*. I am calling for opinions upon this most momentous subject from the several authorities, and am getting all the information I can from sensible and dispassionate people; and my conviction is, that the great bulk of opinion will be in favour of allowing the Bill to go out without notice or observation.

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*Dean Phillpotts to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

16, Clarges Street, 25th March, 1828.

I have the honour of transmitting my poor thoughts on the subject of communication with Rome; and I have ventured to append to them what will, I fear, be deemed a very useless, if not presumptuous, suggestion of a mode of rendering practicable the concession of equal civil rights to the Roman Catholics.

In doing this I throw myself on your Grace's indulgence for my excuse. The end to be obtained is so important, that every British subject may be pardoned for seeking to contribute to its attainment. That my meagre plan shall be thought worthy of adoption I cannot hope, but if it contain a single suggestion which can be made available by your Grace's wisdom, I shall be more than rewarded for the trouble it has given me.

That your Grace may, in your own good time, be enabled to effect the settlement of this long agitated question, is not only my earnest wish but my fervent hope.

I may be permitted to add, that no person whatever has seen the accompanying papers, and no person except Sir Henry Hardinge (and he only

in a general manner) knows my intention of presuming to address your Grace on the subject.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke,  
with the greatest respect and gratitude,  
your Grace's most obliged and most humble servant,

HENRY PHILLPOTTS.

[ENCLOSURE.]

THOUGHTS ON COMMUNICATION WITH ROME, AND ON CONCESSION OF  
EQUAL CIVIL RIGHTS TO ROMAN CATHOLICS.

It is respectfully submitted whether it be necessary, and, if not necessary, whether it can be expedient, to move for the repeal of laws prohibiting intercourse with Rome, in order to a negotiation with the Pope for the purpose of placing the Roman Catholic prelacy and priesthood under some measure and degree of control from the British government.

Such a motion could not fail to excite alarm, and to be a signal for general clamour; a result, it is presumed, very undesirable, and not to be hazarded unless under circumstances of peculiar urgency.

Experience has made it quite certain that *unofficial* communication with Rome can be carried on with great efficiency in spite of the existing laws, and it may be worthy of consideration whether such unofficial intercourse be not, in reality, the most desirable mode of negotiating with a Court so full of finesse and artifice, as well as so peculiar in its internal construction and in its relation to foreign States.

If this be taken into account, perhaps it may be deemed the best course to come to a full understanding of all that can be obtained, and all that is worth obtaining, from the Vatican, before the public mind in England be agitated by any proposal to repeal the statutes which prohibit intercourse with the Papal See. The proposed repeal would thus come before the public free from all the excitement which an indefinite apprehension of the possible views of Government could not fail to excite; and the expediency of the end would have a fair and free course in reconciling the minds of men to the means necessary for obtaining it.

It is further submitted whether it be not in the highest degree important to come to a clear understanding with the Papal See, in the very outset of the negotiation, on *one or two principles* which it may be found absolutely necessary to claim as *indispensable*.

First, it can hardly be supposed that the British government can contemplate the possibility, under any circumstances, of acceding to any measure which would involve an acknowledgment of any Roman Catholic Bishops in England or Ireland, as *Bishops in Ordinary*, or Bishops of *Sees*. An acknowledgment of them in that character would be absolutely incompatible with the rights and privileges of the Bishops of the Established Church, and would therefore (it is humbly submitted), be contrary to his Majesty's Coronation Oath. The utmost that could be safely conceded would be to acknowledge them as *Bishops* as invested with all the power of *Episcopal Order*, but not with *jurisdiction*.

Yet it may be apprehended that the Court of Rome would find, or affect to find, insuperable difficulties in granting to any government any control over the appointment of Bishops, not acknowledged by that government to have a *diocesan* character and power. In fact, in no one of the numerous cases in which *Aatholic* governments (as they are called at Rome) are permitted to direct or influence the appointment of Roman Catholic Bishops within the



dominions does the same grand distinction exist, which makes *the case of this kingdom* at once *singular* and full of difficulty; *is none*, in short, are there *Protestant Bishops of the same Sees*.

Secondly. From this peculiarity another difficulty will be found to arise, which must be provided for in the very outset.

Rome has in no instance granted any influence over its prelacy to any A Catholic government, without requiring the assignment of a specific *fund for endowing the Sees* of those Bishops whose appointment is to be subjected to that influence. But to give an endowment to such Sees, to recognise anything *equivalent to a vested interest* in such endowments in the persons who fill them, would be not only to acknowledge, but absolutely to *establish* a co-ordinate Episcopacy, hostile to the Episcopacy of the Established Church, and not less inconsistent with its just and essential rights than the acknowledgment of another king of Great Britain would be incompatible with the rights of the Sovereign on the throne.

It will be absolutely necessary, therefore, to demand as a *preliminary* to all negotiation at Rome, that more be not expected from his Majesty towards the maintenance of Roman Catholic Prelates or Priests, than a *Regium Donum*, liable to be granted or withholden at pleasure.

The demand of these two preliminaries may possibly be found to preclude all negotiation; for, *in no instance* hitherto *has either of them been conceded*. After all, however, if negotiation cannot be carried on with the Court of Rome, is all hope of adjustment absolutely at an end?

In the very peculiar difficulties which have embarrassed, and continue to embarrass, this great question, and after the failure of every previous attempt to solve the great problem of conciliating the concession of all the reasonable claims of the Roman Catholics with efficient and adequate securities for this Protestant Church and State, it may be pardonable, however presumptuous, for a very humble individual to hazard a few suggestions.

The absolute necessity of avoiding everything like treaty or bargain with his Majesty's Roman Catholic subjects themselves, seems to be now so generally acknowledged, that it will be here assumed as a maxim. This maxim, however, will of course admit of every fair consideration being given to the known conscientious principles, and even as far as possible to the rooted prejudices of the petitioners. Still, those prejudices must not be permitted to interfere with any arrangement which may be *essential* to the security of the main objects of a Protestant government.

The first and greatest point of all is to prevent so large a hostile force being poured into *Parliament* (in the event of concession), as shall endanger the safety or the tranquillity of the State. For that purpose, if for no other, it would be absolutely necessary so to regulate the elective suffrage in Ireland, as shall restore to property its due and constitutional influence. This would involve the extinction of the present system of voting for *forty-shilling fictitious freeholds* in Ireland (or rather for freeholds of fictitious value), a measure which seems, indeed, to be demanded by higher considerations than those of political expedience.

The effect of this measure would, it is obvious, be most important; it would prevent any large number of Roman Catholic members being returned for a long time, and would ensure that those who may be returned shall be of that station, and most probably of those feelings, which would render them least dangerous to any of our existing institutions.

But this measure, it is humbly submitted, ought to be carried on the high ground of moral duty, and as necessary for the prevention of that system of *perjury*, which seems inseparable from the present state of the law among a

people so undisciplined as the Irish. It will thus be free from the degrading appearance of capitulating with an insolent and overbearing faction.

When carried it will make the cause of concession not only to be more free from danger, but perhaps even to be recommended by the strongest reasons of policy as well as generosity. The security of a well-devised *oath* not involving the affirmation or denial of any religious dogmas, would, in this case, succeed to the declaration against Transubstantiation and the Mass, prescribed by 30, cap. II., to be taken by *all who sit and vote in Parliament*.

The efficacy of such an oath as a security to the Church will be found to be greater than seems to have been hitherto considered, or may at first sight appear.

Be it as little operative on Roman Catholics as may be (it would, however, hardly be altogether inoperative on the minds of such of them as would be returned to Parliament), still there are most momentous *collateral advantages* which would result from it, and which, on a fair consideration, would be found to do far more than balance any hazard to be justly apprehended from the introduction of those Roman Catholics into the legislature.

In the first place, supposing that the oath substituted for the declaration of 30, cap. II., should bind the party taking it to "maintain and support to the Bishops and Clergy of the Protestant Church of England and Ireland by law established, all such rights, privileges, and possessions, as do or shall by law belong to them, and not to exercise any political right, power, or privilege, to weaken or disturb the Protestant government or Protestant Reformed Religion by law established within this realm," it would be a great constitutional recognition of the *essential Union of the Protestant Church and State*.

But, secondly, it would carry with it a more direct benefit to the Church. It would bind *all* who have seats in Parliament, whether Roman Catholics or Protestants, to abstain from all acts hostile to it. At present *none* who sit there are so bound. The only security sought or given is in the declaration against Popery. *The Protestant enemies of the Church*, whether in the number of its nominal members, or avowedly dissenting from its whole scheme of doctrine and discipline, may at present prosecute their plans of hostile legislation without any check whatever, except that which is presented by the King's Coronation Oath, and which it is obvious could only be brought into action by a most unpleasant if not perilous conflict of the Crown with the Parliament.

On this point it may be proper to remark, that the very stringent and forcible nature of the Coronation Oath, extending (it is humbly but confidently submitted) to all the Sovereign's regal acts, legislative as well as executive, would fully justify such a restriction to be imposed on the members of both Houses of Parliament.

Hitherto nothing has been said respecting the admission of Roman Catholics to *offices under the Crown*. The reason is, that in the estimation of the writer of these remarks, this is a matter of comparatively very little moment. He conceives that if the exercise of Church patronage attached to offices be withheld from Roman Catholics, little or no danger could accrue from their admissibility to offices, so long as the Church is secured from all hostile legislation. Parliament is now the only depository (under the Crown) of real political power. In this respect the present times differ widely from those in which the laws imposing disabilities on Roman Catholics were enacted. No Minister or Privy Councillor can now, it is conceived, acquire or retain any formidable power unless he be in Parliament. To restrain him *there* is virtually to restrain him altogether. After all, whether two or three of the very highest offices ought to be excepted, is a matter on which it is not necessary here to express an opinion.

With regard to *subjecting the Roman Catholic hierarchy to superintendence and control*, a matter which seems to involve some of the greatest difficulties of the whole question, it is humbly suggested that perhaps the shortest and simplest mode would be the most effectual and the least encumbered with objections.

The modes hitherto proposed have involved interference, direct or indirect, with the *elections* of Roman Catholic Bishops, and have been exposed to much complaint, sincere and insincere, against their trenching on ecclesiastical discipline. Might it not be better to avoid altogether meddling with or recognising their elections or nominations; nay, to avoid even the mention of Roman Catholics in particular, and to make a simple and general enactment that *no person* not being a Bishop of the Established Church shall *exercise any Episcopal function*, or pretended Episcopal function, without first obtaining a licence from the Crown, through the Secretary of State for the Home Department in England, or the Secretary for Ireland in cases arising in that country, or the

\* for Scotland; in which last country the *Protestant* Bishops would thus be subjected to the same restraint; a matter perfectly reasonable and proper in a country where the Presbyterian Church government is established by law, and likely to make the whole measure more palatable to all parties, by being equal in its operation.

By the Bills of 1813, 1822, and 1825, *Boards* were to be erected, for the purpose of bearing or receiving testimony to the fitness of the persons elected Bishops, and the structure of these Boards gave rise to much discussion, and provoked much of well-grounded, and more of specious objection. Now it is conceived that if these Boards be necessary (for the information of the Crown before the licence be granted), a matter in itself very questionable, they might under the enactment suggested above, be erected by the Crown without any notice whatever being previously taken of them in any Act of Parliament, and thus much needless excitement would be prevented.

The penalty for any person, not being a Bishop of the Established Church, exercising any episcopal function without a licence, might be removal out of the kingdom to any part of Europe which the party shall choose for the first offence, and in case of his return without leave of the Crown, or repeating his offence if he return with leave, removal to any part of Europe, or beyond seas, which the Crown shall choose.

An additional and very important security would be obtained by making the licence *revocable at the pleasure of the Crown*.

The *stipends* to the Roman clergy (if it be deemed expedient to grant them), instead of being provided for by an Act of Parliament, as proposed in 1825, would, on every account, be much better left, like other grants, to an annual vote. This would remove all semblance of an establishment, and, therefore, would be more becoming; it would excite less of alarm and hostility, and therefore would accord better with the general principle and purpose of the whole proceeding.

There remains the question respecting *Bulls* and other Papal instruments. To forbid the *introduction* of them would most probably be vain; to forbid, under fit penalties, the *publication* of them without leave of the Crown (to be signified as in the former case) would be at once effectual and sufficient.

The laws prohibiting processions and other public exhibitions of all religious worship, except that of the Established Church, might well continue as they are.

In fine, the whole amount of the legislative provisions here suggested is as follows:—

1st. The effectual regulation of the elective suffrage in Ireland, so as to ensure to property its due influence.

\* Blank in manuscript.

2nd. The imposing an oath for the protection of the Church, to be taken by all members of both Houses of Parliament in lieu of the declaration on oath against Transubstantiation, &c., now required to be taken by all.

3rd. The prohibition of any person not being a Bishop of the Established Church exercising episcopal functions without a licence from the Crown.

4th. Prohibition of publication of Bulls, &c., without a similar licence.

The stipends to Roman Catholic clergy to be the subject of an annual grant by vote of Parliament, not by statute.

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*A son Altesse le Prince d'Estéshazy.*

[ 848. ]

MON CHER PRINCE,

A Londres, ce 28 Mars, 1828.

Je vous renvoie les papiers inclus.

M. le Comte de la Ferronnays s'est trompé sur quelques points importants.

1. Nous n'avons pas proposé *une expédition* en Morée.

2. L'Empereur de Russie n'a jamais même soufflé l'idée de s'arrêter sur le Danube.

3. L'Empereur de Russie, dans ses propositions du 26<sup>me</sup> Février, ne nous dit pas "Marchez avec moi. Je m'arrêterai sur le Danube; (ou, ce qui est plus) je marcherai selon le Traité du 6<sup>me</sup> Juillet." Mais il nous a dit: "Marchez avec moi. Je remplirai le but du Traité du 6<sup>me</sup> Juillet en ce qui regarde la Grèce; et je ne prendrai rien et vous ne prendrez rien sur ce compte-là. Mais pour ce qui me regarde, il me faudrait satisfaction pour moi et mes sujets, sécurité pour l'avenir pour commerce, religion, privilège, et indemnification de mes dépenses, des pertes de mes sujets, &c., &c."

Vous voyez donc que M. le Comte de la Ferronnays est loin de voir les choses comme elles sont réellement.

Toujours à vous, mon cher Prince,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Marquess of Londonderry to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Grandvilliers, France, 28th March, 1828.

As you know my feelings about the Catholic Association, and as you will shortly have to consider this subject, I send you, *confidentially*, a letter from Clancarty, which shows the conviction of a resident proprietor, whose understanding and good sense is unquestionable.

I wish what he says of Akermann could be the policy of the day; but I fear your horizon there is too much *embrouillé*. The remainder of the letter, of course, you will not mind or allude to, and when read burn it.

I will write to you from Paris if I can make my communication of any interest, though I suspect the Liberals and Russians will be very shy of me.

Ever yours most affectionately,

VANE LONDONDERRY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*The Earl of Clancarty to the Marquess of Londonderry.*

MY DEAR CHARLES,

Garbally, 20th March, 1828.

You will have seen that your most useful *splash* upon Lord Duncannon's letter, or rather Lord Lansdowne's explanations upon that occasion, has subverted the popularity of the noble Marquess in the popish parliament and hurled him down from the highest pitch of *éloge* to the lowest point of reprobation. This alone would be of great utility on both sides of the water: on yours, by affording an additional excitement in the ranks of the Whigs against this *imperium in imperio*; on ours, in sowing distrust among the most moderate of the Romanists in the *legislative part of their establishment*, and inducing them to doubt whether the setting both sides of the British legislature personally against them is the best means of obtaining their objects.

Had I the means I should with anxious pleasure furnish you with any hints in my power calculated to assist in the overthrow of that monster of an assembly, which the pusillanimity of our ministry has suffered to usurp the real government of this country; but ever since my arrival in this island in March, 1824, down to the premiership of Mr. Canning, I have been incessantly labouring with ministers themselves, and quite in vain, to work out this effect. In my opinion the Act for putting down these assemblies, now about to expire, should never have been passed: the common law of the land was amply sufficient (had ministers possessed the spunk to execute it) to have sent Mr. O'Connell and all his myrmidons packing into their native obscurity; and in this opinion I am happy to find that I am borne out by that of no less an authority than Lord Eldon. The law, however, did pass, and its very passage has furnished a kind of *legislative declaration* that the *common law* did not reach the *evil*. It is now about to expire. The question is, what is *now* to be done? Had it ever been acted upon, its weak points might have been perceived and additional force afforded. But with a pusillanimity unprecedented by any example in former times, added to a *truckling* desire of acquiring popularity, though ample grounds for prosecution have existed, not a single attempt has been made to render the statute of avail.

Notwithstanding the evil of a legislative declaration, such as that I have described, had I a voice in what was now about to be done, I should incline to let the Bill run out, revert to the common law, and put an end to the popish parliament by authority, and *immediately*. I say immediately, because with such a *legislative declaration* as the Act about to expire has furnished in their favour, no doubt the Orangemen, who have shown their deference to the principles declared by Parliament, by their never having attempted to evade the provisions of the Act, when it shall actually have expired, will no longer be disposed to continue themselves tame spectators of the ruin of the country; but, if the government shall continue to abdicate the legitimate authority of the Crown, and to hand it over to the popish hierarchy and its popish parliament, they will stand forward in opposition to such a shameful and pernicious surrender. We shall thus be blessed with all the benefits of a civil war, in addition to the advantages the United Kingdom is to derive from the Triple Alliance.

If the Russians have declared war against the Porte upon the Treaty of Akermann, this is surely a subject upon which to congratulate the Duke of Wellington. Such a step would be, as far as Russia is concerned, a direct violation of the Treaty of London; and though war, aye, and war the termination of which cannot be foreseen, would still be the probable consequence, yet we should then go to war on the right, instead of the wrong side.

Heaven send us a good deliverance! But with such men as Huskisson and the fag end of his infernal Canningites as our rulers—with Mr. Peel's art of weakening the ministry in the Commons by associating with men who never can possess the public confidence—I must own I am almost in despair. God bless you.

Yours most affectionately,

CLANCARTY.

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*The Marquess of Anglesey to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Dublin Castle, 28th March, 1828.

I wish to call your attention to the survey of Ireland.

Having turned my thoughts to the subject when I was at the Ordnance, I have been led to make inquiries about it since I came to this country, and I have reason to believe that the business is not going on as rapidly and as economically as it might do under a different system.

No fault whatever is to be found, either from want of zeal or from want of science, in the chief officer, Colonel Colby. On the contrary, it is perhaps from an excess of both that the service is not proceeding so satisfactorily as it is capable of being made to advance.

Colonel Colby works upon the most *refined* and scientific principles, and these are necessarily so slow in progress, and, as appears from many results obtained, so liable to errors of infinite consequence, that recourse has frequently been had to the usual practice of surveying, in order to detect them.

The time necessary to complete the work upon the system pursued by Colonel Colby will greatly exceed that originally calculated upon, and the expense will be proportionably increased. Such is the general impression of this country.

The proposition I have to make is, that you will move the Master-General of the Ordnance to cause a Committee of scientific practical and impartial officers to examine the work done, the progress made, and the expense incurred, and to report upon the most eligible method of pursuing this very important undertaking.

There are also certain points relative to the boundaries and to the boundary surveyors that I would wish to be investigated by the Committee, if it should be decided to send one.

Believe me, my dear Duke of Wellington, very sincerely yours,

ANGLESEY.

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*Mr. Briggs\* to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

The following extracts, just received from Egypt to 29th March, communicate the confidential feelings of his Highness the Pacha on the subject of his army in the Morea, and are respectfully submitted by Mr. Briggs to his Grace the Duke of Wellington, in hopes they may tend to promote the object of Lieutenant-Colonel Cradock's mission.

“ Alexandria, 29th March, 1828.

“ The answer of the Porte on the subject of Lieutenant-Colonel Cradock's mission leaves things precisely in the same position as before, the Porte refusing to give any other reply than that already communicated to the three ambassadors, which it confirms; so that Colonel Cradock will return immediately to Corfu. The Pacha has written from the Delta that he will still continue to use his best endeavours to induce the Turkish government to relax in its determination.

“ At the same time the Pacha states that out of consideration for the Allied Powers he had desired his son *Ibrahim Pacha* to desist from hostilities against the Greeks, and had found a pretext for recalling his troops from Tripolizza (the capital) to the neighbourhood of *Modon*, where they will remain in a state of inactivity; whereby he complies with the wishes of the Allies respecting neutrality, so far as it is in his power to do, under the circumstances in which he is placed. He expresses a hope that these circumstances and the favourable disposition manifested by him will be taken into consideration by the Allies, and induce them not to allow Ibrahim Pacha and his army to suffer for want of provisions, before an arrangement can be made for their retiring from the Morea with decorum and without compromising their character with the Porte. The Turkish government, in contemplation of the distress to which Ibrahim Pacha might be reduced for want of supplies, had given him orders to retire upon *Roumelia*; but as it was the intention of the Porte that he should act upon the same system of devastation which they had ordered him to employ in the Morea, the Pacha cannot comply with that order, were it not even objectionable on other grounds of more immediate personal interest to himself; as his object is to bring back his son and his army as soon as possible to Egypt, instead of employing them in operations entirely foreign to his policy and interests. The Porte, suspecting that the Pacha might avail himself of the pretext of want of provisions to withdraw his troops from the Morea, has also despatched the *tefterdas* from Constantinople with a sum of money to procure supplies in Roumelia and forward them to Ibrahim Pacha. This would, however, be impracticable now that the troops have retired to Modon, and the Porte will consequently expect that, if pressed, Ibrahim Pacha should march into Roumelia, leaving garrisons in the forts occupied by him, and laying waste the whole country in his way. But this disposition will never be carried into effect by the Pacha; for I cannot suppose that our government will consider it by any means advisable to reduce Ibrahim Pacha to the necessity of falling back upon Roumelia, as the presence of so efficient an army there could only serve to protract the contest, and if once there, it would be impossible to neutralise its operations, as may be accomplished by the plan

\* A banker and merchant in Alexandria.

which the Pacha has now in view. It appears to me that the Allies will approve the line of conduct adopted by the Pacha, and will not be disposed to distress Ibrahim Pacha by a strict maritime blockade, which would be equally destructive to the Greek population; as the small district to which he will now be confined by his father's instructions may enable the Greek government to proceed in the organisation of the rest of the Morea, until some plan can be devised for the entire evacuation of the country, without committing the Pacha with the Porte.

“His Highness is, however, apprehensive that the Allies, and particularly England, whose influence is paramount, may have it in view to involve him with the Porte; and it is for this purpose that I put you *au fait* of what is passing, that you may exert yourself to avert the evil with which he thinks he is threatened. I have endeavoured to persuade our friends that our government can have no interest in exposing the Pacha to the displeasure of the Sultan, and if they have entertained the idea of putting the Morea in a state of blockade, it could only be with the hope of avoiding a greater evil, which might result from actual hostilities in any other part of Turkey; as in the event of a war once breaking out, it was impossible to foresee where it might end. The Pacha asks for no compensation but what the British government may consider him entitled to.

“The Allies, in their negotiations with the Porte, having consented to let the forts of the Morea remain in possession of the Turks, the Pacha does not think on that principle they can object to Ibrahim Pacha receiving supplies of provisions.”

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*To the Marquess of Anglesey.*

[ 849. ]

MY DEAR LORD ANGLESEY,

London, 31st March, 1828.

I have just received your letter of the 28th instant regarding the survey.

The objects in view when that survey was undertaken, and which, in fact, caused the undertaking, rendered extreme accuracy absolutely necessary; and, in order to ensure it, I resisted all the efforts made, not only by the Irish government and gentlemen that I should employ the Civil Engineers, but likewise the efforts to attain the same objects made by some of the officers of Engineers themselves employed upon the work.

If, however, accuracy has not been obtained, Lieutenant-Colonel Colby is very severely responsible; for I left the whole, the selection of every individual employed, the numbers to be employed, &c., to himself, and did nothing excepting approve of the original plan of the work, its progress from time to time, and its execution. Of all this I approved, after a discussion with, and explanation from, Lieutenant-Colonel Colby, upon a plan suggested by one of the officers under his command for accelerating the work by the employment of Civil Engineers.



There is no doubt that the matter must be severely inquired into, and I will immediately see Lord Beresford upon the subject.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 850. ]

MEMORANDUM.

4th April, 1828.

The Treaty says, "Les Grecs relèveront du Sultan comme d'un seigneur suzerain ; et en conséquence de cette suzeraineté ils payeront à l'empire ottoman une redevance annuelle dont le montant sera fixé une fois pour toutes d'un commun accord."

"Ils seront gouvernés par des autorités qu'ils choisiront et nommeront eux-mêmes, mais à la nomination desquelles la Porte aura une part déterminée."

The "part déterminée" fixed in our *projet* is the approbation of the President ; and a veto upon the choice for two turns.

We have, then, determined that the Porte shall have a Commissioner residing with the Greek government, who may have a knowledge of what is going on.

The question then is, whether anything shall be defined, and what, respecting the future communications of this *suzeraineté* with other foreign Powers.

It is quite obvious that we can't prevent such communications with all foreign Powers upon affairs of commerce ; nor can we prevent communications upon political subjects with the guaranteeing Powers.

This "dependency" of the Porte is to pay a tribute, the amount of which is to be fixed once for all. The inhabitants are to choose and name the authorities by which they are to be governed, but in the nomination of which the Porte are to have a certain share.

It is clear that the tribute cannot be increased in war. But it is equally clear that in peace and war the dependency must follow the fortunes of the *suzerain*.

This appears so clear from the Treaty that, upon the whole, I should say that it is scarcely necessary to enter into explanation upon this point.

WELLINGTON.

*To his Royal Highness the Prince of Orange.*

[ 851. ]

SIR,

London, 5th April, 1828.

I have had the honour of receiving your Royal Highness's letter, and I am very much gratified by your recollection of me, and by the kindness of your expressions towards me.

I have been under the necessity of undertaking to perform the duties of a most arduous situation, under circumstances of great difficulty, and in most critical times; a situation for the performance of the duties of which I am not qualified, and they are very disagreeable to me. But I must say that, up to the present moment, the government have been very successful. There is in fact but little, if any, opposition to it. This state of things cannot last, I know. But as the whole of the landed and great commercial and monied interests of the country are decidedly with us, I hope that, if the existing state of tranquillity in this country should terminate, we shall remain still with a strong government.

Your Royal Highness would scarcely recognise England again if you were now to come here. There is no party remaining. The ladies and the youth of the country in particular are with us, and I could almost count upon my fingers those who are hostile to the government.

I conclude that your Royal Highness is about to witness scenes such as those which we witnessed together some years ago. I confess that I have regretted much all that has passed upon this subject; and notwithstanding the confidence I feel in the talents, the discretion, and the excellent intentions of his Imperial Majesty, I am very much afraid that he will find it out of his power to control the circumstances in which he will find himself. I was informed of the first steps taken in the negotiation of the Treaty of the 6th of July (not indeed at the time they were taken), but before I quitted office in April last; and I certainly did everything in my power to prevail upon the late Mr. Canning not to agree to that Treaty. I have now copies of the letters which I wrote to him in which I foretold its consequences. He persevered, and we are witnesses of the dangers with which Europe is threatened.

I assure your Royal Highness, however, that there is no government more determined than this; no man more deter-

mined than I am, to carry that Treaty into execution, with all the celerity that is in the power of this government, acting in conformity with the principles on which the Treaty was concluded, and which are recited in its provisions.

I sincerely wish your Royal Highness success, and all the honour and glory to which, from what I know of your Royal Highness's character and conduct, I am certain you will have a well-founded title. I entreat you to present my best respects to his Imperial Majesty, and to all the branches of the Imperial Family, and to believe me with the most respectful regard, affection, and attachment,

your Royal Highness's most devoted  
and most faithful servant,

WELLINGTON.

[ 852. ]

*To the Right Hon. Charles Grant.*

MY DEAR MR. GRANT,

London, 5th April, 1828.

I enclose a report which I have received from Lord Melville of the herring and cod fishery to which Lord Melville referred yesterday.

It appears to me that this subject ought to be carefully looked at in these views. Can we hope to preserve the fishery in its existing prosperous condition without the superintendence of the Board?

Can the Board superintend, or will their superintendence be submitted to, unless a bounty is given in some shape?

In the hypothesis of continuing the superintendence and bounty, say till 1835, might we not diminish the bounty upon herrings to a shilling a barrel cured, and upon cod very materially?

The scamen, formed and maintained by this fishery, are really a national object of which we must not risk the loss upon any speculative opinions.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. William Huskisson.*

[ 853. ]

MY DEAR HUSKISSON,

London, 5th April, 1828.

Since the Cabinet of yesterday I have been looking over the information which we have of the suspension of hostilities granted by the Grand Signior to the Greeks; and considering its probable and possible effects in the Levant. I enclose you the copy of the paper which Lord Cowley sent upon it from Vienna, and we have since received accounts that orders had been sent to the Ottoman Commanders-in-Chief, by sea and land, to suspend hostilities unconditionally for three months from the day on which the answer to the Patriarch, that is to say the paper of which the enclosed is an abstract, should arrive in Greece.

Hostilities will therefore be considered as suspended throughout the Levant. Our friends in the Ionian Islands, and particularly at Zante, will immediately recommence their traffic. The Austrians may do the same. Our Admiral, who appears not to dislike his residence at Malta, may think proper to continue there, seeing that there is an armistice, of which he will have the communication from Admiral de Rigny.

In the unfortunate situation of this Greek Question in consequence of the line the Russians have taken, and their still undecided position, it is difficult for us to do much. But I think we might, in the same sense in which we wrote heretofore to the Lord Commissioner and to the Admiral, write again to both, and inform the first that this supposed armistice must not produce a relaxation of the measures ordered to prevent the supply of Ibrahim's army with provisions from the Ionian Islands, Zante in particular; and to the second that as it is hoped he will have resumed his operations to carry into execution his instructions of the 15th October, it is likewise hoped he will not discontinue them in consequence of hearing of this suspension of hostilities until he shall receive further orders from the Conference in London.

I think this will be quite safe. In respect to the Austrian commerce we must speak to Esterhazy.

If you should agree in opinion with me, I beg you to write accordingly to the Lord Commissioner and the Admiral.

Believe me ever yours, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

*The Right Hon. Sir Frederick Lamb to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Lisbon, 5th April, 1828.

I ought to have mentioned to you some time back that these people look much more to their private letters to you and to Lord Beresford than to the public channels of communication. This is quite in the Portuguese fashion, and I hope your answers will correct it. I fear by the letters I get that my government has not looked to the necessity of following up the demands I was directed to make, by some measure, in case they should be refused. This would never do; it would sink our character, and destroy all chance of our being attended to in future. The penalty under which an ambassador asks for the removal of a ministry, is that of taking himself off if he fails. He cannot continue to treat with the same men he has tried to drive out. The order for me to come away may even yet carry our point; or if not, the determination it will evince may still have its influence with this government, and prevent its going all lengths; but my own belief is, that the best thing for us would be to take advantage of these affairs to revise our whole relations with this country, and put them on a reasonable footing, which I doubt their now being.

Faithfully yours,

F. LAMB.

[ 854. ]

*To the Right Hon. William Huskisson.*

MY DEAR HUSKISSON,

London, 6th April, 1828.

I enclose some papers which Lord Dudley has just sent me.

The perusal of them confirms the view which I took yesterday of the line to be taken by us upon this proposed armistice. It is quite obvious that neither Admiral de Rigny nor General Guilleminot knew of the answer to the Patriarch of which Lord Cowley sent us, and I sent you, the substance. Both advised the Greeks to accept the armistice. I think De Rigny would have done so, as I would, even if he had known the communication of the Turkish government to the Patriarch. I think that General Guilleminot upon his own principles ought to give that advice likewise. In truth it is the Greeks who are the party which will gain by the armistice. Whatever may be the peace between the parties (and that, it must be observed, is the affair of the Allied Powers) the war will never be renewed if a suspension of hostilities should once take place. This is General Guilleminot's opinion as well as mine. We are not now so situated, whether locally or politically, as to give advice to the Greeks whether they should or not accept the armistice; or under what circumstances; or how it should be negotiated. But we can warn our Admiral not to allow himself to discontinue

his operations in consequence of its existence. Here again we agree exactly with General Guilleminot.

I have thought it as well to write you these few lines with these despatches, which I will send immediately by a messenger, in order that if possible you may receive them before you will have acted upon my letter of yesterday.

I beg you to observe the readiness of Capo d'Istria to take at once the line most suitable to the Russians.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Viscount Palmerston to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Broadlands, 6th April, 1828.

Upon thinking over the arrangements respecting Greece, which the Cabinet settled on Friday, I have been struck with some considerations upon one point, which I should wish to submit to your judgment.

With reference to that article of the Treaty which declares that the Greeks shall be governed by an administration of their own choosing, but in the nomination of which the Porte shall have "*une certaine part*," it was determined to propose to France, that the Greeks should elect their own President, but that the Porte should have the right of a veto upon the first and second person so elected. This arrangement is certainly in strict conformity with the Treaty; but it seems liable to objections which I confess did not strike me on Friday as they have done since.

In the infancy of the Greek State, which period will probably continue for some time to come, one of the great difficulties which Greece will have to contend with will be the dearth of men properly qualified by their instruction and experience to administer the government of their country.

At the present moment perhaps Capo d'Istria, however objectionable he may be on some peculiar grounds, is the only man in any degree capable of acting as chief of the government. In this state of things, by giving to the Porte an absolute veto, even upon the first choice of the Greeks, we should enable Turkey, possibly, to prevent the Greeks from having any government at all, but certainly from having that government which would be most capable of well conducting their affairs; and even looking forward to future times, when the condition of Greece shall have become more settled, and its internal arrangements shall have assumed a shape more similar to that of the well-organised countries of Europe, the power to be given to Turkey of excluding from the government of Greece the individual who may in the highest degree possess the confidence and good will of his countrymen, seems to be one which may at all events be exercised capriciously and without reason; but considering the angry feelings which this contest and its results must long engender in the Turkish councils, it is more likely to be exerted with a direct intention of crippling and embarrassing the Greek administration. There seems to be no proportion

between the inconvenience which this arrangement might in a great variety of cases entail upon Greece, and the security, if any, which it could give to Turkey.

The spirit of the Treaty seems to me to be that some arrangement should be made which would give to the Greeks practical exemption from any interference of Turkish power within their limits, and thus afford them internal independence; while, on the other hand, it should save Turkish honour, by retaining for the Sultan a nominal authority under the designation of Suzeraineté, and it would seem that if the arrangement which determines the "*certain part*" that Turkey is to have in the nomination of the governor is consistent with these objects, it would fulfil the meaning of the Treaty.

The objection which I have stated above would certainly be obviated, if the veto of Turkey were not to be effectual unless it received the concurrence of the contracting Powers, but I am aware that there would be great difficulties in such a condition as a permanent system; but would not all the just objects of the Treaty in this respect be accomplished if the President were to be fully elected by the free and unfettered choice of the Greeks, and if he were then to receive from the Porte *an investiture* by some written commission which the Porte should send him. I would not propose that he should do homage in person at Constantinople, lest he might perchance share the fate of the Servian deputies, and spend seven years in the seven towers.

Such an arrangement would, on the one hand, secure to Turkey that acknowledgment of superiority which the Treaty reserves to her; and, on the other hand, it would prevent that jarring of interests, and that conflict of feelings which the veto might produce, and it would afford to Greece the best chance of an efficient and acceptable government.

The great object for which this country embarked in this undertaking was *peace*, and it would seem, therefore, that our purposes will best be accomplished in proportion as we exclude from our settlement the elements of future discord.

My dear Duke, yours very sincerely,

PALMERSTON.

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*The Marquess of Londonderry to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Paris, 6th April, 1828.

I promised you in my last a more regular account of the manner in which, I think, parties in this country have formed themselves since I was here in 1815. And I will now endeavour to sketch what I have heard and observed, which you can cast your eye over at any unoccupied moment.

By the restoration of the Bourbons, the French empire was again placed under a vigorous, but always absolute, and sometimes violent government. This event, we know, was brought about by the operations, wisdom, and combinations of the Allied Powers. A deep hatred, however, remained in the breasts of the French people, and especially in the army. The greatest

part of the partisans of Napoleon, however, were finally put down after the Battle of Waterloo, and the Chamber of 1815 only thought of revenge, and would have returned to the *ancien régime* if the Duc de Cazes had not arrested their sentiments, and, by his creation of eighty new peers of liberal opinions, laid the foundation for that opposition which Villèle has tried lately to extinguish by his creation of as many more. The Duc de Cazes was evidently obliged to submit to the conditions which the favouritism he enjoyed imposed, and he accomplished nothing against the will of his sovereign; he tried to steer a *middle course* between the revolutionary party and the counter revolutionists, composed of the emigration and the clergy.

The Duc de Richelieu succeeded him in much the same course, only with some modifications in men rather than in measures. Neither one nor the other formed any compact party on whom they could rely; the Revolutionary party and the Royalist and Emigrant party were equally formidable to them as ministers. They floated between the two, while *Monsieur* became the head more or less declared of the Ultra or Secret Government party.

It was by this secret influence that Villèle and Corbière, who were at the head of the *Côté Droit* or Emigration party, succeeded, under the guidance of the Comte d'Artois, in overthrowing Richelieu's administration, and their efforts were then directed to conduct the government on the same system that had been previously attempted in 1815.

These were the first ministers who had a regular party, which party allowed themselves to be directed and governed by the ministers, and they became in fact an united administration of the Royalist party.

They did not seem to explain their principles accurately as to what degree of observance would be paid to the Charte, the forms of which more than the terms they seemed desirous of upholding. At this epoch Louis XVIII. became more infirm, Madame du Cayla having entirely replaced as a favourite M. de Cazes. She used her influence in favour of Monsieur, and the King's jealousy and aversion to his brother was diminished. Louis XVIII. was now persuaded to sign many Ordonnances, which were sufficient to make the prelude of a new reign unpopular,—such as the Censorship, the introduction of the heads of the clergy into the Cabinet and into the Council of State.

The Royalist party were now masters of the Court, the Army, and all the lucrative places and appointments.

The expedition to Spain was now attempted, probably against Villèle's opinions. But he yielded in the hopes of gaining a more absolute power under the Charte.

The elections of 1814, dictated by the ministry, had reduced the *Côté Gauche* in the Chamber of Deputies. But the Chamber of Peers, in consequence of the *infusion* of De Cazes' eighty peers, preserved a strong appearance of opposition. This was first principally shown on Villèle's project of reducing the Three per Cents., which measure, more unpopular in the capital than elsewhere, was finally rejected by the Peers.

Chateaubriand, who foretold the fate of this question, refused to defend it, and in consequence of disagreements with Villèle, the latter turned him out of his Cabinet without any ceremony. Villèle thought, however, to



retain in the interest of the government the 'Journal des Débats,' to which the government paid 6000 francs a month, besides which Villèle had created its principal proprietor, M. Bertin de Vaux, Conseiller d'Etat. In this however, he was deceived, and this most influential journal in France followed the fortunes of M. Chateaubriand, and has been, ever since his dismissal, the greatest thorn to M. de Villèle, and is now to the existing government.

From the above schism many of Villèle's late errors seem to have sprung. From it may be dated the open efforts of the Jesuits, who found so much favour in the King's secret sentiments; from it also arose that division in the Royalist party, and the increased power of the clergy.

M. de Chateaubriand's party, which was, in fact, a fraction of the Royalist party, rallied round him both at Court and in the Faubourg St. Germain.

Villèle, uneasy at the defection of the Noblesse, called now *la Parti Exaltée*, and also dissatisfied with the old Royalist party, sought the support of the clergy and Jesuits.

Charles X., on coming to the throne, was happy to find Villèle approved by the clergy, and was glad to retain a minister so congenial to his own sentiments. Aware, however, that his bigotry excited distrust, he sought to popularise himself by suppressing the Censorship, which M. Peyronne had re-established during Louis XVIII.'s long illness. This measure of the King's, avowedly against the wishes of his government, made them, and especially Villèle, more unpopular, and in order to prop up his declining power, he gave to the clergy "La Loi du Sacrilège," and to the emigrant "le milliard d'Indemnités." However, party became still more violent and all those who had left Villèle's standard with Chateaubriand, allied themselves by degrees to the principles of the Liberal Oppositionists.

The rapid progress also now of the Priest and Jesuit party round the feelings of the Tribunaux, which seemed disposed to resist the increasing influence, and the numerous *procès* against the daily journals were so many defeats to the ministry, and the Liberal Opposition made immense strides in public opinion.

The government, now menaced on all sides, intrenched themselves more and more in the interest and passions of the party they had adopted. The disbanding the National Guard in 1827 carried the discontent against Villèle to the highest pitch; and some days after the close of the session he re-established the Censorship, and began to plan more deliberately his anti-constitutional system.

The great support of Villèle's government at this period was a constant majority of 300 in the Chamber of Deputies. On these he was prodigal of his favours and places, but there began some wavering amongst them and he listened to the advice and counsel of the Préfets, who answered for the formation of the *Collèges Electoraux*, and of their choice in the interest of the ministers. Under false hopes, therefore, Villèle decided upon the dissolution, and the Censorship being at an end by the above measure, the journals began their outcry against an administration which had lasted six years, not being perhaps oppressive or persecuting, but arbitrary, exclusive and turning everything to profit of the reigning faction.

Public opinion now arose in a storm of hatred against Villèle, accusing

of sacrificing the King and the Chambers in obeying the Jesuits, without liking them, and corrupting all those whose services he wanted.

The dissolution was accompanied by the creation of seventy-six new peers; forty taken from the ranks of the deputies going out, and thirty-six amongst the favourites of the Court and priesthood. This measure only served to heighten public indignation.

Villèle assured the King he could command a majority of 430 deputies to 269. The King believed him, and allowed him to prepare for some changes in the departments of the government, in order to appear with greater security in the Chambers. But Villèle tried to reinforce his Cabinet without effect. He had many refusals, and the King at last took fright, lest his government should be forced by the new Chambers, and in a fit of terror ordered M. Chabrol to prepare him an administration, with more certainty of a majority, and his Majesty dismissed all the ministers but MM. Chabrol and D'Hermopolis.

This administration, with the exception of Chabrol and Frasnynois, is what is now in existence. *These* fell before public opinion, which pursues still with more or less bitterness Martignac, St. Cricq, and De Caux, ex-director-general under the orders of M. Villèle.

The Chamber of Peers has a majority in consequence of the last introduction of ninety-six by Villèle, which it is thought will be favourable to him. The late peers, however, are very shy, being ashamed of the circumstance of their inauguration. But the majority is compact and united, and when a question of principle arises they will show themselves.

The Chamber of Deputies, the complement of which is 430, has only at present 390. They are proceeding to elect the forty wanting in consequence of the double and triple elections. All believe that near thirty out of the forty new deputies will be of the Liberal Opposition.

The Chamber of Deputies is divided as follows:—

In *Côté Gauche*, or Liberals.—In *Côté Droit*, or Ultra.—In *Contre*, Opposition.

The <i>Côté Gauche</i> joined to its <i>Centre</i> which is the most <i>modérée</i> is reckoned at about .. .. .	140
The <i>Côté Droit</i> .. .. .	160
The <i>Contre</i> , Opposition, of which some vote with the <i>Côté Gauche</i>	70
The twenty others may be said to be composing the party purely ministerial .. .. .	20
	390

These last ninety, according to their votes with one side or other, give the majority which has occasioned all the hitherto anomalies and fluctuations that have had birth.

From this uncertainty has arisen Ravenez's election to the presidency; from this also the censure in the address on the late ministry, and the introduction likewise of Hyde de Neuville into the Cabinet, as well, in short, as all the uncertainty of action that at present prevails.

I have now brought the state of parties, and the position of the Chambers, to what they appear to me to be at present, from the conversation and information I can collect. Next week I will write to you more at length as to what I think likely, from the present *Carte du Pays*, and how foreign

politics is likely to be regarded under all the circumstances of the present administration. I am sure you will receive with indulgence the best lights my limited powers and limited means enable me to send you of all I observe here, and

Believe me, my dear Duke, ever yours most affectionately,

VANE LONDONDERRY.

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*The Right Hon. W. Huskisson to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Eartham, 6th April, 1828.

I enclose for your consideration a draft of Instructions to Codrington, and another to Sir Frederick Adam, which I have endeavoured to frame according to your suggestions, in which I entirely concur.

From your letter I infer that you are under the misapprehension that the instructions which I prepared some two or three weeks ago for Sir Frederick Adam have been sent. They, as well as those which had been settled for Codrington, were hung up by the last Note from Lieven, as they embraced several points—such as the Greeks withdrawing from Scio, Candia, and Western Greece, their co-operation with us in the Morea, and the supplies to be furnished to them, if so co-operating—which could not properly be proceeded in, except as a joint Instruction. The interruption of the supplies furnished from the Ionian Islands made one part of that despatch. I have now thrown it into a separate Instruction. But our people there will be much out of humour if we cannot prevail upon Austria forthwith to interpose with her traders to the like extent. They would be so with good reason—we should deprive them of a very beneficial trade without effecting our purpose, as the Austrian flag and trade would amply supply their share of this traffic.

I have, therefore, thought it right that Sir Frederick Adam should be told that application will be made to Austria to impose similar restraints upon her commerce with the Ports of the Morea occupied by Ibrahim. No time, I think, should be lost in pressing this application, not only upon Esterhazy, but formally through Lord Cowley. Surely the recent communications from Vienna afford ample opening for this purpose.

In the draft to Codrington, I have adverted to the Greek slaves in a manner which I hope will meet your approbation. You will see that I assume that a despatch has been already written by Dudley to our Consul at Alexandria to try to get them back, by a strong appeal to the Pacha of Egypt. Such an appeal should be made to him in the most forcible terms, as he values the protection and friendship of this country. I think something to this effect should be sent off immediately, dated at least a fortnight back, when Peel strongly urged it in the Cabinet, and I understood it was settled. We shall otherwise not stand well in Parliament on this point.

If you will send for Mr. Hay or Lord Francis, the blank in the despatch to Adam may be filled up, and they may both, when approved of, be copied for my signature.

Yours very truly,

W. HUSKISSON.

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*The Right Hon. W. Huskisson to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Eartham, 6th April, 11 p.m.

The messenger arrived with your letter, and the despatches from Sir Frederick Adam, a couple of hours after I had forwarded to you, by the post, the drafts which I had prepared upon the suggestions of your former letter.

It does not occur to me that these despatches make it necessary to alter the instructions contained in those drafts. They seem very strongly to confirm their expediency, and that of sending them off without delay.

All I have done, therefore, is to add another short despatch to Sir Frederick Adam, which I enclose, trusting it will meet with your approbation.

It is impossible not to contrast the intelligence and acuteness of Guilleminot and de Rigny, with the lamentable incompetency and self-sufficiency of Sir Edward Codrington. Surely the time is come to send back Stratford Canning to the Levant, or to supply his place by some other efficient person, with discretionary power to advise and control Codrington, unless we are prepared to supersede him by some one less likely than he has shown himself to involve us in scrapes both of omission and commission.

Yours very truly,

W. HUSKISSON.

P.S.—To save time I send three blank signatures, into which the drafts may be copied when you have approved of them. Excuse the trouble I give you in requesting you will send directions to Hay or Lord Francis for this purpose.

W. H.

You will probably think it right that these instructions should be communicated to Prince Polignac.

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*To the Right Hon. William Huskisson.*

[ 855. ]

MY DEAR HUSKISSON,

London, 7th April, 1828.

I received your letter of the 6th this morning. We made some alterations in your despatch to Sir Edward Codrington; omitting all reference to the offers through the medium of the Patriarch to the Greeks as being a political consideration.

We have likewise made that part of the despatch which refers to the Greek women and children, in exact conformity to that written to Consul Barker by Lord Dudley; that is to say the expression of a hope that the women and children would be given up, rather than as a condition of carrying Ibrahim and his army to Egypt.

With these alterations this despatch will go this evening.

I spoke yesterday to Esterhazy respecting the commerce of the Austrians, and he promised to write to Prince Metternich, assuring me at the same time that he was convinced Prince

Metternich would do everything we wished. Lord Dudley writes this day to Lord Cowley upon the subject.

Peel, Lord Dudley, and I think it very desirable that an additional instruction should be sent to Sir Frederick Adam to urge him to send again to Ibrahim Pacha to point out to him that the Grand Signior, having agreed to a suspension of hostilities, his stay in the Morea under these circumstances, blockaded as his army will be, and cut off from all communication with Egypt and Constantinople by the Allied squadrons, only exposes it to certain loss for no purpose whatever. That passage in the communication to the Patriarch might likewise be shown to him which states that another Vizier is to be sent to the Morea. I am going out of town if I can get away. But if you should wish me to see this despatch, I shall be to-morrow morning at Stratfield Saye.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Marquess of Londonderry to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Paris, 7th April, 1828.

In addition to my other letter, I will add shortly the *on-dits* that I have collected.

The following has been given me from the best authority as the version of M. Chateaubriand's late proceedings as to his getting into power, or acting with the present ministers. About six months since, and before the last change, Villèle opened a negotiation to bring Chateaubriand back to the Cabinet. But the latter thought, in honour to his adherents, he could not separate from them, and declined it.

Upon the formation of the present ministry, Chateaubriand was in full treaty with the parties, but ultimately gave it to be understood that if Hyde de Neuville was brought in he would require nothing prominent for himself at present, and in this case he would deliver up the 'Journal des Débats' to the government (which, by-the-by, is the great instrument of Chateaubriand's power, and is the great terror of the ministry). This was acceded to; but no sooner partially settled, than Chateaubriand flew off and required something positive for himself, either in the shape of dignity or a promise of future employment for himself; and he suggested the appointment as a plenipotentiary for the affairs of Greece to such congress as possibly might be formed, as no one knew so much about Greece, &c., as himself. This was declined on the ground that the promise of an appointment to a congress not in being was wholly without precedent and premature. He then stipulated for a situation that would produce a payment of 12,000 francs a month; and it was nearly settled he should have the

embassy to St. Petersburg, when Pozzo was consulted, and difficulties arose. Vienna was then talked of; but Chateaubriand required special credentials relative to the management in his hands of the affairs of Greece. This was stated to be unusual and inexpedient, and it was then settled he should see the King. At this interview the King treated him very cavalierly, and Chateaubriand at his audience was so confounded, that he entirely forgot to press either his own object or any other political subject for which he had previously prepared himself.

There is less conversation these last few days on Turkish affairs. Soult told me he thought the whole question mere *illusion* for the present. They think that the features of the government of England are not as yet *assez prononcés* to form decisive conclusions. They pretend that both France and England are placed in the same position, and adverse parties tolerate the present ministry in both countries for fear of getting a worse, although the germs of formation in both are disapproved of.

In the Portugal question we are sadly abused by Hyde de Neuville, who is our bitter enemy, and declares we only interfere to *embrouiller*, and then leave our victims to their fate. They insist that the old Queen should be removed, or Don Miguel will never be manageable. The debate in the Chambers on Saturday was of use to the ministers; while the right of assemblage, &c., was upheld, a consideration of its being disapproved by the government determined the party to forego any repetition of the meetings. This has evinced a feeling to the government which may be argued as favourable, and it seems a degree of bienveillance will be extended towards them, and the opinion gains ground that they will get through the business of the session without difficulty or more accession, although you will judge yourself from my other letter how uncertain their numbers must be, and they are besieged morning, noon, and night for places, jobs, &c.

They are occupied now especially on a law for the press, and the daily journals are to be raised and established more as ours in price, &c., which will destroy all the small papers which do so much mischief.

Believe me, my dear Duke, ever yours most affectionately,

VANE LONDONDERRY.

*The Right Hon. Charles Grant to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 7th April, 1828, Monday night.

I have this afternoon received a communication from Baron Bülow which obliges me to trouble you, as it relates to an important subject that presses in point of time.

You are aware that at the Congress of Vienna certain rules were laid down by the assembled Powers respecting the navigation of the European rivers, and among these particularly of the Rhine. You have probably also been informed that, ever since the time of the Congress of Vienna, there have been conferences and negotiations between the Netherlands and the States bordering on the Rhine, on the subject of the duties and regulations on the whole course of the river. The government of the Low Countries has advanced pretensions which certainly seem to counteract the intentions

of the Treaty of Vienna. After long discussions, conducted ably but not without some warmth on both sides, there is now, as it appears, a final conference to be held at Mayence on the 15th of this month. This conference has been delayed in consequence of the reluctance of Prussia to take a part in it unless she and Holland had previously come to some agreement on the stipulations to be proposed. As such agreement is not now likely to take place, Holland has announced her intention to propose her resolutions definitively at the approaching conference, and this has led to Baron Bülow's interview with me. Among the points in contest between Holland and Prussia there are many which do not particularly concern this country, excepting as showing in general a jealous and restrictive spirit on the part of Holland. But there are two propositions which deeply affect English interests. The one is, the exclusion from the navigation of the Rhine of all vessels except those belonging to some of the States on the Rhine. The other is, the imposition of nearly prohibitory duties on sugar and tea entering the Rhine in any vessels.

English vessels will, if the former proposition be adopted, be excluded, at the very time that there is every probability of a considerable commerce from this country up the Rhine by means of steam. This regulation is, I conceive, directly in violation of the 109th Article of the Treaty of Vienna of 1815.

The second proposition is very hostile to us. The export of sugar, raw and refined, would probably have been in great degree the cause of the increased steam navigation to the Rhine.

In both these respects these regulations cannot be regarded but as directly touching our interests. Baron Bülow told me that it was the wish of Prussia to act with liberality; that she disapproved of both these propositions; that she found her resistance ineffectual; and that, without some assistance from some other quarter, she could not expect to prevent the adoption of this system. He said that he stated the circumstances to me in order that the British government might consider whether they should resolve on any interposition. If Great Britain interferes, Prussia, he said, would gladly co-operate with her; but otherwise Prussia would think further opposition useless. He begged the British government to consider the subject without delay, and inform him of the result.

He desired his communication to me to be considered as confidential.

He observed that there are two modes in which we might now interpose:—

1. We may despatch an agent or envoy to the conference at Mayence (having first given notice to the government of the Low Countries) to remonstrate against the proposals.

2. We may present a sort of protest to the Dutch government against the measures in question, reserving to ourselves the right of more seriously resisting the application of them to ourselves on a future occasion.

The question I wish to submit to you is, What step ought we to take?

I think we must interpose. The idea that has occurred to me is, that we should despatch some agent (under whatever character may be thought best) to go first to the Court of the Netherlands and there to make our remonstrances, and then to proceed (with authority from that Court) to Mayence.

The choice of the agent may be difficult, but I suppose at the Foreign Office many might be suggested. I do not know if such a mission would be below a minister, but Mr. Addington is just going as minister to Frankfort, and would be a very proper person for this duty, if no objections of rank or etiquette exist.

There is certainly no time to be lost. I wish Baron Bülow had sooner made the communication. I had heard something of these negotiations some time ago, and saw Count Lottum (Baron Bülow being then absent) on the subject, but he could give me no intelligence, though he promised to inform me of all he should hear. There is now barely time for any proceeding on our part. Yet it is by far too important a subject to be neglected. I was going out of town to-day, but have deferred my excursion on account of this matter, nor shall I leave town till I hear from you, though I lament losing these few days of the country. I will see M. Falck to-morrow and be ready to act without delay on the receipt of your answer.

I send you the papers which Baron Bülow left with me, that you may, if you wish it, see the case more fully. They are to be considered as confidential, and I beg they may be returned. I also request as early an answer as may be convenient to you. It is a great object with me to get out of town to-morrow afternoon.

I have written in the greatest possible haste, and only hope I have made the matter sufficiently intelligible.

I am, my dear Lord, your Grace's faithfully,

CHAS. GRANT.

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*To the Right Hon. Charles Grant.*

[ 856. ]

MY DEAR MR. GRANT,

Stratfield Saye, 8th April, 1828.

I could not answer you this morning, as I wished to look at the Treaty of Vienna before I should reply; and I came here thinking that I had here a copy of it. But I have not, and I must now write from a recollection of it.

As well as I can remember the words and spirit of the Treaty of Vienna, the King of the Netherlands has no right, any more than the King of Prussia or any other sovereign on the banks of the Rhine, to exclude foreign built vessels or foreigners from navigating that river; such foreign built vessels and foreigners paying the duties laid on vessels which navigate the river, for keeping the navigation in order, for lights, &c.; and acting in conformity to all the regulations of police, for preventing smuggling, &c., on the passage through the territories of the several States occupying the banks of the Rhine.

I do not believe the King of the Netherlands and all the sovereigns on the Rhine have a right to lay a particular duty upon any particular commodity for its passage up or down the



river, or its transit through their respective territories; excepting always that sovereign into whose territory the commodity in question shall finally be imported.

This is, as well as I recollect, the spirit as well as the letter of the Treaty. But upon this point you had better consult somebody more capable of giving you an opinion than I can be; such as the law officers of the Crown, the Lord Chancellor, &c.

I do not know whether you have read the papers which you have sent to me; but I confess that I cannot find any objection on the part of the Prussian government to those parts of the arrangement to which we particularly object, viz., the exclusion of our ships, and the high transit duties upon tea, sugar, &c.; on the contrary, I should say that the two parties had now agreed upon every point; and that the King of the Netherlands had now a right to claim the co-operation and support of the King of Prussia in the commission sitting at Mayence. However, I may be mistaken.

This question of the navigation of the Rhine is a very delicate one. The King of the Netherlands is very sore about it; and I know that the Emperor of Russia is disposed to favour all his pretensions to avoid the strict performance of the conditions imposed upon him by the Treaty of Vienna; and I believe this to be the reason why the King of Prussia appears to be so little difficult; and, on the contrary, disposed to favour the King of the Netherlands; and that Baron Bülow comes to us confidentially.

The first thing for us to do is to be quite certain that we are right; and that we cannot be excluded from the navigation of the Rhine. Let us then look at the whole of the proposed regulations, and see which are inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty; and are important to us. Having this information we shall know what our case is, and shall be better able to judge than I am at present what we ought to do.

In the mean time I would recommend to you to tell Baron Bülow that we do not believe that the sovereigns having dominions on the Rhine have any right to exclude British built vessels from the navigation of that river, or to impose transit duties other than those required for keeping the river in a state for navigation, &c.; and that we shall not be unprepared after examining the question to concert with the Prussian government the mode of resisting this pretension. That, in the

mean time, we desire that the Prussian government should make an effort that the communication of the regulation to the commission at Mayence might be postponed for a month. This will give us time.

Sir Charles Bagot might be desired to inquire from the government of the Netherlands what they are doing upon the subject of the navigation of the Rhine; and his attention should be particularly drawn to the proposed regulations which will prove so disadvantageous to his Majesty's subjects. Indeed I am astonished that he should not have noticed them already.

I have no objection to the employment of Mr. Addington in a more advanced state of this business. But whatever we may do at the Court of the Netherlands should be through the Ambassador. I hope that you have not waited in town for this answer, but I could not send it sooner.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Earl of Dudley.*

[ 857. ]

London, 8th April, 1828.  
12 at midnight.

MY DEAR LORD DUDLEY,

I quite concur in what you propose to communicate to Lord Cowley for Prince Metternich's information; telling him, however, that the last communication to France is only a projet upon which a decision will not be finally made till we shall know the sentiments of the French government.

It is desirable to avoid to ask him to do more than give his approbation and assistance to what we are doing by way of advice at Constantinople. Keep clear of anything that should have the appearance of seeking the Austrian mediation; or at the present moment an union with Austria for the purpose of attaining our objects.

Let us be quite sure of France before we make any approach towards any other Power.

You should desire Lord Cowley, however, to press Prince Metternich strongly to aid us in our view of prevailing upon and forcing Ibrahim Pacha to quit the Morea, by laying an embargo upon the trade in provisions from the Austrian ports in the Adriatic to the Morea; and by ordering the Austrian admiral to enforce it.

Lament what is passing in Portugal. But I think you must do M. de Bembelles the justice to acknowledge that he has done everything in his power to prevent the evil.

Ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Marquess of Londonderry to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Paris, 8th April, 1828.

There are so many *on-dits* in the salons since my last letter, that it would be idle to take up your time in detailing them all. The most prominent are, the near approach to decisive differences between the Cabinets of the two countries, which, however, the last explanations have somewhat softened, Pozzo, however, continuing to look black.

Rothschild's visit to England is said to have been as unsuccessful in throwing any light upon the complications as his interview with Le Roy, the finance minister, was unpropitious. The latter told him, when he offered his services *pour les fonds*, "Je ne comprends rien, M. le Baron, de ce *tripotage-là*, les fonds d'un grand pays n'ont pas besoin de faiseurs." After this audience Rothschild was called upon to pay up 12,000,000 francs to the government. The King told the Duc d'Albert, on conversing about his ministry, "That he would sooner cut wood in his forests than be placed in the situation of the King of England, to give his *confidence* to ministers he disliked." So much for absolutism and his Majesty's congeniality with the present men.

The King has, however, declared to Pozzo his approbation of the law for the press, and it is said he will have it supported. Its details, you know, are chiefly that journals will need now no previous authorisation, the power of establishing the Censorship is abolished, and prosecutions for tendency are done away with. The loan for raising the army to its complete peace establishment of 250,000 men is stated not to be with a view of any warlike attitude, but to be *en mesure* at the present crisis. The Russians decidedly were to move on the 7th, and all eyes are directed there. I saw yesterday Admiral Titchakoff. His language was, To trust everything to the professions and honour of the Emperor. The first conflict will force Mahmoud to yield to that justice and moderation which Russia will alone dictate. This doctrine is successfully preached to the present ministers. As to Portugal, the doubt now is if the Queen will influence Don Miguel to declare himself, or if he will wait for the cloak of assembling the Cortes of Lamego?

So much for the general conversation of society. Now to return to the state of the Chambers and to the purport of my last letter. I have thought it interesting to inform myself of the probable parties and composition of the Chamber of Peers. As to the Chamber of Deputies, the ministry are pretty sure of a majority there for their *améliorations*. The peers may be divided as follows:—1st. The party of Uzès, called now Havré or Blacas, 150; 2nd, the party of Mortemart or Crillon, formerly Cardinalists, 110;

3rd, the party of Marbois, the most constitutional, 60. The last party, it is said, has somewhat diminished by MM. Pasquier and Portal and Generals Reille and Dubreton having joined the second or Mortemart party. All Villèle's peers are comprised in the first or Blacas party, with the single exception of Maréchal Soult.

The *Côté Droit*, now anti-ministerial, in uniting nearly two of the above parties are necessarily the most formidable, and will be disposed to combat everything the ministry produce, backed by a strong party feeling, and it depends very much upon the King what course will be taken. There seems no remedy at present in this particular for the weakness of the present Cabinet. If another accession to the peerage was proposed, the King, seeing the object, would scarcely consent to it.

You will observe, from what I have stated, that the uncertainty as to any decision to be taken by the two Chambers reciprocally forms one of the main embarrassments of the ministers. They have no actual or personal influence belonging exclusively to themselves as a government, and even the majority in the deputies arises from the efforts towards liberalism that the government propose, and that are supported by the *Côté Gauche*, the *Centre Gauche*, and the *Contre Opposition*, who have in the elections overthrown Villèle and the *Côté Droit*.

It results, therefore, that the actual ministry, without any marked talent or character, have a choice of difficulties, and will probably steer without satisfying completely or irritating any party. Their position will be always perilous, with the uncertainty of the King's support, and with the intrigues and influence of the clergy, court, and old aristocracy against them. They have no *point d'appui*, and with the clamours of those who are stopped in their career of restoring the *ancien régime*, the government have an arduous position and an uncertain tenure.

The *Doctrinaires*, headed by Royer Collard, flatter themselves that this order of things evinces the triumph of moderation and reason. But, however specious this may seem, it is in vain to be blind to the fact, that no government without a fixed system and a security to measures which an important crisis demands, can carry on the affairs of a great nation, exposed to the continual fear of *tracasserie*. They exist on an uncertain majority which may only declare its support from the disinclination and fear of seeing Villèle recalled to power.

The session may be weathered, but there must be intrinsic difficulties. The persons whom the *Côté Gauche* and *Centre Gauche* would desire to see as reinforcements to the ministry are M. Chateaubriand for foreign affairs, Sebastiani for the war department, and Casimir Perrier for commerce. Those, on the other hand, whom the *Côté Droit* (distinct from the *Contre Opposition*) would like to see in employment are M. La Bourdonnaye, Villèle, and De Lulot. The *Contre Opposition*, at present satisfied with having M. Hyde de Neuville, only press some distinction for M. Chateaubriand and grasp at all places they can get. MM. Pasquier and Portal are two candidates whom it is supposed, in case of reinforcements, the ministry will first apply to. Chateaubriand has lost ground generally. He is not esteemed a good foreign minister, though possessing undoubted talents. He considers diplomacy as mainly to hinge upon writing elegant and perfect despatches, and he largely supplied the Emperors of Russia and Austria and also Mr. Canning. He cannot speak off-hand, but reads

a speech, and writes one admirably. Many now declare his chief remaining *appui* consists in having 15,000 *abonnés* to the 'Journal des Débats.' This publication is half disarmed by his obtaining place for Hyde de Neuville, and at any moment the ministry may now get possession of it by a bargain with Chateaubriand; and it is reported that the embassy to Rome with a dukedom is now negotiating. He has expended 550,000 francs, which the complete edition of his works produced; and he has 20,000 francs of new debts, which press.

M. de Rivière still holds out; but his death is daily expected. If La Ferronays could be translated *there*, Pasquier would be the best person and the most popular to the *corps diplomatique* to succeed him; but La Ferronays would dislike it, and the Duchesse de Berri would never consent. Polignac is mentioned, to have him near the Tuileries, but the most probable successor to La Rivière is the Duc Descars, who was in the 7th Light Dragoons.

I wish, my dear Duke, I had more means of sending you letters better worth reading; but since the newspapers have begun to write me up, I think my old friends are especially shy of much communication with me. La Ferronays evidently cuts me. However, I know your indulgence when I scribble all I pick up just as I should converse with you.

I enclose the last 'Constitutionnel,' in which you will see how I am run at. I also send the 'Journal des Débats' of to-day, which has a curious article as to Austria.

God be with you, my dear Duke. I hope a little relaxation and horse exercise at Stratfield Saye has recruited you for your Herculean labours.

Ever, believe me, yours most affectionately,

VANE LONDONDERRY.

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*The Earl of Dudley to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Foreign Office, Tuesday,  
8th April, 1828.

I do not mean to send the messenger to Vienna till to-morrow. Have you anything to suggest as to what should be sent or written to Lord Cowley? I think we should let him have all that Esterhazy has seen of our late correspondence about the Greek business, which he may show to Prince Metternich, but not give copies. At the same time desire him to impress upon the Austrian government that we are quite resolved to carry into effect the Treaty by *such means, according to such a definition of it* as we have proposed to France, and that we think ourselves entitled to expect their aid and concurrence in a plan which has for its chief object to prevent a war in Europe. This, of course, to be said in a perfectly amicable tone.

In another despatch we may as well say something as to what is passing in Portugal; express our regret at the line Don Miguel is taking, and take for granted that we shall have their aid to keep him in order.

Yours most sincerely and faithfully,

DUDLEY.

I do not mean to trouble you with much writing, only a few words to hint anything that occurs.

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*Son Altesse le Prince d'Estersazy to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

Mercredi matin, ce 9 Avril, 1828.

Je vous envoie en grande confiance, et pour votre connaissance *personnelle et exclusive*, les rapports de notre ambassadeur à Paris, qui offrent beaucoup d'intérêt, et dont le contenu m'a été confirmé par d'autres voies.

Il y a positivement de l'amélioration dans l'attitude de la France, et vous avez votre part à cet heureux résultat.

Il s'agit maintenant d'effectuer l'objet du Traité le plus tôt possible. Nous avons envoyé, sans perte de temps, une sommation catégorique à Constantinople, pour faire comprendre, 1°, la nécessité pour le gouvernement turc de désavouer l'*interprétation* donnée au Hatti-chérif; 2°, et de faire déclarer à la Russie qu'il n'était pas dans son intention de se refuser aux engagements du Traité d'Akermann, en date du 28 Mars.

Veillez me dire quand vous revenez et me donner quelques mots d'opinion sur les papiers de Paris, que je vous prie de me renvoyer par le porteur.

Toujours à vous bien sincèrement, M. le Duc,

Votre très-obéissant serviteur,

ESTERHAZY.

*The Earl of Dudley to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Foreign Office, 10th April, 1828.

Here are two drafts for Lord Cowley. I shall keep the messenger till to-morrow. Upon a matter of such consequence it is better that you should see everything "in extenso" before it goes. A mistake or a difference might have a very bad effect, but the loss of twenty-four hours don't much signify—at least in this case.

I thought it better to put Portugal into a separate despatch. Perhaps I have said rather more on that point than you suggested; but I have said it very civilly, and I think it very desirable that the Emperor should understand that we think his credit, as well as our own, concerned in doing the utmost to hinder Don Miguel from violating his engagements.

Be so good as to let me have back the papers to-morrow, as soon as you conveniently can. I must leave town at four o'clock to go to the Royal Lodge.

I have seen the paper and your letter to Charles Grant about the navigation of the Rhine;\* and I am sending a messenger to-night to Sir Charles Bagot, to desire him to ask the Dutch to stay proceedings till we know more precisely what is intended, and how far it will affect our interests.

Yours most sincerely and faithfully,

DUDLEY.

\* See page 349.

[ 858. ]

*A son Altesse le Prince d'Esterhazy.*

MON CHER PRINCE,

Stratfield Saye, le 10 Avril, 1828.

Je viens de recevoir les dépêches de Monsieur le Comte d'Appony, que je vous renvoie en vous remerciant de me les avoir communiqué.

Pour en faire le vrai commentaire, il faut faire la conjugaison du verbe *mentir*.

Vous avez tout vu ; et vous devez savoir si c'est vrai que nous avons proposé une expédition en Morée, dont nous ne voulons plus ; si c'est vrai que nous voulons nous retirer du Traité ; si c'est vrai que nous avons approuvé la marche de l'Empereur de Russie, &c.

Mais ce qui est d'heureux augure dans ces dépêches est de voir qu'on ne pense plus à l'expédition en Morée ; qu'on veut la Péloponnèse comme Grèce ; et qu'on ne veut pas de l'indépendance.

Je vous ai déjà dit que je croyais que Lord Granville aura montré le memorandum du Prince Metternich. Mais c'est de peu d'importance à présent.

J'ai l'honneur, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

*The Earl of Dudley to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*Royal Lodge, Friday,  
11th April, 1828.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Pray look at this note and its enclosure, which came the evening before last from Palmella ; and at the draft of an answer which I propose to make. Perhaps you may think some expressions too strong, and I mean to point out more fully in what manner he has violated the Charter in not immediately convoking another Chamber ; but I should like to know whether you think some such reply ought to be made to the communication. We must show that we are in earnest. Not that the Constitution is good for much in itself, but the immediate subversion of it by violence would be an affront to us.

Ever most sincerely yours,

DUDLEY.

*The Marquess of Londonderry to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Paris, 11th April, 1828.

Your kind note of the 9th received this morning, emboldens me to take up my pen again and detail to you such observations as have occurred to me since my last.

I had a long and very satisfactory conversation with the Duc d'Orléans last night, and I was rejoiced to hear him express himself more cordially in the interests of the King than I ever before remember. Whether this arises from the probable marriage that may take place between his son and Mademoiselle the sister of the Duc de Bordeaux, or whether he has become seriously aware that *any crisis* in France must be attended with the most fatal consequences, I cannot say; but there appeared evidently a greater *rapprochement* between the King and this branch of his family.

The general import of the Duke's communication was as follows. He said the objects of most interest at Paris at present in the Chambers was the law for the press about to be proposed, and two or three other *projets* of laws which the King had consented to have brought forward. There is no doubt of these passing in the Chamber of Deputies by a large majority; but in the Peers, owing to Villèle's creation, the government cannot count upon a majority of more than four or five, if so many. The seeming indifference of the King to the success of these measures, if worked on by the Jesuits and clergy, may cause the rejection by the Peers of these *projets de lois*; especially that of the press: and nothing would now create greater sensation, and be attended with such disastrous consequences, as Villèle's party causing the overthrow of these important questions, carried triumphantly by the feeling of the country through the other Chamber.

The great point to achieve is to induce the King to act with good faith towards his present servants, and not to allow them to be tripped up in the Peers by secret influence or his Majesty's *insouciance*. It is surely politic to look steadily at what his Majesty must yield, and to yield two points rather than have ten forced from him. In short, every power over the King should be exerted to turn a deaf ear to the Court party against the legitimate measures of that administration which the spirit and feeling of the country have forced upon him. He will thus take the initiative with them in the constitutional enactments acceptable to the nation, and this will best ensure the liberal party from pressing too hard, which in such case would be resisted.

A great evil in this government (unknown to ours) is, that there is a ministry of the King and Court separate and different from the constitutional ministry. *Les charges de Cour* (partly hereditary), all the household, and Conseil du Roi, form in themselves a directing government independent of the real servants of the Crown. This explains the cry against *ministerialism*, for no constitutional government is averse to *ministerialism*—that is, a ministry that is responsible; but in France the King is in the hands of his Court, and he has not energy or firmness to extricate himself.

Foreign politics, in my mind, have been very much directed in France by this above-described party, and it has been, as it were, the *domestic* politics or interest of the *Bourbons* that has mainly regulated it. Public opinion is considered as an enemy which the Court have to struggle with, and the great object is to yield as little as possible to its impulse.

In 1815, 1816, and 1817, the Court of France had more confidence in the counsels and directions of the Allied Cabinets than in the public men in their own country. Pozzo, though not agreeable to the Court, had more influence than any French minister, and even these have often em-



ployed him to carry their own objects. The secret notes that were formerly addressed to the Allied Cabinets by *Vitrolles* were evidently intended to prolong the action of exterior direction and to repress the independent will of France. This chiefly made the French Court desirous of entering into the Holy Alliance at Verona, although M. de Montmorency was disavowed on his return, on account, as it was said, of yielding the passage of foreign troops through France into Spain: France preferring rather to charge herself with the enormous expense and burthen of the undertaking than have the scandal of the French soil being again trodden on by the Allied forces. The expedition to Spain was, however, always rather an affair of the Court party, though acquiesced in by the Liberals. The Ultras promised themselves other results from the war: they thought that, after having established absolute power and the dominion of the clergy beyond the Pyrenees, the French would be more familiarised with these ideas and bring them back to France; while the Liberals argued, on their side, that the army would never fight either with or for the interests of the monks and the clergy. The affairs of the Peninsula have thus never ceased to cause excitement, and to the King they were always held up as mixed with his family interest and his religion. But yet no idea of conquest was ever entertained by this party (they looked upon Spain as calling for protection and support), which is powerfully evinced by France never having acknowledged more decidedly the South American provinces. It is true that she never would make any sacrifice to restore them to Spain. She knows Spain has no means to govern or pacify them; but the ministry have always been afraid of pressing on the King the dismemberment of the possessions of any branch of his family. The clergy in France, with the clergy in Spain and Portugal, foment very greatly the agitations in the Peninsula; and religion and catholicism is so completely the order of the politics at this Court that ministers who are the least bigoted are obliged to feign devotion and zeal in order to be acceptable to the King. This *manie* is carried so far that I am credibly informed if the Greeks had made overtures to the Court of Rome their cause would have been warmly espoused by the Court party. As it is, the King himself is decidedly a *Turk*, and lamented the battle of Navarino. But it occurred at the period of the elections, and Villèle tried to turn the harvest to the best account; and since the event it would not be possible for the King to change his tone about it; more especially as it is universally popular throughout the nation, though my doubts daily increase as to the quantum of sacrifice which the nation would make to sustain it.

In short, my dear Duke, the *résumé* of things here, if I am not much deceived, is, that the country is *wholly* absorbed in its interior political and personal struggles. The King is too much frightened at the idea of revolution (the tocsin, of which the old government resound) to be firm in any purpose. The new government, *without* a real established party, *without* the confidence of the King, *without* a fixed majority in either Chamber, are too much enveloped in their own embarrassments to have either the time or the inclination to occupy themselves very deeply with the exterior system of politics, or to enter into the graver question of new alliances or settlements.

This government may sign notes, or assemble troops, or agree to offers of

mediation, or participate in intrigues, but it will only be to conceal a *real nullity* in their *extérieur politique*, which I am disposed (since I have seen more) to think will be their attitude. The influence of Russia is alone to be dreaded, and Pozzo will be great so long as La Ferronnays is Foreign Minister and as long as *De Rayneval* is second, whom *you remember* and whom Pozzo was cunning enough to get called from Switzerland to place him second in the Foreign Department.

I have only to add, in corroboration of the above sentiments, that Appony assured me to-day that the spirit and feelings of the communications to the Austrian embassy had within the last month assumed an evident *shade* of amelioration. "Grâces aux sages conseils et à l'excellente marche du Duc de Wellington," he added.

This proves to me, without knowing anything of your official *démarches*, that you are getting the vessel to the right trim.

I will try to make my next letter better worth your reading.

Ever yours most affectionately,

VANE LONDONDERRY.

*The Marquess of Londonderry to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

11th April, 1828.

The piece of intelligence which has just been communicated to me may arrive by more authentic channels, and it also may be erroneous; but, as it has been stated in a positive manner, I hesitate not to give it you in the shape I have received it. They say that it is determined immediately to re-establish the National Guard, the King having the momentary popularity of the measure, and the country the national revolutionary spirit of efficiency that this power will again create. You will judge yourself as to the effects this may have.

Ever yours most affectionately, in haste,

VANE LONDONDERRY.

*The Right Hon. Charles Grant to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD,

Somerset Place, 11th April, 1828.

I had the pleasure of receiving your note on the fishery bounties,\* and should be very glad to converse with you on the subject. At the same time it is the less necessary to trouble you now with many observations, because I think the course immediately open to us accords with your own suggestion. As the Act now stands, the bounty, from July next, will be one shilling on herrings till April, 1830. You suggest that "on the hypothesis of continuing the superintendence and bounty, say till 1835, we might diminish the bounty upon herrings to a shilling a barrel cured, and upon cod very materially." Till April, 1830—that is, for two years longer—the present law would execute this purpose. There is, therefore, abundant time for reconsidering the question and (if it be thought proper, on deli-

\* See page 336.

berate discussion, to alter the law) for proposing an alteration next session. I should earnestly submit that the subject should not be moved in Parliament this session, as your purpose of leaving it for the present at a shilling is secured by the existing Act, and no time is lost by waiting till next year.

In the meanwhile the whole subject should be well weighed. I need not enter into it at present, though I confess I do not attach much benefit to the system of bounties. It should be remembered that this decrease of bounty, which is now made the cause of complaint, is not a measure of this year or the last. It was in 1824 that, after due consideration, Lord Liverpool and the government resolved to adopt the principle of a gradual reduction of *all* bounties in general. The principle has been carried into operation generally, and, if to be reconsidered, must be regarded in reference to its *general* application. There is no branch of industry to which bounties attach that has not strenuously resisted the reduction; and every one of them can make a case of sufficient plausibility to render its appeal irresistible, if the precedent of retracing our steps be in any instance established. There are reasons for thoroughly considering the subject as a general one, and they support my wish to leave it as it is for the present session. In this proposition I have no desire but to have the question well sifted by you and the government: for, though I have not disguised my present opinion, I shall be quite ready to abandon it on conviction of its erroneousness. In so far, indeed, as my inclination may be affected by some of my Scotch friends, I should be glad to be so convinced.

I am, my dear Lord, your Grace's very faithfully,

CHAS. GRANT.

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*Le Marquis de Salaverri to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR,

Paris, Rue St. Joseph, No. 3, ce 11 Avril, 1828.

Ami des Anglais, de ce pays que j'ai habité longtems, je ne puis m'empêcher de vous faire quelques communications qui peuvent être utiles à votre gouvernement.

Depuis que la Russie vient de déclarer la guerre à la Porte, l'attitude de la France devient menaçante. L'Angleterre a avec raison de justes soupçons sur elle. Mes liaisons étroites avec un employé supérieur du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères m'ont fait parvenir il y a dix jours à connaître qu'il existe positivement un traité entre la France et la Russie sur les affaires de la Turquie, et un autre entre l'Espagne et la France sur le Portugal. J'en donne avis à votre Excellence dans la persuasion que cet avis pourra lui être agréable. Dans quelques jours je verrai les moyens d'obtenir copie de ces pièces. En attendant, je prie son Excellence de vouloir me dire en réponse si d'autres renseignements que je pourrais me procurer peuvent lui être agréables. Dans tous les cas je n'ai pas besoin de lui parler de secret pour tout ce que je lui communique par la présente, et que je fais dans l'intérêt du gouvernement anglais.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, avec un profond respect,

de votre Excellence, Monseigneur,

votre très-humble et très-obéissant serviteur,

LE MARQUIS DE SALAVERRI.

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*The Right Hon. Sir George Cockburn, Bart., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

Admiralty, 12th April, 1828.

I return herewith the letter and statement regarding the French Navy, which your Grace was good enough to send me the other day. I also enclose for your Grace's information a more correct statement made out from the latest and most authentic intelligence we have received. Your Grace will perceive that the two statements do not differ materially in their gross numbers, but that the *effective* force of the French Navy is, in point of fact, no more than I first mentioned to you, so that we certainly have at present a superiority of at least two to one.

Our information is not very perfect as to the progress of their ships *building*; but as their last vote for the whole annual expenditure in their naval department was but 2,300,000*l.*; and considering the present calls on them for maintaining considerable force at sea, as well as the docks, slips, &c. said to be making in their different dockyards, I do not think they are likely to improve their comparative state with us very rapidly.

Believe me, my dear Lord Duke, yours very faithfully,

G. COCKBURN.

I have a copy of the statement I send your Grace; it is not necessary, therefore, for you to return it.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

London, 31st March, 1828.

The dockyards were by no means neglected by the former government. It is well known that they were established on an immense scale, but under the guidance of their celebrated engineer, Dupin (who was allowed to visit and to take notes in all our arsenals), they have received considerable augmentation and improvement. The present government set out with the opinion that it was better to have no navy, and consequently no colonies, than to have a navy so weak as to be unable, in the event of war, to protect those colonies, and, in peace, to have their flag respected; they therefore decided that the re-establishment of the navy admitted of no delay. The first intention was to have forty sail of the line and forty frigates, but every year since there has been an augmentation; and the Minister of Marine proposed in the session of 1826 to increase the navy to *fifty-eight* sail of the line and forty-seven frigates, a large proportion of which were to be vessels of the first class. The ships which have been laid down since 1824 are upon the scale of the Americans, and their qualities perhaps superior as regards their sailing and their stowage. They are built from the finest models. The first of the frigates which was launched, the *Surveillante*, of sixty guns, is the fastest sailing ship they have; she is built on the new system, which requires but little large timber; she mounts 30-pounders on the main deck, and 600 men, war complement. They have fifteen of this class.

The *Bayard*, a ship of 100 guns, on two decks, also the *Suffrein* and *Duguesclin*, are of immense scantling, and to mount 30-pounders on each deck. Iron tanks are adopted throughout the navy, to be supplied from the forges of Charenton. The intention to arm all ships of the line and the 60-gun frigates with 30-pounders appears from the following report of the Minister of Marine:

“Depuis plusieurs années des essais importantes ont été faites sur de nouvelles bouches à feu, et ils ont eu des résultats assez heureux pour faire désirer qu'ils se poursuivent sans interruption. Les canons du calibre de 30 auront pour tous nos armemens l'avantage de moins charger les bâtiments que ne faisaient les canons de 36; ils seront plus faciles à manœuvrer, et ils exigeront un approvisionnement moins pesant en poudre et en projectiles.”

The number of guns of 30-lbs. to arm all the fleet is 4650, it was proposed to cast in 1827 but 380; at the same time, continuing those of 24 and 18. In the minister's report respecting the necessity of introducing steam-vessels, he says navigation by steam has already made considerable progress amongst maritime nations, and France will, perhaps, hereafter regret having remained so long inattentive. It is not, however, possible yet to know what influence this powerful engine may have in the chances of maritime warfare; nevertheless it is quite certain that steam-vessels are most advantageous for the defence of ports and roads, and for the protection of the coasting trade; and their utility in towing has been proved at Rochefort. It is then important to construct a sufficient number to have some in all the principal ports of equipment in the kingdom, and it is not too much to value this expense at ten millions (france). A special commission, presided over by a vice-admiral, a Peer of France, is at present occupied in examining this important question. Money was voted this session for improving the arsenal at Toulon, at the Castlencaux side, to make a dépôt for the preservation of ship timber, and for twenty additional slips, for the purpose of keeping the new ships, during the peace, out of the water. Money was also voted for finishing the slips at L'Orient and Rochefort for the same purpose.

A commission was appointed to inquire into the state of the navy, and the decay of ships. The commission report that the duration of ships from launching has been on an average not exceeding twelve years; consequently to keep the fleet complete one-twelfth part of the number should be laid down every year on a thorough repair. Twenty-two sail of the line (two of which were considered in too bad a state to be repaired) have had a thorough repair since 1815. The mean time of their service, from launching to going into dock, was eleven years and four months; of these twenty their repair cost fifteen twenty-fourths of their first cost. Of thirteen frigates the mean term of their service was eleven years one month, and cost fourteen twenty-fourths of their first cost. Of nine corvettes and brigs the mean term of service was fourteen years and eight months; their repairs eleven twenty-fourths of the first cost.

The commission gave the preference to the wood of Albania, Sardinia, and Provence, and they consider it economy to repair the ships every ten years. The commissioners were the Baron Roussin, president; M. Lannant, the Chevalier d'Ubraye, and the Baron Lair.

With respect to the duration of masts, they report that nine years is the average for ships in commission, in ordinary eighteen years, topmasts and yards six years, topgallant-masts and yards three years, oars the same, anchors 150 years, and for loss one in six every three years. Grapnels being in constant use, the decay is quicker. Iron cables and tanks they cannot yet report on.

The following works were recommended to be finished with the least possible delay: at Cherbourg, a basin; at Brest, two docks and an hospital; at L'Orient, a basin and mast pond; at Rochefort two slips and workshop; at Toulon sheds for line-of-battle ships, and mast pond. Other works are in contemplation. The attention of government is deeply occupied by Cherbourg. The Minister of Marine estimates the works proposed there at the enormous sum of

fifty-two millions, which marks the importance attached to this port. He recommended the Chamber to vote these sums specially for that service, independent of the navy estimates.

The necessity of profiting by the peace for supplying the arsenals with timber was strongly insisted on.

## II.

## LIST OF THE FRENCH FLEET, 1827.

Ports they belong to.	Ships.	Guns.	Ports of Construction.	When Launched, or had a thorough Repair.
Brest ..	L'Océan .. .. .	118	Brest ..	November, 1818. R.
Toulon ..	Le Majestueux .. ..	118	Rocheport	October, 1818. R.
Brest ..	L'Austerlitz .. ..	118	Toulon ..	.., 1822. R.
..	Le Wagram .. .. .	118	..	January, 1821. R.
Toulon ..	Le Montebello .. ..	118	..	April, 1822. R.
..	Le Héros .. .. .	118	..	August, 1813.
..	Le Souverain .. ..	118	..	.., 1819.
..	Le Trocadéro .. ..	118	..	April, 1824.
Brest ..	Le Commerce de Paris	110	..	May, 1825.
..	Le Duc d'Angoulême	110	Made flush in 1827.	Rated 80.
Cherbourg	Le Duc de Bordeaux	118	Cherbourg	Launched.
Rocheport	Le Comte d'Artois ..	118	Rocheport	} These ships to remain housed, and not launched till a declaration of war.
..	Le Tonnant .. .. .	118	..	
Brest ..	Le Polyphème .. ..	100	Brest ..	
Toulon ..	L'Hercule .. .. .	100	Toulon ..	
L'Orient	Le Royal Charles ..	100	L'Orient ..	
Toulon ..	Le Dauphin Royal ..	100	Toulon ..	
Rocheport	Le Lys .. .. .	100	Rocheport	
L'Orient	Le Duguay Trouin ..	100	L'Orient ..	
..	L'Annibal .. .. .	100	..	
Rocheport	Le Turenne .. .. .	100	Rocheport	
Cherbourg	Le Suffrein .. .. .	100	Cherbourg	Launched.
L'Orient	Le Bayard .. .. .	106}	}	} These ships are now removed to the class of 80 gun-ships.
Rocheport	Le Duguesclin .. ..	100}		
Total 24.				

## 80-Gun Ships.

Ports they belong to.	Ships.	Ports of Construction.	When Launched, or had a thorough Repair.
Brest ..	Le Foudroyant .. ..	Rocheport	August, 1820. R.
..	L'Eylau .. .. .	L'Orient ..	.., 1818. R.
Toulon ..	Le Sceptre .. .. .	Toulon ..	.., 1810.
Brest ..	L'Illustre .. .. .	Anvers ..	June, 1811. A hulk.
..	Le Diadème .. .. .	L'Orient ..	January, 1822. R.
..	Le Conquérant .. ..	Anvers ..	October, 1822. R.
..	Le Duquesne .. .. .	Cherbourg	January, 1822. R.
..	Le Magnifique .. ..	L'Orient ..	July, 1820. R.
..	Le Santi Petri .. ..	Cherbourg	January, 1818.
..	Le Neptune .. .. .	L'Orient ..	March, 1818.
L'Orient	L'Algesiras .. .. .	..	August, 1824.
..	L'Alexandre .. .. .	..	1827.
Toulon ..	Le Fontenoy .. .. .	Toulon ..	1827.
Brest ..	L'Achille .. .. .	Brest ..	1827.
Rocheport	L'Inflexible .. .. .	Rocheport	1827.
Cherbourg	Le Jupiter .. .. .	Cherbourg	1827.
Total 16.			

## 4th Rates, or 74 Guns.

Ports they belong to.	Ships.	Ports of Construction.	When Launched, or had a thorough Repair.
Brest ..	Le Tourville .. .. .	Brest ..	June, 1817.
..	Le Vétéran .. .. .	..	.. 1816.
Toulon ..	Le Borée .. .. .	Toulon ..	.. 1805. A visitor.
Brest ..	Le Courageux .. .. .	L'Orient ..	July, 1816.
Rochefort	Le Breslaw .. .. .	Gènes ..	August, 1824.
Toulon ..	Le Danube .. .. .	Toulon ..	December, 1808. A visitor.
..	L'Ulm .. .. .	..	May, 1809. A visitor.
Brest ..	Le Nestor .. .. .	Brest ..	July, 1823.
..	Le Marengo .. .. .	L'Orient ..	October, 1822.
Toulon ..	Le Trident .. .. .	Toulon ..	November, 1820. R.
Brest ..	Le Trajan .. .. .	Anvers ..	August, 1811. Hulk.
..	Le Gardois .. .. .	..	April, 1812. Hulk.
Toulon ..	La Ville de Marseilles ..	Toulon ..	May, 1825. R.
..	Le Scipion .. .. .	Gènes ..	August, 1823. R.
Brest ..	L'Orion .. .. .	Brest ..	November, 1813.
..	Le Superbe .. .. .	Anvers ..	July, 1823. R.
Toulon ..	La Provence .. .. .	Toulon ..	May, 1815.
Brest ..	Le Duc de Berri .. .. .	Rochefort	June, 1818.
L'Orient	Le Jean Bart .. .. .	L'Orient ..	August, 1820.
Rochefort	Le Triton .. .. .	Rochefort	September, 1823.
Brest ..	La Couronne .. .. .	Brest ..	August, 1824.
	Total 21.		

## Frigates—1st Class.

Ports they belong to.	Ships.	Guns.	Pndrs.	When Launched, or had a thorough Repair.
Brest ..	La Guerrière .. .. .	58	36	Toulon, March, 1821. R.
..	L'Amphitrite .. .. .	..	..	Gènes, December, 1823. R.
..	La Pallas .. .. .	..	..	Toulon, 1827. R.
L'Orient	La Surveillante .. .. .	60	30	1825.
Cherbourg	La Belle Gabrielle .. .. .	..	..	1824.
Brest ..	La Terpsichore .. .. .	..	..	1824.
Rochefort	La Dryade .. .. .	..	..	1824.
Toulon ..	L'Iphigénie .. .. .	..	..	1824.
Cherbourg	La Melpomène .. .. .	..	..	1825.
L'Orient	L'Hermione .. .. .	..	..	1825.
Toulon ..	La Didon .. .. .	..	..	1825.
Rochefort	La Renommée .. .. .	..	..	1825.
Toulon ..	L'Uranie .. .. .	..	..	1826.
L'Orient	La Surveillante .. .. .	..	..	1827.
..	L'Andromache .. .. .	..	..	1827.
	Total 15.			

*Frigates—2nd Class.*

Ports they belong to.	Ships.	Guns.	Pndrs.	When Launched, or had a thorough Repair.
Brest ..	La Jeanne d'Arc .. ..	50	24	September, 1820.
Cherbourg	La Clorinde .. ..	..	..	February, 1821.
Brest ..	L'Amazone .. ..	..	..	May, 1821.
Rochefort	La Vestale .. ..	..	..	.. 1822.
I'Orient	La Vénus .. ..	..	..	March, 1823.
Toulon ..	La Marie Thérèse .. ..	..	..	May, 1823.
.. ..	La Sirène .. ..	..	..	1823.
L'Orient	L'Atalante .. ..	..	..	1824.
Brest ..	L'Artémise .. ..	..	..	1826.
L'Orient	L'Andromache .. ..	..	..	1827.
Rochefort	La Gloire .. ..	..	..	1827.
Toulon ..	La Poursuivante .. ..	..	..	1827.
Rochefort	La Niobé .. ..	..	..	1827.
St. Servan	La Cléopâtre .. ..	..	..	1827.
..	La Danae .. ..	..	..	1827.
	Total 15.			

*Frigates of 18-Pounders.*

Brest ..	La Flore .. ..	40	18	November, 1821. R.
Toulon ..	La Pénélope .. ..	..	..	October, 1806. R. Un-serviceable.
.. ..	La Bellone .. ..	..	..	May, 1824. R.
.. ..	La Junon .. ..	..	..	April, 1826. R.
.. ..	L'Aurore .. ..	..	..	August, 1824. R.
Brest ..	La Nymphé .. ..	..	..	October, 1823. R.
Toulon ..	La Médée .. ..	..	..	January, 1818. R.
Brest ..	La Circe .. ..	..	..	July, 1819. R.
.. ..	L'Hermione .. ..	..	..	October, 1822. R.
.. ..	La Galatée .. ..	..	..	January, 1823. R.
.. ..	L'Aréthuse .. ..	..	..	October, 1823. R.
Toulon ..	La Fleur de Lis .. ..	..	..	April, 1823. R.
Brest ..	La Thémis .. ..	..	..	May, 1821. R.
.. ..	L'Eurydice .. ..	..	..	January, 1818. Broken up.
.. ..	La Cybèle .. ..	..	..	April, 1815.
Rochefort	L'Antigone .. ..	..	..	March, 1816.
L'Orient	La Duchesse de Berri .. ..	..	..	1827.
Brest ..	La Constance .. ..	..	..	September, 1818.
Toulon ..	La Thétis .. ..	..	..	May, 1819.
.. ..	La Proserpine .. ..	..	..	September, 1824. R.
L'Orient	L'Astrée .. ..	..	..	April, 1820.
.. ..	L'Armide .. ..	..	..	May, 1821.
Rochefort	La Magicienne .. ..	..	..	April, 1823.
	Total 23.			



*Steam Vessels.*

Ports they belong to.	Ships.	
Bayonne	La Caroline.	The steamboats of 350 tons are estimated at 749,572 francs.
Rochefort	Le Courreux.	
..	Le Rapide.	
Sénégal ..	L'Africain.	
..	Le Serpent.	
L'Orient	Le Pélican.	
Cherbourg	Le Nageur.	
..	Le Souffleur.	
Brest ..	Le Requin.	
Cherbourg	Le Castor.	
St. Servan	Le Crocodile.	
L'Orient	Le Vautour.	
Rochefort	Le Sphynx.	
	Total 13.	

## III.

7th April, 1828.

AN ACCOUNT OF THE LINE-OF-BATTLE SHIPS, FRIGATES, AND STEAM VESSELS  
IN THE FRENCH NAVY.*Line-of-Battle Ships.*

Afloat, and supposed to be effective.

Ports they belong to.	Guns.	Ships.	When Launched, or last thoroughly Repaired.
Brest ..	118	Océan .. .. .	Repaired November, 1818.
.. ..	..	Austerlitz .. .. .	.. .. October, 1822.
.. ..	..	Wagram .. .. .	.. .. January, 1821.
Toulon ..	..	Majestueux .. .. .	.. .. October, 1818.
.. ..	..	Montebello .. .. .	.. .. April, 1822.
Cherbourg	..	Duc de Bordeaux .. .. .	Launched in 1827 or 1828.
Brest ..	110	Commerce de Paris	Repaired May, 1825.
Cherbourg	90	Suffrein .. .. .	Launched in 1827 or 1828.
Brest ..	80	Duc d'Angoulême .. .. .	Cut down 1827 from 110 guns.
.. ..	..	Foudroyant .. .. .	Repaired August, 1820.
.. ..	..	Eylan .. .. .	.. .. 1818.
.. ..	..	Diadème .. .. .	.. .. January, 1822.
.. ..	..	Conquérant .. .. .	.. .. October, 1822.
.. ..	..	Duquesne .. .. .	.. .. January, 1822.
.. ..	..	Magnifique .. .. .	.. .. July, 1820.
.. ..	..	Santi Petri .. .. .	Launched January, 1818.
.. ..	..	Neptune .. .. .	.. .. March, 1818.
L'Orient ..	..	Algesiras .. .. .	.. .. August, 1824.
Brest ..	74	Tourville .. .. .	Repaired June, 1817.
.. ..	..	Veteran .. .. .	.. .. 1816.
.. ..	..	Nestor .. .. .	.. .. July, 1823.
.. ..	..	Marengo .. .. .	.. .. October, 1822.
.. ..	..	Superbe .. .. .	.. .. July, 1823.
.. ..	..	Duc de Berri .. .. .	Launched June, 1818.
.. ..	..	Couronne .. .. .	.. .. August, 1824.
L'Orient ..	..	Jean Bart .. .. .	.. .. 1820.
Rochefort	..	Triton .. .. .	.. .. September, 1823.
.. ..	..	Breslaw .. .. .	Repaired August, 1824.
Toulon ..	..	Villo de Marseilles	.. .. May, 1825.
.. ..	..	Scipion .. .. .	.. .. August, 1823.
.. ..	..	Trident .. .. .	.. .. November, 1820.
.. ..	..	Provence .. .. .	Launched May, 1815.

Afloat, but supposed *not* to be effective.

Ports they belong to.	Guns.	Ships.	When Launched, or last thoroughly Repaired.
Toulon ..	118	Héros .. .. .	Not repaired since her launch in August, 1813. Stated in 1825 to require considerable repair, though never at sea.
.. ..	..	Souverain .. .. .	Launched 1819) But in a
.. ..	..	Trocadéro .. .. .	.. 1824) paper transmitted by Vice-Adm. Sir Henry Neale in March, 1827, they are reported to be rotten, though newly built.
.. ..	80	Sceptre .. .. .	Not repaired since her launch in August, 1810. Stated in 1825 to require great repairs.
Brest ..	74	Courageux .. .. .	Repaired 1816, but employed as a receiving ship for new-raised men.
.. ..	..	Orion .. .. .	Launched 1818. Employed as a Naval College afloat.
Toulon ..	..	Borée .. .. .	Launched 1805) Marked as
.. ..	..	Danube .. .. .	.. 1808) requiring to
.. ..	..	Ulm .. .. .	.. 1809) be surveyed.

Building.

Rochefort	118	Comte d'Artois .. ..	Begun 1807.
.. ..	..	Tonnant .. .. .	.. 1811.
Brest ..	100	Polyphème .. .. .	.. 1824.
L'Orient ..	..	Royal Charles .. ..	.. 1825.
.. ..	..	Duguay Trouin .. ..	.. 1827.
.. ..	..	Annibal .. .. .	.. 1827.
Rochefort	..	Lys .. .. .	.. 1825.
.. ..	..	Turenne .. .. .	.. 1827.
Toulon ..	..	Hercule .. .. .	.. 1824.
.. ..	..	Dauphin Royal .. ..	.. 1827.
Brest ..	90	Achille .. .. .	.. 1827.
L'Orient ..	..	Bayard .. .. .	.. 1824.
.. ..	..	Alexandre .. .. .	.. 1827.
Rochefort	..	Duguesclin .. .. .	.. 1823.
.. ..	..	Inflexible .. .. .	.. 1827.
Toulon ..	..	Fontenoy .. .. .	.. 1827.
Cherbourg	80	Jupiter .. .. .	.. 1811.
.. ..	74	Généreux .. .. .	.. 1823.

## Abstract of the Line-of-Battle Ships.

Rates.	Supposed to be Effective.	Supposed not to be Effective.	Total Afloat.	Building.	Total.
First Rate, 118 guns ..	6	3	9	2	11
.. 110 .. ..	1	..	1	..	1
.. 100 .. ..	..	..	..	8	8
Second Rate, 90 .. ..	1	..	1	6	7
.. 80 .. ..	10	1	11	1	12
Third Rate, 74 .. ..	14	5	19	1	20
Total .. ..	32	9	41	18	59

N.B.—There are, besides the above, some old ships which have been converted into hulks, viz., *Illustre*, *Trajan*, *Gaulois*, *Atlas*, *Commerce de Lyons*, &c.

*Frigates.*

Afloat, and supposed to be effective.

Ports they belong to.	Guns.	Pndrs.	Ships.	When Launched, or last thoroughly Repaired.
<b>First Class :—</b>				
Brest ..	58	36	<i>Guerrière</i> .. .. .	Razé March, 1821.
.. ..	..	..	<i>Amphitrite</i> .. .. .	.. December, 1823.
.. ..	..	..	<i>Pallas</i> .. .. .	.. 1827.
.. ..	60	30	<i>Terpsichore</i> .. .. .	Launched 1824.
L'Orient ..	..	..	<i>Surveillante</i> .. .. .	.. 1825.
Toulon ..	..	..	<i>Iphigénie</i> .. .. .	.. 1824.
<b>Second Class :—</b>				
Cherbourg	50	24	<i>Clorinde</i> .. .. .	.. February, 1821.
Brest ..	..	..	<i>Jeanne d'Aro</i> .. .. .	.. September, 1820.
.. ..	..	..	<i>Amazonne</i> .. .. .	.. May, 1821.
L'Orient ..	..	..	<i>Vénus</i> .. .. .	.. March, 1823.
.. ..	..	..	<i>Atalante</i> .. .. .	.. 1824.
Rochefort ..	..	..	<i>Vestale</i> .. .. .	.. May, 1822.
Toulon ..	..	..	<i>Marie Thérèse</i> .. .. .	.. 1823.
.. ..	..	..	<i>Sirène</i> .. .. .	.. 1823.
<b>Third Class :—</b>				
Brest ..	44	18	<i>Flore</i> .. .. .	Repaired November, 1821.
.. ..	..	..	<i>Nymphe</i> .. .. .	.. October, 1823.
.. ..	..	..	<i>Circe</i> .. .. .	.. July, 1819.
.. ..	..	..	<i>Hermione</i> .. .. .	.. October, 1822.
.. ..	..	..	<i>Galatée</i> .. .. .	.. January, 1823.
.. ..	..	..	<i>Aréthuse</i> .. .. .	.. October, 1823.
.. ..	..	..	<i>Thémis</i> .. .. .	.. May, 1821.
.. ..	..	..	<i>Cybèle</i> .. .. .	Launched April, 1815.
.. ..	..	..	<i>Constance</i> .. .. .	.. September, 1818.
L'Orient ..	..	..	<i>Duchesse de Berri</i> .. .. .	Repaired 1827.
.. ..	..	..	<i>Astrée</i> .. .. .	Launched April, 1820.
.. ..	..	..	<i>Armide</i> .. .. .	.. May, 1821.
Rochefort ..	..	..	<i>Antigone</i> .. .. .	.. March, 1816.
.. ..	..	..	<i>Magicienne</i> .. .. .	.. April, 1823.
Toulon ..	..	..	<i>Bellone</i> .. .. .	Repaired May, 1824.
.. ..	..	..	<i>Junon</i> .. .. .	.. April, 1826.
.. ..	..	..	<i>Aurore</i> .. .. .	.. August, 1824.
.. ..	..	..	<i>Médée</i> .. .. .	.. January, 1818.
.. ..	..	..	<i>Fleur de Lys</i> .. .. .	.. April, 1823.
.. ..	..	..	<i>Thétis</i> .. .. .	Launched May, 1819.
.. ..	..	..	<i>Proserpine</i> .. .. .	Repaired September, 1824.

Building.

Ports they belong to.	Guns. Pndrs.	Ships.	When Launched, or last thoroughly Repaired.
<b>First Class :—</b>			
Cherbourg	60 30	Belle Gabrielle .. ..	Begun 1824.
.. ..	.. ..	Melpomène .. ..	.. 1825.
L'Orient	.. ..	Hermione .. ..	.. 1825.
.. ..	.. ..	Sémillante .. ..	.. 1827.
.. ..	.. ..	Andromache .. ..	.. 1827.
Rochefort	.. ..	Dryade .. ..	.. 1824.
.. ..	.. ..	Renommée .. ..	.. 1825.
Toulon ..	.. ..	Didon .. ..	.. 1825.
.. ..	.. ..	Uranie .. ..	.. 1826.
<b>Second Class :—</b>			
St. Servan	50 24	Cléopâtre .. ..	.. 1827.
.. ..	.. ..	Danae .. ..	.. 1827.
Brest ..	.. ..	Artémise .. ..	.. 1826.
Rochefort	.. ..	Gloire .. ..	.. 1827.
.. ..	.. ..	Niobé .. ..	.. 1827.
Toulon ..	.. ..	Poursuivante .. ..	.. 1827.

Abstract of the Frigates.

Classes.	Afloat, and supposed to be Effective.	Building.	Total.
1st Class, 58 36-pounders, or 60 30-pounders	6	9	15
2nd ,, 50 24-pounders .. ..	8	6	14
3rd ,, 44 18-pounders .. ..	21	..	21
<b>Total .. ..</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>50</b>

N.B.—There are two old frigates considered as unserviceable, viz., the Pénélope and Eurydice.

*Steam Vessels.*

There are 8 of these vessels, viz. :—

Nageur .. ..	Cherbourg
Souffleur .. ..	.. ..
Pélican .. ..	L'Orient
Courreux .. ..	Rochefort
Rapide .. ..	.. ..
Africain .. ..	Sénégal
Serpent .. ..	.. ..
Caroline .. ..	Cayenne

And there are 5 building, viz. :—

Castor .. ..	Cherbourg
Crocodile .. ..	St. Servan
Requin .. ..	Brest
Vautour .. ..	L'Orient
Sphinx .. ..	Rochefort

[ 859. ]

*To the Earl of Dudley.*

MY DEAR LORD DUDLEY,

London, 13th April, 1828.

I should be very much obliged to you if you would let me see the despatches to Sir Frederick Lamb, written since the receipt of his of the 12th March.

It appears to me that his demand of an entire change of Ministers has been a little more positive and peremptory than we intended, at least as made to the Vicomte de Santarem. I should wish likewise to see the Protocols and Notes of Vienna and London.

Ever yours, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Mr. W. A. Kentish, to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

4, River Street, Lower Road, Islington,  
13th April, 1828.

MY LORD DUKE,

It may be advisable, perhaps, to give the following communication a careful perusal, as it is very possible, I think, that it may present information not altogether within the knowledge of any individual of his Majesty's government, but which I can offer with the certainty of its being correct, having resided many years upon the spot, and have therefore been a daily witness of the fact.

I observe that a convention was signed at Rio on the 23rd November, 1826, "to prevent illicit trade in slaves." Now this is an agreement which that government could not carry into execution, even if it were *candid* in its professions, which on this point I can aver it is not. The whole of the agriculture of the country is carried on by the individuals exclusively who come from the *prohibited districts*. They alone are fitted for the labour, being much taller, stronger, and more robust than any of the African nations to the south. The whole prosperity, therefore, of the empire depends upon the exertions of these very men. They cannot do without them. None others have sufficient nerve to perform the labours of raising sugar, rice, cotton, and a variety of other produce, from whence come their revenue and wealth.

The government *may prohibit* their importation at the *principal ports*, as Rio, Bahia, Pernambuco, Maranhão, &c.; but I am certain it will *leave it to be understood* at the time that *liberty will be given to land them on any contiguous part of the coast*, because the nation to a man, I am persuaded, would acquiesce in nothing short of this. It were as reasonable to make a treaty with their government to give up the country altogether. It is by this alone that they subsist, and they are not a race of people to abandon their prosperity to the *caprice of their rulers*.

For years past there has been a commission at Rio composed of Haynes and Cunningham, who are paid expressly to take cognizance of this matter, and to see that this stipulation is strictly carried into effect; and

yet *nine vessels out of ten* go to the prohibited parts *for slaves alone*; and this is known to every one.

Besides, those parts take in exchange, for the greater part, rum and tobacco; and nearly the whole of the latter article *refuse*, which is a great advantage to the planter; whereas the southern nations, who are generally incapable of agriculture when brought over, are higher in price in the first instance, will take off very little rum and tobacco, but will have in exchange chiefly *manufactured goods*.

During a twelve years' residence in Bahia, I can state as a fact, that not one vessel in *ten ever* went to the south. It will not answer their purpose to do so, because *those* slaves are bought by articles which must in general be paid *cash* for, which is one drawback. Then they pay higher in the purchase of each individual, who is sold infinitely lower on importing.

The traffic is carried on by fast sailing vessels, built in the United States *expressly*, and with *sweeps*; so that, in the event of any suspicious vessel appearing, they run into the wind's eye, and so are not only safe from all capture, but make very expeditious voyages. The houses of Siqueira, Oliveira, &c., have made enormous fortunes by this arrangement; but, in short, it is *universal*.

During the siege of Bahia (the last hold of the Portuguese) when provisions were excessively dear, I went down to Rio with the intent of chartering two vessels to proceed on to Buenos Ayres, with the expectation of procuring two cargoes of fresh provisions. A Dutch and a Prussian vessel, of considerable tonnage, *both loaded* with slaves from *Bahia*, which sailed from this latter port a few days previous to myself, reached Rio about the same time, with none but slaves from the *prohibited parts*. This I personally communicated to Mr. Haynes, the judge of the slave commission (formerly Lord Amherst's secretary), but no proceedings or even notice was taken thereon. Indeed, any interference upon such occasions would be so unacceptable to the government, but more decidedly so to the nation at large, that I dare say both he and Cunningham find it convenient to be as little inquisitorial as possible on this head. If the government there can gain any *important point* by *professing* to discountenance the traffic, or by *pretending* to enforce its abolition, I have no doubt of its professions; but never, while the Brazils shall depend upon the fruits of agriculture for its support, will there be any diminution in this trade from those parts of Africa which, though prohibited, are the only points to which it will answer the purpose of the Brazilians to resort to; and resort to them they will, unless something more forcible than treaties—more effective than ordinary vessels of war usually are, and more independent than commissions find it convenient to be, can be found to prevent it.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke,  
your Grace's most obedient and very humble servant,

W. A. KENTISH.

P.S.—I have another communication to make in a few days, of somewhat more importance than the above perhaps, as it more intimately concerns the welfare of our own country commercially; a matter of so much the

more consequence as all other nations are now so effectually competing with us in this point, from which alone has originated all our past, and on which alone we can depend for all our future, success and prosperity.

[ 860. ]

*To the Right Hon. William Huskisson.*

MY DEAR HUSKISSON,

London, 14th April, 1828.

Mr. Finlay does me justice in stating that I was well acquainted with, and sensible of, the eminent talents and qualities of Sir Thomas Munro; and of the great services which he was enabled to render to the public during a laborious and brilliant career of service.

But I must confess that I could not without impropriety suggest to his Majesty to adopt the course proposed, in order that his Majesty may record his sense of Sir Thomas Munro's merits.

Notwithstanding the long declared wish and intention of the government to adopt every measure in their power to induce the nobility and gentry of Ireland to reside in Ireland, I am apprehensive that the grant of Irish peerages has but too frequently been made to others for services and objects not exactly having in view the particular benefit of that part of the United Kingdom.

Under these circumstances, and as there is but one vacancy, to fill which an arrangement has already been made, I must decline to make the recommendation to his Majesty suggested by Mr. Finlay.

Ever, my dear Huskisson, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 861. ]

*To the Right Hon. Sir Frederick Lamb.*

MY DEAR LAMB,

London, 14th April, 1828.

I received your letter of the \* , on Saturday; and this morning that of the 5th, and I do not lose a moment in assuring you that, since your departure from this country, I have not written a line to Lisbon excepting to yourself; and that I

\* Blank in manuscript.

have never had any correspondence with that country excepting with the Conde de Perva upon my private affairs, and with Sir William Clinton while I was in the office of Commander-in-Chief.

I will go further and tell you this. I have been too long in the public service of this country, and know my duty in office too well, to think of writing to anybody upon public affairs excepting the official person charged with the conduct of the particular affair under discussion. My practice indeed has been more strict upon this subject than that of others. I commanded abroad for many years; and had two brothers at different times, and many friends always, in the Cabinet. I never wrote a line to anybody excepting to the Secretary of State, with whom I was directed to correspond; and to him very little excepting officially. In the same manner, when employed in the diplomatic service, I never wrote excepting to the Secretary of State for the Foreign Department; that Secretary of State having been for the two last occasions I was so employed Mr. Canning.

On the other hand, when in office and in the Cabinet, I always refused to correspond even with my own brother, who was Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland; and for six years I never wrote to him excepting upon mere family affairs, such as his marriage. You may rely upon it, therefore, that those who have told you that there are any letters from me at Lisbon have deceived you. I defy the production of a line excepting to yourself, nor have I spoken to anybody more than a word upon the subject, excepting to the King's servants, my colleagues, and to Prince Esterhazy.

I will go further, and tell you that even to yourself I did not write without showing my letter to Lord Dudley, as I shall yours of the 5th, and this answer to it.

I shall reserve my answer to the latter part of your letter for the official despatch from the government.

Ever, my dear Lamb, &c.,

WELLINGTON.



*The Marquess of Londonderry to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Paris, 14th April, 1828.

It may not be wholly without interest to give you some description of the late ministers, and the measures that caused their overthrow, as well as their successors, and the mode in which they have unaccountably arrived in power. I have been enabled to pick up the following history, which I believe to be pretty accurate.

Although Villèle found himself obliged to throw himself into the arms of the clergy and Jesuits, supported by the ardent devotion of both the King and the Dauphin, still he never was himself a bigot, nor gave himself any trouble to profess it.

MM. Corbière, Peyronnet, and Chabrol, had pretty much the same religious indifference.

M. Corbière, an advocate of Rheims, arrived at Paris in 1815, and caused much scandal by his loose principles. He was a decided friend to the *ancien régime*, and an enemy to all innovation. In the ministry he was more feared than liked, and Villèle latterly could neither manage nor control him. M. Peyronnet was an obscure advocate of Bordeaux, and only famous for his debts and his licentiousness. His wife lived, and is living still, publicly with a merchant, by whom she has four children. She arrived one fine day at the Ministry of Justice, and threatened an immediate scandal and exposure of her husband if he did not secure her from the government a pension of 12,000 francs. To this atrocious job he was obliged to submit. This minister made his *début* as Avocat-Général; and, with Corbière and Villèle, he formed in the late government what was termed the Triumvirate.

M. Chabrol, who was one of the most ardent Revolutionists until 1814, returned then and attached himself to Monsieur. He was dismissed by the Duc de Cazes from the Prefecture of Police because he mixed up in the intrigues of the Comte d'Artois. He does not possess any remarkable talents, but he is understood to have conducted the affairs of the Marine with ability and judgment.

The three other prominent members of this administration, viz., Clermont Tonnerre, Damas, and Frasnynois, were all most notorious bigots, their principles entirely according with their interests in this particular.

Clermont Tonnerre was formerly Chamberlain to Joseph Bonaparte, and sought during the time of his power to bury the remembrance of *the past* by heaping favours on the emigrants and hangers-on of the Court possessed of military science. He has an admirable memory, and a great fluency of delivery; entirely devoted to the Jesuits on account of his uncle, the Archbishop of Toulouse. He established chaplains and communions in the regiments, and when he was one day criticised to the King, his Majesty replied, "Il a du moins rendu mon armée chrétienne."

Damas was chiefly governed by Villèle. Without talent or experience in diplomacy, or in the politics of the European cabinets. More *English* than *Russian*, not from *system*, but from *hatred* to Pozzo di Borgo, whom he still believes by his art and cunning will play false with all the world.

M. Frasnynois, Archévêque d'Hermopolis, largely protected the Jesuits

from fright as well as from principle. He contrived that the Duc de Rivière should surround the young Duc de Bordeaux with the brethren, insomuch that he is already designated by the people as *Le Petit Jesuit*.

Now, with respect to the grounds of the unpopularity of these ministers and their fall.

The open and undisguised corruption of the elective system, which gave on a population of 32,000,000 only 80,000 electors, the right being vested in a contribution of 300 francs.

The abuse in the majority of 330 members, holding all salaries or the promises of peerages, and proclaiming through Paris that all the public functionaries, and 40,000 mayors (amongst whom there are 10,000 electors), could, and dared only vote with the ministers on pain of being turned out.

The exclusive favours heaped upon the emigrant party and clergy, and the impossibility of obtaining any appointment but by the recommendation of the priests and the Court party.

The declared intention of working a change in the public opinion of France, in order to arrive at an alteration in its liberal institutions; to establish greater power amongst the clergy, the sole real support of the throne and the altar; to regard the Charte only as an instrument or machine to raise taxes with greater facility than in a government purely absolute.

The serious changes that have already been attempted in the Charte, such as the Seven Years' Chambers and the Double Vote, which only leaves 258 deputies to be named by 80,000 electors.

The diplomatic appointments and high judicial and administrative situations; the prefectures, charges at Court, regiments, &c., being exclusively disposed of to the Royalist party, and even to the fraction who pronounced loudly in favour of the Jesuits.

The reduction of interest of the Rentes from 5 to 3 per cent., while the milliard was given to the emigrants; the annual addition to the Budget for the clergy, the provision already amounting to forty millions; the reduction of the National Guard; the inconceivable dissolution of the Chambers, and the mistaken idea of Villèle that the party of the clergy, and the *ancien régime*, would return him a stronger Chamber than one in which he counted 300 votes.

The creation of seventy-six peers, all of whom (with the exception of Maréchal Soult) were chosen from Villèle's dependents and the ranks of the Jesuits.

These are the main grievancés and allegations which ultimately blew up Villèle's administration. He had strong hopes for some time after the elections still to hold his ground, and the King gave him six weeks to try to strengthen himself.

But he met with refusals from MM. Pastorel, Portal, Martignac, De Lulot, St. Priest, De Rayneval, and even from *Polignac*, who, it is said, was intriguing for the Présidence du Conseil, aided by La Rivière and the Court party in the Tuileries; but in this Polignac failed. And it is here not a little curious to note the cause that is alleged for La Rivière's failure in an object to which his soul has been long devoted, and when no one has more complete power over the King, besides Polignac, being one of his Majesty's greatest favourites, and if once named would probably remain for ever. It

seems Villèle was so much afraid of this that he caused the King's religious conscience to be worked upon the received idea that Polignac is the King's natural son, and that it would be the greatest scandal, at his Majesty's advanced age, to place him before Europe as the first minister of France. This disquieting thought has completely succeeded in the King's religious mind, and Villèle's cunning subdued La Rivière's personal influence.

The crisis now arrived; and M. Chabrol was sent for and commanded to form a government by the King, with the express condition that it was to be as near as possible upon the principles of that Cabinet which his Majesty had been forced to abandon, and sincerely regretted.

M. Chabrol consulted only M. St. Crieg and M. Monnier. The latter, one of Bonaparte's old Secretaries, and one in whom the Duc de Richelieu much confided. These three individuals thought more of pleasing the King than of constructing a solid edifice and they avoided all names hostile to Villèle, whom they supposed only put on the shelf for the moment.

MM. Roy and Portalis were talked of for the government of which La Rivière wanted to make Polignac chief. These two therefore were first secured, while Chabrol kept the Marine, and Frasnnois the Ecclesiastical affairs.

M. La Ferronnays being by accident *en congé* at Paris, was most unexpectedly and hastily named to the Foreign Affairs. The King having positively objected to both Pasquier and Chateaubriand, though of the two he would have preferred the former. La Ferronnays is esteemed the only real gentleman in the ministry which the Ultras call the *Bourgeois Ministry*.

Chabrol next wished to enlist the suffrages of the Dauphin by putting him at the head of the army. The Prince would have wished Guilleminot as Minister of War, but was satisfied with M. de Caux. The two remaining ministers named were both Villèle's Directors-General, namely, St. Crieg and Martignac, and thus all hostile elements to Villèle were avoided.

The organisation, however, was soon considered by all parties as only temporary. The great triumph at first was to get rid of Villèle; but in the new formation there appeared no talent or character, nor any guarantee against the return of Villèle, when two of his old colleagues were leaders, and three others principal members of the Cabinet, entirely attached to him, viz., Martignac, St. Crieg, and De Caux.

Thus menaced, the two chiefs, Chabrol and D'Hermopolis, dared not meet the Chambers, and they retired to give way to Hyde de Neuville and the Bishop of Beauvais, formerly Secretary to Cardinal Fesch. These two were the most prominent leaders of the *Contre Opposition* party.

Martignac now stepped forward as the most popular and prominent leader in the Chamber of the new government. By his address and admitted eloquence he obtained early an armistice from his opponents.

M. de St. Crieg, who has the department of trade, has not yet shown himself; indeed, M. Casimir Perrier is considered hereafter as likely to succeed to this place, as he is the man of the most information and means in France in commercial knowledge.

About this period Chateaubriand's affairs and intrigues were vigorously pushed, and he was offered, amongst other proposals, La Grande Maîtrise de l'Université; but, declining it for higher game, M. Portalis was appointed to it; but he has as yet made no effect in the Chambers.

Out of the chaos, uncertainty, and intrigues which existed, the government became formed, as I have above detailed; and I will now tell you briefly what I learn of the characters of the new *Dramatis Personæ*.

Le Roy, *Ministre des Finances*, is an old *avocat* without much reputation, save a facility in speaking and great application to business. He has made an immense fortune in speculation, and is famous for great method and regularity in business. The opinion *in Paris* is very much in his favour, and he is made much of by the Liberal party. He is entirely engrossed in the business of his own department, and he has avowed open hostility to Villèle, whom he proclaims in a deficit of two millions. M. Portalis, *Garde des Sceaux*, is the son of the famous author of the Concordat with the Pope. He is religious to bigotry, and was a member of the Opposition against the late ministry in the Peers. He is not much of an orator, and is considered weak, but is more popular than his predecessor, M. de Peyronnet. La Ferronnays, *Affaires Étrangères*, was sent, after his quarrel with the Duc de Berri, as minister to Denmark, where, getting into repute with Madame de Rosenkranz, his fame reached St. Petersburg, and he was appointed ambassador at the request of the Emperor Alexander. He is certainly *popular, frank*, and supposed to be *moderate* in his general politics on all subjects. La Ferronnays, however, is considered as more *encamped* than at present *consolidated* in his position. Martignac, *Ministre de l'Intérieur*, is an old *avocat* of Bordeaux, and in the midst of debts and pleasures of all kinds which have ruined his health, he appeared on the political arena at the moment of Villèle's power and triumphs. Martignac has a seducing power in his words and delivery, and is the first debating card. His former obligations to Villèle he already forgets, and will no longer march in his footsteps. After La Ferronnays Martignac has become the most influential minister with the Tuileries.

M. Hyde de Neuville, *Ministre de la Marine*, was a very active agent of the Bourbons during the Revolution, and lent himself to all the plots against Napoleon, even to the Infernal Machine. He has great diplomatic pretensions from his missions to America, U. S., and Portugal. He is a most bitter enemy of England, and is now convinced that *his destiny* is to regenerate the French Navy to the annihilation of the British supremacy on the seas. He figured since his return from Portugal among the chiefs of the *Contre Opposition*, and was mainly brought into the Cabinet by the negotiations with Chateaubriand. I have already stated all I have been told of.

Of M. St. Cricq, *Ministre de Commerce*, M. de Caux, *Ministre de la Guerre*, and of M. de Patrimenil, *Ministre des Cultes*, M. de Fentner, *Ministre de l'Instruction Publique*, I have heard nothing to note.

My last letter stated what I consider will be the action of these newly-composed particles, from the best general information I am in the way of obtaining. I know not that I can add much more. They entertain great respect for you, but will have a difficulty in any combined movement with England, lest they should be accused of being led, and being subordinate to us. The clergy and the emigrant party have undoubtedly a great ingratitude towards England; they don't like our Protestantism, nor forgive the efforts we have been making lately for Liberal institutions and universal tolerance.

That the Bourbons will incline more to Russia than England I must still believe, from the preponderance of Pozzo, and from the feeling

great Continental Power is of more advantage to their dynasty in case of interior difficulties than a maritime nation.

The Court of the Tuileries is also evidently displeas'd at our late *marche* against apostolicism in Spain, and our menacing Constitution in Portugal, thus engaging in a secret war against the Bourbon feelings and absolute power.

To conclude, however: although the balance would be against England at the present epoch, time and good councils, and sage measures, may widely change present feelings. These and *present* interests and *present* means evidently lead France to an armed neutrality in her deliberations and actions; and a position of *decorum* will be kept up, in which she can nourish an ill-assorted and unstable ministry, and a distracted and divided country.

In my next I will tell you what they now say of the majorities in the two Chambers, and of the increasing consistency of the government.

Believe me ever yours most affectionately,

VANE LONDONDERRY.

I have no time, and never read over these my hasty scrawls, so pray excuse all blunders.

*The Marquess of Londonderry to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Paris, 14th April, 1828.

In addition to my long prose to read at your leisure, I add these few words to say that I learn they have again paused about the National Guard, and no final decision is yet taken. I saw the King and Dauphin yesterday; the former is much changed, and seem'd evidently in low spirits. He inquired much after you, and said he was sure you would do everything that could be done "et pour l'Angleterre et pour la France." He was very cautious in expressing any opinions, although I remained a quarter of an hour with him. There seem's still a stagnation in the great questions here. I know not *les piéces*, though I often hear them discuss'd, and Lord Dudley's *mot d'indemnités* has puzzled Pozzo very decidedly. *Le but* of France and England may possibly be the same, but the former is for placing everything in the hands and upon the honour of *Nicholas*, as the shortest and only mode of bringing the Sultan to yield, whereas, I should suppose, we might fairly doubt when Russia becomes *omnipotent* where she will stop.

Thirty-two transports for cavalry have arriv'd at Toulon from Marseilles, taking in forage, &c., to proceed to Cadiz, to re-embark the French cavalry, and to bring them from thence. No communication, however, of this intention has been made to San Carlos, and it is still doubtful (they say) whether the French will so soon evacuate.

In Brest preparations go on actively; they say six vessels of the line are coming on with forwardness.

I shall curtail my stay here, as you will see by the papers, one of which I send, that they are already writing about me. This is extremely disagree-

able, and renders me a suspected person; and in delicacy to Lord Granville, as well as in proper *égard* towards you, I think the sooner I leave Paris the better, although I own I should have liked now to remain.

Ever yours, my dear Duke, most affectionately,

VANE LONDONDERRY.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Paris, le 12 Avril, 1828.

Le Marquis de Londonderry est ici depuis quelques jours. Le noble pair n'a peut-être profité des vacances de Pâques, que pour un voyage de distraction; mais un ancien séjour à Vienne, comme ambassadeur, un rôle tranché à la Chambre Haute dans la dernière guerre contre le Cabinet Canning, des relations formées dans l'Opposition avec le chef actuel du ministère anglais, et qui ne sont pas toutes brisées depuis son avènement au pouvoir, en voilà peut-être plus qu'il n'en faut pour faire attacher quelque importance politique au voyage de cet étranger.

Ne nous étonnons donc pas que quelques personnes aient vu dans le Marquis de Londonderry un successeur possible de Lord Granville, ambassadeur actuel d'Angleterre, et que d'autres aient même prêté à ses démarches à Paris un demi caractère officiel pour entraîner la France dans une triple alliance avec l'Autriche et l'Angleterre contre les prétentions futures de la Russie.

Jusqu'ici, nous l'avouons, rien n'annonce encore de la part d'Angleterre une attitude aussi prononcée que celle où la placerait vis à vis du Cabinet de Saint-Petersbourg cet appel à une coalition européenne contre des éventualités. Le ministère anglais, dans les circonstances actuelles, paraît beaucoup plus occupé du présent que de l'avenir. Il s'accroche à toutes les espérances de paix partout où elles naissent. Il perçoit bien dans tout cela une secrète défiance, une inquiétude vague; mais de là à un pas sérieux vers une rupture, quelle distance! Tant que l'accomplissement du Traité de Londres pourra servir de prétexte honorable à l'inaction du Cabinet anglais, nous ne le croyons pas disposé à se précipiter au devant des événements; il les attend, et cette politique expectante semble avoir passé dans tous les conseils de l'Europe.—*Journal des Débats.*

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*Viscount Melville to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

India Board, 14th April, 1828.

I return herewith Mr. Grant's letter,\* and I quite agree with him on the two principal points to which he adverts, viz., the general inexpediency of the bounty system, and that it may be more convenient to defer till next year the consideration as to whether it will be proper to continue the fishery bounties and police regulations beyond the 5th April, 1830. I do not advocate the expediency of granting a bounty for the encouragement of any manufactured article, in the ordinary acceptation of that term, but the manufacture of seamen is a totally different affair. The French government are encouraging by bounties and regulations *their* fisheries in the Channel, and there are now many thousands of those fishermen. I have frequently seen French boats, manned by 15, 20, and 25 men, fishing in our own roadsteads. All I ask is, that with a view to our maritime resources, the subject shall in due time be reconsidered. If it shall be

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\* See page 359.

decided that the fisheries will go on equally well without bounties and without police regulations as they have done under the present system, I am quite content; but when I see what has been done since that system was established, I think we ought to be quite sure that the same resources will continue to us after it is abolished. I would not give a farthing to encourage the catching and curing of codfish and herrings; but if we can maintain, at the expense of a few thousand pounds, such a formidable body of efficient seamen as are exhibited in the Report which I sent to you, I am sure that it is worthy of consideration whether we will apply to that part of the subject the sweeping principle of "no bounties," however sound that principle may be abstractedly. I think it right to add that, to the best of my recollection, the Act for the abolition of the fishery bounties was passed without any communication with the Admiralty, and that I never heard of it till the following year.

I remain ever yours most sincerely,

MELVILLE.

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[ 862. ] MEMORANDUM.—DRAFT OF PROPOSED NOTE TO PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT, GIVEN TO LORD DUDLEY, APRIL 15TH, 1828.

The undersigned has received his Majesty's commands to acknowledge the receipt of the Note of his Excellency the Marquis Palmella of the 8th instant, in which his Excellency has enclosed the extract of a letter from the Vicomte de Santarem, and to inform his Excellency that his Majesty receives the assurances of the sincerity of the intentions of his Royal Highness the Infante Regent, which his Excellency the Vicomte de Santarem has conveyed to the Marquis de Palmella, for the information of his Majesty's government, as a proof of the desire of his Royal Highness the Infante Don Miguel to conciliate the confidence of his Majesty.

In the year 1826, his Royal Highness the Infante took the oath of fidelity to the constitution prescribed by the Portuguese Charter. In the month of October his Royal Highness, having been appointed by his brother the Emperor and King Don Pedro to be his Lieutenant and Regent of Portugal, *aux termes des lois existantes dans cet Etat, et conformément aux institutions données par l'Empereur son auguste frère à la monarchie portugaise*, declared by his Royal Highness's plenipotentiaries the Baron de Villa Seca and the Comte de Villa Real, upon the Protocol of a conference at Vienna, which was held upon that occasion, that he had ordered that a letter for his signature might be prepared, addressed to his sister, the then Regent

Donna Maria Isabel, *de manière à ce qu'elle puisse être rendue publique, et à ce qu'elle ne puisse en même temps laisser aucune doute sur la ferme volonté de ce Prince en acceptant la Lieutenance du royaume que l'Empereur son frère vient de lui conférer, d'en maintenir religieusement les institutions, de vouer le passé à un entier oubli, mais de contenir en même temps avec force et fermeté l'esprit de parti et de faction qui a trop longtemps agité le Portugal.*

His Royal Highness likewise addressed his Majesty in a letter dated Vienna, the 19th October, in which his Royal Highness stated :—

*Convaincu de la part qu'elle y prendra par suite de l'ancienne alliance entre le Portugal et la Grande-Bretagne, et que je désire sincèrement cultiver, j'ose me flatter qu'elle voudra bien m'accorder sa bienveillance et son appui ; le but que je me propose étant de maintenir invariablement la tranquillité et le bon ordre en Portugal au moyen des institutions octroyées par l'Empereur et Roi mon frère ; institutions que je suis fermement résolu de faire respecter.*

His Majesty not doubting of his Royal Highness's intentions to carry into execution the promises held forth in the letter written by his Royal Highness to his august sister the then Regent of Portugal, according to the intention thus formally announced by his minister on the Protocol, as well as in that to his Majesty himself, received his Royal Highness upon his arrival in England with that honour and distinction due to his exalted station.

While his Royal Highness was in England his Majesty agreed, by a Protocol signed by his Secretary of State, dated the \* , to facilitate to his Royal Highness the means of raising a loan of money ; and to allow his Majesty's troops, which had been ordered to return from Portugal, to remain during a reasonable period of time, according to his Royal Highness's wishes ; and when his Royal Highness quitted this kingdom his Majesty detached a squadron of his fleet to escort his Royal Highness, in order to mark to the world the satisfaction which his Majesty felt upon seeing the government of Portugal confided by his Imperial Majesty the Emperor and King Don Pedro to his brother the Infante Don Miguel, as his Lieutenant.

\* Blank in manuscript.



In the mean time his Majesty's influence at the Court of Rio de Janeiro had been uniformly exerted to persuade the Emperor and King Don Pedro to complete his intended abdication of the kingdom of Portugal; and to send to Europe the Queen Donna Maria da Gloria.

All these acts of his Majesty were founded upon the conviction of his Majesty's mind that his Royal Highness the Infante intended to carry into execution fairly, as he had sworn, and promised, in his letter to his august sister and in that to his Majesty, the Charter granted to the people of Portugal by the Emperor and King Don Pedro.

His Majesty prefers that form of government under which the dominions over which he reigns have enjoyed such a series of years of happiness, and have attained such a degree of glory and prosperity; and his Majesty would have wished that the people of Portugal, in whose fate his Majesty feels such an interest, should enjoy similar advantages.

Under treaties of the highest antiquity, his Majesty is bound to defend the kingdom of Portugal against all attack by a foreign enemy; and his Majesty, equally with his royal predecessors, has shown himself ready to assist his ancient Ally in a moment of danger or of difficulty. His Majesty could not but feel that the best chance for tranquillity and strength in Portugal was by the establishment of the Charter granted by the Emperor and King Don Pedro, and by the abdication by that Sovereign of his rights to the Crown. Any attempt by the Infante to set aside the Charter was calculated to excite its adherents to consider the Emperor and King Don Pedro as their Protector.

The least that could be expected in such a state of things was that Don Pedro should, contrary to his Majesty's earnest entreaties, delay his abdication; and should order from Rio de Janeiro the execution of those laws upon the acceptance of which in Portugal his Imperial Majesty had declared his abdication to depend. The foundation would thus be laid for a civil war between factions, of which the Emperor would be the head of one, and his Royal Highness the Infante the head of another, instead of governing the kingdom under the legal authorisation of his Imperial brother and Sovereign; and Portugal thus destroyed, and without resources, would fall an easy conquest to an enemy.

It is not with Portugal placed in such circumstances that his Majesty's royal predecessors or his Majesty himself had been allied, and that the strength of the Kings of England had been put forth for her assistance.

Circumstances have occurred since the arrival of his Royal Highness the Infante in Portugal which had led to the belief, in which his Majesty participated, that his Royal Highness did entertain the fixed intention of setting aside the Charter.

His Royal Highness's first act was to form an administration, and to call to his assistance in carrying on a government, of which the object was to be *de maintenir invariablement la tranquillité au moyen des institutions octroyées par l'Empereur et Roi*, persons who, however honourable and respectable in station and character, were in general known to entertain opinions hostile to that charter.

His Royal Highness then dismissed from their commands, and from his military service, many of those who had led the Portuguese troops to victory in the recent contest against those who had opposed in arms the will of their Sovereign the Emperor and King Don Pedro, and the execution of the Charter, and replaced those officers by others notoriously entertaining a contrary opinion; and finally, his Royal Highness dissolved the Chamber of Deputies without calling another Chamber, according to the Charter; and his Royal Highness has appointed a Junta to consider of a law for the elections, which Junta may postpone its report to an indefinite period, and thus defeat the object of the Sovereign who granted this Charter to his people.

The undersigned has received his Majesty's commands to inform his Excellency the Marquis de Palmella that these acts had excited the anxiety of his Majesty for the fate of Portugal, and the ease and happiness of his Royal Highness the Infante himself. The undersigned does not conceal from his Excellency that that anxiety has not been removed from the minds of his Majesty's servants by the letter of the Vicomte de Santarem, enclosed in his Excellency's Note of the 8th instant.

The impression made by such acts as those recited, acts inconsistent with the oaths repeatedly taken and promises made by a Prince, cannot be removed by the letter of a minister declaring that the intention of the Prince his master is not that which all the acts of his government would tend to prove that he entertained.

Under these circumstances the undersigned has received his Majesty's commands to announce to his Excellency the Marquis de Palmella that his Majesty waits for the result of the events now passing in Portugal with patience ; but also with an anxiety proportionate to the interest which his Majesty has invariably felt for the honour, the happiness, and the tranquillity of that kingdom, and the sense which his Majesty entertains of the risk to which all those advantages, as well as the honour and ease of his Royal Highness the Regent, are exposed by the conduct which has been pursued by the Portuguese government since his Royal Highness has landed in that kingdom.

WELLINGTON.

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*Mr. John Read to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Royal Military Repository, 15th April, 1828.

I have taken the liberty of addressing the enclosed to your Grace, thinking that if any attempt of forcing the passage of the Dardanelles should be found necessary, the observations therein contained may not be deemed unworthy of your Grace's consideration.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect,  
your Grace's most obedient devoted servant,

JOHN READ.

[Compliments. The Duke has received his letter, and is much obliged to him.]

[ENCLOSURE.]

ON FORCING THE PASSAGE OF THE DARDANELLES.

If hostilities should be renewed with the Ottoman empire, the passage of the Dardanelles becomes a necessary consequence ; and considering what has occurred on a former occasion from the effects produced by the colossal ordnance which the castles on the Asiatic side are armed with, any suggestions which may tend to counteract and diminish their tremendous effects will not be thought a matter of indifference.

Having premised thus much, I have to state that in 1799 I was attached to the military mission proceeding to Turkey, under the command of the late Brigadier-General Koehler, and soon after our arrival at Constantinople was employed with Major Holloway, R.E., who was empowered by the Turkish government to improve the defences on both sides of the Straits ; for which purpose our quarters were established at Sultanier, or the Old Castle, on the Asiatic side, which defends the narrowest, and consequently the most dangerous, part for an hostile ship to pass. But on Lord Elgin's arrival at Constantinople the mission were ordered to join him before any alterations and additions in contemplation were commenced ; and as Major Holloway did not leave any

documents relating to this subject behind him, it is presumed that the works are still nearly in *statu quo*.

Notwithstanding that upwards of twenty years have elapsed, I have still a recollection of certain circumstances and localities which may not be deemed unimportant at this time, and, if attended to, may render any future attempt to force a passage less dangerous.

In the front of this Castle (the old one on the Asiatic side), which faces the Strait, are ranged, under an arcade, *à fleur d'eau*, those pieces of ordnance of immense calibre, so as to be completely covered from a lateral view; their muzzles resting on skids with a small elevation, and the breech abutting against a body of solid masonry. In addition to the concealment afforded this formidable battery by this structure, a strong wall or traverse runs from it to the water's edge, entirely covering its left flank, so that it is protected from any fire which might be directed against it from ships approaching to pass, and it is not until these guns can make use of their fire (which is instantaneous as soon as any vessel appears beyond this screen or traverse) that a ship can return it. And from this circumstance, that no vessel can annoy them until exposed to view, they are sure to have the advantage of the first discharge, with a certainty of effect from the previous arrangement of a due elevation for the distance at which the object must pass, as was experienced by Admiral Duckworth when passing this battery. Although nothing seriously is to be apprehended after the vessels have escaped the first discharge, from the impracticability of traversing these guns to follow the object—and the time taken to reload them gives the ships that have escaped the first fire the opportunity of getting out of their range, and their loading would be further interrupted from being exposed to the fire of the vessels in succession—yet one shot striking the object between wind and water would most probably be its destruction.

To render the passing this battery less dangerous a diversion might be made by gun and mortar boats in taking a position which would materially distract the attention of the enemy by directing their fire against the wall which covers their left flank. And there can be no doubt that such a force, judiciously employed, would succeed in a short time in making a breach and in rendering that part too hot for occupation, and thus enable the passing ships to proceed without much molestation.

The most effectual means of ensuring success in this enterprise is to employ a co-operating land-force, to disembark in the rear of the first castle on the European side and take a position where field artillery, from its elevated situation, would keep this formidable battery in check without being exposed to its fire, and the same position would have in command the castle immediately below it; so that any efforts made from thence to co-operate with the opposite shore would be rendered ineffectual. It is to be observed that this spot was the one contemplated by Major Holloway for the erection of a new work to protect the castle beneath from insult.

Notwithstanding, after all that is suggested, if the Ottoman government have science enough to improve the natural advantages which present themselves in this narrow part of the Straits by erecting batteries of the common calibre only, the success of a fleet without a co-operating land force appears very problematical; and perhaps it may be found necessary that this force should protect the fleet until it passes Gallipoli and enters the Straits of Saint George.

The castles at the entrance of the Straits have not been noticed, from the little danger to be apprehended; and none at all if the attempt is made before daylight and hugging the European shore.

JOHN READ,  
R. M. Repository.

*The Right Hon. Sir Frederick Lamb to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Lisbon, 16th April, 1828.

Your summary of the events here is complete. I not only remember your opinion as to the withdrawing our troops when the Spaniards removed their cordon, but I pressed it at the time strongly and repeatedly with Lords Dudley and Goderich ; if it had been done then we should have stood much better now. At the time when your letter was written, I too might have regarded Don Miguel's acts and omissions as isolated facts, proving no ultimate design ; but you will have seen by my later despatches that I now consider his usurpation of the Crown to have been settled for him from the beginning by those who lead him. It was intended to have taken place in the first days after his landing ; but the Portuguese have had enough of being put forwards, and neither the army nor the populace would set up the cry. The provocations that were given to the former to join in it did not come before me in a sufficiently authentic shape to be stated in my despatches ; but there is no doubt that the soldiers on duty were incited to it by officers, and in many instances even by those who were on actual duty attending the person of Don Miguel.

Among the Infant's omissions you have not stated one of the most remarkable—the omission to publish an amnesty to the leaders of the refugees. This should naturally have been one of his first acts, but the redaction presented the difficulty of treating them as men pardoned, and who, therefore, had committed, if not a crime, at least an error. They, on the contrary, would not be content to return upon these terms ; they hold themselves to deserve reward, not pardon, and so does Miguel. From this contradictory situation a total silence respecting them has ensued, and the terms upon which they are to re-enter Portugal are not yet cleared up.

Now for our conduct. If engagements are anything, we have a right to enforce whatever is contained in the Protocols of Vienna. Our intention not to do so is not proved by the departure of our troops ; their presence was but a mode of acting, and we possess many others perhaps equally efficacious, certainly better suited to our interests. If we do not mean to uphold these Protocols, it would perhaps have been better that they should never have been framed, and this is my belief. But, however, there they are, and they contain, as I read them, two provisions—the maintenance of Don Pedro's institutions, and amnesty for the past. Now, with respect to the first of these conditions, I would not give one straw for it. Miguel has overset these institutions in the most foolish and offensive way ; but it is not for us to embroil ourselves with a vain endeavour to set them up again : being down, there let them lie. Do not, however, let it be inferred from their fall that the constitutional party is the weakest. In truth, there is no party that means to risk or sacrifice anything now but what intends to gain by its opinion. The party of the head of the government will always be the strongest, and one of the absurdities of Miguel's conduct has been that he did not make it clear from the beginning what his conduct was to be. Everybody would have been glad enough to have conformed themselves to it, if he would but have left them a little time and a decent mode of doing it.

To return to our Protocols. Their first provision is disposed of. Upon the second I am more stubborn. If acts of violence or persecution should take place, I know not how to limit the extent of protection which in such a case we are called upon to give. We have no point of honour towards the Constitution. We have none for the employment of any individuals in preference to others; but for their personal safety for acts done in support of a system set up by ourselves, we have; and the more so, as the Vienna Protocols were alleged (if I am not misinformed) by Lord Heytesbury (as they would have been by me) as assurances of security upon which full confidence might be placed, and which we were pledged to make respected. The call upon us to support their observance, as far as regards the safety of individuals, goes much beyond the withdrawal of an ambassador, for which the time has, in my mind, long since come. Do not let us deceive ourselves. We do not stand well here, and the reason is plain: we have not gone fairly through with either party. This is the penalty of intermeddling. But it is singular that we stand much worse with the Court party than with the other, who have much more to reproach us with. The Court party cannot forgive us our recommendation of the Constitution, and the chief families, who have taken that side of the question, retain an actively hostile feeling against us. As these will be the possessors of power, it will be some time before any British agent can find himself acting cordially with the government. All circumstances point out that, having taken the line of not interfering, your alleged non-interference should become a real one; and the presence of an ambassador gives you the appearance of striving to regain an influence which has escaped you, while it keeps up a jealousy of your doing so which it is not for your interest to keep alive. The engagements taken to you have been broken. Your call to have them respected is left unanswered. Your recommendations are flatly refused without examination. The officers who have fought for the system you advocate are removed to make way for the men whose invasion you considered as a foreign one and resisted by sending your troops. All this is done without the slightest attempt to save appearances or conciliate your feelings. There is an end of every symptom of grace or favour between the two Courts; there is an end not only to all influence, but to all good intelligence, to such an extent that my recommendation to those to whom I wish well is to cease to have any communication or connection with me. How, under such circumstances, is an ambassador to be retained here? Is it that in cases depending upon the Portuguese government he should have to apply to the Spanish minister as the preferable channel for carrying his point? My recommendation continues the same—to profit by the conjunction, in order to remodel our relations with this country according to our interest. Should you hold that interest to require the same close connection which existed before our mistaken measures about the Constitution, still I hold that this will ultimately be best secured by standing aloof for the present, and leaving these people entirely to themselves. For the moment, whatever is wrong is laid upon us; let us stand aside, and it will be but a short time before the want of us is felt. Then, and not before, we may come forward with advantage. From our system of non-interference I except only the case of protection, upon which our credit in Europe and our power of ever resuming our influence here depends. Should

you feel this as strongly as I do, the sooner an intimation of it is given to this government the less likely will the necessity for acting upon it be to occur.

In the line you have taken, then—as far as it has yet gone—I fully concur. But I go further: I feel that you had no choice, that you could have taken no other; and this I deplore. As to all political doctrines, I hold them but as the arguments by which statesmen justify the course which interest or necessity calls upon them to take; never as the motives by which that course is decided. Take the non-interference doctrine, for instance; it was invented by Lord Londonderry, when the country would not sanction the lengths to which the Holy Alliance wished to go; at the same time that he tacked to it a clause of exception, enabling Austria to take that line towards Naples in which he refused to participate. This non-interference doctrine, which has never been fairly in operation in the whole history of Europe, has subsequently been slackened or tightened according to the temper and circumstances of the country, and, as we are just now under the high pressure of a finance committee, it is drawn to the tightest. The truth is, that our conduct, both abroad and at home, has for years depended upon the struggle we are making to escape from financial embarrassments, aggravated, if not brought on, by our return to cash payments upon a mistaken principle. From the consequent vain endeavour to pay what we never owed has resulted the contradictory attempt to keep up high prices in a currency of augmented value, with all the round of expedients ending and to end in disappointment. Hence, too, has proceeded the sinking of character which ensues to nations as well as to individuals from a state of debt—I will not call it of poverty, for it is a state of debt in the midst of wealth, proceeding from the balance between our charges and our currency having been forcibly disturbed. It is to these causes that our incapacity for action abroad and our constant state of turmoil at home are due, and it is to this side that it is not even yet quite too late to look for a remedy. If my opinion upon this is false, at least it is one I am entitled to be attached to on account of the time during which I have held it; for, with your excellent memory, you cannot have forgotten my having pressed it upon you many years ago (long, indeed, before the first bill had yet been carried upon the subject) during the whole of a long rainy day out with Lady Salisbury's hounds. You may be sure I think the subject most important, and even yet practically open to revision, or I should not mention it to you now.

You were right about Miguel not having taken the oath: at least, the Duke of Cadaval, who administered it, has said confidentially that he did not take it.

Adieu, my dear Duke, most truly yours,

F. LAMB.

[ 863. ]

*To Sir Henry Parnell, Bart.*

MY DEAR SIR,

London, 18th April, 1828.

I return the report of my evidence before the Committee of

Finance corrected. I have made no alteration that is not verbal. I have marked some parts which I think ought not to be printed.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

[ 864. ]

EVIDENCE OF FIELD MARSHAL HIS GRACE THE DUKE OF  
WELLINGTON ON THE DEFENCES OF BRITISH NORTH  
AMERICA.

15th April, 1828.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Select Committee on Public Income and Expenditure.

Martis 15<sup>o</sup> die Aprilis, 1828.

Sir Henry Parnell, Bart., in the chair.

(Copy from Mr. Gurney's Shorthand Notes.)

His Grace the Duke of Wellington attending by permission of the House of Lords, was examined as follows :—

Question.—The Committee having received evidence on the proposed Canals and Military Works for the defence of Canada, and on the estimates of the expense to be incurred in making them, are desirous to have the opinion of your Grace upon the necessity and efficiency of that plan of defence for securing the Canadas against successful invasion.

Answer.—I delivered my opinion in a letter to which, on reflection, I adhere entirely.

Question.—There is a reference in your Grace's letter to works on the Niagara Frontier to which no particular reference was made in the evidence of Sir Henry Hardinge.

Answer.—The Board of Ordnance have divided the works into three classes, the first of which consists of those that they consider necessary without delay. I think it would be desirable to have the work on the Niagara Frontier, though not inserted, in the first class. There were during the late war two forts on the river Niagara itself, one upon each of the lakes; and there was likewise an American fort, of which the British troops were in possession, on the right side of the Fall. I am quite convinced it would be very desirable to have the work on that frontier to support the operations of the troops. My opinion originally was, when I looked at this question, that it would be very desirable to have a work there; and my opinion was confirmed by the report of the engineers.



Question.—The Committee are desirous of knowing the opinion of your Grace how far these works would, if completed, put it in the power of this country to abandon the defences by the lakes.

Answer.—The view I had originally formed, on information which I collected from reading a variety of books on the late war, and also the reports of Sir Edward Owen on the inland communication by water in those countries was, that there might be a communication from the Great River to Kingston; that from Kingston it was possible to form a communication to Pentengashene, through what is called the Nin Lake, and Simcoe's Lake; and that from that communication by water, it was possible to communicate with Lake Erie, with Lake Huron likewise by water. Thus the land and the naval means of defence might be concentrated wherever the Commander-in-Chief of the operations might think fit. He would thus be at all times master of the seat of operations of the war.

The Committee of Engineers went out and examined, as far as their time would allow them, into the details of this plan. They were not able to receive, during the time they were there, sufficient information to enable them to decide satisfactorily respecting that part of the inland navigation above Kingston; and I cannot say that when I quitted the Ordnance that information had been entirely satisfactory.

I had received one report from certain officers of the Engineers, which induced me to believe that the plan is practicable, and that at no very great expense it can be completely carried into execution; that is, an actual communication by water can be carried into effect the whole way to Pentengashene; and, indeed, those reports confirm the information which I had before acquired by perusing Sir Edward Owen's reports, who knows more on that particular part of the subject than any other person. If these communications can be established, there is no doubt whatever that the naval operations on the lakes might be either abandoned altogether, or might be carried on with every prospect of advantage. If those communications cannot be established, I should say it will be absolutely necessary to endeavour to retain a force on the lakes, in order to communicate with the Niagara frontier and the scene of operations of the troops in that quarter. The question is, whether the Canadas are to be defended: if they are to be defended, I am sure something of this sort must be done.

Question.—Has your Grace anything to suggest on the subject of the Militia Laws to render them more efficient?

Answer.—That would lead into a considerable detail.

Question.—Supposing that no works were undertaken, except those of the first class, which are declared to be important and absolutely necessary, and that a war were to break out with the United States, what must be the plan of defence for the whole of the country above Kingston; including nearly the whole of the Upper Province?

Answer.—I should think that what they must do immediately must be to arm the fleet now in Kingston harbour. They have a considerable number of ships there in a certain state of preparation. They must immediately assemble a force at Burlington Heights, and look to the defence of the Niagara frontier. I mean supposing the works, in the first class only, carried into execution. But I confess that if I were to choose between some of those I see in the first class, and those put into the second class, I should infinitely prefer not to have the works at Montreal, however important Montreal is; and to have it upon the Niagara frontier. I think the last the most important, more particularly as there is a work on the Island of St. Helens, and one at the mouth of the Chatanghar River. I should infinitely prefer a fort on the Niagara frontier in the first instance to having it at Montreal. It will be very important to have a good work behind the Welland Canal. I dare say when they come to consider the plans, this notion will be adopted.

Question.—Would one work be sufficient to defend the Niagara frontier?

Answer.—The way in which I view this work, which should be of a considerable strength, would be as a support to the troops that might be left for the defence of the frontier; and in order to prevent the enemy from advancing further than that particular work, I would remove it some distance, in order to render the attack of it more difficult.

Question.—Does your Grace remember the number of miles that frontier extends that you would contemplate defending by that work?

Answer.—I do not suppose that this work would prevent straggling parties from entering the country. This work would give cover and protection to so large a body of men, as that the enemy could not venture to pass them with large numbers until the work was got the better of. I think the country would be

safer with the Militia that would be collected under the protection of the work until an army could be brought to its relief.

Question.—What force should your Grace consider necessary to garrison that defence if assailed?

Answer.—In time of war 1500 men, probably.

Question.—Does your Grace think, in the system of warfare that would be carried on, the Americans, if they had hostile intentions, would be stopped by any fortress of that kind? Would they not take possession of the country, leaving the garrison behind?

Answer.—The fortress and its garrison of 1500 men would give protection, I apprehend, to more than that number. I can only speak from an experience of what happened in the late war. I do not think any body of men ever penetrated any distance into the country. I should say not more than five-and-twenty miles, excepting one corps, which fought with General Procter at Moravian Town, and that corps, although successful, was obliged to retire immediately after the action, on account of the great difficulty of subsisting in the country. Under these circumstances, I should say that a work of this kind, at the expense of 280,000*l.*, if well supplied, as it ought to be, would prevent any considerable body of men advancing beyond it.

Question.—Your Grace would be more disposed to put that work into the first class of works than the proposed work at Montreal?

Answer.—I would certainly—more particularly as the means are to be provided of protecting the stores in the Island of St. Helens.

Question.—What force would your Grace contemplate as necessary to defend that country, supposing all the works which have been stated completed, canals and all?

Answer.—I always reckoned that it could be defended with about as many men as there were there during the late war. If I rightly recollect, there were 10,000 men—10,000 King's regular troops—that is of course besides the militia to be found in different parts of the country.

Question.—Does your Grace think that that force, divided, as it necessarily must be, in an extent of so many hundred miles, would not be in greater danger of being surrounded by the power of the United States, than if they concentrated their forces in any given point of that line, so as to interrupt and stop the communication?

Answer.—I am supposing all is done which I contemplate. I think in that case the person who commanded those troops

would act very improperly if he ever exposed too small a force, and not strong enough to hold an enemy in check. I am supposing the war to be defensive, which is what I have always contemplated.

Question.—How far is it to be considered that the actual possession of Canada is absolutely necessary for the successful defence of the provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick? Could they be successfully defended supposing Canada not to be in possession of Great Britain?

Answer.—I think not.

Question.—Then the abandonment of Canada would necessarily involve the abandonment of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick?

Answer.—I should say that considering their situation, in my opinion, the abandonment of Canada would occasion the loss of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia.

Question.—Supposing that Canada were not in the possession of the United States, and still not in the possession of Great Britain, what is your Grace's opinion?

Answer.—The question then would be whether it would be in the possession of a friendly Power, or otherwise. I always considered that the first outlay upon this water communication would complete all the rest. My notion was, after this first canal should be completed, to sell it under certain arrangements for securing the command of it to his Majesty for the purposes of his service; keeping it in repair under the inspection of the officers of his Majesty's government; and having sold this canal, to do that which was necessary further with the produce of the sale in carrying the water communications as far as we might find it expedient for his Majesty's service.

Question.—Your Grace has been asked whether the province of New Brunswick could be defended if Canada were in possession of the United States. Is there any fortification, or any means by which the Americans might not now penetrate through the province of Maine, and take possession of New Brunswick?

Answer.—I believe the communication from the province of Maine into New Brunswick is very difficult; that country is very little settled, and the difficulties would be great.

Question.—What assistance could, in your Grace's opinion, be rendered from Quebec or the Upper Provinces in case an hostile force was invading New Brunswick by the Province of Maine?

Answer.—I have never contemplated the possibility of an attack from the United States on that point; but in a case of that sort there are means of carrying on a temporary offensive.

operation, with a view to the relief of New Brunswick. The plan in contemplation goes to establish communications by roads between New Brunswick and the Lower Province of Quebec.

Question.—As there are limits to the exertions of any country, would not the distance that country is from England render the exertions on our part to oppose them much more limited without such an expense as would be altogether overwhelming?

Answer.—I consider that the works now proposed to be executed would render the means of communicating with the upper part of that province, and defending that province, not only more easy, but also infinitely less expensive. The difference is so great, that it would appear almost imaginary.

Question.—What would be the probability of defending Canada if neither the water communication nor the works mentioned in these estimates were executed?

Answer.—I should say that the defence of Canada would be impossible. I have never been in that country, but I must add that I have been astonished that the officers of the army and navy employed in that country were able to defend those provinces last war; and I can attribute their having been able to defend them as they did only to the inexperience of the officers of the United States in the operations of war, and possibly likewise to the difficulty which they must have found in stationing their forces, as they ought to have done, upon the right bank of the St. Lawrence.

Question.—In the event of all these defences being completed according to the plan proposed, in what way is it proposed to guard against the incursions of the inhabitants of the new settled colonies, Indiana, and those new settled States coming round the head of the lakes in the rear of those defences?

Answer.—The Committee will observe from what I have stated, and the report of the Committee of Engineers, that the plan which I had in agitation went up as high as Pentengashene. If once we can get men up to Pentengashene, I have no doubt we should have better means of defending ourselves than the United States would have of attacking us. Moreover, I believe that within our frontier, of which I know but little, having seen very few accounts of it, there is a very considerable tract of wooded country, that description of desert which prevails in that part of the world, through which it is very difficult to move a large body of troops. Therefore, in

the present state of cultivation and population in that part of the world, there is little probability of attack on that side in any war which can be expected at present. The plan of defence proposed is referable to the state of things which has existed from 1819 up to the present time.

Question.—Does your Grace think that, in those parts of the territory of the United States which join our provinces by land, it would be expedient to leave a margin of uncultivated country, a jungle of wood, for a certain distance, rather than to occupy it by settlements up to the extreme point?

Answer.—There is this to be said in favour of the two views taken on the question. If the country is tolerably well settled, there are communications through it, there are means of subsistence to be found in it, and there are people stationed upon it who will form militia, and assist in its defence. Then, on the other hand, if there is nothing but wood and swamp, it is difficult, if not impossible, for the enemy to penetrate through it in large numbers. I should, upon the whole, say that if it were possible, I would prefer an impossibility rather than an obstacle by means of force. I am afraid that in all these cases we cannot decide whether we will have populations; that must depend on situation, and on navigable rivers, and on what we are now doing in canals. I should say that in cases where the country is open and cultivated, I should look to its militia for its defence. In cases where there is jungle, I should consider the attack as impracticable, and I should remove the defensive means elsewhere, relying on that impracticability.

Question.—Your Grace places the principal part of your reliance for the defence of these provinces in the actions of the militia; is it intended to make any alterations in the present existing system, or are the militia to remain as they now are?

Answer.—My view would be to have them well trained, to have a sufficient supply of arms for the number of men that are likely to be called out; to have their arms on the spot; that they should be officered, and that there should be a good system of organisation established by the law of the province, and all this at as small an expense as possible, but so that they should be called out at the shortest notice possible.

Question.—What extent of militia force does your Grace contemplate as necessary, in addition to the 10,000 regular troops, for the defence of these provinces?

Answer.—I believe that the militia force in the two provinces

of Canada is 40,000, and Nova Scotia and New Brunswick 20,000 men.

The plan I always had in view was that the army, the militia, and the navy should operate together. I imagined that this army of 10,000 men might be divided into two corps of 5000 each; that one of these corps should be placed on one of the rivers in the upper part of the province, with a view to the defence of particularly the Niagara frontier; that the other should be placed somewhere above Kingston, on the water communication from the Ottawa to Kingston; having ready means of communication as well with Kingston as with Montreal and the Lower Province, the Richelieu, and the Chateau Gaye. Those two corps, consisting of 5000 men each, should be joined by the militia in their neighbourhood, to the number of eight or ten thousand men, or as many as could be collected.

Question.—Should your Grace think it prudent to leave such a fortress as Quebec without a garrison?

Answer.—I propose to put in some regular infantry, and three or four battalions of militia. Quebec could not be attacked without such notice as could enable the corps which I suppose upon the Rideau to get down. On the other hand, the very moment that corps moved down for the relief of Quebec, I should suppose the other would move to its left down on Kingston. I would always keep those corps in movement for the defence of any point which might be attacked, and in that way I should say that the country would be safe, not against stragglers carrying off cattle, but against movements of serious nature.

Question.—As the war between the United States and these provinces would be a defensive one, would not the defence most probably begin on the other side, on the north-western side of the St. Lawrence, by the abandonment of the small strip of ground which we possess on the eastern side, from Quebec and upwards?

Answer.—I should think that the Americans could not move into that part of the country except along the Richelieu, or along the Chateau Gaye. We have provided against these movements. The lines of attack invariably adopted in that country have been the Richelieu and Chateau Gaye.

Question.—Is your Grace aware that, during the last war, the New England States were paralysed, by being more or less disinclined to the war, and that, therefore, they made very little effort on their frontier; they being, in fact, supposing them to be well affected to the war, the most

powerful and efficient people as to the establishment and state of their militia, as well as to the spirit of the people themselves, what effect do you conceive their efforts might produce?

Answer.—If that were to be the line of attack, which I have never contemplated as probable, or indeed as more than just possible, I should have no hesitation in saying that one of those corps ought to be placed lower down, between Montreal and Quebec, wherever the attack is. There is no doubt whatever that the militia, if once got together, with 5000 regular troops, would be equal to the defence of his Majesty's dominions in Canada. I believe the militia just as good as the militia of the New England States.

Question.—The New England States lie close to that frontier?

Answer.—They do.

Question.—What effect would be produced by the occupation by America of the land in question between this country and the United States?

Answer.—It would materially affect the communication between Nova Scotia and Canada. The United States would then be within twelve miles of the river St. Lawrence, and the country below Quebec would be in great danger. From thence the communication to Quebec would be perfect by water.

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*Viscount Palmerston to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Stanhope Street, 18th April, 1828.

I think you may like to see a return which was moved for in the House of Commons about the militia, and which has just been printed.

This subject is one which will very soon force itself upon the government for some decision. No money has been voted for the militia beyond the 24th March last past, and it will become necessary very shortly to propose a vote for it in the House of Commons.

That vote is not founded, like the vote for the army, upon an estimate presented by the King's command; but a Select Committee of the House is annually appointed to prepare the militia estimate, and the vote is founded upon their report.

I confess I have long thought that there is great difficulty in maintaining the necessity or expediency of so large an annual expense for the militia Staff, and have had strong doubts whether a considerable saving might not be made upon it without any material impairment of the real efficiency of the system.

I would suggest, with respect to the English militia, whether all useful purposes might not be sufficiently accomplished by retaining the sergeants and dismissing the corporals, together with a great proportion of the



drummers; though if the men are ever to be got together, even for mustering, some drummers might perhaps be necessary. But the sergeants would be sufficient to take care of the depôts of arms; and, whenever drilling became necessary, might not better instruction be obtained by men lent from the line, or by pensioners to be found in the neighbourhood, than could probably be given by these corporals who are daily losing their military habits?

With respect to the Irish militia the case is a difficult one. The English militia, for an establishment of 51,357 privates, have 2486 sergeants and corporals on permanent pay; the Irish, for an establishment of 18,869 privates, have 1223 sergeants and corporals on permanent pay (I am taking here the establishment of the permanent Staff which the Colonels may keep up, and not of the number which happened by the last returns to be effective). The proper proportion of the Irish ought not to be above 900. But then the English militia *have* privates, whom the sergeants and corporals may and do train; whereas the Irish militia have *no* privates, and consequently their Staff, which is one-fourth higher than the English, can have *no militia duties* to perform in time of peace. But then it may be said that this Staff is of some use as part of the general garrison of Ireland. In this point of view, however, it is expensive and inefficient. Our 1223 sergeants and corporals and 412 drummers, making in all a little more than 1600 men, are all we get, in the way of force, for 92,000*l.*, while for that sum we might maintain nearly three battalions and a half of regular infantry. But the militia Staff is scattered in driblets all over the country, cannot be moved beyond the limits of each county, and can therefore never be brought together to bear on any one point; and unless the Irish law differs materially from the English, which I am not clear about, this Staff cannot be placed under military command, but can only act under the command of its own officers and the authority of the civil magistracy,

My dear Duke, yours very sincerely,

PALMERSTON.

[ 865. ]

*To Viscount Palmerston.*

MY DEAR LORD PALMERSTON,

London, 19th April, 1828.

I have received your letter regarding the militia. I do not think you can do without the sergeants, corporals, or a proportion, say not less than three, drummers in the large regiments and two in the small ones, in the militia in Great Britain.

I do not agree with you about the drilling and training of the militia. Pensioners could be of no use; and men of the Line could not be got, or would have the drill of their own regiments to attend to; besides, the corporals are necessary for the care of the arms, &c., in the county town.

In respect to the Irish militia, I happened to be in Ireland when the Irish militia was first raised, and certainly there never

was confusion equal to that which attended the levy. I do not think that in the times of *the March of the Mind* the levy could be completed without the assistance of the non-commissioned officers. Therefore, not only would I recommend that they should be kept up, but that an officer of the Staff should be sent to inspect them occasionally, to see that they were in order.

Their drummers might all be put down.

I think that the paymaster of each regiment of militia in Great Britain, as well as in Ireland, might be put down.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*The Earl of Dudley to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Arlington Street, Sunday night,  
20th April, 1828.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

We have told Don Miguel that it was wrong to make a pretence for delaying the convocation of the Cortes; but should we not call upon him directly to convoke them? And should we not tell him still more plainly that, if Don Pedro chooses to turn him out of his regency for his faithlessness and disobedience, we should not interpose to uphold him against the resentment of his brother? I have done both in the annexed "scrap," which I propose as a "finale" to our paper.

Yours most faithfully and sincerely,

DUDLEY.

*To the Earl of Dudley.*

[ 866. ]

MY DEAR LORD DUDLEY,

London, 21st April, 1828.

It appears to me that your Note to Portugal is intended to be a moderate and dignified exposition of the state of the case between his Majesty's government and the Prince Regent. It should not contain an angry or an equivocal expression; and any doubt expressed of his Royal Highness's intentions should be on the part of his Majesty's servants, rather than on the part of his Majesty himself.

Much less should it contain anything like a threat, or any indication of a course of proceeding on the part of his Majesty otherwise than friendly founded upon any hypothetical case.

I would recommend to you, therefore, not to tack on your *tail*.

This paper will not *be* confined to Portugal. It would be desirable to communicate it to the Austrian government, and likewise to France. Its *tail* might prevent their approbation of it. But their approbation and support would give it much more weight than its conclusion.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*The Marquess of Londonderry to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Paris, 21st April, 1828.

I shall devote this letter to all I have heard on the affairs of the East, and endeavour to show how little I consider England has to fear from any attitude France can adopt in her present position, and under her own embarrassments.

If the demand of the government from the Chambers of eighty millions appears menacing, upon an examination of the circumstances of this country, as well as *les pours* and *les contres*, for their own interest, of any line they adopt, all uneasiness and anxiety must disappear, and this government will remain in that state of neutrality and inaction which I described in my last letter.

The Bourbons are naturally vainglorious, and they are accustomed to exaggerate their political influence in Europe. Their ministers are, therefore, obliged to adopt the same course of proceeding, and the country go along with the Court in wishing to maintain that ascendancy on the Continent which Napoleon established, and which they vainly flatter themselves is not diminished. The last ministry were severely criticised, in conformity with the above absurd notions, from the total nullity of their action in exterior politics; the new government will try, therefore, by dissimulation and contrivance, to conceal that they are absolutely reduced to the same line of conduct, while, at the same time, they are without even the resource of a party who uphold them or carry them forward (as M. Villèle had in the measure of the war in Spain).

Suppose France was reduced to the alternative of deciding either for Russia or England, in their separate policy in the East. If such should ever arrive, let us consider what *she* has to gain or lose by embracing the views of either party. By any rupture with England a maritime war must seriously annoy her. It would shut her ports, destroy her interior commerce, and prevent the reconstruction of her navy. If a war with Austria followed, France, no doubt, could maintain herself on the Rhine, while Austria had her largest portion of troops employed towards Galicia, or the frontiers of Poland. But what object could *France* obtain from Austria, who is no longer a neighbour, while Russia, with whom *she* would be an auxiliary, protects the Low Countries, and would not let France obtain acquisition there? Where, then, would she reap indemnities for her military efforts, as Prussia would probably be a party in the same league, and the German Confederation could not be attacked without just cause? It would only remain, then, for France to engage in sending expeditions to aid and

second Russia in the East (which probably our fleets would intercept); but if not, how would they employ the French forces when they arrived there? To occupy the Morea, now laid waste and deserted—to take possession of any island, while the English were masters of the sea—would be very critical experiments. Besides any new insular possession would only add to the same sort of burthen which France already experiences in the expenses, &c., of Corsica; and after all there would be difficulty in finding money for such expensive and useless undertakings; especially if the nation did not unanimously support a war against England. If France was even to look to Egypt (where she would have very little chance of being well received), where find the means for the enterprise? which baffled the genius and active expedients of Napoleon. An attempt at colonisation or an establishment in Africa, under pretence of revenge against the Dey of Algiers, would be equally impolitic, as it would be alike exposed to the preponderance of our English naval power. These are the reasons that appear in force against France rashly adopting Russian alliance to the extent of any breach with England, and yet it is very certain the Russian diplomacy has most weight and influence here, although, as I have already said, since *your reign* an evident alteration has occurred. The Greek cause, however, is popular; its success is counted upon as certain as soon as the Russians advance; and although the dismemberment of the Ottoman empire or the occupation of Constantinople by the Russians would not be palatable in France, nevertheless the nation would deem it as ridiculous to sacrifice armies or treasure to prevent these events, as to assist in accomplishing them. The Eastern question is regarded generally more as Austrian and English, and the opinion is somewhat prevalent that Austria, after all sorts of dissimulation and intrigue, may (instead of taking subsidies from England to quarrel with Russia in favour of the Turks, if such ever could be offered) finish by imitating the Emperor Nicholas and invade Bosnia and Servia, and hold them under promise of surrender when the Russians evacuate Wallachia and Moldavia.

In looking now to the other alternative, of France uniting with England and Austria, one must admit that her partiality to Russia is far greater than to the latter nation which she detests, and to the former which is her natural rival; and indeed, in 1814, the Liberals in France think they owe la Charte to Alexander's power over Louis XVIII.; for Constitution has always been advocated by the Russian diplomacy. For all these reasons in the outset, this line of policy would be very difficult. France is likewise undoubtedly cajoled by the idea of Russian moderation, and considers even that extensions to the East will divert this colossal empire from extending in another direction. Our alarm is said to be exaggeration on account of our Indian possessions, and not arising from any interest in the fate of the Turks; and any idea of a common cause with Metternich and the Austrians for any occasion or for any purpose would be met with universal disgust.

The French in no way respect the Austrian army, and *le petit Napoléon* and Bonapartism seem at present (as far as I can judge) dead in France. The timid mind of the King and the Court may be operated upon by revolutionary spectres for intriguing purposes; but I believe it is all merely chimera. If military pride and enthusiasm ever rises again in our time in this nation, it is most probable it will be for the object of Belgium; and

to carry a war to the Rhine for this possession is nearest the heart of the French; and Pozzo di Borgo is said to have let out that by France becoming *Russian* she might obtain authorisation to seize *Landau* and the Palatinate to *Mayence*, but not the fortress. Such a bribe, however, would not be enough to indemnify for the expenses and chances of a war in the East, and also for a rupture with Prussia and the Low Countries, which it might entail.

You will deduce, my dear Duke, from what I have above expressed, and from every data I can obtain, my humble conviction that on the side of France you have absolutely *nothing* to apprehend. She may bluster, advise, urge, write, menace, demonstrate; but to do *definitively* NOTHING will be, if I am not greatly deceived, her line of politics.

I will now say one word of the war department and of the present state of the army. I hear De Caux is an excellent minister for the bureau and organisation; but if important military projects were in contemplation he must be replaced. His mind does not soar to great combinations; Hyde de Neuville is the only projector in the Cabinet. De Caux's personal interest, therefore, is to support everything pacific and passive. The new council of war, with Marmont as the most influential member, might encourage the Dauphin to a *perspective* of any personal glory; but at the King's age, and as heir to the throne, the Dauphin's embarking in any Eastern crusade is quite out of all question. Besides, all the troops which France now has embodied are positively required at home: 100,000 men is the least number which the exigencies of the service of the interior demands; that is to say, for the garrisons in the provinces and for Paris, and for 24,000 Royal Guard, which never move further than thirty leagues from Paris.

The budget of the army is 196,000,000 francs, which, allowing a million for a thousand men, and making deductions for keeping up *Staff*, *artillery*, and *fortresses*, it cannot produce more than 180,000 men; from which number 16,000 gens-d'armes must also be taken, and the men in hospital, the troops still in Spain and in their colonies, and you will then see to what a small force the interior is reduced and how very far short of the estimated peace establishment of 240,000 men.

The 80,000,000 now asked for will make an immediate and large augmentation, and will also add to the navy and other works; but it will by no means place France in a warlike attitude. It is not thought there will be any serious objection in the Chambers to the 80,000,000; the nine members chosen to examine the proposition are all of the *Côté Gauche*; General Sebastiani is the most conspicuous, and it is thought he will make the report as pacific as possible and not over favourable to the Greeks, as he was long ambassador at Constantinople and hates the Russians most cordially, and especially Pozzo. The Commission will, of course, require explanations of the ministers of their intentions as to the forces to be augmented, and the first levy is to consist, I hear, of 40,000 or 50,000 men.

The general sentiment appears to be now that the government is *consolidating*. The Duc de Cazes had a long prose with me yesterday. He wants to come in, and thinks he could *s'entendre* with you better than any one. He told me Polignac seemed doing ill in England. He talks of the true policy existing in the two countries keeping on a *Constitutional Creed*, *united*.

The Duc de la Rivière died yesterday. There are various speculations as to his probable successor. I send you in the note I enclose the only intelligence I have. You will know more from a better source; but it is only so far interesting to us as it might change the Minister for Foreign Affairs or the French ambassador in England. I have heard no other gossip to-day, and must entreat your usual indulgence for this dull letter.

Ever yours most affectionately,

VANE LONDONDERRY.

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*The Marquess of Londonderry to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Paris, 23rd April, 1828, at night.

As I hear of a departure to-morrow from Paris, I write these few lines to say that Damas, who was formerly Minister of Foreign Affairs, is to succeed La Rivière. This nomination is not agreeable to the ministers, as he is a bigot and Jesuit, and Descars or Mortemart would have been more palatable. Indeed it was stated two days since that an understanding had taken place between the government and the King that he would not name to a post, in which the country had so deep a stake, without the consultation and concurrence of his ministers. However the King, unmindful of this supposed arrangement, has absolutely appointed the Baron de Damas. It is said La Rivière, before his death, pressed much that Polignac should be his successor; but scruples of conscience interfere. This decision of the King is coupled with the displeasure the Court party have felt at the late elections. They abuse the government as having taken no pains to arrest the revolutionary nomination of *six* of the very greatest Jacobins (one only excepted) deputies of Paris. Demarsay's election is violently resented, and the King has been worked upon to keep up against the encroachments that are now painted to him in the most vivid colours. The Ultras are exulting in this triumph with the King. The government are out of sorts, and the *Côté Gauche* are alarmed at the extent to which the Paris elections have gone, and are as much annoyed by Demarsay's return as the Whigs would be if Hunt or Cobbett were sent to Parliament, lest things should go too far.

However, the King seems determined to be his own minister in the party-coloured state of his Cabinet, and he has evinced this not only by this last nomination, but he made twenty-four *Gentilhommes de la Chambre* the other day, and none of the ministers ever heard of it until the appointments were out. These circumstances create suspicions of underhand play, and in proportion as liberalism is upheld by the government in the Chambers, the reaction of the Court party will infallibly follow; but while the crisis may be uncertain within, it affords greater security for inaction without.

The tone of the late intelligence from Russia is reported as much more favourable, and much is expected from Metternich's next communications. The passage of the Pruth deferred till the 15th May, and at the same time Russia declares she does not require the Principalities, or any other territories, as permanent indemnity for the contest she engages in, but only retribution to her subjects for their just demands. Old Talleyrand, whom I sat by at dinner yesterday (but whom, I fear, by some late transactions

in a Paris bank, which has broken down, is in more *mauvaise odeur* than ever), assured me that "*Le Duc avait montré beaucoup de consistance, pour le moment, et que la crise fut ajournée.*" In short, there is no doubt that the change in our government has prevented Europe being plunged now in war. They are confoundedly afraid of you here, and this all works so much the better.

La Ferronays has made the *amende honorable* to me—*supposing* I cut him, and not he me—and has asked me to dinner and been very civil. Since he feels himself more in his saddle, he conceives he can establish his fame as one of the first diplomatists of the age, and he has (as I am informed) hinted to Rayneval that he has no further occasion for his aid, and that he can return to his mission in Switzerland.

A curious fact occurred the other day in the Court, which evinces the power of female Jesuitism over male Jacobinism. A place of *questeur* became vacant, and the names of three candidates were submitted to the King—M. de St. Aignan (the second name I don't recollect), and Le Comte Bondy. The two first are Royalists and good men; the third was *Préfet* of Paris during the Cent Jours. To the great astonishment of all the King nominated the Comte Bondy, entirely owing to La Comtesse, his wife, who is the leading female in the congregation within the Tuileries.

24th.—I have given you in my scrawl of last night the reports and statement I heard at Lord Granville's dinner of ministers yesterday. This morning I am just told that the King's letter to Damas, which was written, has been arrested, and that the ministers, Pozzo, &c., are doing all they can that the appointment may devolve on Descars or Mortemart, or some one whose Jesuitical principles are not so notorious. The fact is that the Governor of the Duc de Bordeaux is the *occult* ministry of the country, with constant access to the King; and hence the place is of the first moment in these times. I will write to-morrow by the usual post, if I hear any gossip. '*Au reste,*' I shall soon cease to bore your good nature, as I think we shall be on our return next week. "*Les emplettes de Miladi viennent d'être achevées,*" and their display at Almacks is now *l'ordre du jour*. Adieu, my dear Duke.

Believe me ever yours most affectionately,

VANE LONDONDERRY.

[ 867. ]

To Thomas Godfrey, Esq., Greffier of the States of Jersey.

SIR,

London, 25th April, 1828.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 17th instant, and I have since looked over the different orders and directions which have been given by his Majesty's command to regulate the Oyster Fishery between his Majesty's subjects and those of the King of France between the island of Jersey and the adjoining coast of that kingdom, during the period of time which must elapse before the discussions between the two

governments on the subject of the permanent Oyster Fishery can be brought to a conclusion.

It appears to me that these orders are just and fair; and are calculated to give the fishermen of both countries a fair participation of the benefits of the Fishery. I am sorry to observe that there has been but little, if any, cause for complaint of a breach of them by the French fishermen on the part of his Majesty's government; and a great deal on the part of the French government of the conduct of his Majesty's subjects; as well on account of their passing the limits, their improper mode of carrying on the Fishery, their fishing at improper seasons; and, last of all, their attack upon a ship of war in the service of the King of France, and the recapture of certain English fishing vessels which had been detained by that ship of war for a breach of the regulations by which both nations had agreed to be governed.

I am not sure whether the regulations respecting the period of Fishery—which will affect British subjects generally—ought to be made by the States of Jersey, by the Privy Council here, or by both authorities jointly.

It appears to me that it would be highly desirable that rules should be framed for the regulation of this Fishery in future, founded upon the temporary fixation of limits between the two governments, as already made known to the States by his Majesty's principal Secretary of State; that they should fix the date of the commencement, and that of the cessation of the Fishery, the mode of carrying it on, and how far it can be carried on under licensed boats, of which the owners should be known.

These measures must tend to the advantage of all concerned in the Fishery during its temporary existence on its present footing, and will greatly facilitate any future permanent arrangement with the French government.

I have, &c.,  
WELLINGTON.

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*The King to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR FRIEND, St. James's Palace,  
Friday, 2 o'clock p.m., 25th April, 1828.

I received your box, with the account of last night's debate, about an hour since.



I wish that you had come and talked the business over with me, that was to take place in the House of Lords, previous to your going down to the House yesterday. Had I entertained the slightest idea of what was to occupy the House, I should most certainly have desired your attendance, and that of our friend the Lord Chancellor, before the discussion.

After that which did pass in a conversation (not long since) between me and the Archbishop of Canterbury upon this *very subject*, and in which I strongly expressed my own sentiments, which for years and years have never varied, I feel that unless the word *Protestant* be introduced as proposed into the *Act itself*, individually, as a *Protestant*, and as the head and protector of the religion of this country, we have virtually no sort of permanent security left us to look to for the preservation of the Established Church.

I am most anxious, my dear friend, that you should show this letter to the Chancellor the first moment you can see him, and at any rate before he takes his seat on the woolsack.

Always your sincere friend,

G. R.

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*The Marquess of Londonderry to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Paris, 28th April, 1828.

You will learn that the ministers have not succeeded in their efforts to arrest the nomination of M. de Damas. The Archbishop of Beauvais was sent to the King, and M. de Caux to the Dauphin, to make strong and even menacing remonstrances. The King is said to have expressed himself with much bitterness at the interference, while the result rouses the embers of discontent amongst the contending parties to the highest pitch, and resignations are talked of, and greater violence in the Chambers expected. However my impression is that matters will momentarily subside, although from the present *carte du pays* nothing but intrigue, secret influence, and uncertainty must prevail.

Again, an event has occurred which manifests glaringly how much the King foments a secret action and party, in opposition to his ministry. M. la Bourdonnaye, a *chef* of the *Côté Droit*, deemed it judicious to assemble that party and harangue them on the concessions that were extorting from royalty, calling upon them to rally in the tribune, and oppose the present government, who were leading the country to liberalism and revolution.

The assembled multitude heard silently all that was advanced; but as the greater part hold offices of emolument and places, they were afraid to express any enthusiasm or commit themselves, lest the ministry should turn them out, and the *meeting* failed of producing any great effect. But the remarkable feature is, that it was held at General Coutard's apartment in the Tuileries, he being Commandant of the 1st military division at Paris, and it must thus have been assembled by the express permission and order of the King. A more decisive proof of double agency could not be adduced; and if the King cannot be loyal to his present servants, unless he is desirous of augmenting his evils beyond all remedy, he should at once replace them.

General Sebastiani told me last night that his report from the Committee

of the 80,000,000 would be made in a few days. He assured me it was extremely moderate—that he avoided touching on the relations either with Russia or England, while he could not resist hinting at the impolicy of any great Power endeavouring to seek aggrandisement under any pretences, however plausible. The report, he added, would be most pacific; that Russia would never get anything from France but *les belles paroles*. As Sebastiani is a clever man in the Chambers, and is gaining ground largely in France, I do not think his Russian aversions of bad omen.

I was asked to an immense meeting of forty at De Cazes', in the Faubourg St. Germain, yesterday, at dinner of all the Oppositionists, and I am sure party will run higher than ever before the close of the Chambers.

I will now give you the characters of some of the leading diplomatists of France, as accredited at the different Courts, as they have been represented to me. Diplomacy is less considered, however, as a *profession* in France than in England; every man of family seems eligible for it, and no preliminary study or service is required, nor any progressive rise.

M. Bourgeot, an old *élève* of Talleyrand's, has long had alone the main superintendence of the Foreign Office correspondence. All the other *employés* in the department have been changed with the chief for the time being.

Under MM. de Montmorency, Richelieu, and Pasquier, M. de Rayneval became the *grand faiseur*. He is undoubtedly a very able man, especially in all *redactions* of treaties, &c.

M. de Chateaubriand was his own great operator and composer, and he exercised great coquetry in all his communications to the foreign potentates and their ministers.

Baron Damas allowed M. Bourgeot to do all his official business for him; but all decisions during his administration were made by M. Villèle, who was sole minister of France. Villèle, I think, was neither a Russian nor an Englishman in his foreign policy. He thought he could cajole us all by his ability and *finesse*. He thought in every great event France must be *the chief*, so he adopted a certain *laissez aller* in the diplomatic exterior transactions.

La Ferronnays has not as yet made any great change in his department.

M. Bourgeot still directs all the details of the foreign correspondence, and the return of M. de Rayneval to Switzerland is arranged, as I have already mentioned. Flattery has already raised La Ferronnays to a splendid conception of his own diplomatic knowledge and address, and the Faubourg St. Germain has adopted him as the only gentleman in the government, while the liberal party do not reject him, and his first appointment of the Duc de Mortemart to St. Petersburg has been very generally popular, as since the days of Madame de Montespan it is agreed in France as a proverb that "*L'esprit des Mortemart est propre à tout.*"

The great claims of Pasquier and Chateaubriand to employment in Foreign Affairs, and the talked-of changes of the Duc de Laval from Rome, Blacas from Naples, and Caraman from Vienna, occupy the speculations of this class of persons. General Sebastiani is also on the list as a candidate for high diplomacy, and if the Liberal party make further head he will probably be employed.

M. Polignac has lost immense influence in La Rivière's death. He is too

much in the congregation to be acceptable to the present ministers, and Villele has managed to intimidate the King's conscience against him. It is likely he will be kept in London, to place him out of the way in aiding in the conduct of the Court intrigues here.

M. de Caraman's recall from Vienna is said to be nearly resolved on. They do not reproach him for any want of ability, but they believe he is not only the friend but the absolute *courtisan* of Metternich. They suspect him of concealing nothing from Metternich, and that he writes his despatches under Metternich's dictation. There will ever exist a great hatred and suspicion of the Austrian Cabinet in France; the nation having proclaimed the young Napoleon Emperor in the Cent Jours, keeps alive the watchfulness of the Bourbons, and the Duchesse d'Angoulême preserves an invincible dislike to the house of Hapsburg; add to all this the recent injudicious proceedings of Appony about the titles of the French Marshals, as well as the anti-constitutional principles and doctrines of Metternich.

General Guillemot, the Ambassador at Constantinople, is stated to have a high reputation for ability and talents. He is more eminent as a *Chef de Bureau*, or a man of detail, than a General. He professes moderate constitutional principles, and is endowed with considerable esprit and conciliatory manners. The Ultra party, however, show him no favour, and they wished to remove him from the Duc d'Angoulême, in Spain, who strongly patronises him. He has been suspected of not being ignorant of Ouvrard's famous transactions, nor to the benefits they have produced. They say also his own share was 500,000 or 600,000 francs. It was at his instigation the Dauphin signed the Ordonnance of Andryar, which the French ministry afterwards annulled, and it was to send him out of the way that Villele gave him the Embassy to the East.

M. de St. Priest, Ambassador to Spain, served as a General in the Russian army, and was French minister at Berlin, and has a fair reputation; and was a rival candidate with the Duc de Mortemart for St. Petersburg. He has not yet been at Madrid, and his Peninsular politics are not much known.

M. de Durand de Marcuil, minister to Portugal, is an old *élève* of Talleyrand's. He is reckoned *very able*. He still retains the nomination to the United States, but is sent provisionally to Lisbon to replace the Duc de Rauzan, whose profound incapacity has occasioned his recall. The French government wish to place a clever man at Lisbon, to counteract English influence and to manage their affairs in the Peninsula.

It is a curious but a certain fact that there exists a Committee in Paris composed of emigrants, Spanish, Portuguese, and Apostolics, who correspond with all the Juntas in the Peninsula; and this Committee, under the guidance of the three *nouces*, propagate measures, with the directions of the Court of Rome, for the dominion of the clergy and the triumph of absolutism. This Committee has, further, its secret correspondence with Bayonne, Perpignan, and Bordeaux, by which communications money and even arms are distributed. All this is looked upon as an affair of the Church to serve the throne. Their journal and instrument at Paris is the '*Quotidienne*,' and they lost a great *appui* in M. Des Moustiers, when he was recalled from Spain.

M. de la Moussaye is the minister to the Low Countries. He is much esteemed, and was a *protégé* of the Duc de Richelieu's. He was no favourite

with M. de Villèle, and his politics are Russian. The Bourbons have always had a distrust of the House of Orange, and late arrangements have not drawn the *éloignement* nearer.

M. de Montalembert, the minister in Sweden, is an able man, and his politics are English. He has, it is known, the strictest orders to *surveiller* Bernadotte, who is detested by all in France. It is ascertained fully that in 1814 he was momentarily plotting to succeed Napoleon, and the Bourbons cannot bear to hail a real King in an upstart French General. The army also look on Bernadotte as a deserter, and the Ultras are indignant at his elevation.

M. Hector D'Argout is at Berlin, but is not of much reputation.

M. de Montmorency, at Rome, is chiefly celebrated for his handsome representation.

Baron Vitrolles, in Tuscany, owes his employment to his devotion to the Comte d'Artois, and he is the author, you know, of the Secret Notes, &c.

I will not enter into further details as to the minor Courts. Amongst the secretaries of embassy and legation there is no knowledge of any marked talents.

I hope you will throw this letter down and only read this diplomatic history at your leisure. I had nothing of more moment to fill up my pages with to-day.

I have now to thank you, my dear Duke, very much for your kind acknowledgment of my letters to the 26th instant. You must only take my gossip as unofficial *salons* conversation. I have no access to any authentic sources, and could in no degree pronounce on the terms on which the government stand, but from mere rumour. In like manner, *about* *Corner*, I could merely detail, for your better judgment, what I heard from England. My sole object in scribbling to you has been to preserve the habit in which I formerly communicated privately when abroad with my poor brother, just as the thought arose or the information (*true or false*) was given; and if you have kindly received my budgets, I am *more than gratified*. Do not trouble yourself to acknowledge this, as I shall be in England soon. But I may bore you with another final letter before my departure.

Ever yours most affectionately,

VANE LONDONDEBBY.

You will observe how the 'Débats' speaks of Damas's appointment.

I am very glad at last you have got my book \* in proper *form* for Stratfield Saye.

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*The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Whitehall, 28th April, 1828.

I have found the passage in Smollett which led the Archbishop of Canterbury to mention to the King a certain form of declaration or oath, and which his Grace communicated to me, by desire of the King, as a fit mode for the declaration to be substituted in lieu of the Sacramental Test.

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\* 'Narrative of the Peninsular War.'

Enclosed is the passage from Smollett. It is not true that the declaration was inserted in any Act of Parliament; Smollett's account is incorrect in that respect.

Ever most faithfully yours,

ROBERT PERL.

[ENCLOSURE.]

"During these disputes another Bill of Abjuration was brought into the House of Commons, by Sir Charles Hedges, that should be obligatory on all persons who enjoyed employments in Church or State. It likewise included an obligation to maintain the government in King, Lords and Commons, and to maintain the Church of England, together with the toleration for Dissenters. Warm debates arose upon the question, Whether the oath should be imposed or voluntary; and at length it was carried for imposition by the majority of one voice. They agreed to insert an additional clause declaring it equally penal to compass or imagine the death of her Royal Highness the Princess Anne of Denmark, as it was to compass or imagine the death of the King's eldest son and heir.

"In the House of Peers this Bill was strenuously opposed by the Tories; and when, after long debates, it passed on the 24th day of February, ten Lords entered a protest against it as an unnecessary and severe imposition."

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*The Duke of Montrose to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

Grosvenor Square, 28th April, 1828.

As to measures on foreign politics, on corn, and Bills of such nature, I think it right to give up my own opinions to a government in which I have full confidence; but on reform of Parliament, on the Catholic question, and the repeal of the Corporation and Test Acts, I consider them so materially affecting the constitution of the country, that till I am convinced of the propriety of changing the present system, I cannot agree to the Bill now in the House, or to change the present state of things as relating to the two other points.

I remain, with the highest respect and confidence, very sincerely,  
my dear Lord Duke, your Grace's obedient servant,

MONTROSE.

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*The Duke of Clarence to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

DEAR DUKE,

Admiralty, 30th April, 1828.

By the periodical reports I have from Brest, and the last of which is up to the 15th instant, I perceive, exclusive of the four sail of the line the French have in that port in commission, there are orders to fit without loss of time three more for actual service. This circumstance I think it my duty to communicate to your Grace, and also to observe that I am taking the necessary steps to arrange so as to obtain the same regular information from the port of Toulon.

I ever remain, dear Duke, yours truly,

WILLIAM.

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*To the Duke of Montrose.*

[ 868.

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

London, 30th April, 1828.

The government was formed on the principle on which all have been formed for the last twenty years; viz., that of the Roman Catholic question being an open one.

On all others we were to act together, as a body, after previous consideration and consultation.

In respect to the Corporation and Test Acts the government had determined to oppose their repeal.

The motion for their repeal was carried in the House of Commons by a majority of 44. Many, some of them men of weight and importance, who had voted with government on that question, declared their determination to vote for the repeal upon the next division. The question was hopeless in the House of Commons.

On the other hand the Archbishop, and all of the Bench of Bishops, at that time in town, expressed their anxious desire to see an arrangement made. As churchmen they objected to the Sacramental Test; and they apprehended the consequences to the peace of the Church, of a continuance of the discussion. As public men they felt for the consequences of a difference of opinion between the two Houses, upon a question in which the House of Commons would have been supported by the public opinion.

In these sentiments many in the House of Lords concurred.

There was, in truth, no appearance of any public sentiment against the repeal. The Universities not only did not stir, but large majorities of the heads of Houses, and the graduated at Oxford, almost unanimously refused to concur in any address upon the subject.

Under these circumstances the government had to determine whether they would comply with the desire of the Archbishops and Bishops, and others, and make an arrangement; or would urge them to concur in an opposition to the Bill in the House of Lords.

I believe we could have thrown the Bill for the repeal of the Corporation and Test Acts out of the House of Lords. But we must have made an effort against the inclination of the Bishops and of other influential persons in that House. This state of things must have been known; and it is impossible to say what would have been the consequence to the future relations between Lords and Commons of such a difference upon

such a question. The opposition to the repeal could not have been permanent. Next year probably the House of Lords would have given way ; and the repeal would have been carried without the advantages which will attend the concession at the present moment.

The government, therefore, having first determined to oppose the repeal, subsequently resolved to support it, on condition of the insertion of the Declaration ; which Declaration, I must inform your Grace, was concocted by the Archbishop and Bishops with Mr. Peel.

I have gone thus far into the details of this question because these form the groundwork of that which I am about to state to your Grace.

I took charge of his Majesty's government under circumstances of the greatest difficulty ; indeed I may say an accumulation of difficulties of past years, postponed by the necessities and the procrastinating spirit of the times. I made the greatest personal and professional sacrifices in taking this charge ; and I hoped that the old friends of the government under whom, and with whom, I had served his Majesty for so many years, would give me a fair and liberal support ; and at least avoid *seeking for curiosities* in order to form a party against me.

I do not write to find fault with your Grace's conduct on the Corporation and Test Acts. Till your Grace, on the last night of the discussion, sent your proxy against us, I did not know that you had any feeling upon the subject ; and that being over I should not have thought it necessary to notice at present what has passed if you had not thought it proper to write to me.

In answer then to your Grace's letter I must say that I neither can, nor will, hold the government on conditions different from those on which my predecessors have held it. If the servants of the Crown do not mean to support me, either I will retire, or those who will not support me must retire.\*

I should infinitely prefer the former alternative ; and I hope that his Majesty will not find it difficult to select a minister more to their liking.

Ever, my dear Lord Duke,  
your most faithful humble servant,  
WELLINGTON.

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\* The Duke of Montrose was Lord Chamberlain.

*To the Duke of Clarence.*

[ 869.

SIR,

London, 30th April, 1828.

I am very much obliged to your Royal Highness for sending me the papers, which I return. They are very interesting. But I don't think they indicate any design calculated to create apprehension in this country at the present moment.

I have the honour, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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MEMORANDUM ON THE CASE OF SIR EDWARD CODRINGTON. [ 870.

May, 1828.

Under the instructions of the 15th October the following orders are given :—

Annex A. to the Protocol of October 15th, 1827.

“The commander of the British fleet should be directed to intercept all ships, whether of war or merchants, having on board troops, arms, ammunition, stores, or provisions, for the use of the Turkish force, employed ‘or intended to be employed’ against the Greeks, either on the Continent or in the Islands.

He will concert with the commanders of the Allied Powers the most effectual mode of preventing any movements by sea on the part of the Turkish or Egyptian forces.”

Annex B.

“The admiral to whom the task of watching the Port of Navarino shall be allotted, by mutual agreement betwixt himself and his colleagues, should be instructed to hold out in concert with them, every inducement to the Pacha of Egypt and to his son, to withdraw the Egyptian ships and land forces altogether from Greece ; and to assure them that every facility and protection will be given for their safe return to Alexandria. But he is, on no account, to enter into any stipulation for allowing the ships to return to Alexandria without the troops.”

Annex C. to the Secret Protocol of October 15th, 1827.

“It is thought expedient, not only that the regular commerce of neutrals, that is, such as is not carried on in order to aid the belligerents, should proceed uninterrupted ; but that the inter-



ruption should be confined to neutrals sailing under the convoy of Turkish ships of war.

“This is to be taken as the general rule, but if any unforeseen circumstance were to arise, in which the passing of neutrals, even without convoy, would be likely to defeat the object of the Treaty, they will then not hesitate to hinder them from proceeding to the place of their destination, always, however, preferring the mildest mode of accomplishing that object.”

Notwithstanding the instructions above detailed Admiral Sir Edward Codrington pretends, in his despatch of the 7th April, that he “was bound to encourage the return of all Turkish and Egyptian forces from Greece; and that he had no right whatever to question the composition of any such returning force.” “That he was not authorized to institute blockades.”

In answer to the first observation it is only necessary to observe that the Admiral was instructed, by Instruction A., “to concert with the Admirals of the Allied Powers the most effectual mode of preventing any movements by sea on the part of the Turkish or Egyptian forces.”

Has he obeyed that instruction? In the Instruction B. he is told “He is on no account to enter into any stipulation for allowing the ships to return to Alexandria without the troops.”

Coupling the Instruction B. with the Instruction A. can it be pretended that the Instruction B. did not mean that he should not allow the ships to go away without the troops, although the going away was not the consequence of a stipulation?

The Admiral then says that he is not “authorized to scrutinize the composition, or to interrupt the movements of any Turkish or Egyptian squadron of ships,” met at sea, and this with an Instruction before us in which he is told that he must adopt “the most effectual mode of preventing movements by sea on the part of the Turkish and Egyptian fleets.”

In respect to blockades, which the Admiral states repeatedly he has no instructions to form, it is certainly true that he has not been instructed, nor could be instructed, to form a maritime blockade according to the usual practice of a belligerent; but not only he was instructed, as above detailed, to prevent supplies of stores and provisions from reaching the Turkish troops in the Morea by sea, but he received and acknowledged the receipt of those instructions nearly three weeks after the battle of Navarino; and let us see what his

own understanding has been of those instructions, and his practice.

In his instructions of the 8th September he directs that all supplies may be intercepted of men, arms, &c., destined against Greece, coming either from Turkey or Africa in general.

In his letter to Colonel Cradock, of the 22nd January, he says that he feels himself authorized to prevent *any vessel whatever* from introducing Turkish or Egyptian supplies into any ports of Greece or the adjacent islands.

In his own instructions of the 2nd March to the respective captains and commanders of the fleet he orders them "to do their utmost to prevent the arrival of men, arms, vessels, and warlike stores destined against Greece, and coming from Africa or Turkey in general."

Then follows an instruction in respect to neutral vessels trading to the Morea in conformity with Instructions B. and C. of the instruction addressed to the Admiral on the 15th of October.

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*To the Right Hon. Charles Grant.*

[ 871. ]

MY DEAR SIR,

London, 1st May, 1828.

In my opinion it is not desirable to alter the rate of freight allowed to captains of the Navy for the transport of treasure in the ships under their command. If they should lose any freight by the omission to alter the rate, and should complain, we might then alter the rate, otherwise I think we ought not.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.*

[ 872. ]

MY DEAR PEEL,

London, 1st May, 1828.

I have perused the enclosed paper which you gave me yesterday, and I found last night that the Committee for framing the Estimates of the expenses of the Militia for this year was named yesterday at the meeting of the House of Commons, and this Committee will probably have met this day. I told Lord Palmerston, some time ago, that the only

reduction to which I could consent was that of the paymaster and of the drummers, excepting three in the large regiments and two in the small ; and I hope that he will not consent to more.

I am perfectly willing to consent to put down every abuse, particularly if it should be attended by expense ; and to adopt every measure which can render the militia system more perfect.

But as we have put down the yeomanry, and knowing as I do that we have not the means of taking care of any one of our dockyards if we should unfortunately be engaged in a war, I cannot consent to any measure which shall tend to diminish the efficiency of the militia at an early period after his Majesty might order that force under arms.

I think, then, that the system of ballot ought to be enforced, putting down all the abuses and preventing the delays attending it. That the Staff (excepting the paymaster), and sergeants, and corporals, and three or two of the drummers, ought to be kept up, and the arms kept in their possession in a state of efficiency, order, and readiness. That the militia ought to be well organized, and in order to effect this purpose the men should be assembled from Monday till Saturday, that is to say, for four days, and allowing one to come and another to return, every year ; that they may know their officers, non-commissioned officers, and their places in the regiment.

These measures will materially diminish the expense of the militia, and will render that body efficient in a period of time shorter by six weeks or two months than that which would elapse if the system were adopted which is proposed in the enclosed paper.

If the militia are to be assembled at all a surgeon must attend ; and I suspect that, to pay a surgeon for the job and for attendance upon the Staff, would cost more than the pay of the surgeons permanently attached to the corps. Besides the services of qualified persons of this profession would not be easily obtained upon the breaking out of war.

I am convinced that it will not answer to break up the old establishments of the country without providing some substitute.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON

[ ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM UPON THE PROPOSED MILITIA ARRANGEMENTS RECEIVED FROM MR. PEEL.

Militia.

There are in England Militia payments	76
"    in Scotland    "	15
"    in Ireland    "	38
	129

In the last 12 years the expense of the Militia has exceeded 2,500,000*l.*

The payments for the Militia in 1827 for <i>Great Britain</i> were . . . . .	£ 189,015	s. 18	d. 3½
Allowances to Reduced Adjutants and Sergeant-Majors under 39 & 40 Geo. III. . . . .	1,767	5	0
	Total	190,783	3 3½
	For Ireland	98,060	12 2
	Total	£288,843	15 5½

The Committee of the House of Commons for preparing the Estimates for the present year is not yet appointed.

*Lieutenancy Meetings.*—By 42 Geo. III., c. 90, General Lieutenancy meetings of every county, riding, or place, shall be holden within every county *annually* upon the last Tuesday which shall happen before the 10th October for the purpose of balloting for the Militia.

The expenses attending these meetings in Great Britain are—

Clerks of General and Subdivision Meetings in England and Wales . . . . .	£ 16,000
Schoolmasters, Constables, &c., in Scotland . . . . .	6,000
Meetings of Lieutenancy for preparing returns . . . . .	800
Surgeons for examining men . . . . .	1,200
	Total
	£24,000

From non-attendance of deputy-lieutenants and magistrates these meetings are in some years adjourned four or five times. At each meeting the clerks receive their fees, &c.

In Scotland subdivision clerks, schoolmasters, constables, and others, are not only paid for the due performance of their duties, but the more irregular they are in the execution of their duties the greater is the remuneration. Irregularities cause adjourned meetings which, of course, are attended with additional expense to the public.

*The Ballot.*—Great annoyance and vexation arises from the present system of balloting in Great Britain.\* Men are brought from a considerable distance, and consequently compelled to neglect their usual avocations. The chances are they are never called upon for a training.

\* The Ballot does not prevail in Ireland.

It is a common practice amongst the clerks of subdivisions to assemble the balloted men for three or four weeks: they are obliged to join their respective regiments from all parts of the country to avoid being proceeded against as deserters. Many men in service are unable to regain their situations when they return from the training.

*The Permanent Staff.*—The Staff of the Militia in its present state are in a great measure useless, and are a great expense to the country.

The Militia Staff mustered on the 1st January last were—

	Great Britain.	Ireland.
Adjutants . . . . .	89	38
Paymasters . . . . .	89	38
Surgeons . . . . .	84	37
Quartermasters . . . . .	55	37
Sergeant-Majors . . . . .	88	37
Quartermaster-Sergeants . . . . .	20	38
Sergeants . . . . .	1,208	606
Corporals . . . . .	1,214	613
Drum-Majors . . . . .	84	38
Drummers . . . . .	457	412

A partial reduction took place in 1819 under the authority of Lord Sidmouth's letter.

*Clothing.*—The expense of clothing a militia regiment when called out for training is very considerable, and as a lapse of four or five years generally takes place between each training, the clothing (deposited in a depôt which costs the country 40*l.* per annum) is consequently moth-eaten, rotten, and almost unfit to wear a second time.

#### *Suggestions.*

Suspend so much of the 42 Geo. III., cap. 90, as enacts that General Meetings of the Lieutenancy shall be holden within every county *annually*, (vide 21 & 25 Sections). The Ballot is put in motion by the General Meeting of Lieutenancy.

Enact that the Crown may have the power, by an Order in Council, to require the Lieutenants of Counties to summon General Meetings of Lieutenancy, and that in future no further Ballot for the Militia shall take place until the Lieutenants be required to summon such General Meetings.

The Ballot may at any time be in full activity within two months after the date of any Order requiring the Lieutenants to summon General Meetings.

*Proposed Reductions.*—*Paymasters* dying, or relinquishing their commissions, not to be replaced.

*Adjutants* to perform the duties of *Paymasters*.

A similar arrangement with respect to *Quartermasters*.

*Surgeons* to be reduced.\* Six months' pay to be allowed them from the day of their reduction.

All *Corporals* † to be discharged.

\* It is presumed that militia surgeons have now private practice in the towns in which they have been for so long a period stationed.

† *Corporals* having had little military occupation since the Peace, are in many instances unfit for the duties of sergeants should vacancies occur.

Non-commissioned Officers and Drummers to be clothed once in four years instead of once in two years.

Saving in Great Britain.	
	£      s.
Paymasters . . . . .	9,709    0
Quartermasters . . . . .	5,018    0
	14,727    0
Surgeons . . . . .	9,745    10
Corporals . . . . .	26,465    10
Suspending Ballot . . . . .	24,000    0
	£74,938    0

Meetings to find substitutes for persons drawn; for so doing they usually obtain 5*l.* They procure a substitute for 2 guineas, thereby receiving a profit of 150 per cent. at the public expense.

The substitutes are generally, then, men of bad character, who frequently do not join the regiment when called out for training. The same men have taken the bounty and been sworn into three or four different regiments. Many balloted men find substitutes. In one regiment (the Dumfries) only 52 principals serve at the present time, the other 432 are substitutes or volunteers.

Many men enrolled in the Militia enlist into the Regular Army, and consequently perjure themselves.

If a man serving in the Militia is anxious to enlist into the Regular Army, and there are many who would do so *without bounty*, they are not permitted by the existing law.

When a man has served, or rather been enrolled in the Militia five years, he is exempted from being further called upon. Great part of the population liable to serve in the Militia have served since the Peace. Thus balloting for the Militia is a bad economy of men as well as of money.

*Training and Exercise.*—Training is of no practical benefit. High military authorities give it as their opinion that the training of men for three or four weeks in a year is of no service.

The government have refrained from calling out the Militia for training more than once in five or six years. The last trainings were in 1821 and 1825. The expense of training in 1821 was 91,000*l.*, in 1825, 112,000*l.*

The trainings have cost on an average per year 40,000*l.*

It is presumed that a similar arrangement may be effected for Ireland.

*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Mansfield Street, 2nd May, 1828.

I send you the enclosed, which I found, with a note from Lord Aberdeen, on my return from the House of Lords yesterday evening, and the best use I can make of it is to send it to you.

We must, it is clear, get something specific from Lieven before we resume the conferences, and I doubt whether we shall get anything satis-

2 E 2

factory. Unless we do, the blame of having suspended them will rest with us; but if their explanation to us come up to what has been communicated to France, I do not see how we can decline to resume.

We have done nothing since the commencement of your government. It is unfortunate that the joint instructions had not been agreed upon before the Russian declaration of war arrived, but with that exception our case stands well; but it would stand better if we took an opportunity of explaining it. We shall be reproached with having done nothing; but the conduct of Russia in the first instance, and the indecision of France, from a disposition to yield to Russia, in the second, have not left it in our power to do anything.

Yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

[ENCLOSURE.]

If the conferences between the plenipotentiaries of the three Powers are to be renewed, it may be proper to look at the situation in which recent events have placed us, and at some of the difficulties with which it is attended, before we finally concert measures of co-operation.

It cannot fail to be observed that Russia, in receiving our support and co-operation, will have in a great measure obtained the main object which she originally had in view; in a different manner, perhaps, but probably not less advantageous to herself than as at first proposed. By the despatch of Count Nesselrode of the 26th of December, it was suggested that, in the event of the continued obstinacy of the Turks, the Russian army should cross the Pruth, should occupy the Principalities, and advance, if necessary, to Constantinople, in execution of the Treaty of London, and for the attainment of its objects. A manifesto or declaration strictly defining the purpose of this invasion, and limiting its effects, was intended to accompany or precede the operation. It was at the same time proposed that the combined fleet should pursue measures of active hostility, and either by blockading the Dardanelles, or proceeding at once to Constantinople, in conjunction with the Russian forces, fulfil the stipulations of the Treaty of London under the walls of the Scraglio. To this proposition we declined to accede, as being unnecessary to accomplish the objects of the Treaty; and as being at the same time contrary to justice, pregnant with dangers, and leading, almost necessarily, to the most calamitous results. Russia, however, thought proper to declare war against the Porte on grounds professedly foreign to those which might be possessed by the other contracting parties: but it now appears, if we may rely on the report of the French Chargé-d'affaires at St. Petersburg, that this war has been declared for the specific object of securing a pecuniary indemnity for the losses of a commercial nature sustained by Russian subjects in consequence of the proceedings of the Turkish government. This is, no doubt, an important admission; but it is to be remarked that these losses had already been incurred at the date of Count Nesselrode's despatch. The Bosphorus had been closed, the commerce of the Black Sea interrupted, and the subjects of Russia had, at that time, been forcibly expelled from Constantinople; and all those injuries committed, for which an indemnity is at present sought. Yet, at that time, Russia only proposed a more energetic method of carrying into effect the Treaty of London; probably apprehensive that in assuming the character of a belligerent, she rendered impracticable the co-operation of neutral Powers for the attainment of a common object. Had she not been

actuated by some such consideration, there was no reason to prevent her from taking that course in December which she has since chosen to adopt.

Having disapproved of the advance of the Russian armies, and deprecated the consequences of that measure, are we quite consistent in giving our support to the same operation when undertaken under circumstances, in some respects, more alarming? The declaration of war seems to make no great difference in the question. Grounds of hostility against Turkey might always be found to exist; and we might no doubt allege such ourselves, did it accord with our policy to put them forward. The real question is, whether our virtual approbation of the hostile invasion by Russia of the northern provinces of the Turkish empire, as evinced by our active co-operation in another quarter, be more justifiable than our acquiescence in the measure formerly proposed by Russia, and which, for cogent reasons, we then declined.

It is true, that according to the report of the French Chargé-d'affaires, Russia now expresses a desire to remain within the limits of the Treaty, and to be bound by its stipulations; proposing to act in the Mediterranean according to our guidance and direction. But supposing this statement to be correct, let us see how the co-operation arising out of this arrangement can be carried into effect, or, indeed, with any regard to consistency or plain sense, can be considered at all practicable.

Whatever may be the case with respect to the vigorous prosecution of the war in the northern provinces, it seems to be thought sufficient that Russia should consent to pursue a different course in the Mediterranean; and by regulating the exertions of her naval force, enable herself to act in concert with us against the Turks; and thus, that her *amicable hostility* and our *hostile neutrality* may be made to unite in accomplishing the same object. But first, it is to be observed that we have always professed a desire to promote the real interests of the Sultan himself by the pacification of Greece. We have maintained that the apparent sacrifice of territory, by admitting the qualified independence of Greece, would be more than compensated by other advantages attending on its pacification. Can a Russian admiral, or a Russian plenipotentiary in London join in these declarations, or can they unite in the tranquillizing assurances we may be called upon to give? Can Russia perform the office of a mediator in the event of the Porte yielding to our solicitations, and accepting the mediation of the three Powers?

In the prosecution of our joint operations and the attainment of our common object, the satisfaction and approbation of Russia must depend mainly on the varying state of the war in the northern provinces, and probably our own views and feelings must in some measure be influenced by the results in that quarter. If, after having virtually established the independence of Greece, we sail with our combined fleet to Constantinople, in order to obtain the acquiescence of the Sultan, by such means as a regard to the interests of the Porte may dictate, and with a view to secure the remaining portions of the empire, what are we to say if we find the city in flames under the bombardment of a Russian fleet, or occupied by Russian troops, and the Sultan himself a fugitive in Asia? It may be that these events are not sufficiently probable to demand present consideration; but although an extreme case be here supposed, it is only a question of degree. In the course of operations, having for their theatre the two extremities of the empire, conducted in such a different manner, and on such different principles, various contingencies must arise in which it will scarcely be possible to reconcile conflicting views and interests. There must be a moment, according to the circumstances of the campaign, when the further prosecution of the war by Russia in the north will be felt &



be incompatible with the continuance of our exertions in Greece, whether this feeling be produced at the time of crossing the Danube, by the destruction of the Turkish armies on the plains of Adrianople, by a movement on Salonica, or by the investment of Constantinople itself; at all events, the Emperor of Russia ought to feel that the progress of his arms might not necessarily, and in the same proportion, advance the final success of the Greek cause.

The settlement of the future limits of Greece, the consideration of which there seems at present an increased disposition on the part of Russia to evade; as well as its relation to the Porte, the amount of tribute, and other particulars of its situation will become more difficult every day, from the varying events of the war, by which they must be more or less influenced.

It is scarcely necessary to refer to the confusion which must arise from the exercise of the rights of belligerents and of neutrals, in the situation in which the respective parties stand towards each other, and from the nature of our co-operation. This situation, it is presumed, is absolutely new in the history of the world; and the more it is examined, the more calculated it appears to lead to complications of the most difficult and embarrassing character. Should the important change in the language and views of the Russian government, reported by the French *Chargé-d'affaires*, be confirmed to its full extent, it may unquestionably be proper to renew the conferences; not so much, however, for the purpose of framing joint instructions, as of free and confidential communication. The production of joint instructions will scarcely meet the proposed case of naval co-operation, which can only be divested of the difficulties attending it by the entire abandonment, on the part of Russia, of her belligerent character in the Mediterranean, and by placing her fleet at the disposal of the neutral Powers. For however perfectly three persons may agree in Downing Street, it seems hopeless to provide for the numberless contingencies which may arise in active service from the extraordinary nature of our relative position. It is possible, too, that in renewing the conferences there may be some danger of our becoming gradually entangled in operations and fettered by conditions unsuited to our actual condition; whilst it must be essential that we should be able at any moment to adopt at once that line of conduct which a regard to justice and to our own consistency may demand.

[ 873. ]

*To Earl Bathurst.*

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST,

London, 2nd May, 1828.

I concur in Lord Aberdeen's paper, excepting that there is one circumstance to which he has not adverted in the relative position of Russia and ourselves.

We have the same object in the Treaty of the 6th of July. Unfortunately, if Russia should again admit that she is bound by the Treaty, we must act in concert with her in relation to everything which tends to define, to limit, or to extend that object; and we must confer with the Russian minister on these points.

Russia having gone to war on grounds purely Russian, we are not bound to concert with her the means of attaining the

object of the Treaty; nor ought we to concert with her those means, or to co-operate with her in any way. Here I agree with Lord Aberdeen's Memorandum.

I think, however, that the necessity of keeping France in check may oblige us to admit the Russian minister to the conferences of France and England on the means of attaining the object, although all co-operation with the Russian squadron and armies should, as it ought to be, positively declined.

I must say that I think our case stands in the most triumphant manner. On the day after the King's Speech, we received the proposition of the 6th January, to which we sent a *contre-projet* directly. Before this was received his Imperial Majesty declared his intention of going to war, and if we would not co-operate with him he would settle Greece *selon ses intérêts et convenances*. We remonstrated upon this determination; declared that he had no right to withdraw himself from the Treaty, though we thought it difficult for us to co-operate with his Imperial Majesty in attaining its object. To this remonstrance we have received no answer.

In the mean time we have not failed to explain to France in detail the measures which we had proposed in our *contre-projet* for the execution of the Treaty; and to these communications we have received the answer only this day.

We likewise remonstrated with the Admiral, and ordered him to resume his blockade. This he has not done, and I think this the lame part of our case. As not only has he allowed the Greek prisoners to be taken over to Egypt, but several vessels have lately got into Navarino; whether loaded with provisions or not is not stated.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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MEMORANDUM.—THE TIME HAS COME FOR THE CABINET TO [ 874. ]  
 DELIBERATE WHETHER SIR EDWARD CODRINGTON SHALL  
 OR SHALL NOT BE RECALLED.

3rd May, 1828.

I have just read despatches from Sir Edward Codrington, in which he reports that an Egyptian fleet had found its way into Navarino. He sends the report on the subject from Captain

Parker of the *Warspite*, who received the information from certain Greeks who saw the fleet enter the port from the hills.

It appears to me that the time has now come at which the Cabinet ought to deliberate whether Sir Edward Codrington ought or ought not to be recalled. He has neither answered the letter from the Secretary of State nor obeyed the orders which it contained; and notwithstanding the pains which the government have taken, and successfully, to prevent the transmission of supplies to the Egyptian army in the Morea, we shall find them supplied by the Egyptian fleet in consequence of our Admiral's disobedience of orders and inattention to his duty.

WELLINGTON.

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[ 875.] MEMORANDUM RESPECTING THE ANSWER OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO PROPOSED EXPLANATIONS OF CERTAIN ARTICLES IN THE TREATY OF THE 6TH JULY.

3rd May, 1828.

The paper from the French government, as well as I could understand its meaning when read to me by Prince Polignac on Friday, contains an answer to our proposition that we should agree upon an explanation of certain articles of the Treaty of the 6th July.

The paper first states that this explanation cannot be made excepting by the concurrence of the Emperor of Russia.

In our reply we might again explain in what manner the Emperor stands, in our opinion, in relation to the Treaty, in consequence of the despatch of February from his minister, and our answer.

The French paper then goes on to contend against our proposed explanations and limitations as being contrary to the text of the Treaty itself, very much in the same tone, and almost in the same terms, as the last Russian paper received.

We might answer this part of the paper by observing that the object of this government had invariably been to attain the benefits of the Treaty without war, and that we had proposed these limitations and explanations with those views.

That all parties had complained of the *vague extrême* of the Treaty, and none more vehemently than those who had taken most pains to carry it into execution, and had manifested the

utmost zeal and ability in the cause : viz., the Comte Guilleminot and Admiral de Rigny. That this government, being of the same opinion with those officers, that the Treaty did require explanation at least, if not modification, if it was expected that it should be accepted by an independent power on the use of other means than those of force, which from the commencement of these negotiations, till a very late period, had been disclaimed by all parties, had proposed the explanations and modifications contained in the Note of the \* .

That it appears to us that the Greeks are as much interested as the Allies in explanations and limitations which can have the effect of bringing the war and the existing state of affairs to a termination, and that we still think that what we proposed was just and fair between the parties.

That we feel, however, that the decision of these questions does not rest with us ; and although we shall not cease to urge those with whom we shall find ourselves engaged in attaining the objects of the Treaty of the 6th of July, to explain the Treaty, we must defer to their judgment if they should decline to enter into such explanation on the score of its being inconsistent with the letter, although quite consistent with its spirit.

In respect to the propositions of the French government, viz., to send money and troops, we must positively decline to send either.

We must deny that any hopes were ever held out to Count Capo d'Istria that money would be supplied by this country.

In respect to sending troops this measure would be, in fact, an useless display of hostility, of far greater magnitude than that of a blockade by sea. In its details it would be attended by great inconvenience, and it may be observed that Count Capo d'Istria has himself declared that the landing of foreign troops in the Morea would be the signal for his departure.

There will be no objection to send a consular agent.

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.*

[ 876. ]

MY DEAR PEEL,

London, 4th May, 1828.

I went to the Cabinet-room yesterday and found the despatches from Berlin to which you refer. They are of a very

\* Blank in manuscript.

ancient date, and the conversation which they relate took place before the Prussian government had been made acquainted with all that had passed between the Emperor of Russia and this government since the beginning of the year.

I may be in the wrong ; although I believe there is no principle more fixed and determined in transactions of all descriptions, than that a written declaration of importance must be withdrawn, qualified, or explained in writing, before the party to whom the declaration was made can act upon the explanation.

We have in the Cabinet at present a victim of a departure from this principle.

But if I am in the wrong let my error be shown ; or let it be shown that the paper recently received from Russia, or the extract of the letter from the French Chargé-d'affaires, garbled as we happen to know it to be, is such an explanation of the Russian despatch of February as that we can act upon either consistently with any rule or principle which governs the conduct of transactions of such importance as that in which we are engaged.

The Emperor says, I will settle this according to my own fancy. We answer, You are under engagements to us, and cannot, without breach of engagement, so settle it ; and then, without explanation from his Imperial Majesty, we are to confer with his ambassador upon this same object.

It must be admitted that the Emperor has it in his power to settle the Greek question according to his own fancy, even after we shall have renewed our conferences with his minister ; and in answer to our remonstrances he may tell us, "I told you I should do so ; and, notwithstanding that information, you thought proper to *invite* my ambassador to your conferences, and this after you had remonstrated against the intention which I had announced ; and you knew that I had given you no answer." God knows that I may be wrong ; but I confess that I have not yet heard any answer to my principles, my facts, or my reasoning ; excepting that it is desirable to renew the conferences.

Ever, my dear Peel, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Mansfield Street, 6th May, 1828.

On thinking over the French note, it appears to me that it may at least relieve us from one of the embarrassing parts of the July Treaty. I mean that which, in fact, takes our own fleet in the Mediterranean out of our own command, by obliging the instructions to be given jointly with the two other parties to the Treaty.

It is this which has prevented our giving any instructions to Sir Edward Codrington since the formation of your government, unless that can be called one which directed him to suspend acting with the Russian Admiral until he should hear again from us.

According to the French Note, the French government say that they cannot act in concert with us, separate from Russia, under the Treaty, as the Treaty is tripartite, and therefore requires the concurrence of the three parties for any act done under it. They also announce that they have acted without waiting for our concurrence, for they have not only decided on sending money to the Greeks, but have also sent instructions to their Admiral to regulate the manner in which this subsidy is to be expended.

They have, therefore, placed the Treaty in abeyance by declining to act under it singly with us; and they have exercised the right of giving singly instructions to their Admiral, which they could not have done if they had considered the Treaty still in activity. We are therefore absolved from the obligation of concerting with them the instructions which we may think it expedient for the common cause to give to our Admiral, though it may be proper to communicate to them the substance of such instructions; and we ought not to defer any longer doing what I am afraid many will think has been too long delayed.

Yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

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*To the Right Hon. Sir Frederick Lamb.*

[ 877. ]

MY DEAR LAMB,

London, 7th May, 1828.

I have received your letter of the 16th April,\* and I confess that in considering my answer I can say but little that I did not say in mine of the 24th March,† to which yours is an answer.

Since I wrote to you, however, I have had occasion to look over, with a greater degree of accuracy, the engagements made by Don Miguel at Vienna, while we were concocting a certain Note addressed to the Marquis de Palmella, in answer to one

\* See page 386.

† See page 321.

from the Marquis to this government, assuring us that the Infante entertained no intention to put down the institutions established by the Charter, of which a copy was sent to you.

I did not find among those engagements any one to issue a proclamation; and I must say in respect to all the engagements into which the Infante entered when he signed those Protocols, that they were voluntary on his part; that we gave him nothing in return excepting politeness and good will, and subsequently a promise of good offices to enable him to raise a sum of money by loan; and that if he had accepted his office of Lieutenant to his brother, or Regent, in silence, instead of being profuse in his promises, we might not have paid him the honours which we did pay him as he passed through England; we might not have escorted him to Portugal, but he would equally have been Regent. I consider him bound by his promises made at Vienna and elsewhere equally as if he obtained his situation in consideration of his having made them. But our duties are very different from those which would have been incumbent upon us, if the appointment of the Infante had been an act, or we had been induced to adopt any measures to obtain or to facilitate that appointment in consideration of his having made those engagements.

We ought never to lose sight of this reasoning in all our transactions and conduct at Lisbon. We have a right to remonstrate and complain of the breach of every engagement entered into in any of the Protocols at Vienna or in London. But we can do no more; and prudence must limit the occasions on which remonstrances ought to be made, and dictate the language to be used on such occasions. I apply the same principles to interference in favour of individuals. This is evidently the most delicate ground upon which a Foreign Minister can interfere in any country; particularly in one in a state of revolution.

The Infante has promised an amnesty for acts previous to a certain date; and he punishes an individual who is in the situation of being obliged to take advantage of the amnesty. The individual will tell the Foreign Minister disposed to interfere in his favour that he is punished for acts committed during the period included in the amnesty. The Regent will answer: "No! He has been engaged in acts of treason since I landed in Portugal." He has secret societies in his house, or he fre-

quents secret societies, or he is a Freemason; all of which are crimes in Portugal!

This shows the caution with which such powers of interference in favour of individuals ought to be exercised; and how desirable it is to continue the practice which you have adopted of taking your first step confidentially, and of proceeding afterwards according to the nature of the information which you may receive.

The power of interference in favour of individuals is a very dangerous one, and must under any circumstances be exercised with caution; as it will not answer to involve the honour of the country respecting the punishment of an individual, more particularly considering the nature of our right to interfere at all.

Notwithstanding that I entertain these opinions, I am quite certain that if any act of atrocious cruelty or injustice is perpetrated we cannot countenance it; and we must take the step pointed out in my letter of the 24th March.

*May 11th.*—Since writing the above I have perused your despatches up to the 26th instant, and I consider that you and I do not look at Portugal or view the relations between this country and Portugal in the same light. It is my opinion not only that we have no right to interfere (excepting in the limited manner above stated under the Protocols), but that the less we interfere in the internal affairs of Portugal the better for both parties. We are bound to defend Portugal against a foreign enemy, and we have a right to give our advice in respect to the measures of foreign policy, and possibly in respect to those measures of internal policy which may in their consequences affect the tranquillity of the country, and its political and military strength. The penalty of omitting to follow our advice must be that such omission puts it out of our power to fulfil the obligations of treaties. We have no right, nor, indeed, have we the means of using force; and my opinion is that we ought to confine our exertions strictly to the objects of keeping the country quiet, and in a state to enable us to assist efficaciously in its defence, if we should unfortunately be called upon to defend it. All the existing mischief has originated in our departure from the strict line above laid down; and the sooner we resume it the better.

I am inclined to believe, however, that Don Miguel is about



to usurp the throne of his brother, and that we shall *very* shortly be relieved from all care about Portugal and its concerns.

I cannot tell you how much annoyed I am by the mischief which appears hanging over the two kingdoms of the Peninsula, which I was the instrument of saving during the late war. If Lord Liverpool's government had treated only with common kindness and attention the two countries which had been saved by us exclusively from the hands of the enemy, they would have now been in a state of prosperity, and useful Allies to this country. But no sooner was peace made than we began to plunder Spain; the revolutions in the colonies, encouraged and fostered by us, occasioned the revolutions in Spain and Portugal of the year 1820; and we have ended, by depriving both countries of their colonies, and by establishing in both a state of confusion from which it will take years to extricate them. We must not aggravate these evils to those countries, to ourselves, and to the world, by making war upon them; nor must we force little questions (into which we have no right to enter excepting to give amicable advice) into importance, and thus place ourselves under the necessity of adopting an extreme course, or of doing nothing after making a noise.

You will see what we have done respecting the transactions of the 25th April. This act will not stop Don Miguel, nor will the serious blow intended to be given by the Brazilian ministers now in London to his credit and resources. But our line is clearly chalked out. He will know what he has to look to if he usurps the crown of his brother, and he must take his own course.

I shall lament the breach of the relations between this country and Portugal. But in the existing situation of the world that breach is not unattended by advantages; and this I must say, that nothing that we could do could prevent the breach, even if the mischief resulting from it was unmixed.

I do not enter into the question of our currency. Its state is one of the evils of the day, of which to discover the remedy has devolved upon this government, and I am doing everything in my power to discover one.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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MEMORANDUM ON DESPATCHES FROM SIR FREDERICK LAMB; [ 878. ]  
No. 59, MOST SECRET, APRIL 23RD; MOST SECRET, APRIL  
25TH; No. 69, APRIL 26TH.

9th May, 1828.

Considering what it is that the Spanish minister at Lisbon is aiming at, I cannot understand why Sir Frederick Lamb should encourage him so far as to appear even to act in concert with him. Our object is that Don Miguel should consider himself, and act as if he considered himself, the servant of his brother the Emperor Don Pedro, and that he should carry into execution the Charter.

The object of Spain is, above all, that Portugal should not be governed by the Charter; and that his Catholic Majesty should, by his interference to prevent a breach between Don Miguel and the Emperor Don Pedro, establish an influence in Portugal which may prevent the revival of the system of the Charter, be the monarch of the country hereafter who he may.

I confess that, provided there is neither violent reaction, nor oppression of individuals, nor usurpation on the part of Don Miguel, nor civil war in Portugal, I do not think it signifies much to this country whether Portugal is governed by the system of the Charter or not.

But the establishment of the paramount influence of Spain in Portugal could not suit this country, and I do not think that we ought to lend ourselves to the measures proposed in these despatches on that subject.

The despatch (most secret, April 23rd) shows most clearly what the Spaniards are aiming at.

WELLINGTON.

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MEMORANDUM ON THE DESPATCH FROM SIR FREDERICK LAMB, [ 879. ]  
No. 61.

9th May, 1828.

I think that we were parties to an arrangement between Portugal and Spain in the year 1826-27 that the arms, accoutrements, horses, &c., carried away by the deserters, should be restored, but not the men on either side.

It will not be very creditable to us or to the French government if the parties to that arrangement should now alter it, and the result should be that the Spanish deserters should be shot.

This subject should be examined into; and if I am right we ought to endeavour to prevail upon the French government to act in concert with us to prevent an alteration of the arrangement, or if the alteration should take place, to prevent the Spanish deserters from suffering upon their restoration to their country.

WELLINGTON.

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[ 880. ] MEMORANDUM ON DESPATCH FROM SIR FREDERICK LAMB,  
No. 63.

9th May, 1828.

I do not think that Sir Frederick Lamb has any reason to complain of the communication to the Marquis de Palmella of the intended evacuation of the forts on the Tagus.

We might have more reason to complain that a moment was lost in announcing the intended evacuation after the order to evacuate had been received.

WELLINGTON.

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[ 881. ] MEMORANDUM ON A DESPATCH FROM SIR FREDERICK LAMB,  
No. 64.

9th May, 1828.

This despatch does not contain the Address from the Senate, which, however, contained a requisition from that body to Don Miguel to take upon himself the title and authority of King of Portugal, this same body having previously sworn allegiance to the Emperor Don Pedro.

This body was therefore guilty of rebellion; and the Minister of the Emperor Don Pedro, instead of ordering that the reader of the Address or the principal magistrate should be seized and punished, or even reproved, stated in reply by a decree that "such important matters should be adjusted by the legal means which the fundamental laws of the monarchy establish, and not in the tumultuous manner which unhappily occurred in the year 1820" (when the throne of his father, Don John VI., was overturned); and his conviction that the loyal inhabitants of Lisbon would give to the world and to posterity another proof of their fidelity by awaiting tranquilly in their houses the ulterior measures which it appertains to me alone (the Infante Regent

and Lieutenant of Don Pedro) to adopt. According to the 'Gazette' the royal signature follows.

The Secretary of State represents this occurrence as having taken place, notwithstanding the most efficacious measures taken to prevent it *by the use of coercion*; and that "the *same august personage* (the Regent), by a spontaneous act in the form of a decree manifesting his sentiments, has disapproved of such illegal acts."

The decree then manifests his sentiments, and nobody can doubt what they are, nor what his intentions are.

The question is, what this government ought to do under such circumstances. We have recognised the sovereignty in Don Pedro, whether right or wrong is not now the question; and this same Sovereign has been recognised by every Power in Europe. We have determined that Sir Frederick Lamb should declare his functions at an end if Don Miguel should declare himself King of Portugal.

Can we now pretend to doubt his intention of so declaring himself? Shall we not with reason be reproached with having omitted to do all in our power to arrest the progress of Don Miguel, if we do not now withdraw our ambassador?

By ordering our ambassador to present as soon as possible a respectful protestation and remonstrance against what passed on the 25th of April, and directing him to notify his immediate departure if measures were not taken to declare in positive and satisfactory terms the Regent's submission and obedience to his Sovereign, and to punish those guilty of such acts of treason and rebellion as those of which the Senate of Lisbon gave the example, we may prevent the mischief. It is obvious that the measure can do no harm, and will only precede by a few days the adoption of a similar measure by every Power in Europe.

At all events it will manifest to the world our determination to adhere to our principles.

WELLINGTON.

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MEMORANDUM ON DESPATCH FROM SIR FREDERICK LAMB, [ 882.]  
No. 67, APRIL 26TH.

9th May, 1828.

The persons likely to become the objects of persecution in Portugal may say what they please, but it is not true that

qualified recommendation of the Charter caused its acceptance in Portugal. Neither is it true that the presence of our troops caused its establishment. But supposing both assertions were true, are we therefore bound, contrary to our principles and our duty, to interfere to protect those who may be the victims of the changes which are likely to occur in Portugal? We did no more than our duty in recommending to the government of the day in Portugal to obey the order of the Sovereign Don Pedro; and our troops were positively ordered to refrain, and did refrain, from all interference in the contest between parties then existing in Portugal. The object of our expedition was the foreign invasion alone; we so repeatedly declared it; and the country cannot be held responsible either for the acts or words of its officers, still less for the hopes founded upon such acts or words by Portuguese individuals.

But I will go farther and say that, if I was not correct in principle upon this subject, I really do not know what special protection could be afforded. Excepting an asylum in England, which every individual of all nations and descriptions may claim, there is no other that we could give. Remonstrances are useless. We cannot go to war because we find such remonstrances unavailing.

Yet, short of war, we have no remedy.

On the other hand, I believe it will be admitted that we cannot give pensions to Portuguese emigrants who may flock to this country.

WELLINGTON.

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*The Earl of Dudley to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Arlington Street, Friday night,  
9th May, 1828.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

I have just received these papers from the Marquis de Palmella. I have not had time to consult the treaties and to see how far we are mixed up in this transaction; but it is certainly with no very good grace that just at this moment a Portuguese minister comes to urge upon the Brazilian Emperor the observance of his engagements. I had already put off the Brazil mail in order to give us a little more time.

Yours faithfully and sincerely,

DUDLEY.

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*Le Marquis de Palmella to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

Londres, ce 9 Mai, 1828.

Je viens de recevoir une réponse du Vicomte d'Itabayana annonçant qu'il est *fermement décidé* à ne pas continuer, sans de nouveaux ordres de sa Cour, les paiements de l'emprunt portugais, dont le Brésil s'est chargé par le Traité fait sous la médiation de sa Majesté Britannique, qui a stipulé l'indépendance du Brésil.

Les premiers dividendes sont dus le 31 de ce mois, et si jusqu'à ce jour on ne me donne pas l'argent nécessaire pour les payer, comme il a été fait aux précédents semestres, je serai forcé de faire quelque protestation publique pour justifier la bonne foi, et soutenir, autant qu'il peut dépendre de moi, le crédit public de Portugal !

La malle du Brésil part *demain soir*, et je crains que si une fois le Vicomte d'Itabayana rend compte à son gouvernement de la résolution qu'il a prise, rien ne puisse, après cela, le résoudre à y renoncer.

Ainsi il serait bien nécessaire que vous eussiez la bonté, Monsieur le Duc, de le faire appeler demain matin, et de tâcher de le convaincre à payer encore au moins le semestre présent, quitte à demander pour l'avenir les ordres de sa Cour.

Je ne crois pas que cette question doive être aucunement dépendante des évènements politiques, et je crois surtout que les Brésiliens auront tort de faire naître entre les deux pays un différend qui peut fournir des prétextes et des occasions de mésintelligence, et dont le tort serait de leur côté.

J'adresse aujourd'hui même une note officielle à Lord Dudley pour réclamer l'intervention du gouvernement britannique. Mais le temps est tellement court que je me décide à vous supplier de vouloir bien agir vous même, *demain matin*, si vous ne voulez pas perdre l'occasion de pouvoir nous sauver de ce fatal embarras.

Mille pardons, Monsieur le Duc, et veuillez agréer l'assurance de la très-haute considération et du dévouement, avec lequel j'ai l'honneur d'être,

de votre Excellence le très-humble et très-obéissant serviteur,

PALMELLA.

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*To the Earl of Dudley.*

[ 883. ]

MY DEAR LORD DUDLEY,

London, 10th May, 1828.

I have looked over the papers in this box ; and I confess it appears to me that the Emperor of Brazil is bound to pay this debt. He had engaged to pay two millions sterling in one year from the date of the ratification of the treaty.

The stipulation by which he took upon himself to pay the interest and sinking fund of the Portuguese debt contracted in England, was for his own relief and convenience. I do not think then that this stipulation is of the description of one which his Imperial Majesty could refuse to perform even if the

two kingdoms were to be at war, much less in their existing state.

This being my view of the stipulation, I think we ought to exert our influence to prevail upon the Brazilian minister to pay the interest and sinking fund of the current quarter; and I should say that it cannot suit the interests of the Emperor of Brazil to incur the risks of raising a cry against himself in this country upon such a subject.

I am certain that the whole world would decide against him, whatever might be the conduct of Don Miguel.

Mr. Canning's decision upon the sum remaining due at the period of the death of John VI. would not influence men's minds upon this question. Part of the sum claimed by Portugal from Brazil was for the King's property, and it was reasonable enough that the heir to the throne upon his accession should claim not to be obliged to pay for a property, of which he had become the proprietor by right of succession on the death of his father.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Marquess of Londonderry to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Holderness House, 10th May, 1828.

Before I close my little correspondence with you, my dear Duke, during my late stay at Paris, I will endeavour to give you a short general *résumé* of my opinions of the state of parties in that country, as also my notions of the characters of the *corps diplomatique* that are now accredited at the Court of the Tuileries; I shall then have touched upon everything an unofficial observer can embrace, and I feel much too happy in the kind acknowledgments you have made of my letters amongst your incessant and never-ending occupations not to be largely repaid for my little labour.

The permanent existence of the present dynasty is no longer a problem in France. The entire nation has become accustomed to it, without, however, that affection which Court flattery would establish: but the most ardent Constitutionals and Liberals agree that the Bourbons have taken root again, never to be exterminated without a new revolution in Europe.

The remembrance of the Imperial government recalls the danger and dominion of absolutism without the genius of the chief who directed it, and his son is merely looked on as an Austrian archduke, brought up on Metternich's principles, and very little fit to appreciate constitutional blessings.

There are those who look to the Crown of France passing into the Orleans line, there being only between the throne and the Duke and his offspring a King of 71, a Dauphin of 52, and a child of 7 years old, of a very feeble

constitution. But these are probably the eventual calculations of the friends of the Orleans family, without the least cabal or desire on the part of the Duke to foment them, although occasionally he alludes to them, and leans to all constitutional sentiments to court a popularity which is somewhat exaggerated.

It is, however, clear to me that in France there is only now *two* great and decided parties, with all their fractions and different *nuances*; viz. :—

The party of the new ideas—which the emigrants and their writers and partisans endeavour to describe as *revolutionary*, but which may rather be termed constitutional or liberal : and

2nd. The party of the old ideas, and old system, which may be called royalist, but which its adversaries denominate *Ultras* and Absolutists.

The two parties have their adherents in the *Côté Gauche* and *Côté Droit*. But the moderate, or ministerial party (when there is one), is only a composition of these elements derived from both sources, and becoming a sort of centre of the Chambers.

There is *no doubt* the majority of the French nation belong to the first of these two great parties.

The emigrants, the mass of the *ancienne noblesse*, the clergy, and the most bigoted of the French people will be found in the latter.

A middle or moderate party, constituted with vigour and led by ability, would counterbalance and surpass in numbers the two others united. But from its nature it is uncertain, timid, or passive, and it yields to the most ardent who carry it forward.

It must therefore evidently result that the party formed of the mass of the nation, and recruited by the rising generation (who know nothing of ancient France, and can consequently entertain no regrets), must ultimately preponderate, and be consolidated in power, notwithstanding the clandestine resistance which the Court will still labour to oppose.

I am apt to believe, however, that a worn-out feeling amongst the ultra-royalist party and the universal desire of repose in France would have fixed the course of government under the due organisation pointed out by the Charte, if the King's conscience and religious scruples had been let alone; but his most intimate counsellors, devoted to Jesuitism and absolutism, never leave him a moment at peace, continually placing before his eyes a constitutional government and its inevitable consequences, and a revolution, which is always at hand, thus depriving the weak monarch of the power of making a frank disavowal of arbitrary and absolute royalty.

To repudiate past power for the profit of the future is hardly amongst the energies of an old King, and thus the Dauphin is more looked up to; besides, he has more firmness, and is without the strong prejudices of his father, and he is less repugnant to a constitutional system. His devotion is, however, fervent, and his wife more bigoted than himself, and their joint horror of everything that borders on revolution is so great, that few can positively pronounce what would be the event of a new reign, which, however, the King's health and abstemious habits may very long defer.

What may happen to France in this interval, when the state of Europe seems so menacing, no one can say, or be so blind or presumptuous as to



prelict; but the minds of all Frenchmen are turned to their interior position. There is little confidence in the stability of what exists, and I should describe it as a provisional state, and as a forced transition towards changes and ameliorations, upon which political speculators dream according to their interests or wishes.

Hence arises in some measure the extreme importance that has been worked up and attached to the education of the Duc de Bordeaux, who may possibly one day regulate the cloudy horizon. Hence the fear of seeing him in his early years abandoned to Jesuitism; to which influence France attributes now the evils she fears more than she feels from a government which, without being oppressive, had the bad tact to render itself suspected by a nation who had no justifiable cause to dislike it.

In France at present there are many men of great merit, but none of undisputed superiority amongst the civilians, and the military reputations are grown old, while they are not renewed in time of peace. Besides, experience gained or talents exhibited by men prior to the Restoration is a sure reason for their being put aside by the Bourbons, who endeavour to select their confidential servants from those who partook of their banishment, and who have not had during the Revolution the means of knowing the country, its new habits, and its new wants.

The society and manners of Paris have taken a shade of democracy, inasmuch as any supremacy is entirely nominal. The aristocracy, which ought to be in the peers, has no exclusive ascendancy from fortunes or possessions, which in England secures its power. What was formerly deemed a *grand seigneur* in France has nothing for the public, and can do nothing for his friends or flatterers. Every man seems compelled to beg at Court and exert his little interest for himself and his immediate family, while the ministers seldom listen to applications, but dispose of the patronage to secure votes in the Chambers, and more is given away by those who have the charge of bureaux than by powerful names or by the ministers themselves.

The institutions of France are not of the popular description that many suppose, the immense number of places existing being absolutely in the nomination of the King or the agents of his ministers. With the exception of the judges all places are subject to removal at the pleasure of the Crown. No public functionary is burthened with the least responsibility, and could not be brought to account but by the authority of the King in his council, composed of 30 members, all named by himself. The King confers every military and naval appointment, which are given without any rule or restriction, except (as I understand) one third, which are reserved for seniority.

Every church employment, from the archbishop to the curé, is in the King's hands; also 40,000 mayors, and all préfets, sous-préfets, and officers of every kind in every department. In short, there is not in France a single nomination out of the immediate power of the King, save and except the 430 members of the Septennial Chamber of Deputies.

To be an elector of these deputies you must be 30 years of age and pay for a year preceding 300 francs of direct taxes, &c.

To become a member of the Chamber of Deputies you must be 40 years of age, and pay 1000 francs in direct contribution.

It is averaged that, in 32,000,000 of inhabitants, there are only 75,000 electors, amongst whom less than 12,000 are eligible. It would therefore appear that all France has not more electors than there are in the city of London.

One-fourth at least of the Chamber of Peers occupy places with salaries at Court, in the army, the civil line, or the church. About one-half of the peers have majorats of 1000 livres, which they hold of the King, and which he distributes as he thinks fit or withdraws from the next heir.

Thus royalty, with its immense *cortège* of paid places, removable at pleasure, with an army of 200,000 men, with a special guard of 25,000 men, with a civil list of 40,000,000, with no responsibility in the ministers chosen by the King, with an administrative organisation formed on Napoleon's imperial plan, with a *gens-d'armes* of 16,000 men, is materially and politically far more powerful in France than is generally understood or believed.

Having now exhausted all I know or could learn on the state of parties and the general position of France, I shall proceed to give you my impressions of the *diplomatie* corps belonging to the Court, and what I think I have learned of their respective characters.

The *corps diplomatique* at Paris have little intercourse as a body together. The English, Russian, and Austrian ambassadors alone represent, or receive, and Appony's *salons* have been much deserted since the affair of the French Marshals.

You, of course, remember, in 1815, the European Committee that was formed by the ministers of the four Courts deliberating together, to which the French minister was admitted rather as an assistant than a member. This reunion continued until the liquidations were paid up. The line of demarcation which was thus taken between the ministers of the five Powers and the rest of the *corps diplomatique*, amongst whom Spain was placed, has been much persevered in. The ambassadors have no communication with the King or Court. There is little reception at the Tuileries, except occasional *jeux* and parties of the Duchesse de Berri's; and since Madame de Duras's death and Madame du Cayla's fall, there is no lady of note who receives or mixes much in the intrigues of politics as heretofore. The court machinations are carried on under the influence of the clergy. The cardinals assemble with the nuncio of the Pope and grand aumonier, and there are two formed committees—the one called the Comité d'Avray; the other, an inferior one, where Prince Castelcicala, Appony, and others assist; with this latter Metternich is said to be in constant correspondence; and these two comités have organised correspondence throughout France and the Peninsula by means of the clergy and Jesuits. I heard it positively stated that Prince Polignac was much occupied and in constant communication with the Irish Catholic clergy, and that Mr. Canning had complained to Villèle on the subject. I cannot know if this is correct, but my informant added that Polignac's zeal for proselytism would never allow him to remain quiet.

During Villèle's government Pozzo lost much influence, and even towards the end of the Duc de Richelieu's the Emperor Alexander showed more confidence in the latter minister. The Bourbons dislike Pozzo from his favouring the Constitutionalists, and have constantly refused to give

him the *Cordon Bleu*, for which he has made every effort. Pozzo's talents, knowledge, sagacity, and esprit are universally admitted: but he wants personal reserve, and sometimes discretion. His numerous low relatives in all sorts of society make him know France better than any Frenchman, and this will ever induce Russia to keep him at Paris, notwithstanding efforts have been attempted by the Bourbons for his recall. Pozzo contrives always to insinuate himself deeply into the councils of the reigning Minister of Foreign Affairs, and with M. de la Ferronnays at present he is not idle. If any change should ever bring *Sebastiani* into power it is the only thing that might diminish Pozzo's meddling.

*M. Appony*, the Austrian ambassador, in consequence of the quarrel with the Marshals, had all Paris in arms against him, but little by little the Court have returned to his *salon*. He is considered a mere echo of Metternich, who is detested in France. He is on distant, cool terms with La Ferronnays, and, although one of the best of the Austrian diplomatists, he enjoys little consideration at Paris. He is equally minister for Marie Louise, which prevents awkwardness about her position.

*Baron Werther*, the Prussian, being in England as minister renders it unnecessary to say much of him. France believes Prussia entirely under the control of Russian influence, and Pozzo and M. Werther are closely united as far as public appearance is concerned.

*M. L. Ambuschini*, Archbishop of Genes, the nuncio of the Pope, is the centre of the congregations, and the second king of the clergy. He is believed to be a man of considerable talent, and to keep up the clue of all the religious machinations of Europe. Nothing is done at the Tuileries without his being privately consulted. The old ministers flatter him, the new fear him, and the Jesuits and clergy are at his feet.

*The Duc de San Carlos*, ambassador of Spain, is *blasé* and *usé* in France. He has been so long and so often playing different games and using different language that he is held in no respect. He lives entirely, and in seclusion, with the old Princess Talleyrand, and he neglects his own family. His sole object is to retain his post, although badly paid; but he is largely in debt, and his means, like his capacity, are very moderate.

*Prince Castelcicala*, you know, is a mere Italian pantaloon, not without esprit, but prostituting himself to the lowest flattery at the Tuileries. France seems entirely to have forgotten that she ever had a footing in Italy, and has quietly surrendered that country to Austrian diplomacy, and the King of Naples' ambassador at Paris may quietly repose as the courtesan of the house of Bourbon.

*Baron de Fagel*, the Dutch minister, is both a clever and acute man; and, under the appearance of reserve, he not only obtains great information, but does his business most ably for his Court.

*Count Löwenhelm*, from Sweden, is one of the ablest of the *corps diplomatique*, after Pozzo. He is popular, keen, quick, intelligent, and in every society. He married a niece of Madame du Cayla's, by whose means he learns all the intrigues at Court; but personally M. de Löwenhelm is disliked by the Bourbons from their abhorrence of Charles Jean.

*M. Alfieri*, from Turin, is little more than a zealous partisan of Metternich's.

I will now, my dear Duke, release you and close my little detail during six weeks' residence at Paris. Flattered by your wish for my scrawls, I can only assure you that when you can employ one of your old officers in any way, he will always feel too happy in exerting his humble powers to the best of his abilities.

Ever yours most affectionately,

VANE LONDONDERRY.

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*The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Argyll House, 10th May, 1828.

With respect to the course which it may be proper to pursue in consequence of the conduct of Don Miguel, I venture to suggest for your consideration a doubt how far the immediate recall of Lamb may be necessary.

From the evident character and tendency of this conduct, might it not be proper to direct Lamb to declare, in the most official and explicit manner, that he had orders to quit Lisbon the instant that the usurpation of Don Pedro's sovereignty was completed? This might be accompanied by a last remonstrance. And, in order to discountenance any objectionable proceedings, short of usurpation, he might be directed, if necessary, to absent himself from Court, or even from the city for a time. But so long as the Regent professes to govern in the name and on behalf of his brother, however contrary to his brother's interests and those of his country, should we be quite justified in proceeding to the last extremity, and in putting an end to all diplomatic relations with a country situated as Portugal is with respect to us? We may, by doing so, lose the last feeble hope it is possible to entertain of influencing the Regent; and perhaps precipitate the very measure we are desirous of averting.

It seems to me to be worth considering whether such a declaration as I have mentioned would not be sufficient for our character and consistency at present; it might assist the effect which may possibly be produced by the opinions and remonstrances of the other Powers of Europe on the mind of a timid and irresolute person.

If, as is possible, the Regent may have already usurped the throne, or should do so at any time, our course is clear; but if we recall our ambassador, and Don Miguel, after all, should continue to govern the country, unwisely and unconstitutionally if you please, but still as the regent of his brother, would there not be some difficulty and awkwardness in the renewal of your relations with him, which however might be expedient and necessary? To withdraw a minister is easy enough, but it is not always so easy to manage his return with credit.

Have we not at present an example of a little precipitation of this kind?

I ought to beg pardon for troubling you with these doubts; and I can only say that if, after you have considered the matter, you are of opinion that the conduct of Don Miguel has been equivalent to actual usurpation, and that the time has come when we ought to evince our sense of it as such, I am sure you will be right.

Ever, my dear Duke, yours most sincerely,

ABERDEEN.

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[ 884. ]

*To Lord FitzRoy Somerset.*

London, 11th May, 1828.

Having laid before the King's servants the letter transmitted to me by Lord Hill's desire from Lieutenant — on the half-pay of the 7th Hussars, conveying that officer's application that his Majesty would be most graciously pleased to permit him to be attached to the personal Staff of his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia during the presence of the Russian armies on the eastern frontiers of the empire, I have to inform you that they are of opinion, in which I concur, that his Majesty ought to be advised not to give Lieutenant — the permission for which he solicits, inasmuch as the Emperor of Russia is engaged in a war with the Ottoman Porte, in which war his Majesty is neutral.

WELLINGTON.

[ 885. ]

*To the Earl of Dudley.*

MY DEAR LORD DUDLEY,

London, 12th May, 1828.

I conceive that besides the despatch respecting the events of the 25th of April, you should write another to Sir Frederick Lamb to be likewise communicated to the Portuguese government, in which you should advert to your former despatch which referred him to his credentials in reply to his question respecting his conduct in case the Infante should assume the title of King.

You should then tell him that after what passed on the 25th of April his Majesty's government think proper *to instruct him* to withdraw himself from Lisbon and return to England in case his Royal Highness should assume the title of King of Portugal.

It appears to me that you should write a third but not ostensible despatch directing him to leave the Consul General in charge of the papers, &c., of the mission, and of such commercial affairs as his Majesty's subjects might have to transact in Portugal. In this despatch Sir Frederick Lamb might be desired to avoid witnessing such transactions as occurred at Court on the 25th April, by not going there till the Infante will have afforded some satisfactory proof that he has altered the intention which he had entertained; and that it might be

desirable that he should remove to Cintra or elsewhere in the country if such removal should suit his private convenience.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Le Vicomte d'Itabayana to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

Park Crescent, ce 13 Mai, 1828.

En adressant à votre Grâce un exemplaire du Traité du 29 Août, 1825, et une copie de la Convention Additionnelle, j'aurai l'honneur de vous répéter ce que je vous ai dit de vive voix, savoir :

Que cette convention fait partie du Traité.

Que la question des droits héréditaires de l'Empereur à la couronne de Portugal se rattache à ce Traité.

Que le terme d'un an, dont votre Grâce m'a parlé hier, fut fixé pour le payement de la somme de 600,000*l.*, et non pas de celle des 2 millions sterling.

Ces vérités sont incontestables, Monsieur le Duc, et telle est l'opinion de celui qui a l'honneur d'être, avec la plus haute considération,

De votre Grâce le très-humble et très-obéissant serviteur,

ITABAYANA.

[ENCLOSURE.]

CONVENÇÃO EM NOME DA SANCTISSIMA E INDIVISIVEL TRINDADE.

Havendo-se estabelecido no artigo nono do Tratado de Paz e Alliança, firmado na data desta entre o Brazil e Portugal, que as reclamações publicas de hum a outro governo serão reciprocamente recibidas e decididas, ou com a restituição dos objectos reclamados, ou com huma indemnização equivalente, convindo-se em que para o ajuste dellas ambas as altas partes contractantes farião huma convenção directa e especial. E considerando-se depois ser o melhor meio de terminar esta questão o fixar-se, e ajustar-se desde logo em huma quantia certa, ficando extinto todo o direito para as reciprocas, e ulteriores reclamações de ambos os governos: Os abaixo assignados, Plenipotenciarios de S.M. o Imperador do Brazil, e de S.M. Fidelissima el Rey de Portugal e Algarves, debaixo da mediação de S.M. Britannica convierão em virtude dos seus plenos poderes respectivos em os artigos seguintes.

Artigo 1º.

S.M.I. convem a vista das reclamações apresentadas de governo a governo dar ao de Portugal a somma de dois milhôens de libras sterlinas; ficando com esta somma extinctas de ambas as partes todas, e quaesquer outras reclamações, assim como todo o direito a indemnisações desta natureza.

Artigo 2º.

Para o pagamento desta quantia toma S.M.I. sobre o Thezouro do Brazil o emprestimo que Portugal tem contrahido em Londres pagando o restante para prefazer os sobreditos dois milhôens sterlinos, no prazo de hum anno a quartéis, depois da ratificação, e publicação da presente Convenção.

## Artigo 3º.

Ficão exceptuadas da regra estabelecida no 1º artigo desta Convenção as reclamações reciprocas sobre o transporte de tropas, e despesas feitas com as mesmas tropas. Para liquidação destas reclamações haverá huma commissão mixta, formada e regulada pela mesma maneira que se acha estabelecida no artigo oitavo do Tratado de que acima se faz menção.

## Artigo 4º.

A presente Convenção será ratificada, e a mutua troca das ratificações se fará na cidade de Lisboa dentro do espaço de cinco mezes, ou mais breve se for possível.

Em testemunho do que nos abaixo-assignados, Plenipotenciarios do Imperador do Brazil e de S.M. el Rey de Portugal e Algarves, em virtude dos nossos respectivos plenos poderes assignamos a presente Convenção, e lhe fizemos pôr os sellos das nossas armas. Feita na cidade do Rio de Janeiro aos 29 de Agosto de 1825.

[ 886. ]

## MEMORANDUM.—RUSSIA AND TURKEY.

18th May, 1828.

The following questions must be considered by the Cabinet. Shall we make any observation upon the contents of the Russian papers in relation to our opinion upon the justice of his Imperial Majesty's cause, as follows :—

In the circular from St. Petersburg of the 14th April :

*Il n'en est aucune qui conteste la justice du droit que nous avons de déclarer la guerre à la Porte.*

In the letter to Prince Lieven from Count Nesselrode of the 17th (29th) April :

*En déclarant la guerre à la Turquie par des motifs qui lui sont propres, sa Majesté Impériale ne fait qu'exercer un droit incontestable de juger elle-même la nature des griefs infligés à ses sujets. Le Roi n'entend pas mettre ce droit en question.*

These are understood to be a translation of the expressions of our Cabinet. The letter goes on to say : DÉJÀ LA FRANCE AVAIT RENDU LE MÊME HOMMAGE À LA JUSTICE DE NOTRE CAUSE.

In the despatch to the Austrian Minister, of the same date :

*Toutes les grandes Puissances ont reconnu LA LÉGITIMITÉ DES MOTIFS qui déterminaient l'Empereur à faire marcher ses troupes contre la Turquie. Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique elle-même a déclaré la première dès le mois de Décembre, 1827, que dans aucune hypothèse elle ne contraindrait le Divan. Elle vient de réitérer à l'Empereur, par l'organe du Comte de Zichy, l'assurance qu'elle NE RÉVOQUE PAS EN DOUTE LA VALIDITÉ*

DES DROITS QUI AUTORISENT LA RUSSIE À RECOURIR AUX ARMES. LES MÊMES ASSURANCES NOUS ONT ÉTÉ DONNÉES PAR LA GRANDE-BRETAGNE, PAR LA FRANCE, PAR LA PRUSSE. *La légalité des résolutions de sa Majesté repose donc aujourd'hui SUR L'ASSENTIMENT EXPLICITE DES PRINCIPALES COURS DE L'EUROPE.*

It appears to me that being called upon in the circular to approve of the resolutions communicated to us, we ought to point out the meaning of our paper of the 26th February; not from any desire to manifest a difference of opinion from other Powers, but because it is due to ourselves to declare what we think in frank but friendly and even cordial terms.

The next question which the Cabinet must decide is whether we shall deliver any further opinion upon the Russian objects and terms of peace; expressed as follows in the circular:

*Sa Majesté Impériale veut que les traités entre elle et la Porte se renouvellent de manière à être efficaces, et à renfermer en eux-mêmes la garantie de leur observation scrupuleuse. Sa Majesté veut que la liberté de la navigation du Bosphore et du commerce de la Mer Noire soit désormais inviolables.*

*Sans doute l'Empereur demandera à la Porte d'indemniser la Russie des frais de celle qui commence et ses sujets des pertes dont ils ont à se plaindre.*

These intentions are repeated in the despatch to Prince Lieven.

Possibly it will be necessary only to refer to our despatches of the 7th and 27th March upon this part of the subject; excepting so far as it will be necessary for us to observe upon the pretension put forward that the state of the Ottoman Power is not an interest of those Powers who signed the Treaty of Vienna, and that Russia can aggrandize herself in that quarter without injury to their interests.

These are the words of the despatch to Prince Lieven on this part of the subject:

*Mais nous observons, sans arrière pensée, et pour établir les faits sur toute leur exactitude, que cette même paix et l'état de possession territoriale des diverses Puissances chrétiennes, résultent de négociations et de traités dans lesquels il n'a jamais été fait mention, directement ni indirectement, de la Turquie. Les traités et les garanties réciproques ne sauraient donc lui être applicable de droit; considération qui ne change rien du reste aux intentions toujours également modérées de notre auguste Souverain.*



It is obvious that the alteration of the state of possession there does affect seriously the interest of others, and no Power in Europe can see without regret any independent European Power, even the Turkish, reduced to make such concessions as those stated in these papers at the demand of any other Power.

The next question for this government to consider is the identity of its objects in the Levant with some of those of the Emperor of Russia, that is to say, the Treaty of the 6th of July.

The Emperor has not withdrawn the expressions in his Note of the 26th of February ; but the whole tenor of the papers now under consideration shows that he considers himself bound by the Treaty ; and it appears that we should proceed immediately to consider of the terms to be offered to the Ottoman Porte.

It must be observed, upon this point, that the Emperor insists upon it that the Greeks shall be parties to the concoction of these terms ; which are to be imposed upon the Porte by the force of the Russian arms. Nay, more, it is desirable that the Cabinet should attend to the plan of operations sketched out in these papers, consisting as it does of military operations and negotiations, the former to be brought to a conclusion only when the latter shall have fully attained all their objects ; and then reflect upon this passage in the despatch to Prince Lieven :

*Tandis que les conditions de son existence auxquelles la Porte doit donner une adhésion explicite demandent à être déterminées dans le plus bref délai, afin que la guerre entre la Russie et les Turcs ne se prolonge pas outre mesure, et se termine par une pacification où soient comprises toutes les questions que l'Empereur annonce la résolution de régler avant de poser les armes ; toutes les questions qui feraient naître de nouveaux différends si elles n'étaient heureusement décidées à la signature de la paix.*

Thus, then, the termination of the war does not depend, as is stated in the printed manifesto, upon the submission of the Turks ; or upon the submission of the will and views of the Allies to the will of the Emperor ; but upon the termination of a negotiation with Count Capo d'Istria upon the extent of the limits of Greece, or upon the amount of the tribute, &c. ; and he has only to hold out upon any point, however unreasonable, and he is sure to obtain the continuance of the Russian operations, and the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, notwithstanding its submission to all the Emperor's terms.

This is a state of things to which I believe no independent Power ever yet submitted.

The Cabinet will have to consider this point as well as another very important one, viz., whether the Greece to be formed under such auspices is to be a suzeraineté, or independent, according to the suggestions in the Austrian paper and the Emperor's answer.

Another question for the consideration of the Cabinet will be, the co-operation with the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean.

Before this question is considered, it is desirable to advert to what is stated in the despatch respecting the Protocol, as follows :

*Et d'abord quant aux principes. Les premières stipulations relatives à la pacification de la Grèce ont été arrêtées dans un moment où les deux Cabinets dont elles sont l'ouvrage s'attendaient à une rupture immédiate entre la Russie et la Porte. En conséquence le Protocole du 4 Avril renferme les clauses suivantes. " Quel que soit d'ailleurs l'état des relations de sa Majesté Impériale avec le gouvernement turc, la Russie et la Grande-Bretagne regarderont toujours les termes de l'arrangement mentionné au premier article du présent Protocole comme la base de la réconciliation à effectuer par leur entremise, soit en commun soit séparément, entre les Grecs et la Porte." Ces clauses consacrent à nos yeux un double principe d'union : 1°. Prévoyant le cas d'une guerre entre la Russie et la Turquie, elles établissent que dans cette hypothèse les Puissances contractantes n'en resteront pas moins unies pour le but qu'elles se proposent. 2°. Elles admettent, il est vrai, dans cette même hypothèse la possibilité d'une action séparée, mais elles sont loin d'exclure, et mentionnent au contraire expressément, celle d'une action commune.*

If the second article of the Protocol had been inserted in this Note as follows, this mistaken view of the Protocol could not have been inserted.

*Que si le principe d'une médiation à interposer entre la Turquie et la Grèce avait été admis à la suite des démarches déjà faites dans cette vue, la Russie ferait dans tous les cas servir son influence au succès de la dite médiation. La mode d'après laquelle elle s'associerait aux négociations ultérieures que cette médiation amènerait avec la Porte Ottomane, et l'époque où elle y prendrait part, seraient déterminées d'un commun accord entre le Cabinet de Londres et celui de St.-Pétersbourg.*

When this Protocol was signed the Emperor of Russia was on the point of going to war with the Porte. War was possible ; nay, not improbable ; and the object of the second article was to regulate the mode in which the two Powers should act in case Russia should go to war.

The object of the third article was to bind both parties to the terms of the first, whether at peace or at war ; and the words *soit en commun, soit séparément*, referred to in the Russian despatch as pre-supposing a co-operation of means in case Russia should be at war, had reference to the second article, which supposed the then not improbable case that Russia might be at war, and could not be a party to the mediation.

The words, then, which are represented as meaning that the two parties might co-operate in a mediation, the one being at peace, the other being at war, were intended to bind both to the same object, notwithstanding that the state of war in which one might find itself would render co-operation impossible. This is the answer to that part of Count Nesselrode's despatch.

The question must then be decided whether we can have any co-operation with the Russian squadron in the Levant.

That squadron is already separated from those of the other Allies by the instructions from the Emperor, described in the despatch to Prince Lieven.

But a willingness is expressed to alter them ; and to give instructions *plus analogues encore à la position de nos Alliés dès que la conférence sera convenue d'un plan définitif*.

With whom ? With this Power in a state of war.

*Votre Altesse voudra bien ALORS inviter le Comte de Heyden à prendre la MÊME attitude, &c., à les suspendre en quelque sorte, et à n'en faire usage que dans le cas d'une nécessité urgente, ou d'une attaque de la part des Turcs.*

The French ambassador informed us that his Imperial Majesty was disposed to make such disposition of his fleet in the Levant as we might think proper. The Russian government, that his Imperial Majesty was willing to withdraw his squadron from the Levant altogether. We see nothing of these propositions in these papers ; but we neutrals, who have pronounced an opinion in our despatch of the 7th March, that the Emperor had not completely justifiable grounds for war, and who, in that of the 27th March, declined to give an opinion upon the justice of the war, and who have in these papers been represented as

having admitted its justice, are now called upon to co-operate for the attainment of the objects of the Treaty of the 6th July with a belligerent at present in the exercise of its rights of war, which belligerent, having exercised those rights, consents *à les suspendre en quelque sorte, et à n'en faire usage que dans le cas d'une nécessité urgente.*

WELLINGTON.

*The Right Hon. W. Huskisson to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

[*Private and Confidential.*]

Downing Street, Tuesday morning, 2 a.m.,  
20th May, 1828.

MY DEAR DUKE,

After the vote which, in regard to my own consistency and personal character, I have found myself from the course of this evening's debate compelled to give on the East Retford question, I owe to you, as the head of the administration, and to Mr. Peel, as the leader of the House of Commons, to lose no time in affording you an opportunity of placing my office in other hands; as the only means in my power of preventing the injury to the King's service which may ensue from the appearance of disunion in his Majesty's councils, however unfounded in reality, or unimportant in itself, the question which has given rise to that appearance.

Regretting the necessity of troubling you with this communication,

Believe me, my dear Duke, ever truly yours,

W. HUSKISSON.

*To the Right Hon. William Huskisson.*

[ 887. ]

MY DEAR HUSKISSON,

London, 20th May, 1828.

Your letter of two this morning, which I received at ten, has surprised me much, and has given me great concern.

I have considered it my duty to lay it before the King.

Believe me, ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

*The Right Hon. W. Huskisson to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Downing Street, 20th May, 1828, 6 p.m.

Having understood from Lord Dudley and Lord Palmerston that you had laid my letter of last night before the King under a different impression from that which it was intended to convey, I feel it due both to you and to myself to say, that my object in writing that letter was, not to express any intentions of my own, but to relieve you from any delicacy which you might

feel towards me, if you should think that the interests of his Majesty's service would be prejudiced by my remaining in office after giving a vote, in respect to which, from the turn which the latter part of the debate had taken, a sense of personal honour left me no alternative.

Believe me, my dear Duke, yours very sincerely,

W. HUSKISSON.

[ 888. ]

*To the Right Hon. William Huskisson.*

MY DEAR HUSKISSON,

London, 20th May, 1828.

I have received your letter of this evening. I certainly did not understand your letter of two o'clock this morning as offering me any option; nor do I understand the one of this evening as leaving me any excepting that of submitting myself and his Majesty's government to the necessity of soliciting you to remain in your office, or of incurring the loss of your valuable assistance to his Majesty's service.

However sensible I may be of this loss, I am convinced that in these times any loss is better than that of character, which is the foundation of public confidence.

In this view of the case I have put out of it altogether every consideration of the discredit resulting from the scene of last night; of the extent of which you could not but have been sensible when you thought proper, as a remedy for it, to send me the offer of "placing your office in other hands."

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 889 ]

*To the King.*

London, 20th May, 1828.

Since I saw your Majesty this morning I have seen Lord Dudley and Lord Palmerston upon the subject of the letter which I had received from Mr. Huskisson, which I had laid before your Majesty. Both of them endeavoured to convince me that Mr. Huskisson had intended no more than to leave his resignation at my option. I told them both that I did not nor could not so consider his letter as leaving me any option. I think that Lord Palmerston will follow Mr. Huskisson's example.

I have this evening received from Mr. Huskisson a letter, of which I enclose the copy, and likewise the copy of the answer which I have written to him.

I will inform your Majesty if I should hear any more upon this painful subject.

All of which is submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

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MEMORANDUM UPON MR. HUSKISSON'S RETIREMENT FROM OFFICE. [ 890. ]

20th May, 1828.

When I received the first letter from Mr. Huskisson, of course I inquired from all those capable of giving me any information whether any circumstances had occurred which were calculated to occasion his resignation; but I found that nothing had occurred excepting that he had spoken for the amendment of the Bill and had voted against it.

In his letter to me he mentions what he had done, for which the only remedy was, in his opinion, his own resignation; and with this sentiment he gives his resignation. I had no doubt, I could have no doubt, of his intention, nor had any of those to whom I communicated his letter.

I could consider the letter, therefore, only as a resignation of his office, founded upon his own sense of the injury done to the government by the scene which had taken place in Parliament on the preceding night.

In four or five hours after I received it, not hearing any more from Mr. Huskisson, I took the letter to his Majesty and laid it before him; and received his Majesty's commands to acquaint Mr. Huskisson that I had done so.

From the moment at which I received Mr. Huskisson's letter till that at which I took his Majesty's pleasure upon the appointment of his successor, it appeared to me that I could not take any step excepting to carry into execution the measures consequent upon his resignation. I could not ask Mr. Huskisson to recall his resignation without placing myself in a situation in relation to him very disadvantageous to myself and the government; and it rested with him to decide upon the steps which he would take to relieve us all from the difficulty in which he, and he alone, had placed us.

I considered it my duty to delay as long as possible to take the King's pleasure upon the appointment of Mr. Huskisson's

successor; and I did not do so until the Sunday succeeding the Tuesday on which I had received his resignation, and then only after giving previous notice that I should do so on that day. Unfortunately that notice did not, I understand, reach Mr. Huskisson; but that was not my fault.

I now come to consider two or three subjects which have been adverted to by others. One of these is that Mr. Huskisson had not been admitted to an audience by his Majesty.

It will be observed that Mr. Huskisson's letter had been considered as a tender of the resignation of his office, which had been so far accepted by his Majesty's minister as that it had been laid before the King. The next step was, therefore, that Mr. Huskisson should deliver the seals into his Majesty's hands. Either this must have been the object and consequence of the interview, or his Majesty must have taken upon himself to decide that his minister was in the wrong and Mr. Huskisson in the right. One branch of this alternative would have been the natural consequence of the audience which would have been thus granted to Mr. Huskisson.

But this would not have been the only consequence which would have followed this audience. It would have given ground for the belief that after I had accepted the resignation and had declined to desire Mr. Huskisson to take it back, I had advised his Majesty to interfere to effect that object, which I had not the manliness to do myself.

When I state that I lament these unfortunate circumstances, I state but the truth; and I am certain that it will be admitted that no person ever was involved in such a difficulty so little by his own acts. But when I was in the difficulty, when once I received the letter of the 20th, I could do nothing excepting what I did. I do not believe that Mr. Huskisson or those who advised him had any bad motive in what they did; I entirely acquit them of any intention of bringing the matter to this unfortunate issue. But this I must say, that it was very clear to me from the commencement of the affair that it was not with an individual alone but with a party that I had to deal, and that I could get out of the difficulty without discredit to myself and without disadvantage to the King's service only by taking a clear decided course, and adhering to it strictly. That which I could not do, viz., to take the initiative, it appeared to me that Mr. Huskisson might have done without discredit.

Principles have been talked of as if there was any difference of principle in these discussions. There is not the idea of a principle in all these papers. Principles are brought forward solely to aggravate the consequences of these unfortunate difficulties.

We hear a great deal of Whig principles, and Tory principles, and Liberal principles, and Mr. Canning's principles; but I confess that I have never seen a definition of any of them, and cannot make to myself a clear idea of what any of them mean.

This I know, that this country was never governed in practice according to the extreme principles of any party whatever; much less according to the extremes which other opposing parties attribute to its adversaries.

I am for maintaining the prerogatives of the Crown, the rights and privileges of the Church and its union with the State; and these principles are not inconsistent with a determination to do everything in my power to secure the liberty and promote the prosperity and happiness of the people.

We hear of liberal principles of commerce. What has my Right Honourable friend done upon this subject? He has substituted protection by duty for protection by prohibition on almost all, if not all, articles of foreign production. He may have gone a little too far, or not far enough, in some cases; but this is very certain, that in principle he is right.

Then comes the reciprocity in respect to shipping. It must be observed that this reciprocity is fixed not only by Act of Parliament, which Act Parliament might repeal, but by treaties with foreign Powers, which cannot be broken by us, whatever may be the inconvenience suffered by them.

As for my part, however, I really believe that the inconvenience attributed to these measures may be traced to other causes. But, at all events, enough has been shown to prevent making more of such treaties at present.

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MEMORANDUM UPON LORD PALMERSTON'S RETIREMENT. [ 891. ]

20th May, 1828.

Lord Palmerston spoke to me in the Long Gallery in the House of Lords respecting the letter from Mr. Huskisson, received this morning, and his own and Mr. Huskisson's conduct



in the House of Commons last night. He said that Mr. Huskisson was under the necessity of acting as he had done in consequence of what he had said in debate upon the same subject upon a former occasion; and that he (Lord Palmerston) finding that Mr. Huskisson voted differently from Mr. Peel, and entertaining an opinion that the amendment ought not to pass, considered that he ought not by his vote to give his sanction to an amendment of which he disapproved.

He then told me that I had misunderstood Mr. Huskisson's letter; that Mr. Huskisson intended to leave in my hands an option whether he should retire or not, and that he must, of course, follow the fate of Mr. Huskisson.

I told Lord Palmerston that I thought the whole transaction had been most unfortunate. That the whole town talked of it; and that even the Lord Chancellor had mentioned it to me. I reminded him that from the formation of the government up to that moment I had done everything in my power to conciliate and keep it together; but that several unfortunate occurrences had taken place, all calculated to shake the public confidence; and that at last the event of last night had occurred to crown the whole. That Mr. Huskisson saw it as I did; and had sent me his resignation as the only remedy for the injury. That the reason for the resignation was his own, as well as the resignation itself; and that I had no option excepting to receive it, and act upon it, or request Mr. Huskisson to take it back, which could not in reason be required from me.

In answer to a remark which I made respecting the feelings of the friends of government upon all that had passed, Lord Palmerston observed that we had no reason to complain of the want of support in Parliament. I answered it was true; but that the circumstances of which I complained revolted our friends, who in the day of difficulty would abandon us; and that we should be at the mercy of our enemies. That that was not the mode in which the King's government in this country could be carried on. That I should soon find myself in the same situation as Lord Goderich; and should be under the necessity of going to the King and of telling him that his government was *defunct*; and that I was determined that that should not happen.

In the course of this conversation Lord Palmerston repeatedly stated that he considered himself out of office, or rather offered his resignation; of which I took no notice excepting to express

my regret that Mr. Huskisson and he should have placed themselves, the government, and me, in such difficulties.

WELLINGTON.

MEMORANDUM RESPECTING THE ARRANGEMENT OF THE [ 892. ]  
CABINET UPON MR. HUSKISSON'S RETIREMENT.

May, 1828.

The arrangement now to be made must include Lord Lowther and as many members of the House of Commons as possible who have it in their power, from their talents, to take part in debate.

That proposed last night omits Mr. Wilmot Horton, whose assistance it is very desirable to obtain. It besides removed Mr. Fitzgerald to be Secretary-at-War; a situation which he would not like, and to obtain which he would not incur the risk and expense of a contest for the county of Clare. It would besides at the moment remove Mr. Herries from Parliament and from the Finance Committee.

After considering the subject in every view, and bearing in mind the object of acquiring strength in the House of Commons, the following scheme is proposed:—

Lord Aberdeen, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.  
Mr. Arbuthnot, Chancellor of the Duchy (not in the Cabinet).  
Lord Lowther, Woods and Forests.  
Mr. Wilmot Horton, Secretary-at-War.  
Mr. Fitzgerald, Board of Trade (in the Cabinet).  
Mr. Calcraft, Paymaster of the Forces.  
Sir Henry Hardinge, Secretary in Ireland.  
Colonel Maberley, Clerk of the Ordnance.  
Sir George Murray, Secretary of State, Colonial Department.  
Sir John Byng, Commander of the Forces in Ireland.  
Mr. George Bankes, to be considered.

*Cabinet.*

Lord Lyndhurst, Lord Bathurst, Lord Ellenborough, Duke of Wellington, Lord Melville, Lord Aberdeen, Mr. Peel, Mr. Goulburn, Mr. Herries, Sir George Murray, Mr. Fitzgerald.

WELLINGTON.

*Sir William Knighton to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

St. James's Palace, Tuesday Evening,  
20th May, 1828.

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

The King commands me to acquaint you, with his affectionate regards, that Mr. Huskisson has requested an audience of his Majesty. The King does not intend seeing him until *Thursday*.

I find I am to attend a trial at Guildhall to-morrow morning, at nine o'clock, so that I shall not be able to wait on your Grace as I had intended, but I hope to do so on Thursday morning at ten o'clock.

Ever yours very sincerely,

W. KNIGHTON.

*The Right Hon. W. Huskisson to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Downing Street, 21st May, 1828.

In justice to myself, I cannot acquiesce for a moment in the construction which your letter of last night puts upon my conduct. You cannot refuse to me the right of knowing the motives of my own actions; and I solemnly declare that in both my letters I was actuated by one and the same feeling. It was simply this—that it was not for *me*, but for *you* as the head of the government, to decide how far my vote made it expedient to remove me from his Majesty's service. I felt that I had no alternative, consistently with personal honour (in a difficulty not of my own seeking or creating), but to give that vote; that the question in itself was of very minor importance; that the disunion was more in appearance than in reality; but I also felt that possibly you might take a different view of it, and that, in case you should, I ought (as I had once done on a similar occasion with Lord Liverpool) to relieve you from any difficulty arising out of *personal* consideration towards me in deciding upon a step to which you might find it your *public* duty to resort on the occasion. It was under this impression alone that I wrote to you immediately upon my return from the House of Commons.

If you had not misconceived that impression, as well as the purport of my second letter, I am persuaded that you could not suppose me guilty of the arrogance of expecting that "you and his Majesty's government should submit themselves to the necessity of soliciting me to remain in my office," or do me the injustice of believing that I could be capable of placing you in the alternative of choosing between the continuance of my services (such as they are), and the loss to your administration of one particle of character, which, I agree with you, is the foundation of public confidence.

If, understanding my communication as I intended it to be understood, you had in any way intimated to me, either that the occurrence, however unfortunate, was *not* one of sufficient moment to render it necessary for you, on public grounds, to act in the manner in which I had assumed that you might possibly think it necessary, or that you *were* under that necessity—in either case there would have been an end of the matter. In the first supposition, I should have felt that I had done what in honour and fairness towards you I was bound to do; but it never could have entered

my imagination that I had claimed or received any sacrifice whatever from you or any member of his Majesty's government.

On the other hand, nothing can be further from my intention than to express an opinion that the occasion was not one in which you might fairly consider it your duty to advise his Majesty to withdraw from me the seals of my office on the ground of this vote. I do not therefore complain; but I cannot allow that my removal shall be placed on any other ground. I cannot allow that it was my own act; still less can I admit that, when I had no other intention than to relieve the question on which you had to decide from any personal embarrassment, this step on my part should be ascribed to feelings the very reverse of those by which alone I was actuated either towards you or his Majesty's government.

Believe me, my dear Duke, yours very sincerely,

W. HUSKISSON.

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*To the Right Hon. William Huskisson.*

[ 893. ]

MY DEAR HUSKISSON,

London, 21st May, 1828.

In consequence of your last letter I feel it to be necessary to recall to your recollection the circumstances under which I received your letter of Tuesday morning.

It is addressed to me at two o'clock in the morning, immediately after a debate and division in the House of Commons.

It informs me that you lose no time in affording me an opportunity of placing your office in other hands, as the only means of preventing an injury to the King's service, which you describe. It concludes by "regretting the necessity of troubling me with this communication."

Could I consider this in any other light than as a formal tender of the resignation of your office, or that I had any alternative but either to solicit you to remain in office, contrary to your sense of duty, or to submit your letter to the King?

If you had called on me the next morning after your vote, and had explained to me in conversation what had passed in the House of Commons, the character of the communication would have been quite different, and I might have felt myself at liberty to discuss the whole subject with you, and freely to give my opinion upon any point connected with it. But I must still think that if I had not considered a letter couched in the terms in which that letter is couched, and received under the circumstances under which I received it, as a tender of resignation, and had not laid it before the King, I should have exposed the King's government and myself to very painful misconstructions.

My answer to your letter will have informed you that it surprised me much, and that it gave me great concern.

I must consider, therefore, the resignation of your office as your own act, and not as mine.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To the King.*

23rd May, 1828.

I did not solicit an audience of your Majesty this day, as I had nothing to say upon the affair of Mr. Huskisson.

I saw Lord Dudley, who was very anxious that I should give him my opinion as to the mode of bringing this affair to a conclusion; which I declined. I really feel that it has gone so far that the public will and must eventually have a knowledge of its details; and it would not suit either party or the dignity of your Majesty that it should appear that there had been any collusion or understanding to produce its settlement.

All of which is submitted for your Majesty's pleasure by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

*To Lord Francis Leveson Gower.\**

MY DEAR LORD FRANCIS,

23rd May, 1828.

I had determined that I would give no opinion respecting the mode which Mr. Huskisson should adopt to relieve the administration from the difficulty in which his letter to me of the 20th has placed us; because, whatever we may wish, the public will insist upon knowing, discussing, and probing all the details of the transaction, in consequence of the time which has elapsed since the letter was written; and it will not suit either party that it should be supposed that there had been any collusion or understanding in the settlement.

But I will say this, that the mode suggested by you—I say nothing of the details—would be most objectionable; first, as it would involve his Majesty in the affair; secondly, because it

\* Afterwards Earl of Ellesmere.

would be a verbal arrangement of an affair, of which the details had been conducted in writing.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Dudley.*

[ 896. ]

MY DEAR LORD DUDLEY,

London, 24th May, 1828, at night.

The King has desired to see me to-morrow, after church, and as you have taken an interest in the settlement of the difficulties in which we have found ourselves since Tuesday last, I wish to apprise you that unless they should be removed before I shall see the King to-morrow, I intend to avail myself of that opportunity of speaking to his Majesty respecting the selection of a gentleman to fill Mr. Huskisson's office.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*The Duke of Cumberland to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

St. James's Palace, 25th May, 1828, 1 o'clock a.m.

I remained till this late hour at your brother's, expecting to see you. I was commissioned by my brother to tell you, that "Lord Dudley had intimated to him that Mr. Huskisson was *tenacious* of having an *audience*, but that he had flatly refused it, saying that he could not see him; but that as soon as Mr. Huskisson had written to you he would then receive him." These are, I believe, the very words used by my brother.

I trust you know me too well to believe me capable of uttering a word which is not my firm conviction; and therefore, knowing as you must do the sincerity of my attachment to you, allow me still to add one word from myself. I am firmly persuaded Mr. Huskisson feels himself in a scrape, and does not choose to act as a man who is in the wrong ought to do, which is to cry *peccavi*; his object is to persuade the world, if he remains, that he is sacrificing himself to the wishes of my brother, and thereby give it to be understood that my brother thinks the government cannot stand without him; but I know my brother will act completely hand-in-hand with you; therefore you have the whole game in your own hands; and for the love of God, unless you get such an answer from Huskisson as you think yourself warranted to receive, *lose no time*, but settle the business immediately. *The country is with you*; all they want is *decision*, and that, too, prompt on your part.

Excuse this from an old and faithful friend, who is actuated by no other motive than the happiness and comfort of his brother, and the welfare of his country.

Believe me, my dear Duke, your very sincere and faithful friend,

ERNEST.

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*Lord Ellenborough to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Connaught Place, 25th May, 1828.

The world begins to be very impatient for a dénouement. Our friends will all be breast high with us again should the resigners go out. Should they not, I see they will be in a state of irritation which will make the carrying on of the business in both Houses not only very disagreeable, but really difficult.

For my part I cannot help deeply regretting the loss which has already taken place of a whole week. So many important things were pressing upon us that the injury is great to the public service.

Things have gone so far that I confess I do not see how matters could be made up consistently with the character and stability of the government, or with the good conduct of public affairs. The case is no longer what it was on Tuesday morning; a new case has arisen, which more than the first calls for a change, that the government may go on with unity of purpose and cordiality between its members.

I am quite certain that under present circumstances the country feels that you are necessary to it, and that you alone can govern it with safety. It cares little who are the other ministers, it looks to you, and I am convinced you may act confidently on this belief; but at the same time you will never be able to conduct the affairs of the country with real efficiency and credit unless you have a Cabinet cordially and faithfully acting with you. If after what has passed Huskisson remains in office, it will not be easy to make it clear to the public who is the real minister.

I am certain that as I fully approve of every step you have hitherto taken, so I shall of whatever steps you may take in this affair; but it will be a matter of deep regret to me should it terminate in a manner which will not make it as evident to all the world that you are right as it is to me.

Yours most truly,

ELLENBOROUGH.

[ 897. ]

*To Lord Ellenborough.*

MY DEAR LORD ELLENBOROUGH,

London, 25th May, 1828.

I quite concur with you of the evil of delay, which is in itself a concession. But it will not go farther than two hours from this time. It would not have gone on so long as this day, if I had not found it necessary to postpone my communication to the

King yesterday till I could make known to Lord Dudley that I intended to speak to the King about an arrangement previous to having such conversation. He has now been apprised that I am to see his Majesty on that subject at two o'clock.

In respect to our friends, they must allow me to look at all the circumstances attending the situation of the country in all its relations at home and abroad. I don't mean to say that a quarrel with Mr. Huskisson will do the government much harm, if Mr. Huskisson is in the wrong in the circumstances and details of the affair from its commencement to its termination. But of this I am very certain, that we and the country should feel severely the consequences of any hard or precipitate step. We must not take such a one.

My belief is that we shall be in a better position after this affair, be its result what it may, than we were before; and I confess I am very little anxious about the result, although within two hours of the solution of so important a question.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Right Hon. William Huskisson.*

[ 898. ]

MY DEAR HUSKISSON,

London, 25th May, 1828.

It is with great concern that I inform you that I have at last attended his Majesty, and have received his instructions respecting an arrangement to fill your office.

I sincerely regret the loss of your valuable assistance in the arduous task in which I am engaged.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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*The King to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR FRIEND,

St. James's Palace,  
Sunday, 4 o'clock, p.m., 25th May, 1828.

Pray come to no immediate conclusion upon *any new* arrangement until I see you *to-morrow*. I have thought much upon this subject since we parted. What do you think of the enclosed list which has occurred to me?

Your sincere friend,

G. R.



## [ENCLOSURE.]

Goulburn .. .. .	Colonial Secretary.
Herries .. .. .	Chancellor of the Exchequer.
Vesey Fitzgerald .. ..	Board of Trade.
Calcraft .. .. .	Paymaster-General.
Arbuthnot .. .. .	Mint.
Lord Lowther .. .. .	Woods and Forests.
Sir G. Murray .. .. .	Secretary-at-War, and to be in the Cabinet.

[ 899 ]

*To the King.*

London, 25th May, 1828.

I am afraid that the arrangement suggested by your Majesty would not answer.

It includes Mr. Grant's office, which is not disposable. It removes Mr. Goulburn and Mr. Herries from Parliament, which at the present moment would be very inconvenient, if not impracticable. It places Mr. Goulburn in the Colonial Department at the moment when there are several questions depending in Parliament respecting slavery, he being a proprietor of the West Indies; and Mr. Herries as Chancellor of the Exchequer. There cannot be found a gentleman more highly qualified than he is for this office; but I should think that it would not be desirable to augment the difficulties of the present moment by affording ground for the assertion that they were in any way connected with the breaking up of Lord Goderich's administration.

The conclusion that the two events were connected would be drawn from this appointment; and I would further beg to suggest to your Majesty the possibility that it might occasion the secession of all of the present ministers who belonged to the late administration. On this ground alone I would earnestly recommend to your Majesty not to make it.

The only office vacant at present is that of Secretary of State; and Mr. Peel and others, to whom I mentioned what your Majesty had ordered me to do, considered it an arrangement that would answer perfectly; and that it was the best that could be made under the circumstances. I hope, therefore, that your Majesty will persevere in it.

It is quite certain that Lord Palmerston will resign his office. Indeed, he did resign verbally. But till I shall have his resign-

nation in writing, it is desirable that the arrangement in succession to Lord Palmerston should not be mentioned.

Since I wrote this letter to your Majesty, that is to say, at about a quarter after six, a sealed packet reached me from Mr. Huskisson. I have returned it (in the state in which it reached me) to Lord Dudley; telling him that I had received (as I told him I should) your Majesty's directions respecting an arrangement to fill Mr. Huskisson's office, which I had communicated to others.

All of which is submitted for your Majesty's pleasure by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Dudley.*

[ 900. ]

London, 25th May, 1828.  
Quarter-past 6 p.m.

MY DEAR LORD DUDLEY,

I attended his Majesty at half-past two, as I told you I should, and received his directions respecting an arrangement to fill Mr. Huskisson's office, which I have obeyed so far as to communicate them to others.

I do not think, therefore, that I ought to open the enclosed letter which I have just received, and which I return to you in the state in which it reached me.

I had written to Mr. Huskisson just before I received the enclosed.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*The Right Hon. W. Huskisson to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE, Downing Street, 25th May, 1828.

On Tuesday last I wrote to the King to solicit an audience. His Majesty has not yet been pleased to grant me this honour.

In the expectation (not unnatural for me to entertain in the situation which I hold) of being afforded an opportunity of waiting upon his Majesty, I have deferred acknowledging your letter of the 21st, which, passing by altogether all that is stated in mine of the same date, you conclude in the following words: "I must therefore consider the resignation of your office as your own act, and not as mine."

I will not revert to the full explanation which I have already given you on this subject. Not denying that my first letter might be capable of the construction which you put upon it, I would ask you whether it be usual, after a construction has been from the first moment explicitly disavowed, to persist that it is the right one? It being, however, the construction to which you adhere, I must assume, as you laid the letter before his Majesty, that you advised his Majesty upon it, and that his Majesty is therefore under the same misapprehension as yourself of what I meant; the more especially as I have no means of knowing whether my subsequent letters have been laid before his Majesty.

It was for the purpose of setting right any erroneous impression on the royal mind that I sought to be admitted, as soon as possible, into his Majesty's presence.

I was then, as I am still, most anxious to assure his Majesty that nothing could have been further from my intention than that the letter in question should have been at all submitted to his Majesty; to make known to his Majesty the circumstances and feelings under which it had been written; to point out to him that I had taken the precaution (usual between ministers, in matters of a delicate and confidential nature, when it is wished to keep the subject as much as possible confined to the respective parties) of marking the letter "private and confidential;" that I understood that this letter, so marked specially to guard its object, had been, without previous communication of any sort with me in respect to the transaction, referred to but not explained in the letter itself, laid before his Majesty as conveying to the foot of the throne my positive resignation.

I should further have had to state to his Majesty the great pain and concern which I felt at finding that a paper should have been submitted to his Majesty, and described to him as conveying my resignation of the seals in a form so unusual, and with a restriction so unbecoming towards my sovereign, as is implied in the words "private and confidential;" that in a necessity so painful (had I felt such a necessity) as that of asking his Majesty's permission to withdraw from his service, my first anxiety would have been to lay my reasons in a respectful, but direct, communication from myself at his Majesty's feet; but that, most certainly, in whatever mode conveyed, the uppermost feeling of my heart would have been to have accompanied it with those expressions of dutiful attachment and respectful gratitude which I owe to his Majesty for the many and uniform proofs of confidence and kindness with which he has been graciously pleased to honour me since I have held the seals of the Colonial Department.

If I had been afforded an opportunity of thus relieving myself from the painful position in which I stand towards his Majesty, I should then have entreated of his Majesty's goodness and sense of justice to permit a letter so improper for me to have written (if it could have been in my contemplation that it would have been laid before his Majesty as an act of resignation) to be withdrawn. Neither should I have concealed from his Majesty my regret, considering the trouble which has unfortunately occurred both to his Majesty and his government, that I had not taken a different mode of doing what, for the reasons fully stated in my letter of the 21st, I found myself bound in honour to do; so as to have prevented, perhaps, the misconception arising out of my letter written immediately after the debate.

I have now stated to you frankly, and without reserve, the substance of all that I was anxious to submit to the King. I have done so, in the full confidence that you will do me the favour to lay this statement before his Majesty; and that I may be allowed to implore of his Majesty, that he will do me the justice to believe that of all who have a right to prefer a claim to be admitted to his royal presence I am the last who, in a matter relating to myself, would press that claim in a manner unpleasant to his Majesty's wishes or inclinations. I bow to them with respectful deference, still retaining, however, a confidence, founded in the rectitude of my intentions, that in being removed from his Majesty's service, I may be allowed the consolation of knowing that I have not been debarred from the privilege of my office in consequence of my having incurred his Majesty's personal displeasure.

Believe me, my dear Duke, yours very sincerely,

W. HUSKISSON.

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*The Right Hon. W. Huskisson to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Downing Street, half-past nine p.m.,  
25th May, 1828.

MY DEAR DUKE,

Lord Dudley has just sent me, unopened, my letter to you, which I forwarded to Apsley House about five o'clock this afternoon.

This letter was written as soon as I was given to understand by Lord Dudley, who called here after an interview with you this morning, that his Majesty had not signified any intention of granting me the honour of an audience. No other mode, therefore, remaining open to me of conveying my sentiments to the King, I addressed myself to you for the purpose of bringing before his Majesty, in the shape of a written communication, what I am prevented from stating to his Majesty in person.

I feel confident that you will not deny me this favour, and you will be satisfied by the contents of my letter (which I now return) that, in writing it, nothing was further from my intention than to attempt to intrude myself between you and the arrangements which upon my removal from office (for such I have considered the result of our correspondence since your letter of the 21st) you have received his Majesty's instructions to make.

Your letter communicating this fact reached me about half-past seven this evening. I thank you for the information, and for the kind manner in which you advert to any feeble assistance which I may have been able to give to your administration, as well as for the expression of the concern with which you have advised his Majesty to place my office in other hands.

Believe me, my dear Duke, ever yours most sincerely,

W. HUSKISSON.

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*Viscount Palmerston to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Stanhope Street, 25th May, 1828.

The contingency to which I alluded in the conversation which you allowed me to have with you on Tuesday last having now occurred, I feel

compelled, with extreme regret, to request that you will submit to the King the humble tender of my resignation of the office of Secretary-at-War; and I have also to beg that in so doing, you will lay at the feet of his Majesty my most humble and grateful acknowledgments of the many marks of kind condescension with which his Majesty has been graciously pleased to honour me during the period that I have enjoyed the high distinction of being in his Majesty's service.

My dear Duke, yours very sincerely,

PALMERSTON.

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*To Viscount Palmerston.*

[ 901. ] MY DEAR LORD PALMERSTON, London, 26th May, 1828.

I have received your letter of the 25th instant, which I have laid before his Majesty; having already stated to him the purport of the conversation which I had with you on the 20th instant.

His Majesty very much regrets the loss of your services; as I do, I assure you, the loss of your assistance.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[ 902. ] *To the Right Hon. William Huskisson.*

MY DEAR HUSKINSON, London, 26th May, 1828.

I have received your letter of yesterday, accompanied by another letter from you dated also yesterday, which I had returned to Lord Dudley, under the impression that I ought not to open it without your previous consent, under the circumstances that existed at the time I received it.

I have laid both before the King.

In answer, I have only to repeat that I considered your letter of the 20th as a formal tender of the resignation of your office, and that the circumstance of its being marked "private and confidential" did not alter the character of the letter or relieve me from the painful duty of communicating its contents to his Majesty, as I did in person.

Your subsequent letters did not, according to my understanding of them, convey any disavowal of your intention to tender your resignation. I laid them before his Majesty and my answers to them, and I communicated to Lord Dudley that I had done so.

The King informed me, I think on Wednesday the 21st, that you had desired to have an audience of his Majesty; and that he intended to receive you on the day but one after. I did not consider it my duty to advise his Majesty to receive you at an earlier period.

It is scarcely necessary for me to observe that your letter to me of the 20th was entirely your own act, and wholly unexpected by me. If the letter was written hastily and inconsiderately, surely the natural course was for you to withdraw it altogether; and thus relieve me from the position in which, without any fault of mine, it had placed me; compelling me either to accept the resignation which it tendered, or to solicit you to continue to hold your office.

This latter step was, in my opinion, calculated to do me personally, and the King's government, great disservice; and it appeared to me that the only mode by which we could be extricated from the difficulty in which your letter had placed us, was, that the withdrawal of your letter should be your own spontaneous act, and that it should be adopted without delay.

The interference of his Majesty pending our correspondence would not only have placed his Majesty in a situation in which he ought not to be placed in such a question, but it would have subjected me to the imputation that that interference had taken place on my suggestion or with my concurrence.

I did not consider it my duty to advise his Majesty to interfere in any manner whatever.

His Majesty informed me this day that he had written to you this morning, appointing an audience in the course of the day.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Right Hon. William Lamb to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Whitehall, 26th May, 1828.

The removal of Mr. Huskisson from his Majesty's councils, with the other changes to which this event must necessarily lead, make so essential an alteration in the character and constitution of the administration, and present a state of circumstances so entirely different from that which existed in the month of January last, when the present government was formed, that I feel it necessary to resign the office which I at present hold into your hands, and to give you the earliest intimation of that intention.

W H W

in order that I may be replaced with the least possible delay and inconvenience to the public service.

I have only further to request, that in laying the substance of this communication before his Majesty, you will also be good enough to lay at his Majesty's feet the expression on my part of that duty, devotion, and gratitude, which I owe to his royal person, and that you will yourself accept the declaration of my high respect, as well as of my sincere regard and esteem ; and

I remain, my dear Duke, yours faithfully and sincerely,

WM. LAMB.

[ 903. ]

*To the Right Hon. William Lamb.*

MY DEAR SIR,

26th May, 1828.

I have received your letter of this day, and I admit that the loss of Mr. Huskisson's services to the government is calculated to make an impression upon you ; but I wish that you had waited to see what arrangement would be made in consequence of his retirement from office before you had pronounced upon the character of the government, as this arrangement might have conciliated your future confidence.

However, I have considered it my duty to lay your resignation before the King, who has desired me to express his concern that he should lose your services ; and I beg leave to add the expression of mine that these unfortunate circumstances should have deprived me of your assistance.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 904. ]

*To the Marquess of Anglesey.*

MY DEAR LORD ANGLESEY,

London, 26th May, 1828.

You will probably have heard of the difficulties in which the government has been placed in the course of the last week by a step taken on Tuesday last by Mr. Huskisson. But I will send you all the correspondence, which will enable you to form your own judgment on a case which has ended by depriving the government of Mr. Huskisson's assistance.

Mr. Lamb has, in consequence, sent me his resignation of his office. and I will immediately write you respecting his

successor. I shall consider it my duty to propose to you a gentleman who will entertain the same general opinions as Mr. Lamb on questions of Irish policy.

Ever, my dear Lord Anglesey, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Earl of Dudley.*

[ 905. ]

MY DEAR LORD DUDLEY,

London, 26th May, 1828.

I did not tell you, in my note of yesterday afternoon, what the arrangement was which I had received his Majesty's pleasure to carry into execution in consequence of the unfortunate occurrences of last week. Sir George Murray is to be the Secretary of State ; who is, I believe, as able and respectable a man as can be found in Parliament ; and I propose that all the other arrangements shall be of the same character, and calculated to keep the government together on its present basis.

I can easily conceive that you will regret the loss of the assistance of such a man as Huskisson. But as the character of the government will not be altered and its measures will be the same, I hope that you will not have any public ground to lament his loss.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Lord Francis Leveson Gower to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Colonial Office, 27th May, 1828.

I take the earliest opportunity of communicating to you the circumstances of the position in which I find myself in consequence of the late occurrences. I am sure you will appreciate the difficulties of them. I have thought it my duty in this case to consult with no one but my father, and I have spoken and written very unreservedly to him alone on the subject. The upshot of my own conclusion on the subject has been my wish and readiness to give your government any assistance in my power, as long as my judgment on the changes which it is to undergo, and its subsequent measures, authorise me to do so. This confidence in yourself is what it always has been. I freely own that I can hardly expect that my father's views will entirely coincide with my own, but I have managed the discussion with him so as to prevent, I trust, all haste or irritation on his part. While, therefore, I ask of yourself further time for



consideration you will understand that I ask it with reference to his views alone, and that if I hold office on a frail tenure I stand acquitted of any readiness to join in anything like a strike, or to act upon anything but my own judgment, subject to that of my father, on whom I am dependent for the means of making myself useful to the country. I feel very confident that the course I have taken is not one which will forfeit your good opinion.

Believe me, my dear Duke, very faithfully yours,

F. LEVESON GOWER.

[ 906. ]

*To Lord Francis Leveson Gower.*

MY DEAR LORD FRANCIS,

London, 27th May, 1828.

I have received your letter; and I must confess that the misfortunes of last week would be much aggravated if they were to be attended by the loss of your assistance. I cannot desire you to do otherwise than you have done, nor to say more to me at present than you have written; but I hope that before many days more elapse you and Lord Stafford will be convinced that it is not my intention to alter the principles or the character of the government.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 907. ]

*To the King.*

London, 27th May, 1828.

I found upon my return from your Majesty the enclosed letter from Mr. Grant, and I have since received the enclosed from Lord Dudley.

I likewise enclose to your Majesty the copy of the letter which I wrote to Lord Dudley yesterday. I saw him afterwards; and had no reason to believe from anything that passed that he had any feeling respecting Mr. Huskisson. I sincerely regret his resignation, on account of the annoyance it will be to your Majesty; but these transactions, in which nobody has breathed a complaint of me, have shown that these gentlemen had never amalgamated with your Majesty's other servants, but had continued as a party in your Majesty's government.

Which is submitted for your Majesty's pleasure by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

*The Earl of Dudley to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Arlington Street,  
27th May, 1828, 3 o'clock p.m.

The misunderstanding betwixt your Grace and Mr. Huskisson has occasioned to his Majesty the loss of that gentleman's services.

I do not mean to pronounce any judgment upon the circumstances that led to that unfortunate event ; but the result of it has been to produce such a change in the composition of the government as appears to me to require that I should retire from the situation which I at present hold.\*

It therefore only remains for me to request that your Grace will have the goodness to tender my resignation to his Majesty, to whom I should wish at the same time to convey the expression of my profound respect, gratitude and regret.

I also beg your Grace to accept my sincere thanks for the kindness, cordiality, and fairness that have made the official relations in which I have had the honour to stand towards you so satisfactory and so agreeable.

I am, my dear Duke of Wellington,

Most sincerely and faithfully yours,

DUDLEY.

*The Right Hon. Charles Grant to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD, Somerset Place, 27th May, 1828.

I have been prevented, by a severe domestic affliction, from bearing any part in the discussions which have occupied the members of the Cabinet during the last week, and which, as I learn with deep regret, have terminated in the loss to the government of the services of Mr. Huskisson and Lord Palmerston. This event makes so material a change in the Cabinet as necessarily to lead me to consider what course I ought to adopt on the occasion ; and, after much and anxious reflection, it appears to me that, under the circumstances which have taken place, I cannot consistently retain the situation which I have the honour to hold in his Majesty's counsels.

I feel, therefore, that I have no alternative but to resign my present offices into your Grace's hands.†

I cannot conclude without expressing my respect for your Grace, and my sense of your personal attentions to me during the period of our official connection.

I have the honour to be, my dear Lord,

Your Grace's faithfully,

CHARLES GRANT.

\* Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

† Mr. Grant was then President of the Board of Trade.

[ 908. ]

*To the Earl of Dudley.*

MY DEAR LORD DUDLEY, London, 28th May, 1828.

I laid your letter of yesterday before the King, who expressed great concern at the loss of your services. The King will receive the Seals from you at two o'clock on Friday.

I cannot convey this information to you without expressing my concern and regret at the loss of your assistance in the King's service; which I had hoped would not be the consequence of our recent difficulties and discussions.

Ever, my dear Lord Dudley, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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[ 909. ]

*To the Right Hon. Charles Grant.*

MY DEAR MR. GRANT, London, 28th May, 1828.

I laid your letter of yesterday before the King, who expressed great concern at the loss of your services.

Allow me likewise to take this opportunity of expressing my regret at the loss of your assistance in his Majesty's service.

Believe me ever yours most faithfully,

WELLINGTON.

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[ 910. ]

*To the Right Hon. William Huskisson.*

MY DEAR HUSKISSON, London, 28th May, 1828.

The King has desired me to inform you that his Majesty will receive the Seals from you on Friday at two o'clock.

Allow me to express once more the regret with which I make the communication.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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*Lord Francis Leveson Gower to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Leham, 28th May, 1828.

In order to prevent all possibility of inconvenience to yourself I write to say that although I have received no answer from my father to a letter in which I stated to him the substance of our last conversation, I am so confident that no change will take place in his views, or in my situation, that I must request you to consider my resignation as final. I take the

opportunity of Planta's going up to town to forward this. I think it not unlikely that on Friday I shall find an opportunity of explaining in the House of Commons, at least what are not the grounds of my resignation. Till then I suppose the Whigs will reckon upon me as a partisan.

Believe me, my dear Duke, yours most faithfully,  
F. LEVESON GOWER.

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*Lord Francis Leveson Gower to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, 28th May, 1828.

I must inform you with the deepest regret that the result of my communication with my father leaves me no alternative but that of resigning my situation as Colonial Under-Secretary. I shall not attempt to express to you what my feelings are at leaving you at such a moment. I can only repeat my assurance that I have acted with no man, and that the circumstance of my being compelled to take the same line as many others whom I respect, which in most cases would be a consolation and support, in this unfortunate instance doubles my affliction. I have still the hope that it will not be aggravated by the loss or diminution of your regard.

Believe me, my dear Duke, yours most faithfully,  
F. LEVESON GOWER.

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*The Right Hon. J. C. Herries to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE, Great George Street, 28th May, 1828.

After having reflected upon the plan which you showed me this morning for the reconstruction of the government, and bearing in mind all the circumstances under which you have been called upon at this time to make a new arrangement of it, I feel that I should not be doing justice to the interest which I take in the stability and success of your administration, nor to my feelings of a more personal nature, if I were not to draw your attention to my particular situation.

The office which I now fill is a mere sinecure, and connected as it is with a seat in the Cabinet, is such as might be held by any person who, by high rank or influential connections, though unqualified by official ability or experience, might add to the strength of your government.

My only means, if I have any, of being in any degree useful to you in the public service must consist in the efficient discharge of some public duties; and I confess that I feel myself out of my proper position so long as I occupy an office suited to the station and influence which I do not possess, and unsuited to the exercise of any little ability which I may have acquired by the previous occupations of my official life.

When my present office was conferred upon me, there were circumstances of a peculiar nature which precluded me from putting forward these considerations; but I feel it to be right, now that you are about making a new distribution of the offices at your disposal, to put you in possession of my sentiments on the subject, and candidly to state that it would have

given me more satisfaction if I had found that it would have accorded with your arrangements to place me in a situation of more labour and responsibility than that which I now hold.\*

Having thus frankly expressed my sentiments on this subject, it only remains for me to assure your Grace that whatever may be your ultimate arrangements, and in whatever situation I may be placed, I shall use my best endeavours to justify the confidence reposed in me; and to prove how much I value the honour and advantage of being connected with an administration of which you are at the head.

Believe me, my dear Lord Duke, yours most faithfully,

J. C. HERRIES.

[ 911. ]

*To the Right Hon. J. C. Herries.*

MY DEAR MR. HERRIES,

London, 29th May, 1828.

I was not able to answer your letter yesterday or this day, and I now steal a moment from my rest to reply to you.

Particular circumstances placed you in the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer, for which you are highly qualified; and another train of circumstances rendered it necessary to remove you from it. You are now in the Cabinet; but holding an office which has not much business connected with the government; and for that very reason your being in the Cabinet is the more honourable to your character. You are likewise in a situation in which, having not much business to transact in your own immediate office, you can materially assist the government on a variety of subjects with which you are well acquainted, into which they must make inquiries. This you could not do if employed in an office of which the business might be sufficient to employ all your time.

I entreat you then to be satisfied, and have patience; and be assured that you must rise eventually to offices of more business, though not of more importance or more honourable to your character than that which you now hold.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 912. ]

*To the Marquess of Anglesey.*

MY DEAR LORD ANGLESEY,

London, 29th May, 1828.

The removal of Sir George Murray to fill the office of Secretary of State for the Colonial Department, renders it

\* Duchy of Lancashire.

necessary to consider of an officer to succeed him in the command of the troops in Ireland.

I was in the office of Commander-in-Chief when this subject was under consideration in December last; and Lord Goderich and Lord Lansdowne, with whom I had a conference respecting the selection of an officer to command the troops in Ireland, both told me that the General officer preferred by you was Sir John Byng.

I have not scrupled therefore to tell Lord Hill that he may be appointed.

Ever, my dear Lord Anglesey, yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

*To the Marquess of Londonderry.*

[ 913. ]

MY DEAR CHARLES,

London, 29th May, 1828.

You will have heard of the difficulties in which the government has lately been placed, and of their result; and the consequent changes which we shall have to make.

These afford an opportunity of promoting Hardinge; and I wish to offer him the office of Secretary-at-War. Let me hear from you on this point as soon as you can.

Ever yours most affectionately,

WELLINGTON.

*George Bankes, Esq., M.P., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

16, George Street, Hanover Square, 29th May, 1828.

With reference to the kind proposition which I had the honour of receiving this day from your Grace\* of naming me to his Majesty as Secretary to the Board of Control, I beg to express my readiness to accept that office; and I desire at the same time to convey my earnest wish that it may be in my power to prove in any degree the feelings of sincere respect and grateful attachment which I entertain towards your Grace.

I have the honour to be your Grace's most faithful  
and obliged and very humble servant,

GEORGE BANKES.

\* The Duke's letter to Mr. Bankes has not been found among the Records at Apsley House.

*The Right Hon. R. W. Horton to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD,

Richmond Terrace, 29th May, 1828.

I had only time yesterday to send an acknowledgment of the receipt of your Grace's note which I found on my return home. I should otherwise have taken the liberty of availing myself of that opportunity of making a short explanation. I am not bound to any party, still less to any person; but I am bound by my own opinions expressed and implied since the period of the commencement of Mr. Canning's government; and in relation to those opinions, and to present circumstances, I am convinced that I could not in honour or consistency accept office were the alternative presented to me.

I have thought it due to your Grace to apprise you of my feelings prior to any interview, should you desire to see me; as I should regret being subjected to the necessity of refusing any specific proposition which it might have been your Grace's obliging intention to make to me.

I have the honour to remain, your faithful and obedient servant,

R. W. HORTON.

914.]

*To the Right Hon. R. Wilmot Horton.*

MY DEAR SIR,

London, 29th May, 1828.

When I asked you to do me the favour of calling upon me, it was with the intention of informing you that the King was anxious to see you in his service, and to propose to you to take office.

I am very much concerned that I had not the pleasure of seeing you; as I think I could have convinced you that the difficulties which have lately occurred were not to be attributed to me. I should not have thought of proposing office to you, if I entertained any intention of making any alteration in respect to the conduct or principles of the government.

Ever, my dear Sir, yours most faithfully,

WELLINGTON.

*The Right Hon. R. W. Horton to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD,

Richmond Terrace, 29th May, 1828, p.m.

I cannot refrain from expressing my thanks for the very obliging answer which I have received from your Grace.

The resolution which I have painfully, though at the same time deliberately and dispassionately adopted, rests on my opinion of the paramount necessity that the construction of a government should in itself furnish a

guarantee for the maintenance of those principles by which it professes its conduct to be regulated; and secondly (which is a question exclusively personal to myself), on my conviction of the utter uselessness of public services, unless the course which a public man takes is beyond suspicion.

I beg, therefore, to assure you that no explanation under the precise circumstances of the present period, nor even the high respect and esteem which I bear towards your Grace, could have induced me to change that resolution.

I have the honour to remain, your faithful and obedient servant,

R. W. HORTON.

*The Right Hon. T. Frankland Lewis to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

14, Whitehall Place, 29th May, 1828.

I have given to the proposal, which your Grace has been kind enough to honour me with, the most anxious and earnest consideration; and though I feel sensibly that the measures pursued by the government of which your Grace is at the head, have been such as would under any circumstances have entitled it to my cordial support, I am, nevertheless, fully aware that by undertaking to discharge the arduous duties which devolve upon the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, I should be placed in a situation of so much embarrassment in consequence of the withdrawal of so many persons with whom I have been to a certain degree politically connected, that I feel it incumbent upon me to decline the offer, which, as coming from your Grace, I shall always esteem the highest honour which could befall me.

I have waited until the last in the earnest hope that I might be able to make up my mind to continue to hold office, if your Grace should desire me to do so; but feeling that I cannot come to that conclusion without exposing myself to the chance of having motives imputed to me which I should be unwilling to labour under, I feel constrained to withdraw from a service in the duties of which I had much pride and pleasure.

I do not know in what precise form I ought to tender the resignation of the office which I have now the honour to hold;\* but I trust your Grace will do me favour of laying it before his Majesty, with the humble assurance of my most earnest regrets that I can no longer hold it with advantage to the public service.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke,  
your most faithful and obliged servant,

T. FRANKLAND LEWIS.

\* Mr. Lewis was Vice-President of the Board of Trade.



[ 915. ]

*To the Marquess of Anglesey.*

MY DEAR LORD ANGLESEY,

London, 30th May, 1828.

I now enclose you the correspondence with Mr. Huskisson to which I referred two or three days ago.

I do not ask you to give any opinion upon it. I send it only for your information.

My last letter to Huskisson of the 26th explains the situation in which I was placed from the commencement of this discussion.

I have only to say in addition thereto that since the administration was formed I had done everything in my power to keep it together; and all will acknowledge that I had done so successfully notwithstanding the occurrence of some little accidents occasioned not by me but by others. But in this case Huskisson, I am certain without intending it, put me in a situation in which I could take but one line, without disgracing myself and losing all. On the other hand, he felt that he could not do that, which it was necessary he should do, to extricate us all from our difficulties.

Thus the case unfortunately stood when I was obliged to act.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Marquess of Anglesey to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Phoenix Park, 31st May, 1828.

I have received the information conveyed in your letter of the 26th with feelings of deep regret.

I am sorry, indeed, that you lose the services of Mr. Huskisson. He is a most able statesman.

Lamb's retirement will be much felt here, and particularly by me, for our views of Irish policy are precisely similar. I see, too, all the members of your Cabinet, with whom I lately acted very cordially, quitting their posts.

These things, you will admit, must be perplexing to me, as I have no doubt they are to you. The assurance, however, you give me, that the views of the gentleman you may propose to me as Chief Secretary will correspond with those taken by Lamb, is very satisfactory. It is all you can say upon that point; and I am bound to conclude that no change of policy in regard to Ireland is intended.

I have no desire to put forward my opinions upon the subject. All I shall have to consider, when your arrangements are completed, is, whether they are such as will enable me with consistency, and without deviating from the line of conduct I have prescribed for myself, and with which you are acquainted, to carry cordially into effect the measures of your government.

Pray let me hear from you soon. I have not yet received the correspondence you promised to send me.

Ever, my dear Duke of Wellington, very sincerely yours,

ANGLESEY.

I cannot help adding that I think you have a very superior man in Sir George Murray. I wish he had fallen to my lot here.

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*The Right Hon. Sir Frederick Lamb to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Lisbon, 28th May, 1828.

Now, my dear Duke, enough of this case is before you for you to judge between our respective views. Had the government recalled me when I expected it—had it stood fairly by its own demand of a change of ministers—(a demand fully justified by the necessity of the case, and only liable to attack for its inadequacy) it is my firm belief that none of the subsequent acts would have taken place. My government showed weakness, and these people took courage—here is the whole history of the case.

You will see, by a few private lines to Dudley, that this government is doing everything to excite a guerilla war in the provinces. The plan is to arm the Royalist population against the army. This is Spanish—if it succeeds in Portugal it cannot be confined to Portugal. Do not therefore mistake—the question now is whether you can be indifferent enough to the fate of this country to run the chance of its becoming a dependency of Spain. If you can you may remain quiet, though not with much credit. If you cannot you had best form your choice now, if a choice be still left to you. The first step draws on the others, and the option may already, while I am writing, have passed from your hands. You must not in any case suppose that aid in some shape from Spain will be withheld; and should the parties be at all equally balanced, this aid will secure the triumph of Miguel, unless counter-balanced by England. His triumph is the subjection of this country to Spain.

Should you foresee the necessity of interfering under any circumstances by force, the question will be as to the time. At this moment the smallest force would suffice, and probably deter Spain from taking part—I mean if it were actually here. The necessity for a larger amount, if any be ultimately wanting, will increase with delay. You have therefore to strike a balance.

Good bye, my dear Duke. I write at the last moment, and without even keeping a copy; but I of course reckon upon your showing this to Dudley, or anybody else you please. I am aware that I have been too fatally right about all these affairs ever to be forgiven; but I count equally upon the continuance of that long friendship and kindness from you which is one of the circumstances of my life to which I attach the most value.

As to the political measures which have brought on these events, and kept me here to be a witness of them, my opinion has been repeatedly expressed.

Most truly yours,

F. LAMB.

Any naval force you can dispose of should be sent instantly, though it will probably arrive too late for any use.

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[ 916.]

*To Lady ———.*

MY DEAR LADY ———,

London, 24th May, 1828.

I have received your letter of the 22nd instant.

I assure you that it is impossible to adopt the arrangement suggested by you, that is, to give Lieutenant-Colonel Macdonald a commission of plenipotentiary from his Majesty, on the score of such grant being a reward for the services of Lieutenant-Colonel Macdonald, or any ground excepting that of the expediency of renewing the diplomatic relations between his Majesty and the King of Persia.

This is a subject which I cannot discuss with you ; and I will, therefore, close this by assuring you of the respect which I feel for Lieutenant-Colonel Macdonald and his talents and services.

I hope that you are quite well.

Believe me, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

*Major-General Micauley to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Dover, 31st May, 1828.

I took the liberty of addressing your Grace from Clifton. Ill health again forces me abroad, to the springs beyond Pau, midst the Pyrenees, and then to Italy to winter in Rome.

A strong united administration has now been formed, which, with the King's support, nothing can shake. Would God that advantage were seasonably taken of it to settle that question that unsettles every other. I well remember your Grace saying at Verona, that were a satisfactory concordat established between our government and the Pope, you yourself would go down to the House of Peers and move Catholic emancipation. If that was your view of the question then, how much more imperionally ought it not to guide you now? The minister that happily concludes that most vital matter will be hailed by an admiring world by a name

“ Which every wind to Heaven will bear ;  
Which men to tell, and angels joy to hear.”

To all your other universally admitted claims upon the gratitude of your country, and of the truly wise and good of all countries, may this, the highest of all, be added.

I remain, my dear Duke, your faithful and obliged,

C. MACAULEY.

*Lord Granville to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Paris, 2nd June, 1828.

I have written to Lord Aberdeen to apprise him in a private letter of my intention, as soon as I receive the official notification of his appointment to the Foreign Office, to address to him an official application for my recall from Paris. Connected as I was with Mr. Canning by ties of private friendship, as well as politically attached to him during the course of a long life, I have felt that I should have appeared to have been wanting in what was due to his memory, and have suffered in public character, if, at a moment when all the political friends of Mr. Canning ceased to belong to the King's government, I had retained the important and confidential situation, to which, by his advice, I had been appointed by his Majesty.

You have probably anticipated my intention, and I am sure will not attribute it to any motive inconsistent with my feelings of sincere personal regard for you from whom I have received many marks of the most friendly disposition towards me.

I have thought it my duty, considering the personal kindness and gracious condescension with which the King has always treated me, to address to his Majesty a letter explaining my intention. I think it, however, right to send to you a copy of it, and to request you to have the goodness, if you see nothing objectionable in the letter, to transmit it to his Majesty.

I am, my dear Duke, with great regard, yours sincerely,

GRANVILLE.

*The Right Hon. Sir Frederick Lamb to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Lisbon, 2nd June, 1828.

The difference of principle between us is not great after all.

I have never looked upon the enforcing the Protocols as obligatory upon us.

I have therefore never sought in them for our conduct.

I have expected that to be decided by our interest, and have only held that whatever the decision might be, there was enough in the Protocols to ground it upon and justify it by.

What I have wanted is a clear and consistent line. Was it to be non-interference? In that case your ambassador and your naval force were to be taken away as soon as Miguel entered upon a course which you could not support.

The penalty of doing this was that this country should become a dependency of Spain.

That which you throw down you cannot prevent another from picking up.

This, however, was to enter into the balance of interests to be struck at home.

I have been ready to forward your views whatever they might be, but have never been able to make out what they were.

There were two courses here—either to stop Don Miguel, or to leave him to himself.

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We have done neither, and therefore have the inconveniences of both—remaining at the mercy of events which we do not direct.

Any system may succeed that is taken in toto and followed consistently and perseveringly out. None can, that is adopted by halves, and eked out with bits of an opposite one.

Our non-interference here has never been other than a deception.

At this moment I save the principal opponents of Miguel from his clutches. Can there be a more positive interference? Yet how can it be otherwise if I am here with a frigate? Can I let Villa Real who went to Vienna at our bidding be arrested for the consequences of that step?

Two of Dudley's despatches authorise me to secure a retreat to those Portuguese who may claim our protection. This is right—but see how fallacious in its effect. I refuse to pass them to Oporto, but offer to convey them to England, from whence they may go to Oporto. The difference is about a fortnight.

The truth is that non-interference in its absolute sense, if ever applicable (which you know I doubt) is only so before an affair has begun: when once it is in progress non-interference is the conduct of a surgeon who suspends his help when the limb is off, leaving the arteries bleeding. In him it is neither wise for his own credit and interests, nor humane for the patient; nor do I believe it to be so in us. But this is by the bye.

I am sensible how much difficulty there was in applying our interference in this case, and how many objections to it.

My only quarrel with my government is for not having known its own mind, and made its non-interference (if non-interference it was to be) a real instead of a mock one. You may make it real yet, but under two penalties. The first, in case of a long struggle or of Miguel's success, is the leaving this country dependent upon Spain. The second, in case of the success of the Pedroites, is the seeing it torn by internal dissensions, filled with fantastic schemes, and ultimately some other foreign influence than your own established in it—probably that of France.

If you can run these chances you may stand aloof.

If you can not, you must interfere; and should such be your determination let it be done openly, avowedly, and to a good end, and it may rapidly lead this country to a state in which it will no longer want your interference. On the other hand, I know it *may* totally fail of producing any good result, but this is hardly possible, and in the underhand incomplete way in which it has been hitherto applied it *must* fail—here is the difference.

Let the decision be taken (if you so please) without a reference to Portugal or to any set of people in it—without a reference, if you will, to our past conduct towards it or connection with it. Let it be taken exclusively upon English interests; but let it be taken decisively, permanently, and as involving a long course of conduct to come.

If this is done, and done wisely, it will bear you through; but the middle shifting course of palliatives administered under false pretences will leave you ten years hence in the same embarrassments as you stand in at this moment after ten years of such conduct gone by.

Upon the claims of individuals upon us for protection, I must say a word to Dudley, and therefore refer you to him upon it, if you think it worth

while to look at it. I have no wish to occupy your time, except with the great leading practical points of policy between the two countries.

I was very glad to get your letter, for I feared from a former one of yours that you were out of humour with me. I see you are not and am content.

Believe me, my dear Duke, most faithfully yours,

FREDERICK LAMB.

P.S.—There is more given by us in the Protocols than you allow. We give therein a pledge to obtain the abdication, and have fulfilled it. We give our consent to his coming, without which he could never have come at all; the party which now in its depressed state can probably turn him out, could much more easily have kept him out, and would for a word from us. But if public right was opposed to this, at least we gave him the unity of opinion of his subjects, and the united support of the whole Portuguese nation. These were not trifling gifts had they not been thrown to swine.

F. L.

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*To the King.*

[ 917. ]

London, 5th June, 1828.

I was in hopes that I should not have had to send your Majesty the enclosed, which I have received this afternoon. ]

It may be advisable not to mention this resignation; nor to make any arrangement to fill it till your Majesty will come to town.

Which is submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*Lord Granville to the King.*

Paris, 2nd June, 1828.

Lord Granville presents his humble duty to your Majesty; he is emboldened, by the gracious condescension with which your Majesty has always treated him, to express his earnest hope that his intention to apply to Lord Aberdeen to lay him at your Majesty's feet, and ask your Majesty's permission to send him his letters of recall, will not be considered by your Majesty as inconsistent with a deep and grateful sense of your Majesty's invariable kindness, or with that devoted attachment which he feels to your Majesty's person. Lord Granville feels that if he had taken a line different from that adopted by all the political friends of a person, now no more, with whom he was connected not only politically, but by ties of private friendship and affection, his public character would have suffered, and he would no longer have been a proper representative of your Majesty, or entitled to that consideration which is essential for the due fulfilment of the duties of that important situation.

*Dean Phillpotts to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Stanhope, Durham, 5th June, 1828.

I presume to obtrude on your Grace one very brief, but, I humbly submit, conclusive reason against a concordat. I send it now, thinking it just possible that such a measure may be suggested, perhaps urged, in the debate on Monday next, for it is well known to be favoured by several noble lords. Lords Dudley and Goderich have both, in conversation with me, pressed the necessity or high expediency of a concordat. To them and others I have answered that the measure appeared to me useless, because this country could obtain for itself by direct legislation all that Rome *could* give, and more than it probably *would* give; but I have not stated the argument which has been given in the enclosed, or in the former paper, to any person whatsoever.

It would ill become me, and it is very far from my purpose, to presume to offer advice to such a mind as that of your Grace. But I venture to state that I am sure (on no light grounds) that it would give very great gratification to no small nor inconsiderable portion of the friends of your Grace's government, and would perhaps facilitate their favourable reception of any future plan for the extinction of this lamentable source of perennial dispute, if your Grace should think fit to avail yourself of the opportunity afforded by the approaching debate to say, that no mode of accomplishing the object could ever appear to you worthy of being entertained by the British Parliament, which did not proceed on the principle of giving real, effective, and adequate security to the Protestant Established Church; that unless that point could be provided for, Parliament would forget its first duty to this Protestant nation, and to the Protestant Established Church and the lawful rights of its ministers. If such security can be devised (and it must be the ardent wish of every friend of his country to see them devised), the case will be different. But, meanwhile, it tends to mischief to pledge the House by any vague resolution like which is now proposed.

I am, my Lord Duke, with the greatest respect,  
your Grace's most obliged and most humble servant,

HENRY PHILLPOTTS.

[ENCLOSURE.]

CONCORDATS.

In the former paper it has been attempted to show that it is highly inexpedient for this Protestant country to enter into any treaty with Rome, or to alarm the people unnecessarily with any proposition to repeal the laws which prohibit communication with the Papal See.

Further consideration has much strengthened this conclusion, and has furnished an argument, which, obvious as it is, appears to have been overlooked by all the friends of a concordat, but which seems to be absolutely irresistible.

*A concordat is utterly inconsistent with the OATH OF SUPREMACY.*

Every person who takes that oath thereby "declares that no foreign prince,

person, prelate, State, nor potentate *hath, or ought to have*, any jurisdiction, power, pre-eminence, or authority, ecclesiastical or spiritual, within this realm." But a concordat, in its very nature, is an *express admission* (it is built on it as its foundation) *that the Pope has* such jurisdiction, power, &c., within this realm. Why, else, is application made to him?

If it be said that the Oath of Supremacy may be repealed—the answer is plain, that the proposal of such a repeal would excite an alarm and clamour which it would be very difficult to silence, and not very easy to prove unreasonable. It would add most largely to the other obstacles attending a sober and dispassionate consideration of this great question.

*To Lord Granville.*

[ 918. ]

MY DEAR LORD GRANVILLE, London, 6th June, 1828.

I have received your letter; and I have transmitted to the King, who is at Windsor, that which you had addressed to his Majesty. I have not yet received his Majesty's answer. But I am convinced that he will feel the same concern that I do that his Majesty should be deprived of your valuable services at Paris.

Believe me, my dear Lord Granville,  
ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

*To the Marquess of Anglesey.*

[ 919. ]

MY DEAR LORD ANGLESEY, London, 11th June, 1828.

I have this day seen the King, and have received his permission to write to you to propose Lord Francis Leveson Gower to be Secretary to the government in Ireland.\*

I beg you to let me know as soon as you can whether this appointment will be agreeable to you.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

\* Upon Mr. Huskisson's resignation of the Seals of the Colonial Department, Lord Francis Leveson Gower had resigned the office of Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, and the Right Hon. William Lamb that of Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant.



20.]

*To the King.*

London, 13th June, 1828.

Since I saw your Majesty I have spoken to Mr. Calcraft ; who has accepted the office of Paymaster of your Majesty's forces.

I have reason to believe that Lord Francis Leveson Gower will accept the office of Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland ; of which I will make him the offer as soon as I shall receive the answer of the Lord-Lieutenant to the letter which I wrote to him on Wednesday, after I had spoken to your Majesty on this subject.

All of which is submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

*Lord Cowley to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR ARTHUR,

Vienna, 13th June, 1828.

You will easily conceive that Prince Metternich is delighted at the late changes in England, and particularly so at the appointment of Lord Aberdeen to the Foreign Office. If you mean, however, to keep him steadily with us upon the Greek and Turkish questions, you must be very communicative to him both in London, through Esterhazy, and through the diplomatic agent here, let him be who he may. I am sorry to say that Tatistcheff has great influence over him, and, I believe, was principally instrumental to the appointment of the Prince of Hesse Hombourg to proceed to the Russian head-quarters. He thinks that Tatistcheff is devoted to him.

Believe me ever, my dear Arthur, most affectionately yours,

COWLEY.

*Dean Phillpotts to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Stanhope, Durham, 14th June, 1828.

Even at the hazard of appearing presumptuous I must gratify myself by expressing, what I most sincerely and strongly feel, the highest delight at reading your Grace's speech on Tuesday last. It is impossible that such a speech should not largely contribute to prepare the minds of all parties for a fair settlement of the great question to which you then addressed yourself, and for confiding in your Grace's most wise and most constitutional intentions in respect to that settlement.

Having taken this great liberty of adding my humble suffrage to those applauses which must have from so many higher quarters reached your ear, I venture on making one or two very slight remarks on points,

where, probably from the error of the reporters, there appears to have been a slight inaccuracy. Your Grace will, I fervently hope, ascribe my presumption to its real cause,—an earnest wish that all the facts of the case should be present to your powerful mind when you decide on the course you shall eventually pursue.

Your Grace is represented to have said, that “the fact was plain, from the circumstance of concordats being granted, that the sovereigns of other countries found themselves unable to govern their Roman Catholic subjects without the intervention of the Pope. *The Emperor of Russia, notwithstanding his power, was compelled to call in the assistance of the Pope, by means of a concordat, to govern his Roman Catholic subjects.*”

Forgive me if I say that I apprehend the fact to be directly contrary, that the Emperor of Russia has *no concordat* with the Pope, and that he governs his Roman Catholic subjects not only without the assistance, but *in spite* of the Pope.

The conclusion which is, I think, to be drawn from this fact is, that every other government, if it is as strong and firm as that of Russia is, and as, I venture to submit, that of England in such a case ought to be, may govern its Roman Catholic subjects with equal disregard of the power or wishes of the Pope.

I am pretty confident that your Grace would, on inquiry, find the case of Russia to be nearly as follows :—

The Empress Catharine wished to make a certain Roman Catholic Bishop of Mallo (*in partibus*) Archbishop of Mohilow. This person had permitted the Jesuits of White Russia (after the suppression of their order) to take novices, in conformity, as he said, with the intentions of Clement XIV. and Pius VI. The ministers of France and Spain required of the Pope that he should be enjoined to make a recantation. Pius, in great distress, told the Empress that he could not reward a prelate who had dared to put a false construction on one of his briefs, and to attack the Bull of suppression of the Jesuits. Catharine was firm. She said, that “*She had availed herself of her right, in conferring upon the Bishop of Mallo the archbishopric of Mohilow;*” and as the Pope delayed sending to him the pall, she, of her own mere will and power, entitled the Bishop of Mallo Archbishop of Mohilow OF THE ROMAN CHURCH. Pius yielded; and Catharine thanked him for the good grace with which “he had been pleased to bestow the pall on a man whom she had made archbishop.”

From that time it will be found, if I mistake not, that the claim of *right* on the part of the Emperor is regularly acted upon. He *nominates* the person to be elected bishop; the Catholic Consistory in Poland *elects*, and the Pope *prudently confirms* the election. But the whole is done without a concordat.

I believe I am right in adding, that *by the new constitution of Poland the right* of naming the archbishops and bishops of the different religious communions is reserved to the *Crown*. I will venture to trouble your Grace with the enclosed copy of a Ukase of 14th March, 1827, which confirms the view here taken, and shows the independent course followed by the Court of St. Petersburg.

Now, I repeat that the fair conclusion from this state of things in Russia is, that any government which is strong and firm, may set the Pope at

defiance in governing its Roman Catholic subjects. It would, of course, demand the exercise of much prudence, as well as vigour; but no concordat is necessary.

Happily, in England and in Ireland the due control can be obtained without going to the lengths on which the Empress Catharine ventured, I mean without a forcible interference in the election of Romish bishops.

The other point on which I would presume to remark relates to the Oath of Supremacy. Your Grace is represented to have said that, *by that oath*, the Church of England acknowledges the King's supremacy. Now, I apprehend that your Grace will find that the *King's supremacy* is no longer affirmed by that oath, which, in truth, simply *denies the authority of any other power*, ecclesiastical or spiritual, within this realm. An alteration to this effect was made in the oath at the Revolution; and *the assertion of the King's supremacy* is no longer required as a qualification for any office, or for a seat in Parliament. The Church, indeed, admits the King's supremacy, but this is by its 37th Article (not by any oath), and therefore it affects not the laity, who are only called upon to *deny the spiritual jurisdiction of any foreigner*. This alteration was made in accommodation to the scruples of certain Protestant dissenters.

By venturing to write thus to your Grace I prove my confidence in your candour as well as patience.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke, with the greatest respect,  
your Grace's most obliged and most humble servant,

HENRY PHILLPOTTS.

P.S.—It is perhaps worth adding, that it was on occasion of the Bishop of Mallo's being made Archbishop of Mohilow, that the words *Hæreticos persequar et impugnabo* were first expunged from the oath taken by the Roman Catholic bishops to the Pope, in Ireland as well as in Russia. Archetti, the Nuncio, being questioned relative to the kind of oath the Archbishop was to take, answered that *he must swear not to tolerate heretics and schismatics*: that this was part of the Nuncio's instructions, *from which he could not depart*. In reply, he was bluntly told that those instructions betrayed a want of sense and of reflection; that it was ridiculous to impose on a subject the obligation of persecuting those who lived under the same sovereign as himself.

At length everything was arranged; the Nuncio was authorised to *pass over in silence* the oath thus amended. Archetti extolled the Bishop of Mallo to the skies, in spite of his personal character and of his insult to the Bull of the Pope, and consecrated him, as well as his Coadjutor Benilawski, an ex-Jesuit, whom also Catharine appointed.

It is not the least remarkable part of the story that it was in consequence of Catharine's firmness in respect to the oath, that the omission was most reluctantly made, of which we have heard so much from the Irish bishops in their evidence before the Committees, and from the advocates of "Emanicipation," who all state it as a proof of the moderated tone of feeling at Rome, and of the extinction of all undue hostility towards other Churches.

[ENCLOSURE.]

EXTRAIT DU JOURNAL DE ST.-PÉTERSBOURG, POLITIQUE ET LITTÉRAIRE.  
Mardi, 15 (27) Mars, 1827. No. 32.

“NOUVELLES DE L'INTÉRIEUR, St.-Pétersbourg, 14 Mars.

“Sa Majesté l'Empereur a daigné adresser le 23 Janvier dernier au Sénat-dirigeant, l'Oukase suivant :—

“En témoignage de l'estime que nous faisons des mérites distingués de Gaspard Cieciszewski, Evêque Catholique-Romain de Luck, qui, par ses travaux apostoliques et son zèle pour le trône et l'Église, avait su se concilier la bienveillance de feu notre frère bien-aimé l'Empereur Alexandre I. de glorieuse mémoire, nous élevons ce Prélat à la dignité d'Archevêque Métropolitain des Eglises Catholiques-Romaines en Russie, lui conservant en cette qualité le Siège de Luck; et nous le dispensons en même temps de présider le Collège Ecclésiastique Catholique-Romain, jusqu'à ce que sa santé lui permette de se rendre à St.-Pétersbourg et d'en prendre la direction.”

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*To the Marquess of Anglesey.*

[ 921. ]

MY DEAR LORD ANGLESEY,

15th June, 1828.

I have received your letter of the 13th, which I had hoped would have been different.

In the case of the Chief Secretary to the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, as well as of other public situations, the government is under the necessity of selecting persons to fill them, not only on account of their talents and qualifications, but likewise on account of the estimation in which they are held by the public. There is no doubt of Lord Francis' talents, nor of his temper, manners, and qualities; and he stands higher in the public estimation here than any man who could be found to take the office of Chief Secretary; and his appointment would in various ways strengthen the government, and be of advantage to the King's service.

Under these circumstances, and knowing that he entertains those sentiments respecting Irish questions, which you wished the gentleman should entertain who should be selected to be proposed to you to fill that office, we did not doubt that this proposition would be agreeable to you; and I am very anxious that you should reconsider your objections to Lord Francis.

In the mean time nobody here has been informed that they exist excepting Peel.

From what we hear of the opinion of the world, we have reason to believe that the appointment of Lord Francis will give general satisfaction.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 922. ]

*To J. Wilson Croker, Esq., M.P.*

MY DEAR CROKER,

London, 15th June, 1828.

Peel has stated to me what had passed between you and him ; and I assure you that I regret much that I was so situated at the time that I was informed of your wishes, as to make it impossible for me to gratify them at the moment.

I consulted the Duke of Clarence, however, yesterday morning respecting your being sworn of the Privy Council ; he made no objection whatever, and I subsequently took his Majesty's pleasure upon the subject, who was graciously pleased to direct me to desire you to attend at St. James's to-morrow, at twelve o'clock, when you should be sworn.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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[ 923. ]

*To John Calcraft, Esq., M.P.*

MY DEAR SIR,

London, 15th June, 1828.

I have to inform you that I saw his Majesty yesterday, who approved entirely of what I had said to you ; and that if you will be so kind as to attend at St. James's to-morrow, at twelve, you will be sworn of his Majesty's Privy Council.

Your writ may be moved for to-morrow.

Ever, my dear Sir, yours most faithfully,

WELLINGTON.

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[ 924. ]

*To the King.*

London, 18th June, 1828.

Although I am to have the honour of attending your Majesty to-morrow morning, I will not lose a moment in sending your Majesty the enclosed letter from Lord Anglesey ; in consequence of which I have offered the office to Lord Francis Leveson Gower, which he has accepted ; and a new writ will be moved this day for the county of Sutherland.

Which is submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Marquess of Anglesey.*

[ 925. ]

MY DEAR LORD ANGLESEY,

18th June, 1818.

I have received your letter of the 16th instant, and I have in consequence thereof seen Lord Francis Leveson Gower, who readily accepts the honourable situation offered to him.

Nobody knows, nor shall anybody know from me, that you entertained any doubts upon this subject. I entertain none that he will give you satisfaction; and I hope that if this should turn out to be the case, you will give me that of informing me thereof.

Believe me, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To Viscount Beresford.*

[ 926. ]

MY DEAR BERESFORD,

London, 18th June, 1828.

I think that you do not consider the subject of your correspondence with Portugal in its true light.

You are, Lord Beresford, in a high station in this country; and although not in the Council, enjoying the friendship and intimacy of some if not all of the King's servants. The King's minister in Portugal has complained that your correspondence interferes with the objects of his mission. That the Regent and his ministers do not believe what he says of the opinions of his government, but rather what your correspondents report that you say; and I must add that he states his reasons for making this complaint.

I believe I likewise told you that he some time ago made to myself the same accusation; but I told him that I had no correspondence whatever with Portugal.

Supposing the fact to be true, there is no doubt that the ambassador would have reason to complain; and that the government would be under the necessity of desiring that the correspondence should be discontinued. As the matter stands it appears to me that we could not do otherwise than speak to you, and state to him what we understood to be the result of the conversation with you.

It is very true that it may be a little inconvenience to you not to write about politics to Portugal. But this is one of the small inconveniences attending a man's high station in the

world. Every word he says or writes is of importance, particularly to those living in a country in a state of revolution; and he is necessarily obliged to be cautious both in his speaking and writing. That is all we can ask; and that is certainly necessary; as I can assure you that the ambassador has ground for what he says.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 927. ]

*To the King.*

Royal Lodge, Windsor, 20th June, 1828.

Your Majesty will be glad to see the enclosed letter from Lord Anglesey. He has not quoted the words of my letter accurately.

Mr. Peel has likewise written to me respecting the grant of the Irish peerage to Mr. James Daly.

Before Lord Anglesey went to Ireland Mr. Daly, who, being Member for the county of Galway, had supported your Majesty's government uniformly from the period of the Union, applied to be created a peer; and I requested Lord Anglesey to inquire whether there was a vacancy (respecting which there was some doubt), intending, as soon as this doubt should be removed, to submit this application for your Majesty's pleasure.

Some time has elapsed since this doubt has been removed; but the pressure of other business effaced the affair from my recollection; and I have to excuse myself for having omitted to submit it to your Majesty.

In the mean time the Lord-Lieutenant sent over the official recommendation, of which I was not aware; nor was I that the Secretary of State had sent it to your Majesty before your Majesty had had an opportunity of considering whether such creation should be made.

I will take care that such an event shall not occur again; as I am apprehensive that, without intending it, I alone am to blame; and I now request your Majesty's approbation of this creation; and that I may be permitted to desire that the official letter for your Majesty's signature may be transmitted to your Majesty.

All of which is submitted for your Majesty's pleasure by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

*To the King.*

[ 928. ]

London, 20th June, 1828.

Since my arrival in town I have observed that your Majesty had signed the letter to Lord Anglesey respecting the peerage for Mr. Daly. I propose to keep that document in my possession, however, till I shall learn your Majesty's pleasure upon the subject.

Which is submitted by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.*

[ 929. ]

MY DEAR PEEL,

London, 20th June, 1828.

I received your letter yesterday when we returned from the race-course; and his Majesty having immediately gone out to take his drive, having stayed out till eight o'clock, and having been afterwards occupied by his company till one this morning, I could not speak to him on the subject of Mr. Daly's peerage; and I was under the necessity of returning to town this morning before he was stirring. But I left a letter in which I stated to him the transaction from its commencement; told him that I had intended to lay Mr. Daly's wishes before his Majesty before the official recommendation should be laid before him, but that the pressure of other business had effaced this affair from my memory; and that in the mean time Lord Anglesey had sent over the official recommendation, and that you had laid the signet office paper before him for his signature, concluding that of course I had taken his pleasure, and received his approbation of the creation. That I alone was to blame; and I entreated him to allow this transaction to be completed. I have since observed that he has signed the King's letter; but I will write to him again this night, to beg him to let me know whether he consents, in case he should not answer me before that time.

We must prevail upon Lord Anglesey not to send over these official recommendations till he will be informed from hence that his Majesty has approved.

Believe me, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.



*The Right Hon. J. Wilson Croker to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Admiralty, 21st June, 1828.

Excuse my venturing to press upon your Grace the *vital* importance to the character and interests of England to maintain the rights of *actual blockade*.

The Portuguese case might be a complicated one, *if Sir Frederick Lamb* had resigned his functions, and so ceased to admit the legitimacy of the blockading government; but even then I should be of opinion that a *military blockade de facto* and between two parties, both unrecognised, ought to be respected, and could not be departed from without assuming the character of alliance with one of the belligerents; but, as the case stands, the Portuguese national ship avowing herself to sail under the orders of the recognised government of the *Prince Regent*, I cannot imagine how her rights can be questioned.

The case of Palmella, if fallen in with, may become very serious. Remember our claims to take our subjects out of the American (neutral) ships. Remember also the case of Napper Tandy, and think what we should have done with him or Arthur O'Connor, if we had found them on board a neutral ship endeavouring to make their way into one of the Irish ports during the rebellion. It seems to me essential that we should cheerfully and *de bonne foi* submit to those maritime laws which we have always maintained against others, and which will hereafter be found our own best safeguards and securities.

Excuse my giving your Grace this trouble, and

Believe me to be yours most faithfully,

J. W. CROKER.

I have written *officially* to the Foreign Office for instructions on the papers I left yesterday with your Grace, and Lord Aberdeen will, of course, convey to his Royal Highness the sentiments of the King's government. I need hardly say that the question presses, as our ships seemed inclined to *use force* if necessary.

*The Marquess of Anglesey to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Phoenix Park, 21st June, 1828.

I have received a very satisfactory letter from Lord Francis Leveson Gower. In reply I have not hesitated to state to him the objections I had felt at his appointment. That being young in office myself, I had looked for a practical and experienced man of business to assist me, but that being thus thrown together he may rely upon being received by me with perfect good will and cordiality.

Believe me very sincerely yours,

ANGLESEY.

## MEMORANDUM UPON THE PORTUGUESE CASE.

[ 930. ]

22nd June, 1828.

We have with other Powers recognised the sovereignty of Don Pedro; and we have approved the conduct of our ambassador at Lisbon in suspending the exercise of his functions, in consequence of Don Miguel having called together the ancient Cortes of the kingdom, with a view to consider of his title to the crown; and we had previously ordered him to depart from Lisbon in case Don Miguel should assume the title of King.

It is now supposed that the proceeding contemplated by the ambassadors when they determined to suspend the exercise of their functions will take place in the Cortes; that is, that the right of Don Miguel to the crown will be declared by the three estates of the kingdom (possibly he will be called upon to have himself proclaimed King), but that Don Miguel will take no step; he will not assume the title of King till he will have referred the proceeding to and consulted with his Allies.

His object in this mode of proceeding will be to gain time. He will make use of this time to accustom the people of Portugal by degrees to see their government without any established relation with any of the sovereigns of Europe. Possibly he may expect to be able to induce some Powers to consider his government as a mitigated evil. He must know that there is a large party in Spain in his favour; and he may not unreasonably expect that the apprehensions of the King of Spain of the consequences to himself of the establishment in Portugal of constitutional institutions (which must be the consequence of the sovereignty of Don Pedro), may induce that monarch to consider with favour his usurpation, and if possible to recognise it eventually, and to exert his influence over other Powers to follow his example.

The question is, what ought we to do in this situation of affairs? It is quite obvious that any delay in the assumption of the office of King by Don Miguel will have been occasioned by the wish of Don Miguel to facilitate the exercise of his usurped authority.

Will our view of the case be altered by any reference which can be made to us? Nothing new can be urged upon the subject; and nothing can happen in the time necessary for the reference which can alter our decision. The delay then

can do us no good ; and it will injure the cause which we are under the necessity of promoting to the same degree that it will promote the objects of Don Miguel.

It will besides manifest a certain degree of hesitation in the councils of the government ; and it will prolong the term of the existence of the undefined state of our mission at Lisbon for no purpose.

The argument in favour of delay is that it is possible the example of our ambassador will not be followed by others, if the result of the proposed reference is not waited for. I think the example of our ambassador will be followed by others (I mean Austria and possibly France). The Russian minister has already been withdrawn.

It must likewise be observed that unless we should upon receiving this reference wait for the decision of other Courts, we must be the first to decide ; and we must decide alone and without consultation with others. We must likewise in that case carry into execution our decision alone. Our ambassador must be the first to receive his orders to retire. The other diplomatic agents at Lisbon must, after reference to their several Courts, wait for answers till they should retire. The extremity of the evil would thus necessarily be produced to avoid which we should have been induced to wait for and consider of the reference before we should decide to withdraw our ambassador.

There is, however, one mode of proceeding upon this subject to which I have not adverted, and which ought to be considered in this case. We have recognised Don Pedro's sovereignty in common with other Powers in Europe, and I rather believe that the records of the Foreign Office will show that the general recognition of this sovereignty has been promoted if not occasioned by the exercise of the influence of the government of this country.

Can we hope to establish this sovereignty ? Can Don Pedro establish, or in other words, conquer it for himself or for his daughter ? Can we or ought we to involve this country in hostilities in order to obtain the sovereignty of Portugal for Donna Maria ?

On the other hand, can Portugal remain in a state of *Coventry* in relation to all Europe ? We may prevail upon the King of *Spain* ostensibly to cease his diplomatic relations with Don *Miguel* ; but those of a secret nature must be more frequent

and more intimate ; and these relations will in the end reconcile all Europe to Don Miguel excepting this country.

Under these circumstances ought we not to consult with our Allies respecting the line eventually to be adopted towards Portugal ?

If this is to be done is it necessary to delay the recall of our ambassador till the decision shall have been made and the consultation shall have taken place ? Upon this point it must be observed that months must elapse before the result of such a consultation can be known. In the mean time the state of suspension of diplomatic intercourse would continue at Lisbon with all its inconveniences ; and we might with justice be reproached with connivance at some of the acts of Don Miguel's government.

To withdraw the ambassador then immediately upon the recognition in Cortes of Don Miguel's title to the crown appears to me to be the most consistent and expedient course of proceeding at present, whatever may be the course which his Majesty's government may think proper to pursue in future.

In my opinion we ought forthwith to recall Sir Frederick Lamb ; and to desire him to deliver over charge of all the papers to Mr. Mandeville. We ought to instruct Mr. Mandeville in respect to withdrawing ; and we ought to prevail upon Esterhazy to do the same by Monsieur Bombelles.

We ought to send notice to the British merchants that we had given these orders ; and to assist them with all the naval means at our command to carry them away. These means to remain at Lisbon till Mr. Mandeville should come away. We ought to require the British merchants at the same time to interfere in no manner whatever in what is passing.

With respect to Sir John Doyle and others, I suspect that they have been interfering in the contest. Sir John Milley Doyle is an officer, and knows what it is to approach an army in operation dressed as a muleteer as it is said he was. He talks of reconnoitring roads near Leyria, the head-quarters of Don Miguel's army. Did any man ever hear of a person reconnoitring roads, in a country which was the seat of military operations at the moment, excepting for one purpose ?

I think one of the defects of Sir Frederick Lamb's despatches is that there is a total absence of facts and information in any of them. There is no information in all these papers respecting

the cause of the arrest of these British subjects. Yet anybody who will read the newspapers will discover it; and that we could not with propriety interfere in their favour. In the same manner Sir Frederick Lamb has never informed us of the arrival in Portugal of the intelligence of the abdication of Don Pedro; or of the effect which that intelligence produced!

23rd June.

The despatches arrived this morning from Lisbon appear to hold out hopes that the troops in the north of Portugal have had or will have some success. But as usual no facts are stated; and it is impossible for the government to form any judgment.

As long as Don Miguel's government exists *de facto*, Sir Frederick Lamb ought to avoid to communicate with the Junta of Oporto, excepting through the Consul of Oporto, respecting matters which relate to the interests of British subjects at Oporto. Sir Frederick Lamb, therefore, ought to omit to give any answer to the Junta of Oporto or to their agents as to what line his government will take in case Portugal should be threatened or invaded by Spain.

A reference to Mr. Bosanquet's despatches received last night, will explain some of the facts stated by Monsieur Pfügel; particularly what relates to the detachments sent into Galicia; and to Agnamonte.

WELLINGTON.

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*The Right Hon. Sir Gore Ouseley, Bart., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

Grosvenor Square, 23rd June, 1828.

As you desired me to write to your Grace if anything conducive to the public interest happened to occur to me, I beg leave to say that having heard at dinner yesterday, at Baron Bülow's, that the Persians were about to declare war against Turkey, or had actually done so, it strikes me that I could, by letters from myself to the Shah and Abbas Mirza (if we could ensure the safe and speedy transmission of them), prevent the consummation of this Russian contrivance.

Should your Grace think this hint worth your consideration you have only to command my attendance, when I could explain the grounds on which I venture to anticipate compliance from the Shah to the injunctions in my letter, and also the possibility of having it safely conveyed *viâ* Constantinople.

I have the honour to be your Grace's faithful and attached servant,

GORE OUSELEY.

LORD STUART APPOINTED AMBASSADOR AT PARIS. 499

I meant to have mentioned this report to your Grace last night at Princess Esterhazy's if I had seen you there.

[The Duke does not consider it advisable to interfere in any way in the existing war.]

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*To Lord Cowley.*

[ 931. ]

MY DEAR HENRY,

London, 25th June, 1828.

I have received your letter of the 13th instant, and I have intended to write to you frequently since I thought it was probable that Lord Granville would resign his situation at Paris, but I have been prevented by the multiplicity and variety of the affairs which I have had to arrange. For many reasons I did think of desiring you to remove from Vienna to Paris. I thought the latter situation might suit you better; and at all events that you might like to have the offer of it; and I spoke to the King upon the subject, who did not object; but his Majesty appeared to think that Vienna would suit you best. I therefore acquiesced in the appointment of Lord Stuart to Paris. I am glad now that I did so. But I still think that your appointment to Paris would have been a better arrangement for the public service than that which has been made.

We are going on well here. The government is very popular; and indeed there is but little opposition. We shall get through our Greek difficulties I hope, and that we shall see the peace of Europe again re-established, and resting upon some permanent basis. Portugal is a great difficulty. But I hope that we shall get through that.

Between the delays and procrastinations of Lord Liverpool's government, his having postponed everything from the Session of 1825 on account of the dissolution of Parliament which took place in 1826, and Mr. Canning's government of last year, which could do nothing, my predecessors have left me a vast legacy of difficulties of all descriptions. But I shall get the better of them I hope, if I can only bear the fatigue and labour which I must undergo.

Remember me most kindly to Lady Georgina and Charlotte, and believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*Papers without date on the Roman Catholic Question, from  
Dr. Phillpotts.*

1828.

*Dean Phillpotts to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

It may be not uninteresting to your Grace, in reference to the matter before the House of Lords this day, to know that it is *not a novelty* to require by statute a profession of *religious belief*. I last night mentioned one instance, the requisition of a declaration from Protestant dissenting ministers and schoolmasters that they "believe the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament, as commonly received among Protestant Churches, do contain the revealed Will of God : and that they do receive the same, as the rule of their doctrine and practice." This is by 19 Geo. III. c. 44.

I have now to state a stronger instance. By the Toleration Act (1 William and Mary, c. 18 and 13) it is said, "Whereas there are certain persons, dissenters from the Church of England, who scruple the taking of any oath, it is enacted that every such person shall make and subscribe the declaration aforesaid" (viz., in 30 Charles II. against Transubstantiation, &c.), "and also a declaration of fidelity, and subscribe a *profession of their Christian belief*."

The profession thus required from the Quakers is as follows :—

"I, A. B., profess faith in God the Father, and in Jesus Christ his eternal Son, the true God, and in the Holy Spirit, one God blessed for evermore ; and do acknowledge the holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be given by divine inspiration."

I shall communicate this instance to one lay Lord, and also to a Bishop, who has told me that he considers such a profession to be unprecedented. Therefore it is possible that it may be cited in your Grace's House of Parliament this evening. I mention it now *not* as wishing to see so strict a form required, but for your Grace's information.

H. PHILLPOTTS.

ON THE POWER OF PROHIBITING PERSONS, WITHIN A CERTAIN TIME,  
FROM EXERCISING EPISCOPAL FUNCTIONS.

It may be observed, in the first place, that all these persons, by the oath they take to the Pope, incur very severe penalties, as the law now stands. For although the statute of Elizabeth did not revive the 28 Henry VIII., c. 13 (Irish), "An Act against the authority of the Bishop of Rome," yet it imposes severe penalties of its own.

The new measure therefore would, as far as the letter of the law is concerned, be rather an act of grace than of coercion.

But, be this as it may, the power of the priesthood, and of the hierarchy in particular, is such as would fully justify a much stronger measure. This power is exercised directly for *political* purposes.

Thus, *Dr. M'Gittigan* (Roman Catholic Bishop of Raphoe), in a letter read at the Association, says that he had availed himself of the opportunity afforded him by his visitation to impress on the minds of his people their *political* duties ; and he concludes, "You will have the kindness to assure

that respectable body (the Association) that *I and the people under my spiritual jurisdiction* shall co-operate with them," &c.

The Rev. Mr. Carrol, in the Association, said in plain terms, "*The clergy had to teach their people not only their moral, but their political catechism also.*"

Dr. Doyle, in allusion to his own political preaching, says, "*How often have I perceived, in a congregation of some thousands of persons, how the very mention from my own tongue of the Penal Code caused every eye to glisten, and every ear to stand erect. The trumpet of the last judgment, if sounded, could not produce a more complete stillness in any assemblage of Irish peasantry, than a strong allusion to the wrongs we suffer.*"

Mr. Lawless (January 27th, 1827) speaks of the political agitation which prevailed, as "*the sacred fire, which was communicated from the altar to every cabin in Ireland.*"

Mr. Shiel (September 22nd, 1827): "Much has been already done, but much more may still be done. We have admirable materials in our hands. In every parish in Ireland there is a *priest and a curate.*"

Mr. O'Connell: "The people are so attached to their clergy; they are so docile in the hands of that clergy; they will so readily obey the advice, and follow the instructions of that clergy, at a period like the present, when they are not inflamed by any bad passion, nor driven to madness by any irritating oppression:—in such a state of the public mind *the people will cheerfully obey the voice of the clergy, pointing out to them their political duties.*"

At one of the last meetings of the Association, when the bishops sent their advice that the body should be dissolved, Mr. Shiel thus spoke of them: "*What should we have been without the clergy? What should we have been without the bishops? As nothing. The great intellectual corporation, the Catholic clergy, were our main auxiliaries in the accomplishment of what we have done.*"

Dr. Kiernan's (Roman Catholic Bishop of Clogher) sermon to the 40s. freeholders at Louth, and other instances given in the paper on that subject, are applicable to this likewise.

H. PHILLPOTTS.

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#### ON PROHIBITION OF ASSUMPTION OF TITLES OF SEES, &c.

In addition to the reasons of expediency and fitness for this measure, it may be worth remarking, that it accords with the Irish statute 21 and 22 George III., c. 24., for relieving Roman Catholics.

By the 8th section of that Act it is "provided that no benefit in it shall extend to any Popish ecclesiastic who shall (*inter alia*) assume or take any ecclesiastical dignity or authority, or *assume or take any ecclesiastical rank or title whatsoever*, but that all the pains and penalties which now subsist, &c., shall remain in full force against such Popish ecclesiastics so offending," &c.

The same clause also prohibits any Popish ecclesiastic from officiating in any church or chapel *with a steeple or bell*, or who shall *exercise any of the rites or ceremonies of the Popish religion, or wear the habits*



of their order, save within their several places of worship, or in private houses.

The general words of the 33rd George III. repealed all laws affecting Roman Catholics, excepting those which were particularly specified, and this provision was not in the number. But the omission must have proceeded from inadvertence; it could hardly have been intended.

H. PHILLPOTTS.

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RESPECTING THE NECESSITY OF THE MINISTER, WHO COUNTERSIGNS THE ROYAL LICENSE TO THE PRIEST, BEING A PROTESTANT.

Perhaps it may seem strange, that of the offices which are enumerated I venture to submit the propriety of omitting the office of *First Lord of the Treasury*.

My reasons are as follow :—

1. There is nothing in the business of the Treasurer's office itself which demands a Protestant, therefore the reason must be sought in something extrinsic.

2. This may be supposed to be because the First Lord of the Treasury is usually *Prime Minister*.

But the Constitution knows nothing of a Prime Minister; neither is it, in fact, necessary that the First Lord of the Treasury be Prime Minister. In practice, even in modern practice, he has not always been Prime Minister. The great Lord Chatham, though certainly Prime Minister, was not at that, nor at any other time, First Lord of the Treasury.

Would it not be best to make a provision, that no one who is not in communion with the Church of England (or if the Scots would object to this, who does not take the Oath of Supremacy) shall advise his Majesty in the disposal of any ecclesiastical dignity, or other Church preferment, under severe penalties?

It is true that a captious opponent might suggest that such provision must be nugatory, because it would ordinarily be impossible to prove the giving to the Crown advice in such case, as there would be no witness. But the fair answer is, first, an appeal to common sense whether such a law would not secure its own fulfilment; and, secondly, the indecency of supposing that the Sovereign would receive in such case the advice of a Papist, so forbidden by law to tender it.

The truth would rather seem to be, that such a provision would silently and without offence be found in practice to prevent the Crown from ever making a Papist Prime Minister—a result which cannot be secured by any direct law, because the office itself is unknown to the law or Constitution.

H. PHILLPOTTS.

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10. ON "SEATS IN PARLIAMENT."

The considerations connected with this particular are obviously the most important of all.

The proposed measure goes, in effect, to give an option to members of Parliament to qualify for taking their seats, either by the Oath of Supremacy

and Declaration against Transubstantiation, or by taking the oaths (when amended) prescribed in the 13th and 14th and 33rd George III. (Irish), and equivalent oaths in the case of English Roman Catholics.

I will venture to submit that I think the alternative might be improved by requiring from the Roman Catholics something more precisely referring to their duties as members of the Legislature.

A Roman Catholic gentleman, of first-rate consideration with the opulent and noble laity of his communion in both kingdoms, furnished me last spring with a form of oath which they (and he particularly mentioned the name of the Duke of Norfolk) were prepared to take. The following is a copy of the original paper given to me by him :—

“I sincerely promise and swear that I will, to the utmost of my power, maintain and support to the bishops and clergy of this realm, and the churches committed to them, all such civil rights, immunities, and possessions, as by law do or shall appertain to them, or any of them ; and that I will never \*

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#### ON STIPENDS TO PRIESTS.

The more I consider this point the more strongly I feel the difficulties attending it, if it be taken up avowedly in the way of payment to the priests.

To state, as part of any scheme of settlement, that these stipends are to be given in order to attach the priesthood to the State, while all the Irish Roman Catholics, both clerical and lay, ostentatiously proclaim that they are averse to the granting of such stipends, would, I submit, be only giving to the priests an opportunity of displaying their vaunted disinterestedness by refusal.

It would, at the same time, be open to the objection of the Protestants that it is a payment of persons for preaching doctrines contrary to the reformed religion—and is at variance therefore with the Coronation Oath :—that it would be what Mr. O'Connell, in a speech of his in commendation of it in July, 1825, plainly called it, *an establishment*, in some sort, of the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland.

May I submit for consideration whether the following mode of effecting the purpose may not be free from these objections ?

To announce, as part of the plan, an intention to propose a Bill enabling government, on application from the Roman Catholic inhabitants of any parish in Ireland who may be so poor as to find the maintenance of their priest burthensome to them, to grant to the priest such a stipend as government may think proper (the said stipend to be provided for out of the county rates). That in any case in which such stipend shall be so applied for and granted to an ecclesiastic already officiating and registered as such, the said ecclesiastic shall be liable to all the regulations respecting licenses as if he were newly appointed. That the number of Roman Catholic ecclesiastics in any parish shall not be permitted to exceed the number of those already officiating (except in the case of a coadjutor to

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\* Incomplete.

a priest who may have become disabled by age or infirmity); such number to be ascertained by the register required to be made of those already officiating.

(Unless this or some similar regulation be adopted, the practical result will be found to be that the stipends allowed by government will only serve to increase (as is much wished by the Irish Roman Catholics) the number of their priests.)

It may probably be found not necessary to make any classification of the different ecclesiastics for the purpose of giving larger stipends to the bishops. For, as these hold several parishes, the payments in aid of those parishes will together amount to a sufficient sum. Besides, if it be necessary, a larger stipend might be ordered in the case of parishes which belong to bishops. The other sources of revenue to bishops are:—1st, An annual payment from every one of their clergy. This would still continue; and, 2ndly, In some dioceses a certain proportion of what is paid to the priests for marriages. This latter is said to be inconsiderable.

I may be permitted to submit, in conclusion, that if the county rate be charged with the payment of the proposed stipends, it should be paid by the landlords, not by the tenants. In the case of existing leases, a provision might be made by law to lay this new charge only on the landlord, leaving the tenant liable as before to former charges; but the creation of this new charge gives, perhaps, fresh force to the arguments for making a law which shall, in the case of every future lease, make the landlord in Ireland subject to the rates instead of the tenant, who might be enabled to deduct out of his rent what is paid on account of rates.

H. PHILLPOTTS.

[ 932. ]

MEMORANDUM.—STATE OF AFFAIRS IN PORTUGAL.

30th June, 1828.

It is my opinion that Monsieur de Itabayana is not accredited as minister from Don Pedro, *King of Portugal*; but that he is so from Don Pedro, *Emperor of Brazil*.

Monsieur de Itabayana may be listened to unofficially upon the affairs of the house of Braganza. But it is quite inconsistent with diplomatic rule; with what this country has been doing in order to effect the separation between Portugal and Brazil; and with our policy; to allow Monsieur de Itabayana, a Brazilian, and minister from the Emperor of Brazil, to interfere in questions of this description referable solely to our policy in Portugal.

In respect to the question itself, we know nothing of the Junta of Oporto, excepting that it has been appointed by a body of officers of the army.

A few days must decide whether it is to become the government of Portugal, or to be dispersed. Till that event is decided we may as well be silent.

We have desired our Ambassador to hold no communication with that Junta, excepting through the Consul at Oporto, and only upon the affairs of the King's subjects residing at Oporto.

It would not answer for us to recognise them here while these orders exist; or while our ambassador is at Lisbon, even in the anomalous position in which he is placed.

I would desire Monsieur de Itabayana verbally to withdraw his note.

If he should refuse we can then see what we can do.

WELLINGTON.

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*The Rev. James Hamilton to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

15, Wardour Street, 3rd July, 1828.

Lest the speech of Charles Dupin, a French legislator, on the 3rd ultimo, should have escaped your notice, I enclose the 'Constitutionnel' in which you will find it, and beg your excuse for particularly directing your attention to that part of it which, by the word "*Parti-Prêtre*," alludes to a speech made a few days before in the Chamber by the Bishop of Beauvais, minister for ecclesiastical affairs in France. By this speech your Grace will clearly perceive the authority which regulates the conduct of the Irish Catholic Association, and which from its very commencement has been formed by this Jesuitical model; you may also, I think, clearly perceive that the footing which the society of Jesuits has gained in this and the sister-country is the source of what is past, is passing at this moment, and likely (if not timely corrected) to pass in Ireland. "A stitch in time saves nine," look to Clare and the rebels. I entreat your Grace's indulgence, while out of my zeal for the public good I say a few words on the melancholy situation of Ireland. The mass of people in Munster and Connaught is composed of tenantry—little farmers holding from six to ten acres of land each, generally by leases. The manufactories in these provinces are scarcely worth mentioning. These tenants, if the lands were let at a fair value, would find sufficient employment every day in the week upon their little farms; but the fact is, though they may be sober and industrious, they have nothing by their exertions. It is a strong reflection upon a free, civilised country, when a man who is sober and industrious cannot give himself suitable food and raiment by his greatest exertions. The existence of these tenants, I may say, depends upon chance. In favourable seasons they have their cabins and potatoes, when the seasons prove unfavourable they are in a state of starvation: they become schemers, plunderers, disturbers of the public peace, and fit instruments to execute the wildest plans of the disaffected, the agitators and the demagogues. How then can these wretches contribute to the support of the clergy of two Churches? even their strong prejudices do not incline them to pay their priest's dues, and I am quite satisfied they pay him very badly and with great reluctance; for strange as it may appear, and notwithstanding the

great influence of the priesthood over them, they think they should have nothing to do with anything of a pecuniary nature, and that it is degrading to their sacred character. It is therefore with the greatest difficulty, as well from disinclination as their poverty, that the priest with all his powers of bell, book, and candlelight, receives a great proportion of his dues, AND IT IS THEREFORE, whatever they may say to the contrary, that the secular clergy would most joyfully become pensioners on the British government. It is a ruse in politics for men to make extravagant demands, when they would be heartily satisfied with certain moderate concessions. I recollect when Doctor Doyle the Jesuit (who addressed a letter to your Grace a few days ago, replete with insincerity and casuistry) was asked by the committee before the Lords if he would accept of a provision from the government, he answered he would receive it by Act of Parliament but not as a regium donum. When *the wings* were being discussed before a committee of the House the priests were chuckling at the idea of retiring to their arm-chairs with government pensions; but this would not make them honest or grateful, for they were at the time planning most insidiously to employ the regular clergy or friars in their parishes, who would, no doubt, become excellent substitutes in fleecing the people. These wretched beings are taxed to support this latter class of the priesthood and another class also, called the black sheep, of which two or more are generally found in every diocese; men disqualified from their functions for impropriety of conduct, whoredom, drunkenness, seduction, murder by abortions, &c., &c. The priests, I repeat, would most joyfully receive government pensions, though they would openly declare against the measure, to please the people who would be dissatisfied at it, and I am quite satisfied that their strenuous co-operation with the Association and the agitators is superinduced through this expectation. There are three classes of Catholics to be emancipated, or in plainer words, whose grievances are to be relieved, in the above-mentioned two provinces which are generally the theatres of all the atrocities we read of. The tenants, as before described; the priests; the ambitious and the rich (these latter I make one class of). The grievances of the first are, the high price of lands, the support of two Churches, the want of instruction, and a redundant population. The clergy are badly paid, and from the poverty of the people and the intellectual improvement of the times they expect to be worse paid, if *paid* at all: they have a perfect understanding with the third class, the rich and the ambitious, including the needy lawyers and the demagogues, whose grievances under the head of Catholic emancipation are so well understood by your Grace as to require no explanation. The priests merge their cause in that of the rich, who promise them all power together with the loaves and fishes of the established religion for their strenuous co-operation and influence with the people, while these are persuaded to merge their grievances in those of the other two classes by being promised comfortable food and raiment and complete emancipation from every species of poverty and distress. Thus the Association and the agitators have united all classes of the Popish community in their support, while I believe in my soul they laugh at them for their simplicity and credulity. And having read this morning of O'Connell's return for Clare, I would not be surprised if he would take the odious oaths and his seat, having previously, to keep the clergy in good humour, received

from them a dispensation, and afterwards absolution, for the perjury. When a medical or political physician is acquainted with the cause of disease, it is not unlikely he may effect a cure. I have thrown these hints hastily together, and trust you may find something to aid you in an important and difficult case. You have succeeded gloriously in the field under much greater difficulties, and I pray God you will speedily in the Cabinet succeed in defeating the rebellious schemes, *however vested by the sanction of law*, of the agitators and the Association; they dread defeat through legislation as advised by Lord Plunket; they want to enter into a bargain and compact; you will make them of too much consequence by doing so. I will say a few words and have done. I will not even revise these irregular hints; but take another opportunity of communicating with you if it should appear necessary. The agitators will be quick in their motions—be you prompt to meet them. Why should not our beloved monarch be constitutionally independent in his empire? Why should he not be the head of all temporals? Why should he not be the fountain of all honour and preferment in his dominions as every other monarch in Europe with considerably less pretensions?

Your Grace's devoted humble servant,

JAMES HAMILTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

Si quelque chose pouvait porter l'effroi dans les âmes des hommes qui voient clairement l'avenir, ce serait la confiance et la quiétude d'un prélat aussi vertueux que M. le ministre des affaires ecclésiastiques.\* Comment, Messieurs, tous les hommes qui sont versés dans l'administration civile ou militaire du royaume ont des preuves innombrables de l'action infatigable du parti qu'on appelle, bien ou mal, le parti-prêtre; de ce parti qui sait être dans les régiments plus puissants que le colonel, et dans les départements plus obéi que le préfet; ce parti qui ne reconnaît pas la loi du royaume pour guide de sa vie civile; ce parti qui ne reconnaît pas le Roi comme son suzerain, qui place la Cour de Rome au-dessus de la Cour de France, qui trouve hors du royaume et pour premier moteur un général non sujet du royaume, aux yeux de qui notre pays est simplement la province de France; ce parti qui s'efforce d'éteindre les lumières pour régner, comme l'ange du mal, par les ténèbres; ce parti qui fait fermer les écoles où l'on apprend trop aisément, trop vite, et trop économiquement; ce parti qui pervertit la raison d'un peuple, et qui ne veut pas qu'on l'instruise; ce parti qui se permet pour arriver à ses fins des miracles officiels, attestés par procès-verbal de gendarmes; qu'on ose dire si ce parti, prêtre ou non, pousse la témérité jusqu'à se prétendre l'église révéérée, vénérable, et nationale de la France?

Le parti que je signale en ce moment veut dominer à la fois sur le haut et sur le bas de la société. Dans la portion inférieure du peuple il a ses décuries et ses centuries, ses commandants et ses percepteurs, et son impôt hebdomadaire. Les cotisations recueillies en chaque endroit sont régulièrement encaissées et transmises en des chefs-lieux marqués, pour subvenir aux dépenses occultes. Les affiliés, les adeptes, font secte dans l'état; on les connaît à plusieurs signes, et surtout à leur ambition, à leur hypocrisie; les adeptes forment une classe d'éligibles pour les emplois de tous les rangs; ils arrivent aux places les plus éminentes, même avant l'âge requis pour en exercer les fonctions; ces adeptes

\* The Bishop of Beauvais.

ont, de préférence, envahi les administrations par lesquelles on peut épier notre vie et décacheter nos pensées; ils inondent la ville, ils obéissent la cour, ils oppriment l'armée; et l'on vient nous dire qu'il n'y a pas ce qu'on appelle de parti-prêtre! et l'un de nos vertueux prélats, celui qui tient dans ses mains l'administration de toutes les affaires ecclésiastiques légalement, ostensiblement possibles, ne croit pas même à l'existence de ce parti! Jugeons donc s'il est important, s'il est urgent que tous les journaux actuels et tous les journaux futurs, afin d'éclairer la France et l'autorité suprême, disent et redisent tous les méfaits d'une hypocrisie qui prétend faire prendre sa cause pour celle de la religion et de la divinité même.

On voudrait nous faire accroire que la liberté de la presse, sans restrictions oppressives, tournerait au détriment de la religion catholique. Je le nie; je fais mieux, je prouve ma dénégation.

Messieurs, aux Etats-Unis la presse périodique n'est pas moins libre que la presse non périodique; là, le législateur n'exige pas de cautionnement, pas de gérants responsables; il s'est refusé les jouissances de la confiscation; il n'exige que des amendes modérées pour des cas prévus par la loi. Aucun culte n'est protégé; aucun n'est défavorisé, aucun n'est payé par l'état. Loin que cette indépendance et cette égalité nuisent au catholicisme, il est notoire que la religion catholique fait des progrès marqués dans les états de l'union. Le nombre de familles que l'église attire dans son sein y croît avec rapidité.

En Angleterre, la presse périodique est parfaitement libre; le gouvernement de ce pays protège, il est vrai, l'église anglicane, et même avec beaucoup d'intolérance; mais il ne protège pas les autres sectes protestantes, mais il ne protège pas le catholicisme; cependant c'est une chose si bonne pour un culte d'être libre et non protégé, même contre la presse, que chaque jour les sectes dissidentes et le catholicisme gagnent dans l'opinion contre l'église anglicane. Un grand ministre de ce pays voulait proclamer la liberté civile et religieuse pour tout l'univers; il meurt, et l'intolérance pousse des cris de joie; mais la Providence a des voies qui n'appartiennent qu'à sa sagesse. Il faut que la victoire de la presse ne puisse pas être crue la victoire d'un homme. Le puissant défenseur des catholiques n'est plus, et neuf mois sont à peine écoulés, les catholiques de la Grande-Bretagne obtiennent un triomphe décisif dans la Chambre des Communes, et les dissidents obtiennent un pareil triomphe sur l'intolérance anglicane.

Si donc, en France, vous protégiez la religion catholique avec des lois injustement, abusivement compressives, vous n'auriez en définitive travaillé que pour les dissidents. Songez-y! de 1683 à 1790, il y a juste cent cinq ans, cent cinq ans d'esclavage de la presse périodique; eh bien! par la seule force des choses et par la fatalité des événements, en 1683, les Catholiques, animés par les Jésuites, expropriaient les prêtres catholiques, et en 1790, les incrédules, élevés par des Jésuites, expropriaient les prêtres catholiques.

Amis dévoués et fidèles de la religion catholique, réclamez donc avec moi pour la presse périodique liberté pleine, entière; réclamez pour elle, afin que le clergé de France, sans cesse averti par une censure de tous les jours et de tous les moments, soit vis-à-vis de la presse ce qu'il doit être devant Dieu, sans mauvais desseins et sans mauvaises actions.

La presse agit sur le monde depuis près de quatre siècles. Lorsqu'elle produisait les premiers livres imprimés, songez quel était le relâchement des mœurs du clergé, et la grossièreté des esprits chez des peuples qui portaient le nom de chrétiens, mais qui ne connaissaient guère du christianisme que les pratiques extérieures; comparez ces mœurs du 15<sup>me</sup> siècle à celles du 19<sup>me</sup>, et dites-moi si la presse a corrompu l'espèce humaine. Eclairés par la longue expérience de ses bienfaits dans le passé, soyons donc pleinement rassurés sur ces bienfaits pour l'avenir.

*The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Whitehall, 4th July, 1828.

I believe that I have done everything that it is desirable to do, in order that we may be prepared for any course which Mr. O'Connell may pursue.

I had no letter from Ireland to-day, which is very odd; but I presume, of course, that Mr. O'Connell is returned.

I have this day seen the Speaker, in order that we might determine on our course supposing Mr. O'Connell were *suddenly* to appear. The Speaker was prepared to order him to leave the house if he had not taken the oaths before the Lord Steward, and if necessary, to enforce that order by the serjeant-at-arms, considering Mr. O'Connell as a stranger.

I have a very full opinion on the case from Leslie Foster. I have shown it to the Attorney-General, and have desired him and the Solicitor-General to consider the case without delay.

By Monday therefore I shall be quite prepared.

Ever yours very sincerely,

ROBERT PEEL.

I enclose Leslie Foster's opinion. It seems to me unanswerable.

*Mr. Benjamin Cox to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Castletown, Carrick-on-Suir, 4th July, 1828.

I consider it my duty to trouble you with this which may afford you a means of safely *conducting* that country you have already saved under God. A few years ago a Roman Catholic priest of the parish adjoining my elder brother's residence sent to me that he wished to speak with me on important business. At our interview he told me that knowing I was connected with the then Attorney-General, Mr. Saurin, then on a visit in that neighbourhood, he wished me to see him, and to state that the Roman Catholic parish priests were in such bondage, and so tyrannically treated by their bishops, that it was scarce that one could be found bold enough to act loyally to his King on an emergency; but if government would pass an act to prevent the Roman Catholic Bishops (titular) from removing the Roman Catholic parish priests at their own pleasure, but that the parish priests should have a *trial* by a jury or before the Lord-Lieutenant and Council, it would strengthen the arm of government more than emancipation or anything else: in fact they need do no more. He said the priests would then communicate everything they knew to government, but that now if a well affected loyal priest was suspected of such a thing his bishop could and would remove him at once and let him starve. He told me it would attach all the parish priests to government, and nothing could be hatched seditious that would not at once be made known to government. I called on Mr. Saurin, but he did not approve of the plan. As the thing has never been off my mind, I again, about two years ago, mentioned it (by letter) to Mr. Peel. He did not approve it; still as we don't acknowledge



infallibility, and as *it might be* a measure that would paralyse that tremendous power of the Roman Catholic hierarchy, and as *I can't see any danger or inconvenience can arise from it, the measure not giving them any power,* I determined on communicating with you on the subject. If the measure struck your Grace's mind as likely to be useful I could make farther enquiry. Congratulating your Grace on your situation, and praying that He who guided you in the storm may continue to do so in the calm, to your own farther glory and England's welfare,

I have the honour to remain your Grace's humble servant,

BENJAMIN COX.

P.S.—I would wish a line directed, Castletown, Carrick-on-Suir.

If your Lordship never met Burnet's *View of Poland*, published a few years ago in London, I believe you will see there the consequence of the then Protestant diet, admitting Roman Catholics to sit. *It ended in the Roman Catholics turning out all the Protestants.*

[ 933. ]

*To the Duke of Portland.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

London, 7th July, 1828.

I beg to refer your Grace to the Act lately passed "to enlarge the powers granted to his Majesty under an Act passed in the fifty-seventh year of his late Majesty to recompense the services of persons holding, or who have held, certain high and efficient civil offices," by which you will see that his Majesty is enabled to grant to any persons who may be nominated by his Majesty as trustees in trust for the benefit of the family of the late Right Honourable George Canning, a pension of three thousand pounds per annum for the life of Mr. Charles Canning, his second son.

Being desirous of knowing who the persons are whom it would be agreeable to the family of Mr. Canning that his Majesty should name as trustees under this Act, I trouble your Grace upon the subject, and request you at the same time to let me know what "provisions and regulations" it is desirable that his Majesty should make as to the application of the pension by the trustees in the warrant, as directed by the Act of Parliament.

I have the honour, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Aberdeen.*

[ 934. ]

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

London, 7th July, 1828.

I think that no time ought to be lost in demanding reparation from the Portuguese government for the insult to the ambassador ; and if nothing has yet been done respecting the imprisonment of the King's subjects, we should demand reparation for them.

I have marked some passages in Sir Frederick Lamb's despatches which demonstrate the existence of the same temper.

The omission of the word "same" in the translation of the decree of amnesty is likewise very remarkable.

It is quite obvious that from the commencement of his embassy Sir Frederick Lamb has taken an erroneous view of the relative situation of this country and Portugal.

We are not the protectors of Portugal. Portugal is not a dependency of this country either *de jure* or *de facto*, or in principle, or by any construction of our treaty, or in practice.

It would be desirable to answer the despatch No. 159, because if we are ever to argue Lamb's case in Parliament it will turn upon this point ; and it is very desirable that our opinion upon it should be recorded.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To the Earl of Aberdeen.*

[ 935. ]

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

London, 8th July, 1828.

It is most important that we should not depart from established principles in any case. We can never know the extent of the inconvenient consequences which may attend such departure.

There is no point so clear as that the ambassador from a sovereign, as King of England, for instance, cannot require a Power to listen to and answer officially his representations as ambassador from the same sovereign as King of Hanover ; and he cannot expect that other Powers will bind themselves to an agent not duly and sufficiently authorised.

This principle ought to be clearly and distinctly put forward in any discussion that you may have with M. de Itabayana, and

constantly adverted to. That principle being well guarded, the great object will be to conduct the discussion in such manner as to avoid to involve this country in hostilities for the purpose of upholding the sovereignty of Don Pedro in Portugal. Upon this point I would refer you to Mr. Canning's correspondence with me when I was ambassador at the Congress of Verona, and at the same time with the Portuguese government of the day, in respect to a guarantee asked by the Portuguese government of that day of the liberal institutions established by the Cortes; in which you will find these principles discussed; and they were not communicating officially with a person who is not officially authorised by his sovereign. As for the rest, we must adhere to the principles already laid down in Mr. Canning's correspondence, which will certainly keep us out of the scrape.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*The Lord Chancellor to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

George Street, 8th July, 1828.

Enclosed is a copy of the opinion which I sent this morning to the Duke of Cumberland.

Ever truly yours,

LYNDHURST.

[ENCLOSURE.]

The Chancellor presents his duty to his Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland. The Chancellor has read and attentively considered the opinion of the Lord Chief Justice Best upon the questions proposed to that learned Judge by his Royal Highness, and the Chancellor begs permission to state that he entirely concurs in the legal view which has been taken of the subject by the Chief Justice. As the proviso in the Act of Parliament requires "that the patent should contain a clause that the annuity should not be payable in respect of any period in which the Prince of Cumberland\* shall not reside and be within the United Kingdom unless his Highness shall be absent with the license and consent in writing of his Majesty," a patent without such a clause would not be valid, and the Chancellor is of opinion that his Majesty's license under this Act of Parliament cannot have a retrospective operation. The Chancellor concurs therefore in opinion with the Chief Justice, that with respect to the period already passed no payment of the annuity can be made except with the authority of Parliament.

Looking at the subject in this view the Chancellor has adverted to the case of the grant to his Royal Highness the Duke of Clarence, mentioned to him by his Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland. When that grant was proposed in Parliament in the year 1818, the Duke of Clarence declined accepting it; but afterwards, in the year 1821, in consequence as it was stated of the health of

\* The present dethroned King of Hanover.

the Duchess of Clarence not allowing of her residence abroad, the subject was again brought before Parliament and an Act was passed granting the annuity from the year 1818. The Act of 1821 thus gave effect to the original intention of the legislature. It may probably be contended, in the present case, as the Act of 6th George 4th, c. 69, makes the residence of the Prince of Cumberland in the United Kingdom, unless absent with his Majesty's license, a condition of the payment of the annuity, that to pass an Act for granting the arrears would not, as in the case of his Royal Highness the Duke of Clarence, be to give effect to the original intention of the legislature, but to act at variance with it. This certainly is an unfavourable view of the application of the case of his Royal Highness the Duke of Clarence to the present question, but the Chancellor has thought it his duty to submit it to the consideration of his Royal Highness. The manner in which the education of his Highness the Prince of Cumberland has been conducted, and the selection of the tutor intrusted with so important a charge, have manifested the strong desire of his Royal Highness to give effect, as far as the peculiar circumstances of his situation would permit, to the wishes of the legislature, and cannot fail to be highly gratifying to Parliament and the nation.

With respect to the second question proposed by his Royal Highness, viz. : "What leave of absence his Majesty might give the Prince to reside abroad without affecting his Royal Highness's claim to the annuity," the Chancellor begs permission to observe that the legislature has declared "that it is highly expedient that his Highness the Prince of Cumberland should be educated within the United Kingdom," and to this declaration his Majesty is a party. It would obviously be inconsistent with the spirit of this provision for his Majesty to grant a license for the permanent residence of the Prince of Cumberland abroad; but the Chancellor conceives that the Prince might be allowed, if his Majesty should so please, to make such occasional visits to his friends and connections on the Continent as would not materially interfere with the course of his education in this country.

The Chancellor begs leave to add for the information of his Royal Highness that when Attorney-General he signed the Bill for the patent. This as the Chancellor understands was afterwards cancelled at the Treasury. It will be necessary therefore before the patent can be made out that directions for that purpose should be given by the Lords of the Treasury. The Chancellor, agreeably to his Majesty's desire, humbly submits the above minute of his opinion upon the points above noticed to his Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland.

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*To the Right Hon. Sir George Cockburn, Bart.*

[ 936. ]

MY DEAR SIR GEORGE,

London, July, 1828.

The subject on which you spoke to me yesterday appeared to me to be so likely to attract the attention of the public and to occasion public discussion, that I thought it necessary to converse with my colleagues. Some who framed the Act, and who discussed it in Parliament and in private, recollect perfectly that its object was to relieve the Duke of Clarence from all pecuniary and official responsibility, at the same time that

he should be the efficient head of the navy as Lord High Admiral.

It was understood that this object was attained by giving to his Majesty by law the nomination of the members of the Council of the Lord High Admiral. The arrangement, therefore, stands thus:—the Lord High Admiral while in London, and acting with the knowledge of his Council and without objection on their part, has all the power that the Board of Commissioners of the Admiralty possessed.

But if his Royal Highness should be afloat, or otherwise at a distance from his Council, it will be necessary that he should be attended by one or more of his Council, or transmit his orders to the Council, to be carried into execution. If this is not done it is obvious that his Royal Highness cannot be relieved from official and pecuniary responsibility.

I have not considered the case of the Lord High Admiral hoisting his flag under the special orders of his Majesty in command of a particular detachment of his fleet. In this case his power over that particular detachment is defined by the general orders and instructions to the navy. But his power over the fleet and the department at large would still be conducted according to the same rules, and upon the same principles as those to which I have above adverted.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 937. ]

*To the King.*

London, 11th July, 1828.

It is my duty to inform your Majesty that there are certain delicate questions in discussion between the Lord High Admiral and his Royal Highness's Council, to which some attention must be paid.

These discussions originated in his Royal Highness's desire to establish a standing commission of officers of the navy, for the consideration of gunnery and other matters connected with your Majesty's naval service; which desire his Royal Highness expressed when Sir George Cockburn was absent at Plymouth. Upon Sir George Cockburn's return to town, the plan proposed to which the Council had objected was modified by the Council

of the Lord High Admiral; and, as modified, was submitted for his Royal Highness's pleasure, and signed by his Royal Highness.

His Royal Highness afterwards sent for Sir James Cockburn, and complained to him in very strong terms of his brother, the admiral's, conduct in respect to this commission. Sir George Cockburn having subsequently conversed with his Royal Highness, and explained that his objections in common with those of the Council generally applied to the permanent establishment of the commission, and to the extent of the objects of their enquiry (which in fact embraced all the duties of the Admiralty), rather than to the commission itself for enquiry into any particular branch of the service, the discussion ended amicably.

The discussion has, however, been renewed within these two days, and now embraces objects far more extensive and important to your Majesty's service and to the public interests. It appears that his Royal Highness recently hoisted his flag of Lord High Admiral, on board the *Royal Sovereign* yacht in the river, without the knowledge of his Council; and on Wednesday, the 9th instant, his Royal Highness being then at Bushy Park, sent the enclosed order (A), dated on board the *Royal Sovereign* on the 10th July, directing the commission, to which I have above referred, to proceed to Portsmouth, to meet his Royal Highness on Monday next.

There can be no doubt of the irregularity of this order, and of its inconvenient consequences.

It creates an expense indefinite in amount, for which his Royal Highness is alone responsible. It is defective in point of form; and it establishes a precedent inconsistent with the provisions of the patent by which his Royal Highness was appointed Lord High Admiral, and with the public interests; and it defeats the objects of the Act of the last session of Parliament.

The patent of the Lord High Admiral recites that in order that the office of Lord High Admiral should be better and more conveniently executed, your Majesty ordains and constitutes that at the pleasure of his Royal Highness, there shall be "two men skilled in maritime affairs, to assist and advise the Lord High Admiral, in all things and business appertaining or belonging to that office;" and your Majesty by the same

instrument authorised his Royal Highness to appoint two or more, not exceeding four, to be called the Council of the Lord High Admiral, to "advise" his Royal Highness, and to "assist his Royal Highness in all things and business; and to receive, examine, and prepare" for his Royal Highness, and for his Royal Highness's "forwarding, completing, and perfecting all matters and things appertaining and belonging to the" office of Lord High Admiral.

The Act of the last session of Parliament vested in your Majesty the appointment and removal of the members of the Council of the Lord High Admiral; but it leaves the powers of the Council as established by patent; and the object in vesting this power of appointment in your Majesty was, as stated by the Lord Chancellor, that his Royal Highness might be relieved from all pecuniary and official responsibility, at the same time that he should be the efficient head of your Majesty's navy and of all its departments.

The arrangement understood then, was this: that his Royal Highness acting with the knowledge, the advice, and assistance of two or more of his Council, possessed all the power heretofore possessed by the Board of Commissioners of the Admiralty.

It is quite obvious, however, that if his Royal Highness can hoist his flag as Lord High Admiral on board a yacht in the river, and can from thence transmit orders to any branch or department of the service, the Council becomes useless; his Royal Highness becomes involved in official and pecuniary responsibility; the objects of the law are defeated; and I could easily show your Majesty that your Majesty's interests, those of the public, and the responsibility of your government, are all in a state of risk without any cause to justify such risk.

Upon receiving the order above mentioned, dated the 10th July, Sir George Cockburn wrote to his Royal Highness the letter of which I enclose the copy (B); and he has received the enclosed answer (C); to which he has written the enclosed reply (D).

I hope that his Royal Highness will see that the advice of Sir George Cockburn is that which as an honest counsellor he ought to give his Royal Highness; and at all events I feel a confidence in the kindness which his Royal Highness has always manifested towards me, and with which he has always listened to me, that I shall be able to convince him that his Council

are not in the wrong. Under these circumstances I am anxious that your Majesty should take no notice of what has passed. But I have considered it my duty not to keep from your Majesty a knowledge of what is going on ; and I will take care to apprise your Majesty if anything further should occur.

All of which is humbly submitted to your Majesty, by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

[WELLINGTON. ]

[ENCLOSURES.]

(A.)

MEMORANDUM BY HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DUKE OF CLARENCE.

It is my directions that the members of the Committee on Gunnery, now sitting at the Admiralty, proceed to Portsmouth, ready to wait upon me there by Monday morning, the 14th instant, and that they be prepared to remain at Portsmouth if I shall think proper.

Given under my hand on board the *Royal Sovereign* yacht, this 10th day of July, 1828.

WILLIAM.

(B.)

*The Right Hon. Sir George Cockburn to the Duke of Clarence.*

SIR,

Admiralty, 10th July, 1828.

In consequence of Captain Spencer having put into my hand an order signed by your Royal Highness, stated to be given under your Royal Highness's hand, on board his Majesty's yacht *Royal Sovereign*, it has appeared to me, after giving the subject the fullest consideration, to be my bounden duty, as well towards your Royal Highness, as to the government and the public, most respectfully and most humbly to submit for your Royal Highness's consideration my opinion that such an order (even if its form had been unobjectionable) so given on board of a ship, separated from, and without the knowledge of, the Council which his Majesty and the legislature have attached to your Royal Highness as Lord High Admiral, is neither in accordance with the spirit of the Act of Parliament regulating the appointment of the Council, nor consistent with the real nature of the high office your Royal Highness has condescended to accept ; for if your Royal Highness can, whilst so separated from the Council, issue orders involving questions of important official regulations, or of public policy, or involving (as in this instance) expense to an indefinite amount, the responsibility of the Council would be ideal rather than real, and our continuance in that station under such circumstances would only tend to mislead the public, which might suppose us to be parties to occurrences in which in point of fact we have had no share whatever.

I further humbly conceive that the real and constitutional nature of the office of Lord High Admiral, as at present established, is that of a high and important department of the State, rather than that of the first flag



officer of the sea service; a capacity in which I humbly submit your Royal Highness cannot properly appear without the special order of the King, accompanied by his Majesty's instructions, for the particular service for which it might be his Majesty's pleasure to direct your Royal Highness's flag to be hoisted, and in this case your Royal Highness's authority over such portion of the fleet as might be placed under your Royal Highness's more immediate command would be defined by the general orders and instructions established by his Majesty's Orders in Council for the naval service.

Strongly impressed with the importance of these considerations, I have deemed it most proper humbly to lay them before your Royal Highness previous to giving effect to the order in question, and to await (which I deem it respectful to do at the office) your Royal Highness's further commands on the subject.

In the event of my being so unfortunate as to have taken a different view of this important subject from that which your Royal Highness may, on full consideration, be pleased to adopt, I venture to beg of your Royal Highness to allow of these my observations being submitted to his Majesty's government, and with the most anxious hope that what my sense of public duty has obliged me thus humbly to submit to your Royal Highness may not in any manner incur your Royal Highness's disapprobation.

I have the honour to be, with the most sincere respect and attachment, Sir, your Royal Highness's most dutiful and most devoted humble servant,

G. COCKBURN.

(C).

*The Duke of Clarence to the Right Hon. Sir George Cockburn.*

SIR,

Royal Sovereign, 10th July, 1828.

Your letter of this morning does not give me *displeasure* but *concern*, to see *one* I had *kept* when appointed to this situation of Lord High Admiral, *constantly* opposing what I consider *good* for the King's service. In this free country every one has a *right* to have *his* opinion, and I have therefore to have *mine*, which *differs* totally from *yours*.

The *only* part of *your* letter which I *can* approve, is where *you* mention *expense*, and being now under weigh, I have only to say I shall, *for the present*, leave the order *you* so *improperly* object to in your hands till I return, when I shall talk the matter over with you deliberately. But I cannot conclude without repeating *my* Council is *not* to dictate but to give advice.

I am, Sir, yours,

WILLIAM.

(D).

*The Right Hon. Sir George Cockburn to the Duke of Clarence.*

SIR,

Admiralty, 11th July, 1828.

It is impossible for me adequately to express to your Royal Highness the *pain* and *disappointment* I feel at observing by your Royal Highness's *letter* of yesterday's date, in reply to mine of the same date, that your

Royal Highness remains with an impression that, in my humble but best endeavours to discharge my duty towards your Royal Highness conscientiously and efficiently, I have evinced a disposition to oppose whatever your Royal Highness has deemed necessary and for the good of the service. I cannot, therefore, refrain from again approaching your Royal Highness on this part of the subject, as affecting me personally, to offer to your Royal Highness (as I had the honour of doing the other day in person) my humble but most unqualified assurances that so far from the case being as your Royal Highness conceives, it has been my most anxious and unvarying study, since I have had the honour to serve under your Royal Highness in this department, so to discharge my duty as to gain for me your Royal Highness's confidence and approbation, and I beg permission again to repeat to your Royal Highness that however unfortunate I may have been in these my efforts, and however much by unreservedly laying before your Royal Highness my real opinions on matters as they have arisen, I may have failed in obtaining that countenance of your Royal Highness which it was, as I have said, the highest object of my wishes to secure, yet that I will yield to no man in humble and respectful duty and attachment to your Royal Highness's person and character, and I feel most confident that if your Royal Highness will condescend to inform me of the particular instances or causes which may have led your Royal Highness to form a conclusion so injurious to me, I shall be able to prove to your Royal Highness, (as I trust I did in the two cases you communicated to me through my brother Sir James Cockburn) that they are capable of being most fully and *satisfactorily* explained.

Positive as I am that my first wish and endeavour has always been to learn and to meet, as far as I could, your Royal Highness's wishes in the best, the most regular, and legal manner the nature of the case might admit of; I cannot for an instant doubt, that if your Royal Highness affords me the opportunity I solicit, I shall be able at least to banish from your Royal Highness's mind the impression I now advert to, and which is of all others that which I can least bear the idea of leaving unremoved; for I can truly assure your Royal Highness, that I must ever entertain the deepest sense of respectful gratitude to your Royal Highness for the numerous acts of condescension and kindness which I have on so many occasions experienced from your Royal Highness.

I have the honour to be, with the most sincere respect, Sir, your Royal Highness's most dutiful and most devoted humble servant,

GEORGE COCKBURN.

*To the King.*

[ 938. ]

London, 11th July, 1828, at night.

Since I addressed your Majesty this day, I have received the enclosed letter from his Royal Highness the Duke of Clarence, dated at four this morning, off the North Foreland. It is very unfortunate that his Royal Highness did not wait

till he had received Sir George Cockburn's answer to his Royal Highness's last letter.

I propose to write to his Royal Highness in the morning, to entreat his Royal Highness to reconsider the wish expressed in this letter; and to point out to him the injustice which he will do to Sir George Cockburn, inasmuch as that officer would not have done his duty by your Majesty and by his Royal Highness as an honest counsellor if he had not represented what is contained in his letter to his Royal Highness of the 10th instant.

Reserving myself in respect to the answer to his Royal Highness's proposition, I will submit to his Royal Highness that it is impossible to expect that it can be carried into execution without causing public discussion, and doing his Royal Highness the utmost injury.

Which is submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*Royal Sovereign Yacht, off the North Foreland,*  
11th July, 1828, 4 a.m.

DEAR DUKE,

Finding by the *continued* and *serious* difference of opinion there is between *me* and *Sir George Cockburn*, on points of the utmost consequence concerning his Majesty's naval service, it will not be to the advantage of the public good that *Sir George* should continue *one of my Council*. I am to request your Grace humbly to submit to the King, in *my name*, that Rear-Admiral the honourable Sir Charles Paget may be appointed a member of my Council in the room of Sir George Cockburn.

At the same time I submit to your Grace the sooner this measure takes place the better, in order that Sir Charles Paget may, if possible, be returned to Parliament *before* this session is concluded.

I have also to submit to his Majesty, through your Grace, the appointment of Rear-Admiral Sir Edward Owen to the highly honourable situation of Privy Councillor.

I remain, dear Duke, yours truly,

WILLIAM.

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*The King to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR FRIEND,

Royal Lodge,  
Friday Night, 12 o'clock, 11th July, 1828.

I have this moment received your box, with your long, most interesting and important letter, and other annexations, concerning which at this late hour I will say nothing, but reserve my sentiments (which by-the-bye are

*entirely in unison with your representations*) for a personal interview, when I shall fully enter with you into every part of the present matter, so (as I hope) not only to settle this *immediate* question, but to put the extinguisher upon *all* and *every* future attempt which might (otherwise and at some most unexpected moment) hereafter arise, or rather recur, if not *now*, and *immediately* (but with good humour and firmness), stopped *in limine*. Your time I know in general is (and must be most particularly so at the present moment) so cruelly occupied with a variety of important matter and matters, that I can scarcely bring myself to name any particular day or hour for your attendance upon me, under the apprehension that it might possibly interfere with the only moments of relaxation and comfort which so sparingly fall to your share. However, as the Chancellor is to be in attendance upon me between twelve and one o'clock on Sunday next (the day after to-morrow) to converse over some matters of importance, and to which you must be a primitive, but at any rate a most essential, party, perhaps you will deem it not inconvenient, and more eligible, to come to the Lodge about the *same hour*, by which all purposes may be at once and more easily answered than by separate conferences.

Believe me, always, your most sincere friend,

G. R.

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*Lord Francis Leveson Gower to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Irish Office, 11th July, 1828.

I must apologise for sending you a letter, the greater part of which I have already submitted to your consideration. The fact is that Lord Anglesey, when I informed him that I had made extracts from his letter, was alarmed lest something material should have been omitted; and by his desire I therefore transmit the original letter. The only omission made by me which I should conceive might be considered by his Lordship of importance, was that of the page in the 2nd sheet which I have marked in ink.

Believe me, my dear Duke, ever yours most truly,

F. LEVESON GOWER.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*The Marquess of Anglesey to Lord Francis Leveson Gower.*

MY DEAR LORD FRANCIS,

Phoenix Park, 2nd July, 1828.

I enclose the last reports from Ennis. Baron Tuyl is my first aide-de-camp. Major —— is inspector-general of constabulary of the province of Connaught, in whose charge is also the county of Clare, although not within that province.

I have no doubt of the intention of the agitators to preserve the peace, but when hundreds of thousands of a half barbarous people are excited to feelings of enthusiasm and even of madness, it is impossible to calculate upon tranquillity.

I have inculcated on those in command around Ennis the most perfect forbearance, but the most determined vigour if called upon to act.

I will give you my opinion upon the state of things and upon the great question.

I begin by presuming that I hold in abhorrence the Association, the agitators, the priests and their religion, and I believe that not many, *but that some*, of the bishops are mild, moderate, and anxious to come to a fair and liberal compromise for the adjustment of the points at issue. I think that these latter have very little, if any, influence with the lower clergy and the population.

Such is the extraordinary power of the Association (or rather of the agitators of whom there are many of high ability, of ardent mind and great daring—and if there was no Association, these men are now too well known not to retain their power under the existing order of exclusion) that I am quite certain they could lead on the people to open rebellion at a moment's notice, and their organisation is such that in the hands of desperate and intelligent leaders they would be extremely formidable.

The hope and indeed the probability of present tranquillity rests upon the forbearance and the not very determined courage of O'Connell, and of his belief, as well as of that of the principal men amongst them, that they will carry their cause by unceasing agitation and by intimidation without coming to blows.

I believe their success is inevitable. That no power under heaven can arrest its progress. There may be rebellion. You may put to death thousands. You may suppress it; but it will only be to put off the day of compromise, and in the mean time the country is still more impoverished, and the minds of the people are, if possible, still more alienated, and ruinous expense is entailed upon the empire.

But supposing the whole evil was concentrated in the Association, and that if that was suppressed, all would go smoothly. Where is the man who can tell me *how* to suppress it? Many, many cry out that the nuisance must be abated; that the government is supine; that the insolence of the demagogues is intolerable; but I have not yet found one person capable of pointing out a remedy. All are mute when you ask them to define their proposition. All that even the most determined opposers of emancipation say, is that it is better to leave things as they are, than to risk any change. But *will* things remain as they are? Certainly not. They are bad. They must get worse, and I see no possible means of improving them but by depriving the demagogues of the power of directing the people, and by taking Messrs. O'Connell and Sheil and the rest of them from the Association and placing them in the House of Commons. This desirable object would be at once accomplished.

It was thought here by some that a Catholic might sit in the Imperial Parliament, although he could not have sat either in the English or in the Irish House, but I have been this moment told by the Attorney-General that this is not the case; that a law which was omitted at the Union, was subsequently passed which would prevent his now sitting. It occurs to me that if O'Connell can force himself upon the House and thus establish the Catholics, it would probably be a most fortunate event. It would at once, and as it were by accident, settle this accursed question, and relieve from great embarrassment many a man who, at this moment, opposes the question from habit, and from having committed himself too deeply upon it to recede, but who also begins to be persuaded that the measure is inevitable.\*

3rd July.

The Ennis post is this moment come in. I send for your information, and for that of Mr. Peel, the letters that have been received from thence, and I

\* This is the paragraph marked by Lord Francis Gower.

request you to return them. I have no doubt that in the course of this day we shall hear of the termination of the election. It is expected that there will be an illumination in Dublin. The magistrates who expected one two nights ago absurdly thought of preventing it, and wanted the military for that purpose. This I decline. It is not possible to prevent people from putting candles in their windows, but I shall be perfectly prepared to put down riot if any is attempted.

But to resume the subject of yesterday. The present order of things must not, cannot last. There are three modes of proceeding. 1st. That of trying to go on as we have done. 2ndly. To adjust the question by concession and such guards as may be deemed indispensable. 3rdly. To put down the Association and to crush the power of the priests.

The 1st I hold to be impossible.

The 2nd is practicable and advisable.

The 3rd is only possible by supposing that you can reconstruct the House of Commons; and to suppose that, is to suppose that you can totally alter the feelings of those who send them there. I believe nothing short of the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act and Martial Law will effect the 3rd proposition. This would effect it during their operation, and perhaps for a short time after they had ceased, and then every evil would return with accumulated weight.

But no House of Commons would consent to these measures until there is open rebellion, and therefore until that occurs, it is useless to think of them.

The 2nd mode of proceeding is then, I conceive, the only practicable one. But the present is not a propitious time to effect even this.

I abhor the idea of truckling to the overbearing Catholic demagogues. To make any movement towards conciliation under the present excitement and system of terror would revolt me, but I do most conscientiously and after the most earnest consideration of the subject, give it as my conviction that the first moment of composure and tranquillity should be seized to signify the intention of adjusting the question, lest another period of calm should not present itself. I have considered it to be my duty to state my opinions to you, in order that you may at a convenient moment make them known to Mr. Peel, and through him to the government.

I remain, my dear Lord Francis, very truly yours,

ANGLESEY.

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*To the King.*

[ 939. ]

London, 12th July, 1828.

I have received your Majesty's commands of last night; and I will attend your Majesty to-morrow at the hour which your Majesty has named.

I enclose your Majesty the copy of the answer which I have written to the Duke of Clarence's letter to me, dated off the North Foreland, at four a.m., July 11th.

Which is submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

[ 940. ]

*To the Duke of Clarence.*

SIR,

London, 12th July, 1828.

I had the honour of receiving yesterday in the afternoon your Royal Highness's commands, dated off the North Foreland, at four a.m., July 11th; and I sincerely regret that your Royal Highness had not received the letter written by Sir George Cockburn, in answer to that of your Royal Highness of the 10th instant, before your Royal Highness wrote to me.

I have considered it my duty to make myself acquainted with the circumstances which had occurred, which were the immediate occasion of the wish expressed by your Royal Highness, that Sir George Cockburn should be removed from your Royal Highness's Council; and having perused the letters patent, appointing your Royal Highness to the high situation which you fill, and which define the duties of the members of your Royal Highness's Council; and the Act of Parliament which vests in his Majesty the power of appointing that Council, but leaves their duties as defined in the patent; and having conversed with those who framed that Act,—I cannot but be of opinion that Sir George Cockburn would not have performed his duty by his Majesty, or by your Royal Highness, if he had not written you the letter which he addressed to your Royal Highness on the 10th instant.

Considering the situation of your Royal Highness in this country, it is not fit that you should be involved in pecuniary or official responsibility; or in discussions with the Treasury, or with committees of Parliament about money. It was the special object of the Act of Parliament to relieve your Royal Highness from such responsibility.

On the other hand, your Royal Highness is, I am convinced, too well acquainted with the principles of military discipline and subordination, not to be aware that your Royal Highness cannot hoist the flag of the Lord High Admiral for the purpose of exercising a military command and power, which neither your Royal Highness's patent nor the law enable your Royal Highness to exercise, unless by the special command of his Majesty, which would of course limit the extent of such command.

It is my duty, as the King's minister, to state these opinions to your Royal Highness, and to apprise your Royal Highness

that it is impossible that your Royal Highness's proposition can be persevered in without creating public discussion, and giving to his Majesty and to your Royal Highness much annoyance whatever may be its result. I am certain that your Royal Highness has no real friend who will not give you the same opinion, if he will take the trouble of reading, and of obtaining a competent knowledge of the case.

Under these circumstances I entreat your Royal Highness to reconsider the wish which you have expressed; and that your Royal Highness will allow me to delay to give my answer, or to take his Majesty's pleasure upon your Royal Highness's proposition, till I shall have received your Royal Highness's further commands. I am certain that there is no officer in the navy more anxious than Sir George Cockburn to perform his duty in a manner to give satisfaction to your Royal Highness; and I know that your Royal Highness is too high-minded not to feel that he would be unworthy of your confidence if, differing in opinion with your Royal Highness, he did not frankly state what he thought.

I have the honour to be, Sir, with the highest consideration, respect, and affection, your Royal Highness's most obedient and devoted servant,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Hon. Captain Spencer to the Right Hon. Sir George Cockburn.*

*Royal Sovereign Yacht, off Newhaven,  
12th July, 1828.*

MY DEAR SIR,

His Royal Highness the Duke of Clarence, on a more mature consideration of the tenor of your letter, dated the 10th instant, having applied officially to the King, through the Duke of Wellington, for your removal from the Council of the Lord High Admiral, his Royal Highness is of opinion that any further communication by letter on this subject, for the present, will only cause unnecessary annoyance to himself and you; and he has therefore commanded me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter to him of yesterday and to say to you that, under existing circumstances, he thinks it best no more should be written.

I have the honour to remain, my dear Sir,  
your very faithful servant,

ROBERT SPENCER.

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[ 941. ]

## MEMORANDUM.—SENDING TROOPS TO THE MOREA.

13th July, 1828.

Prince Polignac called upon me yesterday, and read a despatch which he had received from Monsieur de la Ferronays, in which the latter desires him to urge this government to co-operate with France in sending to the Morea a body of troops with a view to force Ibrahim Pacha to quit Greece; or, if circumstances should not permit his Majesty's government to consent to be a party to this operation, they should give their consent to its being carried into execution by France, in the name of the three Powers parties to the Treaty of the 6th July, 1827.

He read me likewise extracts of other despatches from General Guilleminot, Admiral de Rigny, and General \* , who is in Egypt; all of which, together with the despatch of Monsieur de la Ferronays, are intended to be sent to Lord Aberdeen. These last mentioned are intended to show the opinions of the writers, that without the aid of troops it is impossible to get Ibrahim Pacha out of Greece. It is stated that Capo d'Istria is now as anxious as he had been supposed to be otherwise, to obtain the assistance of a body of Allied troops to expel the Egyptians from the Morea. It is said that Ibrahim has been supplied with money by the Porte; and that with money he procures supplies of provisions; and that he may reap the harvest of Greece. Yet Ibrahim has only about 20,000 men, and occupies only Coron, Modon, and Navarino.

It might be hoped that sixty sail of pendants in the Levant, of which twelve of the line, might have prevented the communication with him by sea; and that the Greeks could *at the least* prevent him from separating his army to reap the harvest.

There is besides a despatch from Monsieur de Caraman expressing the opinion of Prince Metternich in favour of this attack upon the Morea; with a view to bring the war in the East more speedily to a termination.

But that which is the most important is what Prince de Polignac told me.

He said that great apprehensions were entertained that the resistance to the Russians in Bulgaria would be greater than had been calculated upon; and that, although the means provided were ample to secure success eventually, more time would

\* Blank in manuscript.

be required than had been expected; and that, in short, a second campaign would be necessary.

That this second campaign would vastly augment the expenses of the war, and the consequent demands for indemnities; and that moreover it appeared that the Russian army were *excessivement montée* by this resistance, and by the expectation of the second campaign; that they were crying out already for an augmentation of indemnities; and that it was greatly to be apprehended that the Emperor would not be found capable of resisting their inclination to continue the war for the purpose of attaining the greatest possible sacrifices on the part of the Porte.

I stated my disbelief of the existence of any spirit of insubordination in the army of which the Emperor would not get the better; upon which Monsieur de Polignac said that Pozzo had stated at Paris that the generals and inferior officers, and the officers in general, were much irritated by the resistance of the Turks, and had been loud in their menaces; and that the Emperor *n'en était plus le maître*. He added that the Emperor had recently given to the Persian army for their services in one campaign above forty millions of francs; and that this army expecting two campaigns were not very moderate in their estimate of the reward which they ought to receive out of the Turkish indemnities.

I cannot say whether I arrived at the real truth of this story. What I believe is this: The Emperor is already tired of the war. He finds that it will be more difficult, will take more time, will cost more money, and will be attended by fewer brilliant events than he expected. He is, therefore, anxious to put an end to it at the earliest possible moment.

The Greek affair is the only real one which he has to settle; and he is anxious to have that one settled for him as soon as possible, by the removal of Ibrahim Pacha from the Morea.

I had heard from another quarter that the Emperor had intended to halt as soon as he should have crossed the Balkan; and it was stated to me that this report had come from the Russians themselves. Now as, if they had entertained such an intention, they would not have announced it, I conclude that it has been announced in consequence of the necessity for a second campaign, which must by this time be obvious.

WELLINGTON.

*The Duke of Clarence to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

*Royal Sovereign Yacht, Portsmouth Harbour,  
13th July, 1828.*

DEAR DUKE,

Your Grace's letter of yesterday has of course reached me, and has given me serious concern, because I see I unfortunately differ with your Grace entirely on the subject of Sir George Cockburn.

When I wrote to your Grace I certainly had not then had Sir George Cockburn's answer to my letter, written on the 10th instant. But I must say I consider this answer of Sir George Cockburn's, if possible, more *disrespectful* and more *impertinent, if possible, than his first*. I must therefore state to your Grace, as the King's minister, that it is *totally* out of my power to carry on his Majesty's naval concerns with Sir George Cockburn as a member of *my* Council, and I must therefore desire your Grace to ask the King to *remove* from *my* Council Sir George Cockburn, and appoint Sir Charles Paget.

I remain, dear Duke, yours truly,

WILLIAM.

[ 942. ]

*To the King.*

London, 14th July, 1828.

I am concerned to have to send your Majesty the enclosed copy of a letter which I received this morning from the Duke of Clarence. I enclose the copy of my answer.

I understand that other Lords of the Lord High Admiral's Council will follow Sir George Cockburn if he should be obliged to retire. I saw Sir Edward Owen this morning, who told me that in his opinion not only the order dated the 10th of July was not a proper one; but that, in general, affairs at the Admiralty were not conducted as the law and the patent appointing his Royal Highness to be Lord High Admiral required they should be; and that he had intended to speak to the Duke of Clarence on the subject if this discussion had not occurred.

All of which is submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

I enclose his Royal Highness's answer to Sir George Cockburn's letter addressed to him.

*To the Duke of Clarence.*

[ 943. ]

SIR,

London, 14th July, 1828.

I was much concerned to receive your Royal Highness's letter of yesterday.

I was in hopes that your Royal Highness would have reviewed the whole case; and would have become sensible that Sir George Cockburn could not have acted otherwise than he has done without a breach of duty towards your Royal Highness, and towards his Majesty.

As, however, your Royal Highness has renewed your commands that I should submit to his Majesty your Royal Highness's wish that Sir George Cockburn should be removed from your Royal Highness's Council, it is necessary that I should consult the Cabinet as to the advice to be given to his Majesty upon this occasion, and I will lay before your Royal Highness the result.

I have the honour, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

14th July, 1828.

I have this morning had an interview with Fitzgerald, Mr. North, and Leslie Foster. The two former are just come from Ireland.

Their impressions are so strong as to the danger of leaving the question as to Mr. O'Connell's eligibility undecided; they think that if Parliament does nothing there will be such despair on the part of the Protestants and such exultation on that of the Catholics, that I think the Cabinet ought to be aware of their views, founded on local information and very recent experience of the state of Ireland.

If we do not stir in the matter of O'Connell I hear that it is likely that some other person will; and we ought therefore to consider whether we will resist a motion for calling O'Connell to the bar. Upon this we must decide without delay, for the petition against him for the county of Clare may be presented to-day.

If it is possible for you to summon a Cabinet for to-day, I wish you would. Fitzgerald may then have an opportunity of stating his views to his colleagues.

Ever yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

*The Right Hon. J. Wilson Croker to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Admiralty, 14th July, 1828.

Sir George Clerk, before he left town, desired me to acquaint your Grace that he made common cause with Sir George Cockburn. I cannot do this better than by enclosing, for your Grace's perusal, a note which he left for Cockburn.

I believe that Lord Brecknock is quite of the same mind; but I have not seen his Lordship since Clerk spoke to me.

Ever, my dear Duke, most faithfully yours,

J. W. CROKER.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*Sir George Clerk to the Right Hon. George Cockburn.*

MY DEAR COCKBURN,

Admiralty, 12th July, 1828.

I regret that I had not an opportunity of speaking to you before you left town to-day, to state to you that, as I entirely approve of the honest and manly course which you have pursued on the occasion of this unfortunate difference of opinion with the Duke of Clarence, I consider myself equally responsible to him if he should continue to disapprove of your conduct on this occasion, and that if, in consequence of it, you should feel it necessary to cease to act as one of his advisers, I should most certainly follow your example. I trust that the view which the Duke of Wellington and his Majesty's government have taken of this question will prevent the possibility of such an event, which, as far as you are concerned, I should consider one of the greatest misfortunes which could befall the naval administration. I will be greatly obliged to you to let me hear from you occasionally, if any further discussion takes place.

I remain yours truly,

GEORGE CLERK.

*The Earl of Brecknock to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Arlington Street, 15th July, 1828.

In case I should not be able to see your Grace, I think it due both to your Grace and to myself to take this opportunity of making my opinion known to you.

I believe Sir G. Cockburn stated to you in his first conversation that I was present when the order arrived from his Royal Highness the Duke of Clarence which has given rise to all the correspondence, that I then entirely agreed with him in the view which he took of the subject, that I thought some step ought to be taken, and I also particularly wished it should be communicated to your Grace.

Since that time Sir G. Cockburn has shown me the letters which he addressed to his Royal Highness the Duke of Clarence and the answers to them, and I think I should not be doing my duty if I did not state to your Grace that I consider Sir George as having taken up the cause in which I (as one of the Council fully concurring in all his views) am equally concerned, that I am embarked in the same boat with him, and that wishing

to uphold the principle, if he, Sir G. Cockburn, should feel it his duty to retire from his office, I shall feel it mine to ask your Grace's permission to follow his example. But I must entreat your Grace to believe that, in taking this step, I am acting upon principle and upon what I consider due to my own honour and character; that I do not lightly or inconsiderately resign the favours which his Majesty, at your recommendation, so kindly conferred upon me. I am fully aware they were not bestowed without difficulty, which enhanced the obligation; and I assure you that, under any circumstances, I shall be most anxious to take every opportunity of showing my gratitude to your Grace personally and my attachment to your government.

I have the honour to remain, my Lord Duke,  
 your Grace's most obedient and faithful servant,  
 BRECKNOCK.

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*The King to the Duke of Clarence.*

MY DEAR WILLIAM, Royal Lodge, Tuesday night, 15th July, 1828.

My friend, the Duke of Wellington, as my first minister, has considered it his duty to lay before me the whole of the correspondence that has taken place with you upon the subject relating to yourself and Sir George Cockburn.

It is with feelings of the deepest regret that I observe the embarrassing situation in which you have placed yourself. You are in error from the beginning to the end. This is not a matter of opinion, but a positive fact; and when the Duke of Wellington so properly calls your attention to the words of your patent, let me ask you how Sir George Cockburn could have acted otherwise?

You must not forget, my dear William, that Sir George Cockburn is the King's Privy Councillor, and so made by the King, to advise the Lord High Admiral.

What becomes of Sir George Cockburn's oath, his duty towards me, his Sovereign, if he fails to offer such advice as he may think necessary to the Lord High Admiral? Am I, then, to be called upon to dismiss the most useful and perhaps the most important naval officer in my service for conscientiously acting up to the letter and spirit of his oath and his duty? The thing is impossible. I love you *most truly*, as you know, and no one would do more or go further to protect and meet your feelings; but on the present occasion I have no alternative; you must give way, and listen to the affection of your best friend and most attached brother,

G. R.

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*To the King.*

[ 944. ]

London, 16th July, 1828.

Sir William Knighton has communicated to me your Majesty's letter to his Royal Highness the Duke of Clarence which is a most able and judicious one; and must produce a good effect.

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I enclose to your Majesty the copy of a letter which I have written this day to his Royal Highness.

Which is submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

[ 945. ]

*To the Duke of Clarence.*

SIR,

London, 16th July, 1828.

I could not but consider the discussions which have recently taken place at the Admiralty, and my correspondence with your Royal Highness upon them, to be of the greatest importance; and I have considered it my duty to draw his Majesty's attention to the subject. I have delayed to give him any advice as his minister; as, to tell your Royal Highness candidly, I was in hopes that I should have been able to prevail upon your Royal Highness to take a different view, not only of the case itself, but likewise of the conduct of Sir George Cockburn; and I was, moreover, desirous of having an opportunity of consulting with my colleagues before I should approach his Majesty with any advice upon a subject of so much importance.

In the mean while his Majesty has thought proper, with his usual kindness and affection towards his brother, and his usual graciousness towards his government, and with his disposition to relieve us from all difficulties, which he has manifested so frequently, to write a letter to your Royal Highness, which he has sent to me to be transmitted to your Royal Highness.

My view of this question is founded entirely upon your Royal Highness's Patent of Appointment, and upon the Act of Parliament the 7th and 8th Geo. IV., cap. 66. I enclose your Royal Highness an extract from your patent containing the clause under which your Royal Highness is enabled to appoint a Council, which clause points out the persons of whom that Council is to be composed, and the duties which they are to perform; and the powers with which they are invested.

The Act of Parliament so far altered this patent as to vest in his Majesty the power of appointing the Council, which the patent had vested in your Royal Highness. It likewise enabled your Royal Highness as Lord High Admiral to perform certain duties, which had been imposed by former Acts upon the First Lord of the Admiralty; and two of your Royal Highness's

by His Majesty's special grace, certain knowledge, and mere motion, have given and granted by these presents do give and grant to you the said William Henry Duke of Clarence full power and authority, as often as you shall please, to create, ordain, constitute, and appoint two or more discreet men and d in maritime affairs, not exceeding in all the number of four, to be called the Council of the High Admiral of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, to advise you the said William Henry Duke of Clarence, High Admiral and Captain-General aforesaid, and to assist you in all things and business, and to receive, examine, and prepare for you for your forwarding, completing and perfecting all matters and things in the offices as aforesaid appertaining and belonging, according to the orders and during the pleasure of you the said William Henry Duke of Clarence, and them and every of them so nominated and appointed at the pleasure of you the said William Henry Duke of Clarence."\*

After this clause follows one granting to his Royal Highness full power and authority to do, execute, exercise, and perform all and every act, matter and thing, belonging or appertaining to the said office of Lord High Admiral.

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*The Duke of Clarence to the King.*

Royal Sovereign Yacht, Portsmouth Harbour,  
17th July, 1828.

Sir,

Your Majesty's most affectionate letter of the 15th instant, from the Royal Lodge, has this moment reached me, and in consequence of another I have also received from the Duke of Wellington, as *the* minister, I think it best to proceed without loss of time to see his Grace in town.

I am fully aware I stand at *this* moment in *two* relations to your Majesty—the one *public*, the other *private*. I rejoice as *brother* the *affection* and *friendship* of *seven and fifty* years remain undiminished, and will I know *always continue so*. But the *duty* I owe my Sovereign is quite another thing; and until I have either convinced the Duke of Wellington that Sir George Cockburn has *materially* erred, or that I shall be obliged to tender my resignation to your Majesty, I will not by seeing your Majesty place *my* Sovereign in that situation where there might be a conflict in the mind of your Majesty between the feelings of a brother and the necessary support the *King* of *this* country *must* give to *his* minister.

I shall, however, make *one* observation to your Majesty, that Sir George Cockburn *cannot* be the *most useful* and the *most important* officer in your Majesty's service, who *never* had the ships *he* commanded in *proper* fighting order.

I remain, Sir, your Majesty's most affectionate  
and most dutiful brother and subject,

WILLIAM.

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\* This power of appointment and removal of the Council is, by Act of Parliament, taken from the Lord High Admiral and placed in the hands of his Majesty.



may equally order that a large one should be incurred, or that any arrangement may be made, or any operation be undertaken; thus rendering useless all the precautions taken to relieve your Royal Highness from responsibility, and inefficient those measures which the constitution of this country requires should be adopted to secure the responsibility of those who perform any public duty.

I have only now to refer to the mode in which Sir George Cockburn proceeded to submit his opinion to your Royal Highness. I assure your Royal Highness that if I thought there was a disrespectful word or intention in any part of that letter I would be the last man to deny it. But it is impossible that Sir George Cockburn could have intended anything excepting to perform his duty by his Majesty and by your Royal Highness, in the mode the most respectful that he could adopt; and he wrote a second letter afterwards upon receiving your Royal Highness's answer to excuse himself, if anything which he had written had unfortunately displeased your Royal Highness.

I submit all this to your Royal Highness and entreat you to consider it maturely; and then to make me acquainted with your pleasure.

I have the honour to be, Sir, with the highest consideration, affection, and respect, your Royal Highness's most obedient and faithful humble servant,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

EXTRACT OF THE PATENT OF THE DUKE OF CLARENCE AS  
LORD HIGH ADMIRAL.

Immediately after the clause appointing his Royal Highness Lord High Admiral follows this clause:—

“And moreover that such office of our High Admiral of our said United Kingdom and other places aforesaid, and Captain-General of our Fleets and Seas and other places aforesaid, and all and everything to the same offices appertaining and belonging throughout the said United Kingdom and other places aforesaid and every of them, shall and may be better and more conveniently executed, We will, ordain, and constitute that from henceforth, at the pleasure of the said William Henry Duke of Clarence, there may and shall be two or more discreet men and skilled in maritime affairs to assist and advise our said High Admiral and Captain-General in all things and business to the offices aforesaid appertaining or belonging, and who shall be and be called the Council of the High Admiral of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland: Know you, therefore, that We, of our

especial grace, certain knowledge, and mere motion, have given and granted and by these presents do give and grant to you the said William Henry Duke of Clarence full power and authority, as often as you shall please, to nominate, ordain, constitute, and appoint two or more discreet men and skilled in maritime affairs, not exceeding in all the number of four, to be called the Council of the High Admiral of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, to advise you the said William Henry Duke of Clarence, High Admiral and Captain-General aforesaid, and to assist you in all things and business, and to receive, examine, and prepare for you and for your forwarding, completing and perfecting all matters and things to the offices as aforesaid appertaining and belonging, according to the orders and during the pleasure of you the said William Henry Duke of Clarence, and them and every of them so nominated and appointed at the pleasure of you the said William Henry Duke of Clarence.\*

After this clause follows one granting to his Royal Highness full power and authority to do, execute, exercise, and perform all and every act, matter and thing, belonging or appertaining to the said office of Lord High Admiral.

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*The Duke of Clarence to the King.*

Royal Sovereign Yacht, Portsmouth Harbour,  
17th July, 1828.

SIR,

Your Majesty's most affectionate letter of the 15th instant, from the Royal Lodge, has this moment reached me, and in consequence of another I have also received from the Duke of Wellington, as *the minister*, I think it best to proceed without loss of time to see his Grace in town.

I am fully aware I stand at *this moment* in *two relations* to your Majesty—the one *public*, the other *private*. I rejoice as *brother* the *affection* and *friendship* of *seven and fifty* years remain undiminished, and will I know *always continue so*. But the *duty* I owe my Sovereign is quite another thing; and until I have either convinced the Duke of Wellington that Sir George Cockburn has *materially* erred, or that I shall be obliged to tender my resignation to your Majesty, I will not by seeing your Majesty place *my Sovereign* in that situation where there might be a conflict in the mind of your Majesty between the feelings of a brother and the necessary support the *King of this country must give to his minister*.

I shall, however, make *one observation* to your Majesty, that Sir George Cockburn *cannot* be the *most useful* and the *most important* officer in your Majesty's service, who *never* had the ships *he* commanded in *proper fighting order*.

I remain, Sir, your Majesty's most affectionate  
and most dutiful brother and subject,

WILLIAM.

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\* This power of appointment and removal of the Council is, by Act of Parliament, taken from the Lord High Admiral and placed in the hands of his Majesty.

*The Duke of Clarence to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Royal Sovereign Yacht, Portsmouth Harbour,  
17th July, 1828.

DEAR DUKE,

I have just received a letter from the King and enclose my answer for his Majesty, which I am to request may be immediately forwarded to the Royal Lodge by a special messenger.

I decline at present answering your Grace's letter of yesterday, because I shall be in town by *eight* this evening in order to have the advantage of conversing with your Grace on the various points of your letter. I shall therefore at present not say anything more, and ever remain,

Dear Duke, yours sincerely,

WILLIAM.

*T. Spring Rice, Esq., M.P. to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD,

House of Commons, 17th July, 1828.

From the proceedings which have taken place in the House of Lords I regret to see that your Grace has been applied to for the purpose of postponing to the next session the Bill for making promissory notes payable at the place of issue.

If I did not consider the matter to be one of great and pressing public exigency, I can assure your Grace that I should not trouble you again on the subject; but if the principle be right, and your Grace has approved of it, I can in a few words point out the motives which render any postponement inconvenient to the public, *if not positively dangerous*.

But allow me in the first place to remove an impression which has, I understand, been suggested with respect to the mode in which this Bill was carried through the House of Commons. Had there been any *haste or surprise*, I can well imagine that your Grace would feel it your duty to withhold or at least suspend your approval of the Bill. But such is not the case. My notice was given (after a full explanation with the Chancellor of the Exchequer) on the 15th May. I explained the object I had in view on the 21st. The Bill was committed, *re-committed*, and did not finally pass the Lower House till the 27th June. I forwarded it as amended to the Northern and Belfast Banks, and to the Bank of Ireland; and through all these stages it passed with the *unanimous* assent of the House of Commons, only one petition being presented against it.

When it reached the Upper House your Grace was so obliging as to permit me to see you. I explained shortly but distinctly and fairly what might be said in favour of and against the measure. I also saw the opponents to the Bill, and though not acquiescing in their arguments, gave them the most sincere advice with respect to the mode in which they could best bring their case under consideration.

The Bill has now been nearly three weeks before the Lords. I think I have *demonstrated* to your Grace that any suggestions of *haste or surprise* are totally inapplicable to the present Bill.

I proceed to state the inconveniences of the postponement.

If postponed for a session, the present bad system must advance. One

Bank will not continue to transact its business to a loss by providing itself generally with gold, if its competitors are allowed to persevere in their present practice. All the paper-circulation of Ireland will become of this objectionable character. Already, since I communicated with a former government (Lord Liverpool's), four great Banks are established issuing paper *not convertible* at the places of issue. Your Grace will find a much more difficult case to deal with next year, and applications innumerable will be made for exceptions and limitations, all breaking down the principle of the Bill.

Again, as new notes will be required to be printed and new stamps paid for, many complicated claims for allowance of duties will also arise. Six months' notice must always be given to enable Banks to prepare for the measure, and it will come into operation more conveniently at the time of the renewal of the Bank licenses than at any other period.

My Lord, the only safety of the paper system consists in convertibility on demand. But Banks issuing paper in one place payable in another, limit and curtail this check. The system may be and is *profitable to the Bank*, but is dangerous to the public. I have endeavoured to do my duty in submitting this Bill. It has passed to its third reading. I trust, if now lost, which I should deplore as a public calamity, that the government will themselves take charge of the question in future.

I have the honour to be, my Lord, with sincere respect,  
your Grace's most obedient very humble servant,

T. SPRING RICE.

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*The Right Hon. J. Wilson Croker to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Admiralty, 18th July, 1828.

As his Royal Highness tells us that he is to see your Grace this morning, I think it as well to apprise your Grace of what we know of his disposition.

Immediately on his arrival (Captain Spencer only had accompanied him) he sent for Sir Edward Owen. We cannot be quite sure of the details of the conversation, nor *how far* Owen acted under his Royal Highness's express authority, but after this interview Owen called on Cockburn, and intimated that if he would *retract* all might be well. Cockburn replied that he would repeat as often as was desired his respect for the Duke, his personal regret at having displeased him, and his disavowal of anything like personal disrespect; that on *all such* points he was willing to go as far as could possibly be suggested; but that as to the *principle* involved in the discussion, *that* he must abide by, and could retract nothing of *that* kind.

Owen is to see the Duke again this morning. I suppose to convey to his Royal Highness Cockburn's answer to his *proposition*; for *such* I consider Owen's overture to have been.

His Royal Highness afterwards sent for me. He talked of ordinary matters with *singular good humour*; told me what he had done in his visitation, and what he *still meant to do*. He alluded very slightly to the pending discussion, but *hinted* at Cockburn with considerable *exasperation*, and talked of *eternal displeasure*, but he did not mention Cockburn's name.

and his allusions were distant enough to allow me to take no notice of them.

My own opinion is decidedly that he means to *submit*. He is, I think, looking out for any *salvo* to his honour, and will be glad to find any *decent excuse* for retracting, and if he cannot find such an excuse he will *retract without one*.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

J. W. CROKER.

[ 946. ]

*To the King.*

London, 18th July, 1828.

I have seen the Duke of Clarence twice this day; and in consequence of his Royal Highness still feeling very strong displeasure that Sir George Cockburn should have written to him on the 10th instant, instead of waiting upon him, Sir George wrote his Royal Highness the letter of which I enclose the copy.

His Royal Highness afterwards saw Sir George Cockburn in my presence; and although I cannot with truth report to your Majesty that his Royal Highness sent away Sir George Cockburn, being entirely satisfied with him, I hope that the business of the Admiralty will hereafter be carried on as it ought to be; according to your Majesty's intentions as manifested in the patent and the law.

His Royal Highness has desired that upon all future occasions he should see Sir George Cockburn and Sir Edward Owen together.

All of which is submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

I have just now seen Lord Melville, who has delivered me the letters with which your Majesty entrusted him.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*The Right Hon. Sir George Cockburn to the Duke of Clarence.*

SIR,

Admiralty, 18th July, 1828.

The Duke of Wellington has informed me of his conversation with your Royal Highness, and I sincerely regret that any act of mine should have incurred your Royal Highness's displeasure.

When I had occasion to submit to your Royal Highness my opinion on the order under your Royal Highness's hand dated the 10th instant, I preferred to do so in writing, on account of the important principle involved

in the proceeding, rather than verbally, in which last mode I feared that I should not have been able to express myself so clearly or so perfectly.

Adhering, as my sense of duty obliges me to do, to the principles stated in the letter in question, I regret exceedingly if, in adopting this mode of performing what I felt and still feel I owed to your Royal Highness, I have incurred your Royal Highness's displeasure, than which, I can sincerely assure your Royal Highness, nothing could have been further from my thoughts and my wishes.

I have the honour to be, with the most perfect respect,

GEORGE COCKBURN.

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*The Duke of Clarence to the King.*

SIR,

Admiralty, 18th July, 1828.

By the letter I had the honour of sending to your Majesty yesterday from Portsmouth, it must be evident I came up with a determination of having a full explanation with the Duke of Wellington.

It has taken place, and I therefore hope, considering the anxious desire I must have to give your Majesty's government as little trouble as possible, I may yet be of use to my Sovereign in the situation I now hold from your Majesty's gracious kindness to me, and I have in consequence to inform your Majesty that I return to-morrow to Portsmouth to continue my annual inspection of the out-ports and to exercise for a few days with the three-deckers.

I remain, Sir, your Majesty's most affectionate and most dutiful brother and subject,

WILLIAM.

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*To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.*

[ 947. ]

MY DEAR PEEL,

London, 19th July, 1828.

I think your answer to Lord Anglesey very right; and that you ought to remind him to have a short-hand writer at the Association.

But I think he ought to write officially when he thinks that any fact or opinion should be communicated to the Cabinet or to the King. The correspondence will then stand thus,—You will communicate what you think proper. When he wishes that anything should be communicated he will write officially.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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## [ 948. ] MEMORANDUM UPON THE TOPICS OF THE KING'S SPEECH.

19th July, 1828.

The King continues to receive from his Allies and in general from all foreign Powers assurances of their continued friendship.

Since he last addressed Parliament he has continued his endeavours to restore peace to the Levant, under the provisions of the Treaty of the 6th of July, in concert with his Allies the King of France and the Emperor of Russia.

The last mentioned Sovereign has found himself under the necessity of declaring war against the Ottoman Porte, on grounds affecting only Russian interests ; and not arising out of the stipulations of the Treaty of the 6th July, 1827, or its consequences. His Majesty sincerely laments these hostilities, and he will omit no efforts to restore peace between the parties.

But his Imperial Majesty having divested himself of his character of a belligerent in the Mediterranean, and having revoked the instructions given to the Admiral of his squadron in that sea, having for their object hostile operations against the Ottoman Porte, his Majesty has been enabled to continue to act in concert with his Imperial Majesty in those measures necessary to complete the execution of the Treaty of the 6th of July.

When his Majesty last addressed you he had every reason to hope that the arrangement which had been made for the government of Portugal till the period at which the Emperor Don Pedro should have completed his abdication, would have secured the happiness of that country, in whose welfare his Majesty feels the utmost interest in common with all his subjects, and for which his Majesty has made the greatest sacrifices.

His Majesty refrains from adverting to the details of what has occurred there, to prevent which neither advice nor remonstrance on his part have been wanting. But these occurrences have occasioned the departure of his Majesty's ambassador from Lisbon, together with the ministers plenipotentiary of every Power in Europe ; thus marking to the world the sense entertained by his Majesty and by his Allies of what has occurred. His Majesty relies upon the wisdom of the august head of the house of Braganza to adopt such measures as may

be necessary to secure the interests and honour of that house, and the peace and welfare of the dominions over which it reigns.

[Thanks for the supply.]

[The growing prosperity of the country.]

WELLINGTON.

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DRAFT OF THE KING'S SPEECH AT THE CLOSE OF THE SESSION, 1828.

MY LORDS AND GENTLEMEN,

We are commanded by his Majesty to acquaint you that the business of the session having been brought to a close, his Majesty is enabled to release you from your attendance in Parliament.

His Majesty commands us at the same time to return to you his warm acknowledgments for the zeal and diligence with which you have applied yourselves to the consideration of many subjects of great importance to the public welfare.

The provisions which you have made for the regulation of the import of corn, combining adequate protection for domestic agriculture with due precautions against the consequences of a deficient harvest, will, in the confident expectation of his Majesty, promote the inseparable interests of all classes of his subjects.

We are commanded by his Majesty to acquaint you that his Majesty continues to receive from his Allies, and from all foreign Powers, assurances of their friendly disposition towards this country.

The endeavours of his Majesty to effect the pacification of Greece in concert with his Allies, the King of France and the Emperor of Russia, have continued unabated.

His Imperial Majesty has found himself under the necessity of declaring war against the Ottoman Porte, upon grounds concerning exclusively the interests of his own dominions, and unconnected with the stipulations of the Treaty of the 6th July, 1827.

His Majesty deeply laments the occurrence of these hostilities, and will omit no effort of friendly interposition to restore peace.

The determination of the Powers parties to the Treaty of the 6th July to effect the objects of that Treaty remains unchanged.

His Imperial Majesty has consented to waive the exercise in the Mediterranean of any rights appertaining to his Imperial Majesty in the character of a belligerent Power, and to recall the separate instructions which had been given to the commander of his naval forces in that sea, directing hostile operations against the Ottoman Porte.

His Majesty will therefore continue to combine his efforts with those of the King of France and his Imperial Majesty, for the purpose of carrying into complete execution the stipulations of the Treaty of London.

His Majesty commands us to acquaint you that his Majesty had every reason to hope, when he last addressed you, that the arrangements which had been made for administering the government of Portugal until the period at which the Emperor of Brazil should have completed his abdica-



tion of the throne of Portugal would have secured the peace and promoted the happiness of a country in the welfare of which his Majesty has ever taken the deepest interest.

The just expectations of his Majesty have been disappointed, and measures have been adopted in Portugal in disregard of the earnest advice and repeated remonstrances of his Majesty, which have compelled his Majesty, and the other Powers of Europe acting in concert with his Majesty, to withdraw their representatives from Lisbon.

His Majesty relies upon the wisdom of the august Sovereign, the head of the house of Braganza, to take the course which shall be best calculated to maintain the interests and honour of that illustrious family, and to secure the peace and happiness of the dominions over which it reigns.

GENTLEMEN OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS,

We are commanded by his Majesty to thank you for the supplies which you have granted to him for the service of the present year. His Majesty will apply them with the utmost regard to economy, and will continue a deliberate revision of the several public establishments, with a view to any further reduction which may be compatible with the dignity of the Crown, and with the permanent interests of the country.

MY LORDS AND GENTLEMEN,

His Majesty commands us to congratulate you upon the general prosperity of the country, and upon the satisfactory state of the public revenue. His Majesty contemplates the increase of our financial resources with peculiar gratification, on account of the decisive proof which it exhibits that the condition of his subjects is one of progressive improvement.

His Majesty commands us, in conclusion, to assure you that his unabated exertions will be directed to inculcate among foreign Powers a spirit of mutual good will, and to encourage the industry, to extend the commerce, and advance the general welfare of his own dominions.

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[ 949. ] MEMORANDUM UPON THE AFFAIRS IN THE LEVANT.

19th July, 1828.

The principles on which the Treaty of the 6th of July was founded were not to make a conquest of Greece, not to deprive the Ottoman Porte of a valuable province, not to establish the Greeks in a state of qualified independence in relation to the Porte, but to re-establish peace upon a permanent basis in the Levant, a peace not less required by humanity than by the interests of all the Powers of Europe.

The measures proposed by the Treaty were first those of friendly remonstrance and persuasion, and next those calculated to prevent the collision of the parties to the war. These

necessarily occasioned coercion ; but even measures of war are not excluded from those which the three Powers engaged by this Treaty contemplated the possible necessity of adopting in order to attain their object. But the three Powers positively engaged to each other and to the world that they would not become parties to the hostilities carrying on in this contest.

For this reason, and because his Majesty's government entered into these engagements with the belief that the government of the Ottoman Porte were unable to re-establish their authority in Greece by force of arms, his plenipotentiary in these conferences has always been instructed to object to measures of actual hostility unless positively forced upon the Allies in the course of the execution of those operations which have been undertaken to prevent the collision of the belligerent parties.

Events have, however, materially altered the situation of affairs. It might have been expected that, Ibrahim Pacha occupying only the three posts of Navarino, Coron, and Modon, twelve sail of the line and more than the usual proportion of vessels of a smaller size would have been able to cut off from him all communication with and supplies from Egypt and elsewhere ; and that the Greeks might have been able to make an effort to prevent him from separating his army to reap the harvest of Greece, and applying its means of transport to collect it.

But various circumstances have contributed to disappoint the first of these expectations ; and in respect to the last it is quite clear that the Greeks can do nothing which can tend effectually to remove Ibrahim Pacha from the country, or to render the tenure of his position within it difficult to him.

In the mean time important events are occurring in other quarters ; and it is necessary that the Allies should be prepared for their probable consequences. Under these circumstances his Majesty's government adopt the measure proposed by his Most Christian Majesty.

His Majesty does not find himself enabled to employ any troops in the Morea. But he is willing, by every means in his power, to aid in the execution of the project either by augmenting his naval force in the Mediterranean, if it should be thought desirable by his Allies, or by such disposition or use of it as may tend to give his Most Christian Majesty most facility

in carrying this project into execution. Trusting to his Most Christian Majesty that this measure will be carried into execution on the true principles of the Treaty of the 6th July, 1827; that the operations which shall be carried on will be limited by the necessity of the case; and that the troops will be withdrawn as soon as Ibrahim Pacha shall have evacuated the Morea, whether by sea or land.

WELLINGTON.

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[ 950. ] MEMORANDUM.—AFFAIRS OF PORTUGAL AND THE BRAZILS.

19th July, 1828.

The state of affairs in Portugal, in all its details, should be made known to Don Pedro; and the absolute hopelessness of the success of any contest in favour of the Constitution should be pointed out to him. This is obvious, not only from the result of the recent contest, but from all its circumstances.

The opposition to Don Miguel and his plans was commenced by the military in the north of Portugal. Many joined those who originally revolted. Some merchants in the town of Oporto subscribed money to pay these troops, which not improbably might have occasioned their revolt; and they were certainly in larger numbers in the early days of the revolt than their antagonists; and they formed, in truth, the only disciplined body that existed in the country of sufficient strength to undertake any operation. But they effected nothing, owing either to the want of energy of their leaders, to their want of confidence in themselves, or to their feeling that the spirit, feelings, and sentiment of the country were against them.

Don Miguel collected against them, after much delay, a body very superior in numbers, but inferior in discipline, organisation, and all the qualities of soldiers; and the revolted troops retired from the strong country on the Mondego, and through that between the Mondego and the Douro; crossed the Douro and abandoned Oporto, having been first abandoned by the officers who pretended to lead them, without striking a blow, or any military event of any importance whatever.

The troops are reported to have retired into Spain, where they will probably be made prisoners. The officers who headed them are on their passage to England.

In the mean time the whole country has submitted to Don Miguel.

The Emperor Don Pedro must see that a contest on his part to recover possession of Portugal for himself or his daughter, and to re-establish in that country the Constitution, would be hopeless. He has not the means even of conquering the Banda Oriental. How can he find those to reconquer the kingdom of Portugal?

The wisest step that he can take now, that which will provide best for his own security and peace, for the peace of Portugal, and for the happiness of the house of Braganza, would be that he should come to an arrangement with his brother. This arrangement should have for its object the settlement of the conflicting claims of the family by the marriage of the daughter of the Emperor with Don Miguel.

The time is not yet come for us to pronounce upon the line which we will take in case Don Pedro should not follow this advice, and should persist in endeavouring to reconquer a footing in Portugal, notwithstanding the state of affairs in that kingdom, as above represented to him. But he should be reminded that he has abdicated that kingdom in favour of his daughter, Donna Maria da Gloria; and that any steps which he may take must be as her guardian and protector, and in her name, and on her behalf. Everything that is done, therefore, must be for her; and we may as well at this early period inform Don Pedro that we do not propose to allow of any further dismemberment of the Portuguese monarchy; that we consider the division of territory as made between his father and him, and the separation of Brazil and Portugal as final; and that we shall not allow of the seizure of any of the Portuguese colonies for Brazil.

WELLINGTON.

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OBSERVATIONS ON A DESPATCH UPON THE AFFAIRS OF [ 951.]  
PORTUGAL.

No, 1, sheet 1, page 4. — Sir Charles Stuart was the ambassador in Brazil of King John VI., as well as of his Majesty. It was in the former capacity that he took charge of the Charter to carry it to Portugal. This should be clearly stated in this despatch.

No. 2, same sheet and page.—Did we, in fact, ever give a recommendation to adopt the Constitution? I do not recollect that we did. If we did, it was only as being the act of the undoubted sovereign Don Pedro.

Note 3, sheet 2, page 1.—Is this strictly true? If true, is it proper to state in an ostensible despatch that we adopted our measure in opposition to a party in Spain. We sent an army, for the reasons stated in the preceding paragraph, with positive orders not to interfere in internal affairs. We must stand upon these reasons; and there is no use in discussing collateral results from our measures.

Note 4, sheet 2, page 2.—If the preceding paragraph is omitted, the word *also* ought to be omitted in this; and I would propose to end the subject at the word *renown*. The next paragraph might be understood as limiting the approbation of free institutions, and encouraging Don Miguel to discover grounds upon which his Majesty's government would not disapprove of the Constitution being overthrown.

No. 5, sheet 2, page 4.—Is this true? He is now acting under the commission of Lieutenant of his brother. I am quite certain that there is a very able despatch from Mr. Canning taking the opposite ground, viz., that Don Miguel had no right to the Regency under the Charter when he should attain the age of 25 years. This objection applies to the whole reasoning down to Observation No. 9.

But I have other objections:—

No. 6, sheet 3, page 1.—First, the words *Apostolical* party. This is a term of which I for one do not know the meaning.

No. 7, sheet 3, page 1.—The same objection as to No. 5.

No. 8, sheet \* , page 2.—*Apostolical*.

No. 9, sheet 3, page 3.—Is not this an avowal too strong, and even beyond the fact of the interference of England and Austria, in his appointment to the Regency?

My opinion is that the advice to be given to him to maintain what exists should be founded, first, upon his oath; secondly, upon the preference of his Majesty to institutions of that description; thirdly, upon the necessity of his governing by force, and by a party, if he attempts to overturn what exists; fourthly, upon the certainty of his perpetuating by these means the in-

\* Blank in manuscript.

fluence and interference of the Emperor Don Pedro in the internal concerns of Portugal; as his Imperial Majesty must protect his own act, the Constitution, and those who profess an attachment to it, particularly if they should be martyrs.

No. 10, sheet 4, page 1.—I quite agree with Lamb in thinking that the statement in this paragraph is not true.

We should not like to see the overthrow of the Portuguese Constitution by force or fraud. But if any foreign Power were to invade Portugal, the overthrow of the Constitution would not prevent this country (nor ought it) from giving Portugal the assistance stipulated by treaty.

A sense of honour, founded upon past transactions, and a sense of safety, would prevent this country from suffering any foreign Power to establish itself in \* , whatever might be its constitution.

No. 11, sheet 4, page 3.—The words *fraud* or *force* are strong.

No. 12, sheet 4, page 4.—It would be advisable to make this the subject of another despatch, which would go down to sheet 8, page 4. All the advice contained in this part of the despatch is excellent. But I confess I doubt the expediency of giving it. The truth is, that Donna Maria is the Queen, and Don Miguel is the Lieutenant of his brother. The Queen is a minor in the possession of the Emperor Don Pedro, who has not yet completed his abdication.

The arguments to be used to him are very correct. But unless a right is given to Don Miguel, which is not given yet, I don't see how you could address him advice not to make war against his brother, which war would, under existing circumstances, be neither more nor less than rebellion.

I would, therefore, limit this despatch to assurances that the King and the Emperor of Austria were sensible of the necessity of having the abdication completed, and the Queen sent to Portugal as soon as possible; and urging the Infanta to wait with patience till they should have accomplished their purpose.

The Infanta might be made use of to urge the King of Spain to recognise Don Pedro as Emperor of Brazil.

No. 13, sheet 8, page 4.—From this to the end of the despatch would be a very good addition to the first part as one despatch.

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\* Blank in manuscript.

I must observe, however, that this part of the despatch contains some symptoms of jealousy of a good understanding with Spain, which jealousy I should think quite consistent with our true policy. Our object must be, first, that Portugal should be independent of all; secondly, that she should be on good terms with her neighbour; because as long as she is so, she can be no burthen upon us.

WELLINGTON.

[ 952. ]

*To the Earl of Aberdeen.*

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, London, 20th July, 1828.

Allow me to remind you to look with attention at the articles of the Treaty with Portugal respecting the rights of the King's subjects residing there, and the duties of the *Jury Conservador*. We should send orders upon this subject by the next packet.

It would likewise be necessary to take some steps respecting the protection of the squadrons at Oporto and in the Tagus claimed by his Majesty's subjects residing in Oporto and at Lisbon.

It is very reasonable that they should have such protection upon extraordinary occasions; and when it suits the public convenience to afford it. But it will not answer to allow his Majesty's subjects to continue to reside in a country in a state of revolution, in which they think their residence is not quite safe, and to reckon upon the constant presence of our squadron, not only to give them protection, but to carry them off at any moment. I think that you should by Wednesday's mail recall to their recollection the usual practice. Inform them that the King's ships will remain in the Tagus and the Douro five days after the receipt of your letters; and that such of them as think proper may come away in those ships. But that they must not look to the constant presence of his Majesty's ships in the Tagus for their protection. The laws of the country, and his Majesty's treaties with the Crown of Portugal, are fully sufficient in ordinary circumstances to protect them in their pursuits if they conduct themselves as they ought. If the state of affairs in Portugal is such as to occasion to any of them uneasiness, they must come away; as his Majesty's government cannot maintain a squadron in the Tagus and another in the Douro to protect their residence in a country which, in their own opinion, is in

such a state of disturbance as not to afford them reasonable safety for their persons, or security in their transactions.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To Dean Phillipotts.*

[ 953. ]

MY DEAR SIR,

London, 20th July, 1828.

I have to apologise for having omitted to answer your letters; but I had really much to do at the time; and I had nothing to tell you, but to thank you. You will have seen that the plot thickens in Ireland. The worst of the mischief is that our foundation fails us whether we look to a settlement or to resistance; I mean in the House of Commons. And if we may judge from what has happened recently in Ireland, any measures that we might adopt under other circumstances to ameliorate our situation in that particular, and even delay, will only make our situation worse, and lead to total ruin.

God will keep me in the right road I hope; but I don't believe that this country was ever placed in a position of such difficulty.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To the King.*

[ 954. ]

London, 21st July, 1828.

The enclosed letter will inform your Majesty of the loss which you have sustained, in common with all your Majesty's subjects.

It will be necessary immediately to consider of a successor to the Archbishop. Those who by talents, qualifications, and reputation, stand the highest are the Bishop of London and the Bishop of Durham. The latter would be preferable. But he would supersede the Bishop of London; and it would be very unfortunate if any dissatisfaction, resulting from such supersession, should occasion a difference, or even coolness, between the persons filling the sees of Canterbury and of London. The



Bishop of Durham has but recently been promoted ; and I believe is quite satisfied and happy.

If your Majesty should determine to prefer the Bishop of London, the best person to succeed to the see of London would be the Bishop of Chester.

If your Majesty should determine to prefer the Bishop of Durham, the best person to succeed to the see of Durham would be the Bishop of Lincoln.

He would be preferable to the Bishop of Chester at Durham ; who, on the other hand, would be preferable to the Bishop of Lincoln in the see of London, Bishop Hooley being preferred to be Archbishop.

Upon the whole, I would recommend to your Majesty to promote the Bishop of London to the see of Canterbury ; and the Bishop of Chester to the see of London.

The person who stands first for promotion to be a bishop is Dr. Ireland, Dean of Westminster ; and I would recommend to your Majesty to promote him to be Bishop of Chester, retaining his Deanery of Westminster.

All of which is submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

I need not tell your Majesty that I have not had any communication with any of the persons above mentioned on the subject of this letter. The whole subject is open to your Majesty.

PENSIONS payable out of the CONSOLIDATED FUND to the ROYAL FAMILY.

His Royal Highness the Duke of Clarence :—

	£.
43 Geo. III. cap. 45 .. .. .	6,000
58 Geo. III. cap. 53 .. .. .	17,500
1 and 2 Geo. IV. cap. 119.. .. .	6,000
7 and 8 Geo. IV. cap. 110 .. .. .	3,000
	<u>32,500</u>

His Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland :—

43 Geo. III. cap. 45 .. .. .	6,000
58 Geo. III. cap. 53 .. .. .	15,000
6 Geo. IV. cap. 51 .. .. .	6,000
	<u>27,000</u>

His Royal Highness the Duke of Sussex :—		£.
43 Geo. III. cap. 45 .. .. .		6,000
58 Geo. III. cap. 53 .. .. .		15,000
		<u>21,000</u>
His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge :—		
43 Geo. III. cap. 45 .. .. .		6,000
58 Geo. III. cap. 53 .. .. .		21,000
		<u>27,000</u>
His Royal Highness the Duke of Gloucester :—		
43 Geo. III. cap. 45 .. .. .		14,000
Her Royal Highness the Princess Sophia of Gloucester :—		
43 Geo. III. cap. 45 .. .. .		7,000
Her Royal Highness the Duchess of Gloucester :—		
52 Geo. III. cap. 31 .. .. .		9,000
58 Geo. III. cap. 53 .. .. .		4,000
		<u>13,000</u>
Her Royal Highness the Princess of Hesse Hombourg (Elizabeth) :—		
By same Acts .. .. .		13,000
Her Royal Highness the Princess Augusta :—		
By same Acts .. .. .		13,000
Her Royal Highness the Princess Sophia :—		
By same Acts .. .. .		13,000
Her Royal Highness the Duchess of Kent :—		
58 Geo. III. cap. 53 .. .. .		6,000
6 Geo. IV. cap. 51 .. .. .		6,000
		<u>12,000</u>
Her Royal Highness the Duchess of Clarence :—		
7 and 8 Geo. IV. cap. 10 .. .. .		6,000
His Royal Highness the Prince of Cobourg :—		
56 Geo. III. cap. 24 .. .. .		50,000
OUT of the 4½ per CENT. FUND.		
Her Royal Highness the Princess of Hesse Hombourg ..		1,000
Her Royal Highness the Duchess of Gloucester .. ..		1,000

*Viscount Beresford to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Ordnance Office, 23rd July, 1828.

From my enquiries to-day it appears very doubtful where the militia arms are kept in Ireland. I annex the only information we have on this

matter and extracts from the Acts of Parliament. We send to-day to the respective officers in Dublin, to give us full information on this head, which Lord Downes will communicate to you on its arrival.

Yours sincerely,

BERESFORD.

P.S.—Lord Downes tells me that at Cullen, head-quarters Louth militia, there is an armoury built by the county, where two or three years since he saw the arms of that regiment.

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

Tower, 23rd July, 1828.

Messrs. Porrett and Scott present their compliments to Mr. Butler, and, in reply to his note of this day, have to acquaint him that the store accounts from Ireland do not furnish any information respecting the places of deposit of the arms of the regiments of Irish militia; but they conclude these arms are in county depôts, as in England, in the care of the adjutants of the permanent Staff, the colonels of the respective regiments having given receipts for them to the Ordnance.

In the store return from Charlemont there appear 1357 muskets, distinguished from the rest in store by being described as "militia" muskets, but no such distinction is made in any of the other returns, so that it cannot be stated whether the general store includes any from militia regiments.

II.

! EXTRACTS from Act, 4th George IV., cap. 59.

3. "And be it further enacted, that every adjutant, paymaster, surgeon, quartermaster, and every non-commissioned officer and drummer on permanent pay of regular militia, when disembodied, shall be constantly resident within the city, town, or place where the arms of the corps to which such officers belong are kept, or within such reasonable distance of the depôt as shall be sanctioned by the Secretary-at-War."

4. "And be it further enacted, that the quartermaster of each regiment of militia in which a quartermaster is appointed, and when no quartermaster is appointed, then the paymaster shall have the charge and care of the arms, accoutrements, great coats, clothing, necessaries, and other stores, under the superintendance of the colonel or commandant; and the paymaster shall out of the allowance of 2d. per month for each private man and drummer directed by this Act to be issued and paid for defraying the contingent expenses of such regiment, battalion, or corps, from time to time issue and pay such sums of money as may be necessary for the repair of arms and other usual contingent expenses, upon an order in writing signed by the colonel or other commandant."

29. "And be it further enacted, that the hire or cost of any house or place to be provided for the keeping of the arms, accoutrements, clothing, or other stores, and for the residence and accommodation of the permanent Staff belonging to any regiment or battalion of militia in Ireland, when not embodied, that is to say, of the paymaster, adjutant, surgeon, and quartermaster thereof, shall be defrayed by the county; and the necessary sum for that purpose shall be raised by the presentment of the grand jury of the said county."

31. " Provided always, and be it enacted, that it shall and may be lawful for the Lord-Lieutenant, or other chief governor or governors of Ireland for the time being (if he or they shall see sufficient cause for so doing) to order and direct that the arms, accoutrements, and other stores, or any part thereof, belonging to any regiment or battalion of the said militia, shall at any time while such regiment or battalion shall not be embodied or in actual service, be conveyed to, and deposited and kept in, any of his Majesty's ordnance stores in the city of Dublin, or to and in any such ordnance store, or to and in any other place of security in any other part of Ireland, as he or they shall from time to time order or direct, and under such rules and regulations as he or they shall think fit and proper in that behalf."

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*To the Bishop of Chester.*

[ 955. ]

MY LORD,

London, 24th July, 1828.

I have received his Majesty's commands to inform your Lordship that his Majesty, intending to translate the Bishop of London to the see of Canterbury, with the consent of the Lord Bishop, proposes with the consent of your Lordship to translate you to the see of London. I have great pleasure in making you acquainted with his Majesty's gracious intentions, and with this mark of his Majesty's favour and confidence.

The arrangement will take place as soon after the funeral of the late Archbishop as possible ; and as his Majesty is desirous of having an opportunity of conversing with the Bishop of London and your Lordship, it will be desirable that you should come to London.

I have the honour, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Duke of Clarence to the Lord Chancellor.*

MY DEAR LORD,

*Royal Sovereign Yacht, Hamoaze, 24th July, 1828.*

From the multiplicity of the business on my annual inspection at this arsenal, it has really not been in my power sooner to acknowledge your Lordship's letter of 21st instant.

It either requires *no* answer or a *very long* one. But I shall make some remarks on parts. In the greater part of your Lordship's letter I agree entirely. Only I must observe that the data on which your Lordship reasons is incorrect, because the correspondence to which your Lordship alludes was forced on me by the ill-timed and ill-advised letter of an individual ; and, after what had passed between the Duke of Wellington and myself, I have been and am anxious to obliterate the whole transaction. I therefore conceive this a perfect answer to the great mass of your Lordship's letter. At the same time it is but justice to the naval part of my

Council to state that, by letters I have received from them since my late departure from London, my orders respecting the discipline of the King's fleet are obeyed with more promptitude.

I entirely coincide with your Lordship that the situation of the Lord High Admiral is very far different from the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces.

So far from the annual visit I think it my duty to make to the out-ports during peace hurting my health, I find myself, with care and attention, much the better; and as, of course, during war the thing would be utterly impossible, I conceive it my peculiar duty in peace to do so. Of course, if urgent matters required my presence in London I should remain there. The eye of the First Lord of the Admiralty or of the Lord High Admiral does infinite good, and the nation at large felt the advantage of Lord Sandwich annually visiting the arsenals from 1771 till the war with America and France. I carry with me the estimates back to London, unless they are points that may require *immediate* decision, and then I send them at once to my Council. In addition to all this I have one most important observation to make, that, even including Cork, which I do not visit, I trust and hope to place before the minister next October every estimate that can be made to complete all our various arsenals to the utmost extent they can and ought to be carried, leaving only the time and the sums to his Majesty's confidential servants to arrange as suits their public duty.

I ever remain, my dear Lord, yours sincerely,

WILLIAM.

---

*James Stephen, Esq., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Master in Chancery's Office, Thursday evening,  
24th July, 1828.

MY LORD DUKE,

After an absence from town of four or five days, occasioned by an alarming accident to one of my sons at Brighton, I find on my return to my official duties letters from respectable friends deeply interested, like myself, in the anti-slavery cause, which seem to impose on me the duty of thus intruding on your Grace, though I am not unconscious that it is a measure which may naturally be regarded as presumptuous. It is understood I find that your Grace, in your reply to Lord Calthorpe in a late debate, disclaimed the right of the British Parliament to legislate in the interior concerns of the colonies; and my friends call my attention to this as a death-blow if unrepelled to all our hopes on behalf of the unfortunate slaves. I was about to write in return my assent to that opinion, adding that I saw not any remedy, unless it might be found in a new style of appeal to the people at large, among whom it has, since the resolutions of May 1823, been a great and, in my opinion, a very unfortunate sedative, that they have considered our cause as ultimately safe in the hands of our rulers, and it has therefore been doubted by no small part of its most influential friends whether invocations of the popular voice were really necessary or useful. On such brief reflection as my official occupations during the day have allowed, I have changed these views so far as to think it possible, and even very probable, that your-Grace's meaning may have been mis-

understood, though certainly my impressions from the report of the debate that I saw, were not different from those of my correspondents; and that it may not yet be too late to prevent the mischief that I foresee in the West Indies if you should think it right by explanation in Parliament to correct the misrepresentation or mistake of the reporters.

That misrepresentation or mistake it must have been I am inclined to think, because, though the expediency of parliamentary legislation on the subject has been unhappily denied, I am not aware that any statesman of any party, or at any time, even in the utmost effervescence of the American quarrel, or when conciliation at the end of it was the general spirit, ever denied that the right of interior legislation was inherent in Parliament throughout the King's British dominions for every other purpose but that of imposing taxes; and because it appears to me a solecism in policy to maintain that the colonies are a part of the British empire, and yet to deny that such a right resides in the imperial legislature. If there be no such right, then Jamaica and Hanover stand in the same relation to us; and a multitude of Acts of Parliament, the Abolition Act among the rest, ought to be repealed as manifest usurpations. But it is not for the sake of legal or constitutional principles that I would thus presume to intrude. The heart-stirring consideration with me is that if, upon the high authority of the Duke of Wellington, the doctrine in question goes forth to the West Indies as the sense of the British government, the hopes of humanity and justice on behalf of the unfortunate slaves will, as I firmly believe, be finally extinguished. The bands of a merciless homicidal oppression may be burst by a sanguinary revolution, but never will be relaxed by pacific or bloodless reformation. The fear of effectual reformation by the British Parliament will be no more, and that this is the only motive that has produced, or could possibly produce, in the West Indies any mitigation whatever, real or ostensible, of that cruel yoke under which the poor slaves are suffering and perishing, no man who knows the case as intimately as I have done for forty-five years can possibly doubt.

The truth is as unquestionable to me almost as my own existence, and the conviction of it will, I hope, be my excuse. The measure I am taking is singular, but so is the occasion that leads to it; and if the Duke of Wellington had feared to act an extraordinary part in extraordinary circumstances, where would have been the liberty and the independency of England and of Europe? where the peace and order of the whole civilised world? Ah! my Lord Duke, God has raised you up as an instrument of astonishing mercies to your country and mankind. Let not, then, your purest glories be sullied by siding with the oppressors against the oppressed. Add rather a wreath to your brow more brilliant and more lasting than the many it is already girt with, by succouring and sustaining, as you of all men best can, that sacred but I fear sinking cause of which I am a feeble advocate. Secure to yourself consolation in your declining years and at the hour of death, and afterwards a crown of glory that fadeth not away.

I have the honour to be, with the heartfelt gratitude that every Englishman owes to you, and with the greatest respect,

My Lord Duke, your most obedient and faithful servant,

JAMES STEPHEN.

Council to state that, by letters I have received from them since my late departure from London, my orders respecting the discipline of the King's fleet are obeyed with more promptitude.

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I ever remain, my dear Lord, yours sincerely,

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MY LORD DUKE,

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think betrays his duty to his Sovereign and to the public by lukewarmness in the cause of these reforms in the colonies, rather than to produce a premature and forced adoption of them by popular clamour.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*The Right Hon. J. Wilson Croker to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Admiralty, 25th July, 1828.

In obedience to your Grace's commands I have consulted Sir George Cockburn on the means which we could afford towards the transport of the French troops from Toulon to the Morea. Cockburn (soit dit en passant) quite agrees with me that it would be desirable, on a great many accounts, to avoid this transaction if possible: but that is no affair of *ours*.

I enclose a list of our whole force in the Mediterranean, and the number of troops they could convey; but, as the force is much dispersed, the Admiral could not hope to be able to collect more than *half* his total strength for this object: in other words, he might undertake to convey about 2000 men in ships of war; but there appear also to be four or five transports in the Mediterranean which he could appropriate to a service of this nature, which would probably carry 1200 or 1500 men more.

In any case, I submit that it would be desirable that all the measures should be taken in the Mediterranean, and that the matter should not get wind in England, which would be the case if we were to send any transports hence.

I am, my dear Duke, yours most faithfully,

J. W. CROKER.

P.S.—Cockburn thinks that transports might be sent from England without difficulty, and that he would prefer that mode to the employment of the men-of-war.

*Lord Stuart de Rothesay to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Paris, 25th July, 1828.

The French government are greatly pleased with the answer which has been received from England respecting the expedition to the Morea, and appear inclined to follow the same course with ourselves in almost every question of foreign policy. Their internal affairs have certainly improved within these two months, though I fear the improvement has been brought about by rather too much concession to the Liberal party.

Ever faithfully yours,

STUART DE ROTHESAY.



[ 956. ]

*To James Stephen, Esq.*

SIR,

London, 25th July, 1828.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 24th instant; and although I must decline to explain in Parliament what I said in debate, which has been misrepresented in the newspapers, I have no objection to inform you that I did not say anything so absurd as that Parliament had no right to legislate for the West Indian colonies. I must have forgotten all that had passed, and the principle on which I was acting, and I must likewise have forgotten a Bill at that moment on the table of the House of Lords, if I could have uttered such an opinion.

What I did say was that the Secretary of State had no right to give *orders* to the Colonial Assemblies; and I deprecated the measure of forcing upon the colonies the provisions of law recommended for their adoption, inasmuch as it would be found that, without the assistance of the resident gentry and proprietors these provisions of law could not be carried into execution.

This is the substance of what I said, if not the very words of which I made use; and I beg you and your friends to reflect upon them.

I likewise beg leave to refer you to what I said respecting the determination of the government to persevere steadily in carrying into execution the wishes of Parliament.

I have now only to make an observation upon the intention of yourself and your friends *to adopt a new style of appeal to the people at large, and to invoke the popular voice*. It must be intended to rouse the people by such *appeals and invocations*, in order (I won't say to intimidate, but) to induce the government and Parliament to force upon the colonies measures which the wisdom of the government and of Parliament might think it expedient to attain by milder means.

Before these "*invocations*" are made I earnestly entreat you to re-peruse the Histories of the Revolution in St. Domingo, likewise brought about by popular appeals and invocations, and of the miseries which it occasioned; and the various accounts of the state of society at present existing in that once flourishing and beautiful island; and I likewise entreat you to direct these "*appeals*" and "*invocations*" which you have in contemplation against those ministers, or rather against that minister, who you

think betrays his duty to his Sovereign and to the public by lukewarmness in the cause of these reforms in the colonies, rather than to produce a premature and forced adoption of them by popular clamour.

I have, &c.,

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---

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Ever faithfully yours,

STUART DE ROTHESAY.

---

EXTRACTS FROM LORD ANGLESEY'S LETTER TO MR. PEEL, dated  
Rich View, July 26th, 1828.

"The priests are using very inflammatory language, and are certainly working upon the Catholics of the army. I think it important that the depôts of Irish recruits should be gradually removed under the appearance of being required to join their regiments, and that whatever regiments are sent here should be those of Scotland, or at all events of men not recruited in the south of Ireland. I desired Sir John Byng to convey this opinion to Lord Hill."

"If I should fortunately be enabled, by the advice and the warnings I give, to keep this country in a quiet state for a little time longer—if the Association should cease to agitate, and there were to be anything like an appearance of moderation—I most seriously conjure you to signify an intention of taking the state of Ireland into consideration in the first days of the next session of Parliament. I hold it to be my duty thus freely to express my opinion, but I beg you to be assured that I never commit myself or the King's government by holding out to any one that the question will be entertained. It is perfectly well known that I have no authority to discuss it, still less to negotiate upon it. Negotiation, indeed, would be beneath the dignity of the State. We must legislate, not negotiate."

[ 957. ]

*To the King.*

London, 28th July, 1828.

I beg to submit for your Majesty's pleasure that Mr. Spencer Perceval should be appointed Clerk of the Ordnance, vice Sir Henry Hardinge, appointed Secretary-at-War. I understand that he is likely to distinguish himself in the House of Commons.

I spoke to the Bishop of London, and conveyed to him your Majesty's most gracious pleasure; for which he expressed the utmost gratitude.

I have written to the Bishop of Chester, who was gone to his diocese. I have informed both that your Majesty was desirous of conversing with them together.

All of which is submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

[ 958. ]

*To the King.*

London, 28th July, 1828.

I enclose to your Majesty a letter which I have just received from the Bishop of Chester, and according to your Majesty's

commands I write to Dr. Sumner, to offer him the diocese of Chester, still retaining his stall at Durham.

Which is submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Reverend Dr. Sumner.*

[ 959. ]

SIR,

London, 28th July, 1828.

His Majesty having been pleased to give directions that the Bishop of Chester should be translated to the diocese of London, has been most graciously pleased to direct me to offer you the bishopric of Chester, allowing you at the same time to retain your stall at Durham.

I beg to know as soon as convenient whether this arrangement will be agreeable to you.

I have the honour, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the King.*

[ 960. ]

London, 30th July, 1828.

I enclose your Majesty the letter which I have received from Dr. Sumner, in answer to the one which I wrote to him conveying your Majesty's most gracious intention to appoint him Bishop of Chester.

The Bishop of London and the Bishop of Chester are in London prepared to attend your Majesty whenever your Majesty may think proper to require their attendance.

Which is submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

[ ENCLOSURE. ]

*Dr. Sumner to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Lodge, Eton College, 30th July, 1828.

Your Grace's most obliging letter has reached me this morning, acquainting me with the King's gracious intention of appointing me to the bishopric of Chester, and allowing me to retain my stall at Durham in commendam. I beg to express my sincere gratitude for this high favour, and to assure his

Majesty that it will be my endeavour so to conduct myself in the arduous situation to which his Majesty has called me, as to show that I entertain a just sense of his royal bounty.

I have, &c.,

J. B. SUMNER.

[ 961. ]

*To Lord FitzRoy Somerset.*

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 30th July, 1828.

I beg you to lay the enclosed letters from Colonel Tucker before the General Commanding the Army in Chief.

When I received the last I determined to prosecute Colonel Tucker, and referred the case for the opinion of the Attorney and Solicitor-General, and for that of Mr. Gurney, which I enclose.

If Colonel Tucker had been convicted in a court of justice of threatening to libel a minister if he did not appoint him to fill a situation, or prevail upon one of his colleagues to appoint him, I entertain no doubt that the General officer commanding his Majesty's army in Chief would not have thought that he was a proper person to continue on the list of colonels in his Majesty's service.

There can be no doubt that the enclosed letter contains such a threat; and although it appears from the enclosed opinions that this act is not considered a legal offence, it appears to me that it is an act disgraceful to the character of an officer, and the perpetrator of which ought not to be allowed to continue on the list of the colonels in his Majesty's army.

However, I beg that Lord Hill will be so kind as to consider it, without reference to my opinion, or to the personal interest which I may be supposed to have in this affair.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Argyll House, 30th July, 1828.

M. d'Asseca, who was with me yesterday, proposed to pay you a visit this morning before you went to the office, and I was rather desirous than otherwise that he should have the satisfaction, before he sent to Lisbon to-day, of hearing from yourself what you chose to tell him.

I repeated to him that our hands were tied, on any other supposition

than the certainty of the marriage. I told him that we were about to open a communication with the Emperor Don Pedro; but that all we said and did would be founded on the conclusion that the marriage should take place. He asked about the fate of the islands; I declined to give him any official pledge whatever, but told him it was not our wish to separate the islands from Portugal, and that much might depend on the conduct of Don Miguel himself, hinting vaguely as an additional reason, in consequence, for his compliance.

He asked, if Don Miguel agreed at once to the marriage, whether we would be responsible for his reconciliation with Don Pedro. To this also I declined to give any official answer, but stated my opinion that without it a reconciliation with his brother and with Europe could not be expected; but that with it I was sanguine in hoping for an accommodation.

I mention the substance of what passed, in order that you may be able to modify or confirm it as you may judge to be proper.

Ever most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

MEMORANDUM.—EAST INDIA COMPANY'S ARMY.

[ 962. ]

31st July, 1828.

*Brevet promotion for distinguished services in the field.*—

There can be no objection to the grant of brevet promotion for distinguished services in the field against the enemy, to the officers of the army of the East India Company, in the same manner as to the officers of the King's army.

But great care must be taken in the grant of this promotion that it is not applied to gratify favourites rather than to reward real services.

The rule which I adopted was to allow General officers to recommend officers who had distinguished themselves; and I selected from the list those whom I might think proper to recommend for brevet promotion.

There was a rule that the aides-de-camp and Staff belonging or attached to General officers should not be recommended for promotion by brevet, for the reasons which are obvious; as well as because they have great advantages over the officers of the Line. But I made many exceptions to this rule.

I should say likewise that the Commander-in-Chief if not himself in the field, or the Governor-General in Council if the Commander-in-Chief should be in the field, ought, after the report of an important service in the field against the enemy, to designate the number of officers to be recommended for this

brevet promotion. A larger number should be named by the Commander of the force in the field, from which number the Commander-in-Chief or the Governor-General in Council should select the names of the number designated.

It is very necessary to check this description of promotion. Otherwise it will go very far indeed. The Company's army ought to have this promotion for the siege of Bhurtpoor.

*Rank of colonel to commandants of regiments of cavalry and infantry, and of battalions of artillery.*—There is a great mistake in the reasoning upon this subject. First, the relation between the British artillery and engineers and the British cavalry and infantry is not the same as that between the Company's army and the King's army in the East Indies.

The officers of the rank of colonel of the former seldom come in competition with the cavalry and infantry. Those of the latter are in daily competition with the officers of the same rank in the King's army.

It is not true likewise that the departure from the regulation of 1796 was to be attributed to the interference of the officers of the King's army in India.

The dispute originated in the East India Company's army of Fort St. George, and from thence went to the King's army.

However, it is not reasonable that the public service should suffer inconvenience on account of the private interest of individuals; and it appears quite right and proper that without retrospect the rank of colonel should now be given to every lieutenant-colonel commandant of a regiment of cavalry or infantry, or battalion of artillery, in the East India Company's service; and that in future an officer promoted to be commandant of a regiment should have the rank of colonel.

I am perfectly ready to admit that the King's army is auxiliary in the East Indies. But although it is auxiliary the King must take care that his officers are not ill-treated; and that their fair claims are not passed over in consequence of the existence of any particular circumstances attending the promotion of the army of the East India Company.

It is my opinion that whenever one of his Majesty's regiments is serving in the army of Fort William, for instance, and the lieutenant-colonel of such regiment is superseded by the promotion to the rank of colonel of a regiment of a lieutenant-colonel of the army of that Presidency, junior as a lieutenant-

think betrays his duty to his Sovereign and to the public by lukewarmness in the cause of these reforms in the colonies, rather than to produce a premature and forced adoption of them by popular clamour.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*The Right Hon. J. Wilson Croker to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Admiralty, 25th July, 1828.

In obedience to your Grace's commands I have consulted Sir George Cockburn on the means which we could afford towards the transport of the French troops from Toulon to the Morea. Cockburn (soit dit en passant) quite agrees with me that it would be desirable, on a great many accounts, to avoid this transaction if possible: but that is no affair of *ours*.

I enclose a list of our whole force in the Mediterranean, and the number of troops they could convey; but, as the force is much dispersed, the Admiral could not hope to be able to collect more than *half* his total strength for this object: in other words, he might undertake to convey about 2000 men in ships of war; but there appear also to be four or five transports in the Mediterranean which he could appropriate to a service of this nature, which would probably carry 1200 or 1500 men more.

In any case, I submit that it would be desirable that all the measures should be taken in the Mediterranean, and that the matter should not get wind in England, which would be the case if we were to send any transports hence.

I am, my dear Duke, yours most faithfully,

J. W. CROKER.

P.S.—Cockburn thinks that transports might be sent from England without difficulty, and that he would prefer that mode to the employment of the men-of-war.

*Lord Stuart de Rothesay to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Paris, 25th July, 1828.

The French government are greatly pleased with the answer which has been received from England respecting the expedition to the Morea, and appear inclined to follow the same course with ourselves in almost every question of foreign policy. Their internal affairs have certainly improved within these two months, though I fear the improvement has been brought about by rather too much concession to the Liberal party.

Ever faithfully yours,

STUART DE ROTHESAY.



EXTRACTS FROM LORD ANGLESEY'S LETTER TO MR. PEEL, dated  
Rich View, July 26th, 1828.

"The priests are using very inflammatory language, and are certainly working upon the Catholics of the army. I think it important that the depôts of Irish recruits should be gradually removed under the appearance of being required to join their regiments, and that whatever regiments are sent here should be those of Scotland, or at all events of men not recruited in the south of Ireland. I desired Sir John Byng to convey this opinion to Lord Hill."

"If I should fortunately be enabled, by the advice and the warnings I give, to keep this country in a quiet state for a little time longer—if the Association should cease to agitate, and there were to be anything like an appearance of moderation—I most seriously conjure you to signify an intention of taking the state of Ireland into consideration in the first days of the next session of Parliament. I hold it to be my duty thus freely to express my opinion, but I beg you to be assured that I never commit myself or the King's government by holding out to any one that the question will be entertained. It is perfectly well known that I have no authority to discuss it, still less to negotiate upon it. Negotiation, indeed, would be beneath the dignity of the State. We must legislate, not negotiate."

[ 957. ]

*To the King.*

London, 28th July, 1828.

I beg to submit for your Majesty's pleasure that Mr. Spencer Perceval should be appointed Clerk of the Ordnance, vice Sir Henry Hardinge, appointed Secretary-at-War. I understand that he is likely to distinguish himself in the House of Commons.

I spoke to the Bishop of London, and conveyed to him your Majesty's most gracious pleasure; for which he expressed the utmost gratitude.

I have written to the Bishop of Chester, who was gone to his diocese. I have informed both that your Majesty was desirous of conversing with them together.

All of which is submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

[ 958. ]

*To the King.*

London, 28th July, 1828.

I enclose to your Majesty a letter which I have just received from the Bishop of Chester, and according to your Majesty's

commands I write to Dr. Sumner, to offer him the diocese of Chester, still retaining his stall at Durham.

Which is submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Reverend Dr. Sumner.*

[ 959. ]

SIR,

London, 28th July, 1828.

His Majesty having been pleased to give directions that the Bishop of Chester should be translated to the diocese of London, has been most graciously pleased to direct me to offer you the bishopric of Chester, allowing you at the same time to retain your stall at Durham.

I beg to know as soon as convenient whether this arrangement will be agreeable to you.

I have the honour, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the King.*

[ 960. ]

London, 30th July, 1828.

I enclose your Majesty the letter which I have received from Dr. Sumner, in answer to the one which I wrote to him conveying your Majesty's most gracious intention to appoint him Bishop of Chester.

The Bishop of London and the Bishop of Chester are in London prepared to attend your Majesty whenever your Majesty may think proper to require their attendance.

Which is submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

[ ENCLOSURE. ]

*Dr. Sumner to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Lodge, Eton College, 30th July, 1828.

Your Grace's most obliging letter has reached me this morning, acquainting me with the King's gracious intention of appointing me to the bishopric of Chester, and allowing me to retain my stall at Durham in commendam. I beg to express my sincere gratitude for this high favour, and to assure his

Majesty that it will be my endeavour so to conduct myself in the arduous situation to which his Majesty has called me, as to show that I entertain a just sense of his royal bounty.

I have, &c.,

J. B. SUMNER.

[ 961. ]

*To Lord FitzRoy Somerset.*

MY DEAR LORD,

London, 30th July, 1828.

I beg you to lay the enclosed letters from Colonel Tucker before the General Commanding the Army in Chief.

When I received the last I determined to prosecute Colonel Tucker, and referred the case for the opinion of the Attorney and Solicitor-General, and for that of Mr. Gurney, which I enclose.

If Colonel Tucker had been convicted in a court of justice of threatening to libel a minister if he did not appoint him to fill a situation, or prevail upon one of his colleagues to appoint him, I entertain no doubt that the General officer commanding his Majesty's army in Chief would not have thought that he was a proper person to continue on the list of colonels in his Majesty's service.

There can be no doubt that the enclosed letter contains such a threat; and although it appears from the enclosed opinions that this act is not considered a legal offence, it appears to me that it is an act disgraceful to the character of an officer, and the perpetrator of which ought not to be allowed to continue on the list of the colonels in his Majesty's army.

However, I beg that Lord Hill will be so kind as to consider it, without reference to my opinion, or to the personal interest which I may be supposed to have in this affair.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Argyll House, 30th July, 1828.

M. d'Asseca, who was with me yesterday, proposed to pay you a visit this morning before you went to the office, and I was rather desirous than otherwise that he should have the satisfaction, before he sent to Lisbon to-day, of hearing from yourself what you chose to tell him.

I repeated to him that our hands were tied, on any other supposition

than the certainty of the marriage. I told him that we were about to open a communication with the Emperor Don Pedro; but that all we said and did would be founded on the conclusion that the marriage should take place. He asked about the fate of the islands; I declined to give him any official pledge whatever, but told him it was not our wish to separate the islands from Portugal, and that much might depend on the conduct of Don Miguel himself, hinting vaguely as an additional reason, in consequence, for his compliance.

He asked, if Don Miguel agreed at once to the marriage, whether we would be responsible for his reconciliation with Don Pedro. To this also I declined to give any official answer, but stated my opinion that without it a reconciliation with his brother and with Europe could not be expected; but that with it I was sanguine in hoping for an accommodation.

I mention the substance of what passed, in order that you may be able to modify or confirm it as you may judge to be proper.

Ever most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

MEMORANDUM.—EAST INDIA COMPANY'S ARMY.

[ 962. ]

31st July, 1828.

*Brevet promotion for distinguished services in the field.*— There can be no objection to the grant of brevet promotion for distinguished services in the field against the enemy, to the officers of the army of the East India Company, in the same manner as to the officers of the King's army.

But great care must be taken in the grant of this promotion that it is not applied to gratify favourites rather than to reward real services.

The rule which I adopted was to allow General officers to recommend officers who had distinguished themselves; and I selected from the list those whom I might think proper to recommend for brevet promotion.

There was a rule that the aides-de-camp and Staff belonging or attached to General officers should not be recommended for promotion by brevet, for the reasons which are obvious; as well as because they have great advantages over the officers of the Line. But I made many exceptions to this rule.

I should say likewise that the Commander-in-Chief if not himself in the field, or the Governor-General in Council if the Commander-in-Chief should be in the field, ought, after the report of an important service in the field against the enemy, to designate the number of officers to be recommended for this

brevet promotion. A larger number should be named by the Commander of the force in the field, from which number the Commander-in-Chief or the Governor-General in Council should select the names of the number designated.

It is very necessary to check this description of promotion. Otherwise it will go very far indeed. The Company's army ought to have this promotion for the siege of Bhurtpoor.

*Rank of colonel to commandants of regiments of cavalry and infantry, and of battalions of artillery.*—There is a great mistake in the reasoning upon this subject. First, the relation between the British artillery and engineers and the British cavalry and infantry is not the same as that between the Company's army and the King's army in the East Indies.

The officers of the rank of colonel of the former seldom come in competition with the cavalry and infantry. Those of the latter are in daily competition with the officers of the same rank in the King's army.

It is not true likewise that the departure from the regulation of 1796 was to be attributed to the interference of the officers of the King's army in India.

The dispute originated in the East India Company's army of Fort St. George, and from thence went to the King's army.

However, it is not reasonable that the public service should suffer inconvenience on account of the private interest of individuals; and it appears quite right and proper that without retrospect the rank of colonel should now be given to every lieutenant-colonel commandant of a regiment of cavalry or infantry, or battalion of artillery, in the East India Company's service; and that in future an officer promoted to be commandant of a regiment should have the rank of colonel.

I am perfectly ready to admit that the King's army is auxiliary in the East Indies. But although it is auxiliary the King must take care that his officers are not ill-treated; and that their fair claims are not passed over in consequence of the existence of any particular circumstances attending the promotion of the army of the East India Company.

It is my opinion that whenever one of his Majesty's regiments is serving in the army of Fort William, for instance, and the lieutenant-colonel of such regiment is superseded by the promotion to the rank of colonel of a regiment of a lieutenant-colonel of the army of that Presidency, junior as a lieutenant-

colonel to the lieutenant-colonel of his Majesty's regiment, his Majesty should grant to the lieutenant-colonel of his regiment a brevet of colonel in that army of the same date as that of the colonel of the army of Fort William ; thus leaving both in their same relative position.

If the King's regiment should be removed to the army of any other Presidency, of course that commission will be no longer valid. But another may be granted to the colonel of his Majesty's regiment, to put him on a par, in respect to rank, with the officers of the service of the East India Company's service, referring always to the date of their respective ranks as lieutenant-colonel.

*Officers in the service of the East India Company in civil employments, or on the Staff, not properly attached to the army.*—The uniform representations from India manifest the necessity of making some improvement in the regimental system in India, so as to obtain a more constant residence with their regiment of the officers of the army, and more assiduous attention to their duty. I think, however, that those who make these complaints do not always consider that these officers are usefully employed for the service of the public, although not with their regiments ; and possibly in some instances more usefully than if with their regiments. It cannot be doubted, however, that the number of European officers with several of the Native regiments is too small ; that the discipline of the army has suffered by the European officers looking to these Staff employments rather than to their duty with their regiments, and by the absence of so many on these Staff employments. It is likewise true that officers who have passed much of their time in these employments are not the most fit for regimental duty, when they think proper themselves to return to the performance of such service after passing a great portion of their lives and service in the performance of more agreeable and better paid duties.

It is my opinion, therefore, that when an officer is required from the Line to perform the duty of a civil Staff office, he should be struck off the strength of his regiment ; and that from that period he should receive no regimental pay ; and an officer should be promoted in his stead.

From that period for five years such officer so employed on the Staff should have the option of returning to his regiment ; and upon his return he should resume his station in the reg-

ment, preceding the officer next in succession to him when he was ordered for employment on the Staff.

He should likewise be promoted to every step of rank at the same time with the officer next to him in his regiment, at the time he should have been removed from it to the Staff, till he should reach the rank of lieutenant-colonel.

Beyond that rank an officer employed on this civil Staff of the army ought not to rise.

He should be allowed to retire according to the usual military regulations.

If such officer should, within five years, desire to return to his regimental duty in the service, he should be permitted to do so, taking rank in the regiment in the place from which he should have been removed to the civil Staff of the army.

The regiment will then have a supernumerary officer till there will be a vacancy, which of course must not be filled up.

WELLINGTON.

[ 963. ]

*To the King.*

London, 1st August, 1828.

I enclose to your Majesty a Memorandum upon the state of Ireland, of which I request your Majesty's serious consideration.

I have not shown it to any of my colleagues; and the object of it is to obtain your Majesty's permission to take into consideration the whole case of Ireland, with a view to the adoption of some measure to be proposed to Parliament for the pacification of that country.

What I wish is that your Majesty would be pleased to permit me to consider this question in communication with Mr. Peel and the Lord Chancellor; that I should bring under your Majesty's review the result of our consideration; and that afterwards, with your Majesty's approbation, I should proceed to such ulterior measures as your Majesty might think proper to ascertain the views of others, before I should finally submit any proposition to my colleagues in the Cabinet.

According to this mode of proceeding your Majesty will have the control over this subject in your hands till the last moment, at the same time that you will have done your government and

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the country the justice to have considered it fairly; and it will not be known that it is even under consideration.

All of which is submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM.

[ 964. ]

1st August, 1828.

It is impossible to allow the ministers to separate without taking into consideration the state of Ireland.

The influence and the powers of government in that country are no longer in the hands of the officers of the government, but have been usurped by the demagogues of the Roman Catholic Association; who, acting through the influence of the Roman Catholic clergy, direct the country as they think proper.

Up to this moment it may be doubted whether anything has been done in violation of the law. Mr. O'Connell's election, although inconsistent with the law, is not a breach of it. But everything has been done to manifest the influence and power of the demagogues of the Association, and of their agents the clergy of the Roman Catholic Church; their contempt for the legislature; their enmity to the British government and its establishments; and their determination to overthrow the authority of that government in Ireland whenever an opportunity will offer.

For this purpose and with these views Ireland has been completely organised. This appears in various recent events; but most particularly in the late election for the county of Clare.

It is useless to enter into the detail of that transaction; but it is certain that the whole of the lower orders of the population (with the exception of a few Protestants) moved in regular military order, those of each parish under the direction of their priest, to the election town; that they there remained under the same influence and direction till it came to the turn of those qualified to vote, *bivouacque*d in an open space near the town, or cantoned in the houses in the neighbourhood on rainy nights, and paid for their lodgings; that no violence, disorder, or even insult was committed; and they returned after the triumph of the successful election was over in the same order as that in



which they had come to Ennis; that the political influence of the priests over the lower orders was in every instance superior to that of the landlords and gentry; and that by this influence Mr. O'Connell was returned instead of Mr. Fitzgerald; the latter being a gentleman of property in and well known to the county, supported unanimously by the gentry, who had represented the county in many Parliaments, and who had, moreover, always voted for what is called Roman Catholic emancipation; the former being a stranger in the county of Clare and not possessing an acre of property within it.

To this statement add the subscriptions collected throughout Ireland to pay the expenses of this election; and the public rejoicings on account of it in the Southern and Western counties; and the absence of all public demonstration of joy in Dublin or in the Northern counties, in which the religious opinions of the people being more divided such demonstrations might have been interrupted by the Protestants, and might have occasioned premature collision; and I think it will appear clearly from the transaction at this election alone, and its consequences, that throughout Ireland a perfect system of organisation has been established by the means of the Roman Catholic clergy, of which the management is in the hands of the demagogues of the Roman Catholic Association.

I entertain no doubt that the organisation is more perfect and the system more extended than it was at the period of the Rebellion of 1798; and the managers of the existing system have the additional advantage of possessing, by means of the *Catholic rent*, considerable pecuniary resources, which I believe they have it in their power, by the use of the same influence over the people, to increase to a very large amount.

It may fairly be stated, then, that the demagogues of the Roman Catholic Association hold in their hands at the present moment the political power and the fate of Ireland. Upon them depends whether the people shall rise in rebellion or shall remain quiet; to what degree they shall obey the law and the legally constituted authorities of the country; and whether they shall submit themselves to the influence which rank and property possess in every well-constituted society.

Accordingly we find the influence of these demagogues paralysing the royal authority itself. The King cannot confer the honour of the Peerage upon an Irish gentleman, a member

of Parliament for an Irish county, because the government cannot in prudence incur the risk of exposing the public peace to the dangers of the evils which were avoided in Clare only by the prudence or the fears of the demagogues of the Roman Catholic Association.

His Majesty cannot appoint a member of an Irish county to an office ; and still less can he dissolve his Parliament.

The Lord-Lieutenant is insulted in his Court by the appearance there of one of these leaders decorated by the *insignia* of the pretended Order of Liberators, that is, of rebels ; and the Roman Catholic Association have continued up to this time to meet, in contempt of the declared intention of Parliament, if not contrary to the positive enactments of the law.

It is impossible that this state of things can last without aggravating all the existing evils, degrading the royal authority, and rendering still more imminent an impending contest for the dominion of Ireland ; of which the result will be more uncertain in proportion as time is given (not for completing the organisation of the country, as that is already complete, but) for deriving all the benefits from that organisation for the purpose of its application to the contest, and for making preparations for the employment of the largest possible physical force over the greatest extent of country.

It must be observed that at the same time that delay in the decision of this affair is all against his Majesty, the moment of decision is not at his option or at that of his government. His Majesty and his government cannot act unless the law not only enables them to act, but requires it. The demagogues will take care not to give them the occasion to act till they will themselves be quite prepared, and will have fixed the moment in which they could resist the action of his Majesty's government with most advantage.

They will avoid all general positive breaches of the law ; but they will keep up the spirit of party and irritation, by daily misrepresentation, exaggeration, and insult ; and they will pay no attention to but rather encourage those acts of individual outrage and revenge which occasion so much terror, and tend so materially to weaken the influence and authority of his Majesty's government, and to destroy the confidence in it and the respect for it which ought to be felt by all the well-disposed and loyal inhabitants of the country.

This being the nature and state of the evil, and of the prospects resulting from it, let us now consider the remedies. We hear constantly of propositions for putting down the Roman Catholic Association; and for disfranchising the forty-shilling freeholders. It is totally forgotten that the leaders of the Roman Catholic Association will still remain; that if Parliament could be persuaded to adopt a law (a question which I will discuss presently) to put down the Roman Catholic Association, or if such a law could be framed and adopted, paying due attention to the established habits of meeting in public which his Majesty's subjects have always enjoyed, the leaders of the Association could still meet, and make and publish speeches delivered at a tavern, or in their respective houses; and if such meetings were or could be prevented by law, they would still remain with undiminished influence over the organisation of the people, and with the means of using it in their hands, of which no law could deprive them.

It is likewise forgotten that the forty-shilling freeholders are not a tenth of the population of the lower orders; that when deprived of their right of voting they would continue under the influence of the same demagogues, in the same state of organisation under the same priests as at present; and equally able and willing to do mischief. To disfranchise these men would undoubtedly apply a remedy to a very important branch of the existing evil; and if this measure could have been adopted some years ago, its effects would have been very important. But it is not a remedy for the greater evil now impending over us. Equally with that above discussed, it is now out of date. But it would create great exasperation; and afford topics for exciting and increasing that exasperation to the leaders of the Association.

Here the important questions occur, Are the government in possession of such proofs of the real intentions of the leaders of the Roman Catholics in Ireland as to be justified in calling for such measures? Would Parliament consent to adopt any measures of this description without positive proof that they are not only necessary, but that none other would answer?

We must start from this certainty, that either of these measures, or any of the same description, will have the effect of bringing on the contest. It may be difficult to avoid it; but it is not desirable that it should be brought on by a measure pro-

posed by government which shall not, in the opinion of Parliament, be a remedy for the state of things existing in Ireland.

Let us now look at the opinion of the House of Commons upon these Irish questions. Upon the last division there was a majority of eight in favour of concession to the Roman Catholics; and upon looking over the list of the whole House I should say that the majority on that side of the question was from twenty to thirty; many of its warmest friends having been upon the last occasion under the necessity of staying away in consequence of the exercise over them of some local or personal influence.

It would not be wise for his Majesty's ministers to advise the King to embark in a course in which he might be defeated at the very first step, to the great detriment of his authority in Ireland, and of his reputation throughout Europe; or in which he might be involved in a civil contest in Ireland, the majority of his Parliament being of opinion that that contest might be avoided by acts of conciliation and concession.

It does not signify whether this opinion is well or ill founded; there is no doubt that it exists; and his Majesty would find that before he should have proceeded one month in the contest he would be required to offer terms of conciliation, including all those which have for so many years been the subject of discussion in this country. No success however decisive, nor conclusion of the contest however honourable and prompt, would prevent such demands by Parliament, or the necessity of complying with them.

It cannot be supposed that the constitution of the country, the King's authority, the establishments, the Protestant interests in Ireland, or the permanent union between the countries, can be benefited by a course of proceeding calculated to produce such results. It is not reasonable to expect that the state and sentiments of Parliament can be altered, excepting for the worse. As I have above shewn, we cannot venture to advise the King to dissolve his Parliament at the expense of the risk of a civil war in Ireland; and if we could give such advice, it is quite obvious that the result of the elections would be a still larger majority in favour of Roman Catholic concession; and against the course of measures proposed by those who think of putting down the Roman Catholic Association, and disfranchising forty-shilling freeholders; and this increased majority would be still less likely than the existing Parliament to support his Majesty

in the measures necessary to enable him to carry on the contest in Ireland.

This, then, may be considered as the real state of the case. We have a rebellion impending over us in Ireland, excited, organised; and this organisation directed by the leaders of the Roman Catholic Association; and their directions carried into execution by the Roman Catholic priests: and we have in England a Parliament which we cannot dissolve, the majority of which is of opinion, with many wise and able men, that the remedy is to be found in Roman Catholic emancipation, and they would unwillingly enter into the contest without making such an endeavour to pacify the country.

It may be very doubtful whether the concession of Roman Catholic emancipation, with any guards or securities, or in any form, would pacify the country, or would save us from the civil contest hanging over us.

But whatever the King and his ministers may think of the chances of pacification which Roman Catholic emancipation would afford, it is the duty of all to look our difficulties in the face and to lay the ground for getting the better of them. We must endeavour to conciliate Parliament and the public to our measures, in order that if we should be involved in this contest we may enter into it with the support of the large majority of the Parliament and of the people of England. We shall thus be enabled to make an effort worthy of his Majesty; and calculated to get the better of the rebellion in such a manner and in so short a space of time as will diminish its evils to the unfortunate country which will be its seat; and will prevent our enemies and our rivals from taking advantage of the unfortunate circumstances in which we shall be placed to pursue their objects to the detriment of the honour and of the prosperity of this country.

WELLINGTON.

[ 965. ]

*To the King.*

London, 1st August, 1828.

Sir George Murray has desired me to submit to your Majesty the enclosed arrangement for filling the vacant governments in North America and the West Indies. They appear to be the best that can be made under existing circumstances.

I likewise beg leave to submit to your Majesty the expediency of relieving Major-General Sir Charles Doyle and Major-General Taylor from the Staff in Ireland. Many circumstances tend to render this desirable.

The officers whom Lord Hill proposes to submit to your Majesty to be placed on the Staff in that country are Sir Thomas Arbuthnot and Sir Edward Blakeney, recently returned from Portugal.

Which is submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

[Highly approved.—G. R.]

[ENCLOSURE.]

To be Governor of Jamaica—The Earl of Belmore.  
 „ Nova Scotia—Sir Peregrine Maitland, vice Kempt.  
 „ Upper Canada—Sir John Colborne\* (heretofore in the  
 52nd Regiment), vice Maitland.  
 „ Trinidad—Major-General Lewis Grant, from the  
 Bahamas, vice Sir Ralph Woodford (deceased).  
 „ the Bahamas—Major-General Bourke, from the Cape  
 of Good Hope, vice Grant.

*To the King.*

[ 966. ]

London, 1st August, 1828.

I am sorry to tell your Majesty that I received accounts this day that the Lord High Admiral sailed from Plymouth on the 30th July, in the *Royal Sovereign* yacht, which bore his flag as Lord High Admiral, with the squadron of ships and vessels as follows, viz. :—The *Britannia*, *Orestes*, *Pylades*, *Procris*. Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Blackwood, in the *Prince Regent*, anchored in Plymouth Sound on the same day.

Your Majesty's government know of these movements only from the report of the Port Admiral at Plymouth. They were aware that a squadron of manœuvre was formed, under the direction of Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Blackwood; but they have had no knowledge of any orders to the Lord High Admiral to go to sea with this squadron, with his flag flying in the *Royal Sovereign* yacht. It is particularly to be regretted that this step should have been taken so immediately after the discussion

\* General Lord Seaton, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.H.

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with his Royal Highness respecting his relations as Lord High Admiral with his Council, in the course of which it was particularly pointed out to his Royal Highness that he could not go to sea in command of any part of your Majesty's fleet excepting under the special orders of your Majesty.

Which is submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

[ 967. ]

*To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.*

MY DEAR PEEL,

London, 1st August, 1828.

The King has declared that the Rev. Dr. Sumner, Prebendary of Durham, should be appointed Bishop of Chester, keeping his Prebend; and I beg you to send the usual documents for his Majesty's signature.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 2nd August, 1828.

I send you a letter just received from Bagot, which contains a declaration very far beyond anything which we have heard from Polignac.

Ever most sincerely,

ABERDEEN.

[ 968. ]

*To the Earl of Aberdeen.*

London, 2nd August, 1828,  $\frac{1}{2}$  past 9 p.m.

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

I think you should see Prince Polignac as soon as you can upon the subject of Sir Charles Bagot's private letter. Tell him that he must have observed that we don't manifest any very remarkable jealousy of the proceedings or intentions of the French government; and that we have been ready to do everything in our power to facilitate their views, in the firm belief and persuasion that they went no further than was stated to us in conversation, and officially on the Protocol of the Conference.

I would then communicate the substance of Sir Charles

Bagot's report. You need not say from whence it comes ; but assure Prince Polignac that it comes from a gentleman who spoke to Monsieur de la Ferronnays, and was told by him what is stated, and was authorised to repeat it.

I would recommend to you besides to write to Lord Stuart to state the report to him, and desire him to endeavour to discover in a quiet way whether such plans are in contemplation.

Robert Fagel is a very steady fellow, and not likely to invent such a story. On the other hand, La Ferronnays is very unlikely to have formed such a plan, with a view to act against Russia.

It is much more probable that the French newspapers, having first written up the expedition to the Morea, are now writing up ulterior objects for that expedition, not of European safety, but of French ambition and aggrandisement, and that La Ferronnays' imagination has taken fire.

Fagel was informed in order that the intention might be imparted to us by that channel ; in the expectation that the gilding might induce us to swallow the pill.

I have no objection to the King of France employing himself in checking Russian ambition, but I don't see why the Morea is to be occupied in order to attain that object.

We must get to the bottom of this affair.

I remain, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*The King to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR FRIEND,

Royal Lodge, 3rd August, 1828.

I have read with the most anxious attention your Memorandum respecting the present state of Ireland. I fear your picture of that unhappy country is but too true. You have my full permission to go into the question of Ireland with the Lord Chancellor and Mr. Peel, and we have this settled understanding, that I pledge myself to *nothing*, with respect to the *Cabinet*, or any *future proceeding*, until I am in possession of your plan.

Always your sincere friend,

G. R.

*The King to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR FRIEND,

Royal Lodge, 3rd August, 1828.

If the Lord High Admiral cannot make up his mind to fill his station according to the laws of his country, it will be quite impossible for the



King to retain him in his present situation. It is very painful to my feelings after all that has passed, that you should be placed in the disagreeable position of again explaining to my brother my sentiments, and consequently those of my government, who are the responsible agents in this matter.

No man understands discipline better than my brother, and I am therefore the more surprised at his hoisting his flag as Lord High Admiral without my orders.

Your sincere friend,

G. R.

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*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Cirencester, 3rd August, 1828.

The Duke of Cumberland has just written a letter to Lady Bathurst announcing his approaching departure, saying that he has left a proxy in support of government, but that if the Catholic question should come on, he should think it his bounden duty to come over and oppose it in person. Has he any suspicions? Your way of proceeding is certainly the most likely to reconcile the Protestants to the measure, as it is little short of a declaration of war against the priesthood; and I know your objections to accomplish the measure by an agreement with the Pope; but consider well whether, seeing the fanatical temper of the people, it would not be more prudent to sound first whether he would not be brought to concur in placing the priesthood under such restraint as would answer your purpose, coupled with the abolition of the forty-shilling freeholders, which is the most important diminution of the authority of the priests. Although I know by experience that the present Pope is not so tractable as the last, under Gonsalvi, yet I am convinced you would find him much more complaisant than he was to the King of Holland.

Yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

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*Sir William Knighton to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Royal Lodge, Monday, 4th August, 1828.

The King wishes to have the pleasure of seeing you to-morrow, at any hour that may best suit your convenience. His Majesty now dines either at home or, if the weather admits, at the Virginia Water, *every day at five*. The King would wish your Grace to dine, or not, as it may suit your public engagements. Whatever you decide upon, either to dine or not, it is desirable that you should be here by *two o'clock*, or soon after.

Always yours very sincerely,

W. KNIGHTON.

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*To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.*

[ 969. ]

MY DEAR PEEL,

London, 6th August, 1828.

The object for which the King wished to see me yesterday was to propose to me to remove Lord Anglesey from the government of Ireland.

I told him that his presence there was certainly very inconvenient; but that I was very much afraid that his removal would be found still more so. I told him that we could not state the real causes of dissatisfaction with his conduct, some of which are personal; and that the measure would be liable to much misrepresentation, and might do mischief. He acquiesced in my decision, but not very willingly.

He had shown my paper to the Duke of Cumberland, who, he says, is equally convinced of the necessity of considering the subject. I did not see the Duke of Cumberland.

I enclose a letter and its enclosure, which I received yesterday. It affords another indication of what the demagogues in Ireland intend, and what is understood of their intentions by those who may be well supposed to know what they are about.

I remain, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Reis Effendi.*

[ 970. ]

6th August, 1828.

I have had the honour of receiving your Excellency's letter; and I assure your Excellency that you do his Majesty justice in believing that his Majesty is, as he always has been, disposed to cultivate the most friendly relations with the Ottoman Porte. His Majesty has had various opportunities of manifesting that friendly disposition by acts for which he has received testimonies of the gratitude of the Ottoman Porte; and I must likewise add that his Majesty has had no reason to complain of any breach of engagement with his Majesty on the part of the Ottoman Porte, nor of any failure in the usual friendly relations between the two Powers.


From the commencement of the contest in Greece his Majesty has not failed to apprise the government of the Porte from time to time of the inconvenience and danger which attended at first the nature of the hostilities which were carried on, the mode in

which they were carried on, the sensation which the various events of the war created throughout Europe, and particularly in Russia. His Majesty subsequently reminded the Porte that the general sense of all these evils was aggravated by their duration; and he repeatedly urged them to consider how desirable and even necessary it was to adopt effectual measures to put an end to the war by pacifying Greece by measures calculated by their wisdom and justice to be permanent and to conciliate the approbation and good will of surrounding nations.

The Ottoman Porte omitted to attend to these friendly warnings and remonstrances; the war continued, massacres of innocent victims, till then unheard of, were perpetrated by both parties; and there appeared no probable termination excepting in the extermination by the sword, by disease, or by famine, of one or other of the parties to the contest. In the mean time the innocent commerce, in the Levant, of all Europe, that of his Majesty's subjects in particular, was suffering the greatest inconvenience and loss by this contest; and great expense and inconvenience were incurred by his Majesty by the necessity of assembling his Majesty's fleets in the Mediterranean to make an effort to protect his Majesty's subjects in their just rights of navigation.

In the commencement of the year 1826 there was every reason to apprehend that the evils would occur which his Majesty had predicted as the inevitable consequence of the state of affairs in Greece, which had then existed for five years after that prediction had been made.

Under these circumstances his Majesty was requested by the Greeks to interpose his good offices to reconcile them to the Ottoman Porte; and his Majesty made a fresh effort at the Ottoman Porte not only alone, but in concert with his Ally, the Emperor of Russia, after certain discussions respecting his Imperial Majesty's own peculiar interests with the Porte had been adjusted to his Imperial Majesty's satisfaction. All these remonstrances were made in vain. The Porte persevered in carrying on hostilities in the same obnoxious spirit and in the same mode as before; the subjects of all the Powers continued to suffer by those hostilities; there was no prospect of a termination to the contest; and his Majesty found himself under the necessity of agreeing with his Allies, the King of France and the Emperor of Russia, to a Treaty calculated to procure the



pacification of Greece upon terms of moderation and justice, and therefore of permanent advantage to both the parties in the war.

The Ottoman Porte have up to this moment declined to adopt any of the measures proposed by this Treaty; even those of an armistice with the Greeks and the admission of the mediation of the Allies to settle the contest.

His Majesty, therefore, finding that the Sublime Porte were determined not to follow his advice in respect to the mode of putting an end to this contest, and that the war was to be persevered in in the same spirit and according to the obnoxious mode up to that moment in practice; that the losses of his subjects and the expenses of his own armaments were to continue for an indefinite period of time; and his Majesty being moreover determined that he would, in concert with his Allies, prevent the belligerent parties from carrying on war, as he could not prevail upon the Ottoman Porte to make peace, ordered that his ambassador should withdraw from Constantinople, and that all diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Porte should be discontinued.

His Majesty laments the existence of this state of his relations with the Ottoman Porte; but his Majesty cannot alter that state till the Ottoman Porte will have accepted the offers made by the Allied Sovereigns under the stipulations of the Treaty of the 6th July; and will have concluded an arrangement with the Greeks accordingly. To this conduct his Majesty is invariably bound to adhere; and the Ottoman Porte must see precisely what measure it is they are to adopt if they wish to restore their relations with his Majesty to that state in which they existed heretofore, so much to the satisfaction of both Sovereigns and to the prosperity and happiness of their people.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Brighton, 7th August, 1828.

I entirely concur in the advice which you gave to the King as to the recall of Lord Anglesey.

It would be very easy to get a much better man; but I think we should

It is subsiding; and perhaps it may not be easy to revive it to the full extent.

If the advisers of the Crown should think the settlement of the Catholic question practicable, I can well conceive that they might wish to have another man in Ireland at that time; but I am confident that just now, unless the government is compelled to act very decidedly to repress actual danger from insurrection, it had better remain very quiet though very vigilant.

I enclose a letter from Lord Forbes. Pray take any step upon it that you may think fit, enabling me to answer the letter. Perhaps the King has already made some arrangement as to the appointment to which it refers.

I have little doubt that every word in the enclosed letter from Dr. Wright of Belfast is correct.

I have no doubt that Mrs. Peel will soon recover her strength. She thanks you for your enquiries after her, and desires to be very kindly remembered to you.

Ever, my dear Duke, most faithfully yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

P.S.—If you should feel at all disposed to have two or three days of sea air, we have plenty of room for you at 24, Brunswick Terrace, close upon the sea, and should be delighted to see you.

[ 971. ]

*To the King.*

London, 8th August, 1828.

Finding that his Royal Highness the Duke of Clarence had arrived in town, I attended at the Admiralty this day to speak to his Royal Highness on the subject of his going to sea in the *Royal Sovereign* with the squadron which had been placed, by your Majesty's command, under the command of Sir Henry Blackwood.

His Royal Highness was not at the Admiralty when I attended; and I have therefore written him the letter of which I enclose your Majesty the copy.

Which is submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

[ENCLOSURE.]

[ 972. ]

*To the Duke of Clarence.*

SIR,

London, 8th August, 1828.

I waited upon your Royal Highness at the Admiralty this day; finding myself again, with very great regret, under the

necessity of calling your Royal Highness's attention to the state of your Royal Highness's relations with the government, and with your Royal Highness's Council.

A squadron of manœuvre having been placed by his Majesty's commands under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Blackwood, your Royal Highness, with the military flag of the Lord High Admiral flying in the *Royal Sovereign* yacht, proceeded to sea on the 30th of July with a part of the squadron which was assembled at Plymouth, previous to the junction of the officer to whom the command of the squadron had been committed by his Majesty. This officer did not arrive in Plymouth Sound till after your Royal Highness's departure with the ships and vessels which had been placed under his command; and he remained there some days. Consequently the squadron must have been at sea under the personal command of your Royal Highness, acting under the military flag of the Lord High Admiral. This event has occurred notwithstanding the explanations which had been recently submitted to your Royal Highness on the subject of your Royal Highness's authority and relations with your Royal Highness's Council.

I was under the necessity of reporting to his Majesty that your Royal Highness had sailed; upon which his Majesty expressed the greatest concern and surprise, inasmuch as his Majesty observed that, "No man understood discipline better" than your Royal Highness.

My duty, as the King's minister, obliges me to submit to your Royal Highness that neither the constitution of this country nor that of your Royal Highness's office allow of your taking such measures without the assistance of your Council; and the same duty, and the sincere attachment and respect which I feel for your Royal Highness's person, induce me to entreat your Royal Highness to conduct the duties of your Royal Highness's office in the manner pointed out by the patent appointing your Royal Highness to hold it, and by the Act of Parliament, and through the usual official persons, and according to the usual forms.

I have the honour to be, Sir, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 973. ]

*To the Lord Chancellor.*

MY DEAR LORD CHANCELLOR, London, 8th August, 1828.

It occurs to me that what follows would be an amendment of what I proposed to you ; and would obviate the objections which occurred to your mind.

1. All ecclesiastics of the Roman Catholic religion to have licenses before they are allowed to perform any religious function of the Roman Catholic Church after \*            day            \*.

2. Those paid by the Crown to take the oaths of '74 and '93 at the Quarter-Sessions or in the Four Courts, Dublin ; and to be licensed by the Crown.

3. Those not paid by the Crown to take the oaths of '74 and '93 at the Quarter-Sessions ; and to be licensed by the Justices at Sessions.

4. The licenses by the Justices to be renewed every year.

5. In case any Roman Catholic clergyman performs any religious function without license from the Crown or Quarter-Sessions, he is to be liable to the penalties as stated in my paper.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 974. ]

*To Dean Phillpotts.*

London, 8th August, 1828.

I am very much obliged to you, my dear Sir, for your suggestion, which is excellent in principle. My mind had been travelling the same way. But you will see that anything that can be enacted upon this subject will go very little way to prevent the Roman Catholic clergy from exercising the influence of their order in confessionals, &c., over their flocks in relation to their votes at elections ; but what you suggest is important in principle ; and I had it under consideration.

How will such an enactment affect the influence of the Primate of Ireland over the borough of Armagh ? Not that I should think the sacrifice of that borough, and the surrender

\* Blank in manuscript.

of it even to Mr. O'Connell himself, of any importance in comparison with any benefit to be obtained from such an enactment.

I remain, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Duke of Clarence to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

DEAR DUKE,

Admiralty, 9th August, 1828.

On my arrival this morning I found your Grace's letter of yesterday, which has surprised me not a little; because, unless some *person* or *persons* had particularly called your Grace's attention to *my* having remained from 30th July to the 4th August at sea *without* Sir Henry Blackwood, I am confident I never *should* have received *such* a letter from your Grace. Under this persuasion I feel singularly situated, for if I am to be *guided* in everything by *my* Council, or if your Grace is to have information of *my* conduct from others, and not listen to my motives for my conduct, I am sure the sooner I resign my official situation the better.

On all matters of expense I thank God I have a Council to consult, and on many points I am sensible of the advantage of having *two professional men* to converse with. But to submit to the previous concurrence of *my* Council on all points may perhaps be the object of *the* Cabinet, but to which *I will not* and *cannot* submit. Therefore, unless it is clearly understood between your Grace and myself that I am to be *in future* the judge, *except in matters of expense*, on what subjects I shall consult my Council, *I must resign.*

I remain, dear Duke, yours truly,

WILLIAM.

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*To the Duke of Clarence.*

[ 975. ]

SIR,

London, 9th August, 1828.

Since I quitted your Royal Highness at the Admiralty, I have had the honour of receiving the letter which you had given me to read.

When your Royal Highness, embarked in a vessel bearing the military flag of the Lord High Admiral, went to sea from Plymouth with a squadron placed by his Majesty's command under the command of Sir Henry Blackwood, notwithstanding what had just previously been submitted to your Royal Highness upon that subject, it was my duty, as his Majesty's minister, to submit to your Royal Highness the opinion I entertained, whatever might have been the quarter from which the intelligence of the fact was received. I entreat your Royal High-



ness to consider the terms of your patent and of the Act of Parliament; and the nature of the King's prerogative. This review of the subject will convince your Royal Highness that the responsibility of your Royal Highness's Council and that of his Majesty's servants are seriously involved if they fail in their duty to his Majesty and to your Royal Highness by omitting to state their sentiments when such events occur; and this conviction will, I hope, relieve me from any charge of pertinacity if I again in writing, as I did verbally, submit to your Royal Highness that neither the patent of Lord High Admiral, nor the Act of Parliament, nor the constitution of the country, allowed of your Royal Highness assuming such authority.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 976. ]

*To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.*

MY DEAR PEEL,

London, 9th August, 1828.

I send you two letters, about the first of which Lord Longford wrote to me. I begged to see it, as I consider it desirable to read everything of that kind within one's reach; and he this day sent me the enclosed letter, and the two letters from the lady in question.

The second letter explains the mystery attending the first. But I confess that I cannot understand how it happened that these people were employed all night in the correspondence mentioned.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 977. ]

*To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.*

MY DEAR PEEL,

London, 9th August, 1828.

I now send you the Memoranda which I sent to the King upon the state of Ireland; the letter which I wrote to him at the same time; his answer; a Memorandum upon the Roman Catholic Question, which I have since drawn; and a letter which I wrote yesterday to the Lord Chancellor. I am to see him again this afternoon; and will write you a line before the post goes out; and I hope to hear from you on Monday.

I will either then, or this evening with the Lord Chancellor, fix a time at which we shall meet to talk over this subject, previous to my having any further communication with the King.

Ever, &c.,  
WELLINGTON.

I have seen the Lord Chancellor, who thinks the arrangement would answer, if there is not a religious objection on the part of the Catholics to the licenses.

He thinks, however, that we ought to limit the number of offices as well as the number of seats in Parliament; and to pass the law for seven years, meaning then to revise it. We might except the Lord Chancellor, the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, and First Lord of the Treasury, as possessing Church patronage; but nothing else. The Chancellor and I are going to Windsor on Tuesday; we will afterwards fix a time to meet you. In the mean time let me hear from you.

Ever, &c.,  
WELLINGTON.

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*To the Duke of Rutland.*

[ 978. ]

MY DEAR DUKE,

London, 9th August, 1828.

I received your kind note, and I sincerely wish that it was in my power to promise that I would attend you at Longshawe. But, if I can get out of town, I am ordered to go to Cheltenham; which I am very much afraid I shall not be able to do.

I am very much flattered by your kindness to my son Lord Douro; and I assure you that nothing would be more agreeable to me than that he should commence his political career under your auspices. But I have been for some time under an engagement for him to Lord Hertford, who offered to bring him into Parliament, and the arrangement was postponed till next year only to afford him leisure to go abroad. I am very sorry, therefore, that I cannot accept your obliging offer for him.

Trench is much mistaken if he supposes that I was displeased with him for speaking to me respecting his own views. I should

pleased me, if at all displeased, was that I had it not in my power to gratify him.

When I shall have the pleasure of seeing Trench he will find that he is mistaken in this notion.

The weather has been very unpropitious for the harvest. Much hay has been destroyed, but I understand that the corn has not been injured. To save it, however, has cost and will cost a great deal of money; and, as you say, I am afraid that some time will elapse before it can be brought to market. There is as yet no great rise of price or importation.

I saw several of the shipping gentlemen; but their case, like many others, is one of the difficulties which I have inherited, to be got the better of only by time and patience.

Ever, my dear Duke, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Right Hon. Maurice Fitzgerald to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Near Listowel, Ireland,

Saturday, 9th August, 1828.

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

Did I think that there was any time to spare, if there were months, or even weeks allowable for the measures necessary to secure this country, I should certainly abstain from troubling your Grace by letter. Being, however, perfectly convinced of the contrary, I venture to write with the same freedom with which I have already spoken to your Grace on the subject. I am aware that facts relating to Ireland must reach the government from various quarters; that I can have nothing new of that sort to communicate, and that your Grace can command more important opinions. I hold no station which calls on me to suggest measures; but were I in a position to advise my Sovereign, I would tell him that Ireland is gradually, and not slowly, slipping from the dominion of the English Crown. Under this solemn conviction, I disregard all risk of seeming presumptuous, and write with a confidence that your Grace will appreciate fairly my motives, and be disposed to receive the truth, from whatever quarter it may come.

A fearful change has taken place in Ireland in the few months which have elapsed since I last was here. The symptoms lie upon the surface, and are sufficiently alarming. The questions for government are the causes and the remedies. The immediate cause is the delay in satisfying the reasonable demands of the Catholics, in which they are countenanced by the most enlightened portion of the English and Irish Protestants, by conceding which in due time, all the upper and more important classes of the Catholics would have been attached to the government, and the remainder might have been diverted from political objects to profitable

industry. The whole are now combined in one body susceptible of one impulse. *That impulse is given.* The minor question of political privilege within the Constitution has grown to a *national* one; and it is in that aspect alone that it can be adequately contemplated by your Grace. All this state of things I foretold to Lord Liverpool six years ago as inevitably certain to result from further delay, only that I gave ten years for the accomplishment of what has now arrived.

No one is more conscious of the tremendous difficulties which surround your Grace as Prime Minister in attempting any practical and effectual remedy. Sufficient difficulties exist in England; and here new ones arise from the actual posture of the Catholics. But in this all agree that within a very short time something decisive must be done. In this country the danger is appalling, and it is rapidly *progressive*. No former state of things can convey any idea of it. In 1797 every gentleman's house formed a sort of military post, in which he could rally friends, adherents, *tenantry*, keeping up courage and communication amongst the loyal, and awing the disaffected. In the present state of things no Protestant gentleman would remain in his house if commotion should arise; as it is, they are beginning to contemplate the placing their families in a state of security. Where is *that* to be found? In 1797 the Catholic of property co-operated as zealously as his Protestant neighbour in resistance to the disaffected. At present material distrust and alienation make frightful progress. The line is strictly drawn between the religions. The distinction is founded in *the nature of things*. The Catholic is actuated by what he considers his duty to his family, his country, and his God. Their organisation is complete without being *tangible*. They know and measure their strength; but if their leaders have any control (and I believe they do possess effectual control), they will not *use* that strength in any manner to commit themselves *prematurely*. But the array of the people is complete; every parish is a regiment; and years of secret conspiracy could not effect such a system as exists in Ireland, as it were by instinct. Then what is the Protestant population of Munster and Connaught? We hold our lives at the mere *discretion* of the Catholic population. Then as to the moral feeling of the respective parties, your Grace reads and hears enough of the tone of the Catholics. I never knew the Protestant mind of Ireland *dismayed* before. Even in Dublin I could find no real spirit remaining. But why occupy your Grace's time with these generalities? I have again to entreat your pardon for the confidence with which I come to particular suggestions. If it be intended to follow up the efforts which doubtless are in progress, to secure Ireland against convulsion by any concessions which may satisfy the moderate and respectable classes of Catholics, *it should be announced at once*. When I have asked that description of persons on what grounds they set your Grace down as the decided enemy of their claims, they have answered, "What has he ever said to make us think otherwise?" The importance attaching to your individual opinion is incalculable. The class I allude to is now for the first time lending itself to the ultra views of the more violent; all moderation will ere long be carried forward by the general *momentum* which the mass has acquired.

and reclaim the moderate before they are carried too far, and hardly a moment remains for it. If anything be intended, an explicit declaration to that effect should transpire, certainly not unaccompanied by the most energetic denunciation of all revolutionary projects, a determination to put them down, and a powerful development of actual force and power for that purpose. In order to check the fatal progress of this danger, a military force must be placed in the southern and western provinces sufficient to demonstrate to the wavering the utter hopelessness of any movement against the government. Nothing could be so mischievous as an abandonment of the country by the Protestant proprietors, like that of the "Emigration" from France. The moral influence of the landlord, the magistrate, the laws, is fast dissolving. For the present even it can only be at all sustained by physical force. The police, which from some blunders attending its formation, has unfortunately become odious to the people, must nevertheless be largely augmented, but with the utmost caution in the selection. The existing materials in point of men are excellent. But the *chief* constables are of the worst description,—half gentry, above their business, and generally dissipated. Promotion should go on within the establishment; that would have miraculous effect; and the chiefs should gradually be supplanted by steady, experienced soldiers. There is another description of force which I earnestly recommend to your Grace to augment at once, and to a considerable extent, viz., the water guard. Two years since, and with a view to such a state of things as now exists, I entreated of Mr. Peel to prevent the reduction of that force. It consists of the best possible description of men, living on very good terms with the people, well officered generally; their increase would be the least invidious of all, might be done almost imperceptibly, without *éclat*, by two or three at a time sent to the different stations from various points, and the increase fully accounted for by that of smuggling, which is renewed to a great extent. The number at each station is five; I earnestly advise that it be increased to fifteen. Such a force distributed as they are would *diffuse* protection and confidence in the quarters where they are most wanting, and in case of emergency might in their concentration afford numerous points of support and communication. I am perfectly convinced that nothing less than what I suggest will prove sufficient; and I must be permitted to say that if economy or want of funds are to be pleaded against the effort, the fate of the government in this country is compromised. Whatever millions of expenditure may be requisite, must be expended ten-fold to recover that which I think may now be prevented by *immediate*, vigorous, and judicious exertion. I am glad that the decision is in your Grace's hands.

Whilst, however, I attribute to your Grace the properties which are requisite to save and settle this country, notwithstanding the terrific state of things, it is indispensable that *your hands be free*, that your Grace as Prime Minister, answerable to the King for the safety of his dominions, shall have a *carte blanche* as to your measures. Your Grace knows this country (which none of your predecessors did), and you are actuated by an unquestionable disposition to preserve all the establishments on the firmest foundations. I, in my very humble sphere, am actuated by the same dispositions; but a deep sense of public duty, and anxiety to save Ireland from

convulsion and ruin and preserve her to the British Crown, compel me, not from presumption, but from an honest conviction that by experience and attentive observation *I understand the case*, to assure your Grace, that if the doctrines of Lord Eldon, and such counsellors, any longer shall influence the King,—if the ignorance of the English aristocracy, and the unwarrantable meddling of the English Church on a subject purely Irish in its practice and its consequences, be suffered to trammel your Grace in the exercise of your discretion, in satisfying that which is reasonable, and just, and safe, in order to be able to resist and repress all that is unreasonable, unjust, and dangerous,—this country is lost; or only to be retained by means and in a condition worse than its loss. My confidence in your Grace has led me to this step beyond the province of a private individual. I have been further encouraged to it by the frank communication with which you honoured me before I left town, and your permitting me to write to you on these topics. I have never breathed a word as to the sentiments your Grace expressed, and in discussions since I came to Ireland, have merely referred to the general impressions prevailing in the political circle in London as to the policy your government is likely to pursue when practicable. What I have now ventured principally to press is the necessity of an *immediate* exposition of that policy.

The only *public opinion* your Grace need consult is that of the Protestants of Ireland. The Protestant feeling of England may *sympathise* with us, but they have no right to goad us on to ruin whilst they are themselves aloof from the danger. No panic, however, influences what I have said. I forewarned Lord Wellesley of the tendency of things, but he considered me an alarmist; that tendency has been fearfully accelerated, and I end as I began, that not an hour is to be lost.

I am, my dear Lord Duke,  
your Grace's most obliged and faithful

MAURICE FITZGERALD.

P.S.—I enclose a letter from a very sensible Protestant in Dublin, having the best means of information, and who has never deceived me. He is very anxious that it should not be known that he communicates, and therefore I beg that his letter, as well as my own, may be destroyed. I have not alluded to the peculiar evil of the present case, *i.e.* that the constitution of the army renders it difficult to be used for the security of the State. No one knows so well as your Grace all that relates to that point. Then the danger is of a nature that one can not *cope* with. It surrounds us, it is above and below; we feel that it augments; it strikes no blow, it cannot be attacked, but is gradually involving us within its folds. I do not consider the ostensible political leaders to be bold men. They are guided by deeper heads than their own. They intend to regulate and direct the movement that they have excited; but should they shrink from the edge of the precipice there are in foreign countries many individuals devoted to the cause, and competent to use the materials prepared to their hands for military purposes, if it shall come to that.

In the case of the water guard, I omitted to mention their importance in

sympathy exists at New York with every movement of Irish disaffection. There is an individual there whom I know to be actuated by the utmost possible malignity towards British connection. I would also suggest that the immense number of pensioners, many quite fit for home service, and all capable of being turned to good or bad purposes, should at least be placed under some strict surveillance, and if not embodied for duty in England, obliged to attend in the several garrisons of Ireland to show that they are not worse employed. I believe a persuasion exists that unless they can take some very decisive course, they cannot long keep up the Catholic rents.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MY DEAR KNIGHT,

2nd August, 1828.

Since I had the pleasure of seeing you, I had an opportunity of conversing with several intelligent men respecting the subject of our conversation. I find a very general feeling of expectation among the young folks of some very decided step being taken by their party before the next session (probably as soon as the harvest is got in), such as in their view will *restore their lost rights*. The youth are worked up to the greatest pitch of excitement, and I think ready to rush into any desperate measure. Some of the Association are in the same temper, but others have more prudence to suppress their opinions. The subject of the confiscated properties is becoming more familiar every day, which I think is the worst feature in the case. The friends of Dan seem now to think that he should have gone over to London, and most people appear to have adopted Cobbett's view as to his losing ground, which may have the effect to create a desperation, and not unlikely to hurry on a crisis. The decided impression of my mind is that nothing will now satisfy but a complete restoration to everything, and that a reliance is placed on the complete organisation that prevails of being able to accomplish it by *force*. They have no expectation of succeeding in any other way, and don't hesitate to state so. To you only would I venture to communicate those sentiments, and from the different conversations we have hitherto had, I believe from what followed that you could judge I collected some useful information, and did not stretch the statement to you. Government should have a very watchful eye. Dan literally has the peace, or otherwise, of the country in his hands. He wields the Association as he likes, and the Roman Catholic priesthood openly acknowledge that they consider themselves bound to act upon any orders that may issue from the Association. You are aware that there are 2800 priests attached to the different parishes. May heaven divert and frustrate the fatal blow contemplated, should be the prayer of us all. I shan't trouble you at present with more, but may probably write to you again before you leave Ireland.

I am, my dear Knight, yours very faithfully,

H.

*The Duke of Clarence to the Lord Chancellor.*

MY DEAR LORD,

Admiralty, 9th August, 1828.

I am most anxious to talk over with your Lordship the different duties of my office, both by patent first, and by the Act afterwards passed on my coming into office. I will therefore thank your Lordship to bring with

you a *précis* of the Act whenever I have the pleasure of shaking your Lordship by the hand. In the event of his Majesty sending for me on the 12th August, I shall not be able to come to town, but shall certainly on the 14th instant. Perhaps I had better name that day, and request your Lordship to come here on the 14th instant (Thursday), when your Lordship's Court rises, and to bring with you the *précis* of the Act.

My best and kindest wishes attend Lady Lyndhurst, and ever believe me, my dear Lord,

Yours most truly,

WILLIAM.

[ENCLOSURE.]

COPY OF LORD HIGH ADMIRAL'S PATENT.

August, 1828.

George the Fourth, by the grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, King Defender of the Faith, to our most dearly beloved brother, William Henry Duke of Clarence, Admiral of our Fleet, greeting: Whereas we did by our Letters Patent, under our Great Seal of our United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, bearing date at Westminster the Sixteenth day of February, in the fifth year of our reign, nominate, constitute, and appoint our right trusty and well beloved cousin and councillor, Robert Viscount Melville, Knight, of the most ancient and most noble Order of the Thistle, our trusty and well beloved Sir William Johnstone Hope, Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Military Order of the Bath, and Vice-Admiral of the Blue Squadron of our Fleet, Sir George Cockburn, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Military Order of the Bath, and Vice-Admiral of the Blue Squadron of our Fleet, Sir George Clerk, Baronet, and William Robert Keith Douglas, Esquire, to be our Commissioners for executing the office of our High Admiral of our United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the Dominions, Islands, and Territories thereunto belonging, and of our High Admiral of Jamaica, Barbados, Saint Christopher, Nevis, Mountserrat, Bermudas, Antigua in America, and of Guiana, Binny, and Angola in Africa, and of the islands and dominions thereof, and also of all and singular our other foreign plantations, dominions, and territories whatsoever, and places thereunto belonging during our pleasure, as by our said recited Letters Patent (amongst other things therein contained, relation being thereunto had) may more fully and at large appear.

Now know you that we have revoked and determined, and by these presents do revoke and determine our said recited Letters Patent, and every clause, article, and thing therein contained; and know you further that we, reposing especial trust and confidence in the approved wisdom, fidelity, and experience of you the said William Henry Duke of Clarence, of our especial grace, certain knowledge, and mere motion have given and granted, and by these presents do give and grant unto you the said William Henry Duke of Clarence the office of High Admiral of our United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the dominions, islands, and territories thereunto belonging, and also of all and singular our foreign plantations, dominions, and territories whatsoever, and places thereunto belonging, during our pleasure; and you the said William Henry Duke of Clarence, our High Admiral aforesaid, we have nominated, constituted, and appointed, and by these presents do nominate, constitute, and appoint. Captain-General of the Fleets and Seas of our United



tions, and territories aforesaid during our pleasure: *And moreover, that such office of our High Admiral of our said United Kingdom, and other places aforesaid, and Captain-General of our Fleets and Seas, and other places aforesaid, and all and everything to the same offices appertaining and belonging throughout the said United Kingdom, and other places aforesaid, and every of them, shall and may be better and more conveniently executed, we will ordain and constitute that from henceforth at the pleasure of the said William Henry Duke of Clarence there may and shall be two or more discreet men, and skilled in maritime affairs, to assist and advise our said High Admiral and Captain-General in all things and business to the offices aforesaid appertaining or belonging, and who shall be and be called the Council of the High Admiral of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland: Know you therefore that we of our especial grace, certain knowledge, and mere motion, have given and granted, and by these presents do give and grant to you, the said William Henry Duke of Clarence, full power and authority as often as you shall please to nominate, ordain, constitute, and appoint two or more discreet men, and skilled in maritime affairs (not exceeding in all the number of four) to be called "The Council of the High Admiral of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland," to advise you the said William Henry Duke of Clarence, High Admiral and Captain-General aforesaid, and to assist you in all things and business, and to receive, examine, and prepare for you and for your forwarding, completing, and perfecting all matters and things to the offices aforesaid appertaining and belonging, according to the orders and during the pleasure of you, the said William Henry Duke of Clarence, and them and every of them so nominated and appointed at the pleasure of you, the said William Henry Duke of Clarence, to move which said Councillors so as aforesaid ordained and constituted shall each of them have and receive such yearly sum of lawful money of Great Britain as fee and salary for the execution of their services aforesaid as by our order in Council shall be declared, or by our instructions under our Royal Sign Manual, or sealed with our Privy Seal, shall seem to us reasonable and requisite: And further of our more especial grace, certain knowledge, and mere motion, we have given and granted, and these presents do give and grant unto you, the said William Henry Duke of Clarence, during our pleasure, full power and authority to do, execute, exercise, and perform all and every act, matter, and thing belonging or appertaining to the said office of High Admiral, as well in as touching all those things which concern our navy and shipping as those which concern the right and jurisdiction of or appertaining to the office of High Admiral aforesaid: And we do further by these presents give and grant unto you, the said William Henry Duke of Clarence, full power and authority to make such orders and issue such warrants for the repairing and preserving our ships and vessels already built and to be built in harbour, with all things belonging to them and every of them according to your best discretion, and for the well building, repairing, fitting, furnishing, arming, victualling, and setting forth such ships and fleets as you shall receive directions for either from us or from our Privy Council; and also to establish and direct such entertainments wages, and rewards for and unto all and every such person and persons as are and shall be employed in those our services, or anything appertaining thereunto; and further, to give discharges for those services, or any of them, as to you in your wisdom and good discretion shall be thought fit, in as ample manner and form as any our Commissioners for executing the said office of our High Admiral might have done by virtue of our commission granted for executing the said office of High Admiral: And our will and pleasure is, and we do hereby strictly charge and command all our Officers and Ministers of or belonging to our navy or ships, and every of them now and for the time being,*



and all others in their several places whom it may in anywise concern, that they and every of them be from time to time attendant to you, the said William Henry Duke of Clarence, and do carefully and diligently observe, execute, and perform all such orders, warrants, and commands as you shall make, give, and direct touching the premises in such manner and sort as if any Commissioners for executing the said office of our High Admiral had made, given, or directed the same: And to the intent you, the said William Henry Duke of Clarence, may be the better instructed how to perform this great and weighty service to our best advantage, and we and our Privy Council may be the better informed what orders and directions from time to time to give therein, our will and pleasure is, and we do hereby of our most especial grace, certain knowledge, and mere motion, give and grant unto you, the said William Henry Duke of Clarence, power and authority, not only by yourself, but also by any other fit person or persons whom you shall make choice of and appoint with all convenient speed, to make a true and perfect survey and account of all such ships and vessels of or belonging to our navy, and of all the munition, tackle, and furniture belonging to them, or any of them, and of all the stores, ammunition, and furnitures prepared for them and every of them, of all sorts, and also of all courses now held in managing, ordering, and governing of our navy, and to deliver the same so made and taken unto us in writing, and to propound such ways and means for the establishing such orders and instructions for regulating the same as shall be found agreeable to our service, and as may increase our power and forces by sea, and remove such corruptions and abuses as may prejudice the same, and especially may maintain the marines and seamen and sea service in due order and obedience; that thereupon we may take such speedy and effectual course for the supplying of all defects and reforming of all abuses as shall be necessary to make and continue our navy serviceable and powerful for our honour, and for the honour and safety of our realm and dominions.

And whereas all droits of the sea, goods, and ships taken from pirates, and divers droits, rights, duties, and privileges have been by express warrants, or otherwise, heretofore granted to our said High Admiral, and to former Admirals for their own benefit, as duties appertaining to the office or place of our High Admiral aforesaid: Now our further will and pleasure is, and we do hereby charge and command that all casual duties, droits, and profits be taken, collected, and received in all places where they shall happen by the Vice-Admirals and other officers of or belonging to the Admiralty, in such sort as they formerly were, or ought to have been taken, collected, and received by them and every of them respectively when there was a High Admiral of Great Britain, and the said Vice-Admirals and others so taking, collecting, or receiving the same shall account for the same, and every part thereof, unto or before you the said William Henry Duke of Clarence, or unto such other person or persons in such manner and form as you shall for that purpose appoint, but to our only use and behoof, and not otherwise. And whereas we conceive it just and reasonable that those who have or shall truly and faithfully account for what they receive, should have sufficient discharges for the same accordingly: Our will and pleasure is, and we do therefore by these presents give and grant to you the said William Henry Duke of Clarence full power and authority to issue forth discharges, releases, and quietuses upon such accounts for all duties, droits, and profits whatsoever received or to be received by the aforesaid Vice-Admirals, or other collectors, receivers, or any commissioners authorised by you, or by the High Court of

Admiralty as you, the said William Henry Duke of Clarence, shall approve of the said releases, discharges, or quietuses, to be under your hand and the seal commonly used by you for things appertaining to the said office of our High Admiral, which we will shall be and remain of record in the High Court of Admiralty, under the custody of the Registrar there, to the end that the parties concerned in such accounts and discharges may according to their occasions (if they desire it) receive the same exemplified under the great seal of our Admiralty: And our further will and pleasure is, and we do hereby declare, that the releases, discharges, and quietuses so signed by you, the said William Henry Duke of Clarence, and sealed with your seal aforesaid, or the duplicates thereof recorded in the High Court of Admiralty, shall be held, deemed, taken, and be a full, sufficient, and lawful discharge, release, and quietus to every such accountant, his executors, or administrators: And whereas all offices, places, and employments belonging to the navy or Admiralty are properly in the trust and disposal of our High Admiral for the time being, and such High Admirals have constituted Vice-Admirals under them, our will and pleasure is, and we do by these presents of our further especial grace, certain knowledge, and mere motion give and grant unto you, the said William Henry Duke of Clarence, full power and authority to give, grant, and dispose of all offices, places, and employments belonging to the navy or Admiralty, and to constitute and appoint Vice-Admirals for such places where Vice-Admirals have been usually appointed by Commissioners for executing the said office of High Admiral for the time being: Lastly, our will and pleasure is, and we do by these presents grant to you, the said William Henry Duke of Clarence, that those our Letters Patent, or the exemplification or enrolment thereof, shall be and remain in and by all things good, firm, valid, and effectual in the law, notwithstanding the ill writing, or not truly, or not fully writing the said former Letters Patent of the date thereof: And notwithstanding the not writing any other Letters Patent or Commission concerning the said office and premises, or any of them heretofore made or granted by us, or any of our ancestors or predecessors, or any other omission, imperfection, defect, matter, cause, or thing whatsoever to the contrary thereof in any wise notwithstanding.

In witness whereof we have caused these our Letters to be made Patent; witness ourself, at Westminster, the Second day of May, in the Eighth year of our Reign.

By the King himself.

BATHURST.

[ 979. ]

*To the King.*

London, 10th August, 1828.

I attended the Lord High Admiral yesterday by his Royal Highness's desire; and his Royal Highness explained himself very much to the same purport as in the enclosed letter, which, in the course of conversation, his Royal Highness gave me to read.

I told his Royal Highness that I could not do otherwise than submit my representation to him upon every occasion on which he should depart from the rules laid down for his conduct by your Majesty in the patent of his appointment or in the Act of

Parliament; that I regretted much the necessity of having such discussions with his Royal Highness, but that I could make no compromise upon such a subject; and I entreated his Royal Highness to consult the Lord Chancellor, if he thought I had formed an erroneous judgment on the extent of the powers conferred upon him.

His Royal Highness afterwards sent me the enclosed letter; and I wrote his Royal Highness the answer of which I enclose your Majesty the copy.

All of which is submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

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*To Earl Bathurst.*

[ 980. ]

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, London, 10th August, 1828.

I have been so much occupied, that I have not been able to answer your letter.

I have made no progress as yet; but I hope I shall soon; and I will let you know as soon as I shall have done anything. I think any dealing with the Pope is out of the question, and will get us into all sorts of difficulties. The Church of England would have great and well founded objections to such a course of proceeding; and my own opinion is that we can do without having recourse to it.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

They have advised me to go to Cheltenham for a short time, in which case I will certainly pay you a visit.

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*The King to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR FRIEND, Royal Lodge, 10th August, 1828.

My sentiments coincide entirely with yours upon this disagreeable altercation with the Lord High Admiral. As he dines with me on the next Tuesday (the 12th), I desire you will be early with me on that day, in order that I may have some conversation with you before I see my brother.

Ever your sincere friend,

G. R.

P.S.—I will restore your papers to you when I shall see you here.

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*The Duke of Clarence to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

DEAR DUKE,

Bushy House, 10th August, 1828.

In answer to your Grace's letter of yesterday in answer to mine, which *was* and *was not* sent, because your Grace must recollect the circumstances under which I put it into your own hands, I shall make *two* observations. The *first* is, I *hope* and *expect* to see the Lord Chancellor in the course of the 14th instant, to talk over *entirely* my *patent* and the *Act of Parliament*, as I am commanded by his Majesty to be at the Royal Lodge on the 12th instant. I shall then be a better judge of how I feel as to the positive power *I possess* or *not*, and therefore my mind will then be able to direct my line of conduct in convincing me whether I can be of real use to the King and the country or not in the situation I now hold in the Admiralty.

The *other*, and the *most important* is—I must feel hurt your Grace conceives it was your duty, from *whatever quarter* the intelligence was received, to mention to me the opinion your Grace entertained, after what I had thought I had so fully and so satisfactorily stated had arisen from a mere accident.

I will not at present say any more, because it is possible that my conversation with the Lord Chancellor *may* be *satisfactory*, and that the mere accident of my having been alone *without* Sir Henry Blackwood *can never* happen again.

I remain, dear Duke, yours sincerely,

WILLIAM.

[ 981. ]

*To the Duke of Clarence.*

SIR,

London, 11th August, 1828.

I had the honour of receiving your Royal Highness's letter last night; and as your Royal Highness informed me therein that you were to speak to the Lord Chancellor on the subject which we had discussed, I did not intend to trouble you again upon it.

I have, however, just received the enclosed from his Majesty, in answer to that I wrote to his Majesty yesterday, in which I sent his Majesty the letter which your Royal Highness wrote me on the 9th, and my answer. I enclose your Royal Highness the copy of the letter from me to the King, of which the enclosed is the answer; and likewise of the letter which I wrote to his Majesty on the 8th instant, in which I transmitted to his Majesty the copy of the letter which I addressed to your Royal Highness on that day.

I have the honour to be,

WELLINGTON.

*The King to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR FRIEND,

Royal Lodge, 11th August, 1828.

I have read with the most careful attention your further correspondence with the Lord High Admiral.

I will repeat to your Grace the words that I used to my brother when I had occasion to write to him on this painful subject, namely, "that he was in error from the beginning to the end."

I now desire distinctly to state, once for all, that I most entirely approve of all that you, in the exercise of your bounden duty towards me, as my First Minister, have communicated to the Lord High Admiral on the subject now before me. When I appointed my brother to the station of Lord High Admiral, I had reasonably hoped that I should have derived comfort, peace, and tranquillity from such an appointment; but from what has hitherto taken place, it would seem as if the very reverse were to happen.

Can the Lord High Admiral suppose that the laws are to be infringed, the rules of true discipline (which he knows so well how to uphold) are to be broken in upon? and that these things are to pass without notice or remonstrance by the responsible advisers of the Crown? Can the Lord High Admiral suppose that his best friend and his Sovereign is to have no feeling under such circumstances? I am quite aware that I am drawing fast to the close of my life; it may be the will of the Almighty that a month, a week, nay a day, may call the Lord High Admiral to be my successor.

I love my brother William, I always have done so to my heart's core; and I will leave him the example of what the inherent duty of a king of this country really is. The Lord High Admiral shall strictly obey the laws enacted by Parliament, as attached to his present station, or I desire immediately to receive his resignation.

Such are my commands to your Grace.

Ever your sincere friend,

G. R.

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*The Duke of Clarence to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Bushy House, 11th August, 1828, 9 p.m.

Your Grace's letter of this day enclosing a letter from his Majesty, also of this day, accepting in its contents my resignation of the office of Lord High Admiral, together with copies of your Grace's letters to the King of 8th and 10th instant, have just reached me.

I have very little under the present circumstances to observe to your Grace, except that I trust in God, from the bottom of my heart, that our justly beloved and gracious Sovereign may be spared to govern us all for many and many a day. However others might feel at the resignation of so high an office, I can with equal truth and satisfaction declare that I retire from this situation with the most perfect satisfaction to my mind;

as conceiving that, with the impediments thrown, and intended to have been thrown, in the way of the execution of my office, I could not have done justice either to the King or to my country.

I remain yours sincerely,  
WILLIAM.

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*The Duke of Clarence to the King.*

DEAREST BROTHER, Bushy House, 11th August, 1828, 9 p.m.

I have just received from the Duke of Wellington your most kind acceptance of my resignation of the office of Lord High Admiral, for which I thank you from the bottom of my heart. As the Sovereign you could not have done otherwise, because "*the King must support his Minister.*" I have my story and facts to relate whenever you will find time to give me an hour's interview. To-morrow is to me a day of peculiar joy and satisfaction, and long long may I and all my fellow-subjects celebrate the 12th of August, as the natal day of the best of Sovereigns, and to me of the kindest and most affectionate of brothers and friends. At half-past six to-morrow I shall pay my personal regards at the Royal Lodge, and then assure you that I am, must, and ever shall be,

Dearest brother, yours most affectionately and unalterably,  
WILLIAM.

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*The Duke of Clarence to the Lord Chancellor.*

MY DEAR LORD, Bushy House, 11th August, 1828, 9 p.m.

Having just received from his Grace the Duke of Wellington the intelligence that the King has been most graciously pleased to accept my resignation of the office of Lord High Admiral, I write to inform your Lordship of this circumstance, which will of course preclude the necessity of my troubling your Lordship with any conversation at the Admiralty on the 14th instant, and

I ever remain yours truly,  
WILLIAM.

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*The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE, Priory, 11th August, 1828.

I am glad to hear that you will be in town to-morrow morning, and in that hope I had already fixed the hour of the Conference for two o'clock. As we shall not be very long, Lieven will have time enough to go to Windsor. But at all events I trust you will not be absent.

Yesterday I took an opportunity of speaking to Lieven about his fleet, and suggested the propriety of its not being augmented, under the circumstances of their neutral character, beyond its present force. He assured me that the ships sent were destined to relieve those now in the Mediterranean, and would be placed under the command of Admiral de Heyden. He said that the squadron would not be more numerous than it is at present; that

is, very inferior to ours. He added, however, that there was nothing to prevent them sending *another squadron, under another admiral*, if they thought fit to do so. I treated this as if said in jest, and totally out of the question. Indeed, he did not appear to speak seriously. I believe last year there was some dispute about the manner of saluting when they were in England, which is the reason of their not having put in at any port in their passage down the Channel. Melville says they were in the right, but I forget the particulars of the dispute.

I have directed enquiry to be made into the records of the Foreign Office, to endeavour to find any letter from King John VI., or any official representation of Palmella, relating to Lord Strangford's recall. When I asked Palmella what was the precise cause of the application on the part of the King, he said he had forgotten the particulars, but believed that it was in consequence of general conduct, rather than any specific acts.

I shall be in town to-morrow at twelve o'clock.

Ever most truly yours,

ABERDEEN.

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*The Right Hon. Charles Arbuthnot to Earl Bathurst.*

DEAR LORD BATHURST,

Woodford, 12th August, 1828.

I thought that before this I should have had wherewithal to make out a letter for you. The Duke had meant two days running to come down for a night or two, but he was prevented. I believe that he will have been obliged to send an excuse to the king, with whom he was to have been to-day.

I am quite sure that he overworks. He will do everything that he thinks ought to be done, and his bodily strength is not equal to it. I hear he looks ill, but there is no persuading him to bear in mind that his bodily strength must at last give way.

The state of Ireland occupies him greatly; and about this I will write to you shortly. Peel is aware that something must be done. He had not let out to the Duke what his own course would be, but to Lord Aberdeen he had intimated that he could not be a party to anything.

He had said something of the same kind to Herries with whom he is not generally on terms of any confidence. The Duke will have the double object of trying to get Ireland into a better state, and of preventing the government from breaking to pieces. The loss of Peel would be a terrible blow; but the Duke will never abandon the helm in despair, and would work with inferior tools if he should be deprived of the better ones. He is as well as possible at Windsor. I am sure of this for he never boasts, and has rather a disposition to see things the other way. I will write to you again very soon.

Ever truly yours,

A.

This letter does not say much, but I would beg you not to take notice to any one of the little it does say.

I hope Lady Bathurst and Lady Georgiana are quite well.

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*Dean Phillpotts to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Stanhope, Durham, 12th August, 1828.

It cannot be necessary for me to say that I feel myself much gratified and honoured by the approbation your Grace is pleased to express of the suggestion I took the liberty of making in my last letter, and still more by finding that it coincides with your own previous views.

May I be permitted to intimate a doubt as to the extent of influence which the priests will be found to exert in the confessionals on the exercise of the elective franchise? I apprehend that those who possess the franchise are not in the habit of going to confession more than once in the year; and it will be hardly the case that this time will often coincide with the date of a contested election. The voters themselves would commonly, I conceive, seek to escape the mandates of their priests; for, if I am not misinformed, there was some difficulty in managing them in the recent struggle in Clare. The time of confession is, I believe, usually at or about Easter, a period when a general election scarcely ever takes place.

It is true that instructions may be given at confession, regulating the vote of the penitent on future contingencies: but though I should at the present crisis expect a systematic exertion of that sort, I should not think it very likely to take place at ordinary times. If it be answered that it is only at critical periods like the present the exercise of the influence would be of moment, and it is probable that at all critical periods it would be put into action; I would reply that, if once the present crisis be well got over, I do not think it likely that anything of the same sort, at least of the same extent, can again occur; for I do not conceive it possible that, after the experience now unhappily afforded, the mischief shall be permitted again to grow up to any serious height without being checked in its earlier stages by the due exertion of the power of law.

I also look to the probability of an inclination to peace on all sides if the questions now afloat be once settled; and it is mainly in the hope of its contributing to such a settlement that I look to the measure proposed as of moment.

There is, too, one other consideration in the case, which seems to me not unimportant. By limiting the exercise of the priest's influence to the confessional, all that is done must be done in secret, without the excitement of popular meetings, and without the spirit of emulation which is now, I conceive, a main stimulant to exertion. Every priest is a demagogue, and enjoys all the glory of that character. It is true that we now know all the mischief, whereas in the secrecy of the confessional instructions may be given which cannot be so well counteracted, because they are unknown. But, notwithstanding this, I am strongly of opinion that the mischief of popular excitement, particularly among so mercurial a race as the Irish, is likely to be much greater than that which would flow from the more insidious corruption of the confessional.

Nor is it to be forgotten that the public peace would in the case supposed—that of excluding all open influence—reap the full benefit to be derived from the individual characters of particular priests, from their love of order, their soberness, their carelessness, their weakness of understanding, or inability to enforce their views. It is to be remembered that each peni-



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tent can hardly be five minutes at his confession in Ireland. At present the influence of the whole body acts with concentrated force on every Roman Catholic in the country. In the other case it would be only the influence of his particular priest, and there would be no public shame in acting contrary to his direction.

With respect to the Primate's borough, I apprehend that the operation of the measure would be utterly without any effect. His Grace cannot at present directly interfere, and his indirect power would remain untouched.

I am ashamed to have written at so great length, and will trespass no longer on your Grace's patience except to say that it might be proper to insert a provision making void an election if either the candidate elected, or any of his agents (as in the Treaty Act), shall have been privy to the interference of any person in holy orders, &c.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect, my Lord Duke,  
your Grace's obliged and most humble servant,

HENRY PHILLPOTTS.

While your Grace is so tolerant of my intrusions, you are likely to be again troubled with them; though I shall not make them where they do not seem likely to be giving the result of rather minute examination of matters, into which your Grace cannot be expected to look. I particularly refer to the evidence respecting forty-shilling freeholders.

H. P.

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*To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.*

[ 982. ]

MY DEAR PEEL,

London, 13th August, 1828.

I return your correspondence with the Duke of Clarence; and I send you mine in regard to his recent cruise, which has ended in his resignation of his office of Lord High Admiral.

After writing to the King on the 1st instant, as we had settled in the Cabinet that I should write, I intended to take no more notice of what had passed, unless the Duke should render such notice necessary by his conduct on his arrival in London.

He came to London on the 7th, and behaved very rudely to Cockburn; in short, laid him aside altogether, sending his orders to the Council through Sir Edward Owen. I saw Cockburn and Croker on that afternoon and next morning, and both agreed in stating that the machine could no longer work.

I therefore consulted the Cabinet on the 8th, and with their concurrence wrote to the Duke the letter of the 8th, upon finding that he had left town before I went to him. The correspondence will explain the rest. I sent it to the King as it passed: and I received on Sunday the King's last letter, which

diately, and wrote to the Lord Chancellor to tell him that a meeting which he had fixed with his Lordship for to-morrow, the 14th, would not take place, as he had resigned.

It was quite obvious that the Duke had mistaken the King's letter, which certainly held out an alternative to obey the law or resign; and as I saw the King yesterday I suggested to his Majesty to explain the meaning of his letter to the Duke. The King made this explanation in presence of the Lord Chancellor, and urged the Duke not to decide that he would not obey the law.

The truth then came out that his Royal Highness would not remain in office unless Sir George Cockburn was removed.

His Royal Highness repeated the same afterwards to the Lord Chancellor. He said that he had no reason to complain of me, or of the King, and that he would do whatever was wished; but that of Sir George Cockburn he did complain, and that he must be removed.

I spoke to the King after dinner; and explained that his Royal Highness had now put the question on its real grounds, but that I must tell his Majesty that it would not answer to remove from his office a gentleman who had performed his duty, for no reason excepting that he had remonstrated against a breach of the law by the Duke.

His Royal Highness is, therefore, out of office. We must consider of the arrangement to be made in consequence, and this without loss of time. In my opinion we should put Lord Melville to the Admiralty and Lord Ellenborough to the Board of Control. I should prefer him still to hold the Privy Seal, wishing to keep that office at the disposition of the government till later in the year, for reasons into which I will enter in another letter.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 983.]

*To the King.*

London, 13th August, 1828.

The deanery of Norwich being vacant by the death of Dr. Turner, I beg leave to submit for your Majesty's pleasure that Mr. Gaisford, Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Oxford, may be appointed Dean of Norwich. He is strongly



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recommended by the Bishop of Durham ; and approved by the Bishop of London.

In case your Majesty should be graciously pleased to approve of this appointment, I would then submit to your Majesty that Mr. Short, son of the late Under-Preceptor to her Royal Highness the Princess Charlotte, may be appointed to the prebend of Worcester, which Mr. Gaisford will vacate.

Which is submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Duke of Clarence to the King.*

DEAREST BROTHER,

Admiralty, 14th August, 1828.

On my arrival here this morning I found a letter from the Duke of Wellington, the copy of which I enclose and also my answer to his Grace.

I have nothing to say or remark, except that in my resignation and retirement from office I go without the least feeling of any anger or disappointment. I could not do justice to the King and the country, or have remained in office with honour to myself, if Sir George Cockburn was to continue in my Council. Of course the decision of the Duke implies that Sir George Cockburn was to have remained. Consequently my retirement is become absolutely necessary.

Having now lived in the uninterrupted and closest union of friendship with your excellent and valuable self for fifty-seven years, I can neither forget the affection due to a brother, or the duty I owe my Sovereign. Under other circumstances, as you now know my zeal, application, and activity in office (I claim not ability), you may at any time and in any way claim my services, and they are entirely at your command.

Whenever Parliament meets I shall not set my foot into the House of Lords, and no man living shall have my proxy. The only favour I have to ask is, that Watson may be permitted to send a copy of the letter I wrote to you from Portsmouth on 17th of last July, as I am not in possession of one.

Till those who are to succeed can begin, here I must remain, and the moment my back is finally turned on this office, I shall request you will most kindly name a morning that I may personally assure you, my best of brothers and friends, that

I am, and ever must be, yours most affectionately,

WILLIAM.

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*The Right Hon. J. Wilson Croker to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Admiralty, 14th August, 1828.

The Duke of Clarence came to the Council to-day and did the usual business: after that was over he made us a speech, under the influence of a good deal of ill-suppressed agitation, stating that he had resigned, and only carried on the business till another arrangement could be made. He said that he looked upon himself as a military officer; that if he were a civil officer, like a First Lord of the Admiralty, he would have many observations to make on the cause of his resignation, but that, in his military character, he could only say that he had resigned, and would give no reason for it.

This speech was very confused; and we did not and do not very well see what his Royal Highness meant by his civil and military distinction. I believe his idea was to *assert his right to hoist the military flag*, and so maintain his point; and at the same time to hint that his silence as to the cause of his retirement was the consequence of his military obedience to the King.

His Royal Highness spoke with an eager look and an impassioned voice, and it was doubtful whether anger or a feeling of regret was prominent in his mind.

He afterwards sent for me into his room, and there said he wished to say to my face what he had often said behind my back, that he was unexceptionably pleased with my conduct, &c., &c., &c. He mixed his praise of me with violent complaints against *others*, and pointed clearly at Sir George Cockburn; and when I was about to express my regret at what had happened, and particularly at the view he thus stated himself to have of the causes of it, he interrupted me (though not at all uncivilly), and put an end to our interview.

He subsequently came into the Board-room and did business as if nothing had happened. At his first appearance he treated Sir George Cockburn with marked displeasure, but at the second interview he was more civil, and charged Sir George with some communications with the different departments.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke, most faithfully yours,

J. W. CROKER.

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*The Right Hon. Sir George Hill, Bart., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Derry, 14th August, 1828.

I returned to the north of Ireland with George Dawson, sincerely determined to endeavour to moderate Protestant feeling, and to prepare the public mind to confide without reserve in your Grace and Peel for due and sufficient protection, as well in a political point of view as against any movement of an insurrectionary character.

A very numerous attendance of gentlemen at our assizes, and a large assemblage of all classes afterwards during our race meeting, gave ample opportunity of observing the prevailing sentiment on the present state of *this country*.

It has undergone a material change since I left the north of Ireland last winter. The increased violence of the Popish Association, their undisguised objects, and their proclaimed means of effecting them, have created serious alarm in some, and indignation and irritation generally throughout society.

Many whom I thought I could influence reject my advice to be moderate and patient, pointedly asking me "if I too was going to betray them?" Then urging me to give them the assurance of remaining steady to my conduct. There was a public dinner on Tuesday, the 12th, to commemorate his Majesty's birthday and the siege of Derry, at which I presided. I stated the objects of the meeting in a manner calculated to divest it of party complexion, but without renouncing any of my own heretofore principles. When George Dawson's health was given, he, in returning thanks, depicted and deplored the present distracted situation of Ireland.

The manner and the terms in which he offered this description were not well received.

A change of principle and conduct was at the moment, and has been since, inferred very unfavourable to his popularity. This I am certain will pass away, for he confined himself to a description of our position and circumstances, abstaining from any avowal to alter his line of acting by voting for concession. However, enough was evinced to mark the unhappy extreme of anxiety which exists, and how certainly George Dawson or myself would lose our friends and characters in Derry if we doubt or trim.

City and county meetings are proposed. If they take place I still hope for a resolution to leave the Roman Catholic claims to be dealt with by your Grace and Peel. What most sorely presses on Protestant feeling in Ulster at this moment is the uninterrupted existence of the Popish Association, contrasted with the suppression of Orange clubs and the rumoured abolition of the yeomanry.

This is not, in my opinion, a propitious season to meddle with the yeomanry; the consequence would be an attempt at the construction of armed associations.

The threat of O'Connell to march 150,000 men from Tipperary into Ulster has roused a spirit amongst the northerners little calculated to make them concede or conciliate. This, coupled with Lawless's mission from the Association, "as their representative and delegate, for the purpose of organising clubs, and the collection of the rent, &c., &c., &c." may, and probably will, give the magistracy some trouble. If he transgresses the law *in this city or county* I will instantly deal with him as I did with Priest and Mullan in 1813—have him taken up and prosecuted.

This should be considered a local proceeding, on the responsibility of the magistrate who acts, and not a State prosecution, in which light if it should be considered I would not act without orders. If he provokes any measure to be taken against him, I will of course report it respectfully to Lord Anglesey.

As your Grace expressed your wish that I should write to you my opinions and observations on the state of this country as soon after my return as I could collect or form any worth attention, I now give you the result, with this addition—that the gentry and Protestant farmers, who

had become much inclined to favour the Roman Catholic claim, and the Romans themselves, who had become well inclined to live at peace and in kind intercourse with their Protestant neighbours, have been separated and alienated from each other by the priesthood and the Association to a degree which every good man must regret and deprecate.

May I request of you to give this letter to Peel; I told him I should write to you as requested.

Yours ever sincerely and faithfully,

G. F. HILL.

*Lord Farnham to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD,

Dublin, 14th August, 1828.

I think the enclosed report of a speech delivered by the Secretary of the Treasury at a meeting held on Tuesday last at Londonderry a document of so much importance, that I feel it to be my duty to enclose it to your Grace.

I do not think that the leading agitators of the Roman Catholic Association have ever exaggerated their own powers to such an extent as Mr. Dawson has done. I fear his speech will be attended with much mischief. I trust your Grace will excuse my troubling you with this communication, which I should not do if I did not think it of considerable importance.

I have the honour to be, my dear Lord,

your very faithful, humble servant,

FARNHAM.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MR. DAWSON.—Sir George Hill, and Gentlemen,—It may seem affectation in a man who has so often had the honour of addressing you on similar occasions, to say that he rises with diffidence and pain to return you thanks for such a gratifying proof of your regard and approbation as you have just bestowed on me—but the eulogiums which have been lavished upon me by the kindness of my friend—(cheers)—and the consciousness of my own unworthiness must give rise to those feelings in my mind. I have, however, a great public duty to perform, and in appearing before you on the present occasion, I have no other wish than to express my sentiments with that openness and sincerity which I have always used, and which I hope will be the best passport to your favour, as it ever shall be to me the best reward. Gentlemen, in gratifying my own wishes, and in obeying the summons which you sent to me to become a Steward of this meeting, I shall briefly state the motives which have induced me to be present, and describe the character which, in my opinion, ought to be given to the celebration of this day. After the lapse of near a century and a half, it has pleased the inhabitants of this enlightened and wealthy city to erect a splendid testimonial in commemoration of the valour, the fortitude, the unparalleled patience, under sufferings of every description, and the success of their forefathers in the defence of their city against a foreign foe and a domestic enemy, in support of their religion, their property, and their liberties. If there were any topics calculated to rouse the feelings of the heart, if any impulse were wanting to animate the emotions of a manly breast, where can we find a more

noble incentive for any true patriot than in claiming his sympathy for men who risked their lives, and encountered all the horrors of a lingering death, amid plague, pestilence, and famine, in support of their religion, their country, and their liberty.—(Loud cheers.) What words are more heart-stirring, or penetrate more deeply into the human breast than the triumphal song in celebration of the warriors who have defended our altars, our homes, and our country—(cheers)—what theme can be so ennobling, both as a mark of gratitude to the illustrious dead, and as an example to those who live, as the record of daring exploits and successful valour; and where could a poet of the warmest imagination find a more glowing picture of the brave, the patient, the invincible soldier, than in the description of those scenes of carnage and of pestilence which aggravated in an unspeakable degree the approach of death, and which history has recorded to have occurred within these very walls?—(Cheers.) To be dead to such emotions is to confess that we deserve not to have illustrious ancestors, is to refuse our tribute of admiration to the valour of our forefathers, is to teach our own children that virtue and merit are unworthy of imitation. It has been said by Dr. Johnson, who well knew the character of the human heart, that he did not envy the man whose piety did not grow warm amid the ruins of Iona, and whose patriotism did not glow on the plains of Marathon. Sir, I agree in this noble sentiment; my heart thrills with responsive concurrence in this natural effusion of a pious and a generous spirit. I am sure that every man in this room is animated with the same feeling, and it is in obedience to this irresistible appeal that I am present at this festival to commemorate the valour of the defenders of this city.—(Cheers.) But, gentlemen, I cannot say that my feelings are of an unmixed nature; I do not feel that single and overwhelming impulse of enthusiasm which ought to prevail in the attainment of a great national victory; and I trust when I have explained the nature of the alloy, which in the contemplation of these occurrences imparts a taste of bitterness to the cup of enjoyment, that there will not be found an Irish heart which will impute an improper motive to these melancholy reflections. Gentlemen, I have said that we are called upon to celebrate the valour and success of our forefathers in the defence of their city against a foreign foe and a domestic enemy. What a multitude of recollections does such an unnatural combination present—what a painful retrospection for every true lover of his country—a foreign foe and a domestic enemy.—(Cheers.) In such an union are combined the horrors of a foreign invasion and a civil war, the two greatest curses which can afflict a country, and where victory itself is robbed of half its glory. Would that the deeds which we now commemorate were confined to the songs of triumph over a foreign enemy, with what unmixed pleasure should we lift the cup to our lips, and raise the shout of triumph in commemoration of our noble defenders! Would to God that we were called upon alone to record the defeat, the disgrace, and rout of the execrable De Rosen and his French squadrons; but what person bearing the name of Irishman will say,—no matter whether a follower of King William or supporter of King James—but what man bearing the common name of Irishman will say, that he peruses the narration of those scenes, where the glory and the misery of his country are blended together, without fixed feelings of triumph and disappointment. Let us give our utmost meed of praise to the valour, the fortitude, and skill of Walker—(cheers)—but what man in the exultation arising from the display of national virtue, can refuse the same praise to his gallant adversary, Sarafield.—(Loud hisses.) If I thought any gentleman could intend to put me down by clamour, no person should ever see me at a meeting of this kind again. It is right that at a meeting such as this, I should express my opinions openly and fearlessly, and I shall do so despite of every attempt to interrupt me. I am here, Sir, as a servant of the Crown, and no one can blame me for expressing the honest con-




viction of my mind. I say, Sir, that no Irishman can blame me for bestowing upon the adversary of Walker that praise to which his valour so justly entitled him.—(Cries of No, no, no.) If it be the opinion of the person that we are to withhold our meed of approbation from Sarsfield, what a pitiful, cringing creature he must be.—(Loud hisses.) Both were Irishmen, both were brave, both skilful, and both have conferred immortal honour on the character of the Irish soldier; but their prowess was proved in the shedding of each other's blood, and though both were heroes, whose personal qualities were calculated to shed a lustre on our national annals, the misfortunes of the times have compelled our historians to paint them according to the bias of their political feelings, either as martyrs or as traitors. In the struggle between King William and James the Second, the citizens of Derry were the first to show their attachment to the principles of liberty, and to set the example of a devoted sacrifice in defence of the freedom of conscience, and the support of the Constitution against a tyrannical and cruel King. But let it be recollected, amidst all the triumphant feelings of those glorious days, that the enemies with whom our ancestors had to contend were natives of the same soil—(no, no)—that they adhered to the religion of their forefathers—that they fought in defence of a King to whom they had sworn allegiance—(hisses)—from whom that allegiance had never been withdrawn, and under whose sway they were content to live. Happily in the struggle the cause of justice and of liberty was triumphant. The whole kingdom has felt the benefit of that glorious trial, and the descendants of men who contributed so largely to the salvation of the empire have a right to feel a just pride in the exploits of their ancestors, and to commemorate with becoming gratitude their deliverance from danger. As one of the descendants of the warriors of that day, not, indeed, of those who endured the siege in the city of Derry, but of those who volunteered their services to King William, I attend this anniversary. I attend here to mark my approval of the principles of the Revolution of 1688; and since it has pleased the descendants of these brave men, even at this late period, to raise up a trophy in commemoration of their exploits, I most willingly contribute the aid both of my purse and presence, to establish what I hope will be a never-fading memorial of our respect and gratitude. But, gentlemen, I wish it to be particularly understood that I do not attend here to mark any triumph over my Roman Catholic brethren; I wish to blot out for ever the recollection that the triumph of those days was achieved over natives of the same soil. I cling only to the blessings which we have gained, namely, the enjoyment of a free Constitution; and I will not diminish the value of such a legacy by a heart-burning reference to national strife, and by tearing open afresh the wounds of civil warfare. Having made these declarations, and thanking you sincerely for the honour which you have done me, I might now close my task; but it is impossible not to see that, under the present very peculiar circumstances of the country, something more is expected from a man who has the honour of being your Representative in Parliament, and who is no inactive spectator of the passing events, than the mere formal ceremony of making a complimentary speech. I shall therefore take this opportunity of making a few observations upon the internal condition of this country, begging of you at the same time to bear in mind that my remarks are made without reference to the opinions of any other individual, that they spring from my own observation of the events of the day, and that they are totally uninfluenced by party connexions or official station. It is a source of the most gratifying pleasure to me to be able to state most unequivocally, that I see a marked improvement in the condition of the people; it is visible in every class, it is corroborated by a reference to those tests in which there can be no deceit. If we were to believe the rumours of the day, if we were to be guided by the reports of the public newspapers, we might fancy ourselves in a

state of insurrection, and in a country where there was no security for life or property, from whence industry had fled, where commerce was extinct, and where poverty and starvation had almost completed their work of degradation and destruction. It is astonishing to see with what avidity the public mind is ready to receive even the most incredible fabrications with respect to Ireland, and how little the real condition of this country is understood. But what are the facts? The English newspapers teem with reports that Ireland is in a state of insurrection, because a couple of regiments have received orders to march from England, to replace other regiments that are about to leave this country—they land at Belfast, and the whole North of Ireland is supposed to be in a state of alarm. But what is the fact? I will venture to assert that so perfect is the state of tranquillity in this province, there is hardly to be found a single family which would think it necessary to fasten the latch of their door; but let us refer to more convincing evidence than mere assertion. The Assizes are just finished: there, at least, are to be found the tests of crime and outrage if they exist in the country; but when within the memory of man have the gaols been emptied with so few evidences of the demoralization of society? When can we recollect so few instances of sanguinary outrage, of midnight robbery, or party violence? I heard the Judges declare their perfect astonishment at the tranquillity of the country; and we heard their congratulations in this city, that they found no crimes on the Circuit but such as must exist in every mixed state of society. Is trade extinct? Has commerce fled, and is starvation staring us in the face? Look at the quays of Belfast and Derry—look at the numerous steam-vessels departing every day for Glasgow, Liverpool, and London; and can any man say that trade is extinct?—(Cries of Oh, oh!) Look at our fairs and markets, and let us ask ourselves if industry has fled; more animated scenes of business and activity cannot be found, and no complaint is heard, save the never-failing one of lowness of prices. Where are to be found the proofs of general poverty and starvation? Food is so cheap that it is within the reach of every individual of even the least industry; potatoes vary from fourpence to sixpence a bushel, a price which will enable a man to maintain himself for little more than a halfpenny a day, and provisions of all kinds are so abundant, that the markets of Liverpool, Glasgow, and Bristol, are actually overloaded with Irish produce. Such is the condition of this part of Ireland. I speak only of this province, with which I am best acquainted, and I will defy any man to contradict the statement which I have made. It may be said that I have exaggerated the picture of our prosperity, and that such a state of things is incompatible with the general confession of the distracted state of Ireland. But the elements of prosperity are to be found in the never-failing resources of a rich soil, a hardy and industrious people, and a neighbouring market, ready to receive all our produce. But with such advantages, and with such resources, there is one ingredient which poisons all our blessings, and which, it is in vain to deny it, meets us in every station, in every society, and every undertaking. I mean the state of our religious and political dissensions, or, in other words, the Catholic Question. I have not stayed here for a trifling object, such as to drink the “Glorious Memory,” or cheer the ‘Prentice Boys. It is my duty, as I am here, to state to the meeting my opinions with respect to that great question; and I beg the attention of this company to the description of the condition to which, in my opinion, this subject has reduced the country. In place of an exclusive devotion to the business of life, and an industrious pursuit of professional occupations, the only certain road to wealth and eminence, this question has made every man, from the peer to the peasant, a politician; it is the absorbing topic of every man’s discourse, and it is in consequence the fruitful parent of exaggerated fears, of unmeasured pretensions, of personal hatred, of religious fury, of political strife, of calumny, of abuse and persecu-

tion, such as is not to be found in any other part of the civilised world. No matter what your pursuits—no matter what your disposition may be—the subject pursues you in every part of the country. It is the prevailing topic of your breakfast-table, of your dinner-table, of your supper-table: it is the subject of debate among men; it is the cause of alarm among women; it meets you at the Castle of Dublin; it meets you at the house of country gentlemen; it creeps into our Courts of Justice; it is to be found at the Grand Jury; it is to be found at the Petty Sessions; it is to be seen in the Vestry-room; it is to be seen at the markets and fairs; it is to be found even at our places of amusement; it meets you wherever you go. Would that the whole evil ended here; but we may see what the mischief of such a state of things must be in the convulsed state of society, and the annihilation of all those ties upon which the well-being of society depends. The state of Ireland is an anomaly in the history of civilised nations; it has no parallel in ancient or modern history, and, being contrary to the character of all civil institutions, it must terminate in general anarchy and confusion. It is true that we have a government to which an awkward obedience is shown, which is responsible to Parliament, and answerable to God for the manner of administering its functions, but it is equally true that an immense majority of the people look up, not to the legitimate government, but to an irresponsible and to a self-constituted Association for the administration of the affairs of the country. *The peace of Ireland depends not upon the government of the King*, but upon the dictation of the Catholic Association—(Cries of More's the shame; shame; why not put it down? It has defied the government, and trampled upon the law of the land)—and it is beyond contradiction that the same power which banished a Cabinet Minister from the representation of his county, because he was a minister of the King, can maintain or disturb the peace of the country just as it suits their caprice or ambition. The same danger impends over every institution established by law. The Church enjoys its dignity, and the clergy enjoy their revenues by the law of the land; but we know not how soon it may please the Catholic Association to issue its anathemas against the payment of tithes, and what man is hardy enough to say that the Catholic people will disobey its mandates? It depends upon the Catholic Association, no man can deny it, whether the clergy are to receive their incomes or not.—(Uproar.) The condition of the landlords is not more consoling: already they have been robbed of their influence over their tenantry; already they are become but mere ciphers upon their estates; nay, in many places they are worse than ciphers; they have been forced to become the tools of their domineering masters, the Catholic priesthood, and it depends upon a single breath, a single resolution of the Catholic Association, whether the landlords are to be robbed of their rents or not. So perfect a system of organisation was never yet achieved by any body not possessing the legislative powers of government; it is powerful, it is arrogant, it decides, and it has triumphed over the enactments of the legislature, and is filling its coffers from the voluntary contributions of the people.—(Uproar; cries of No, no, they are not voluntary.)

The CHAIRMAN here interfered and said,—You are bound to hear every observation that falls from the speaker. When the next gentleman rises to speak to the succeeding toast, he will, on his legs, have an opportunity of controverting the statements of my Honourable friend. But surely, in an assemblage like the present, common courtesy demands that every gentleman should be heard to the end.

Mr. DAWSON resumed and said,—As far as I know this county, I did not think I should have required the interference of my friend, Sir George Hill, to procure me a hearing of what my views were of the present state of the country. What I say is, that the Catholic Association, by securing the voluntary con-



tributions of the people, consolidates to itself a power from which it may supply the sinews of war, or undermine by endless litigation and persecution the established institutions of the country. Such is the power of this new phenomenon, and I will ask any man has it been slow to exercise its influence. In every place where the Catholic population predominates it is all powerful and irresistible: it has subdued two-thirds of Ireland by its denunciations more completely than Oliver Cromwell or King William ever subdued the country by the sword. The aristocracy, the clergy, and the gentry, are all prostrate before it. In those devoted regions a perfect abandonment of all the dignity and influence belonging to station and rank seems to have taken place; or if a struggle be made, as in Clare, it is only to ensure the triumph of this daring autocrat. In those parts of Ireland where the Protestant and Catholic population is pretty equally divided, the same influence is felt, if not in so aggravated a degree, at least so mischievously, that comfort and security are alike uncertain. Amongst the two classes we see distrust and suspicion, a perfect alienation from each other in sentiment and habit, and an ill-suppressed desire to increase each other's strength by open warfare. The institutions of society are reviled, the predominance of authority is lost. The confidence of the people in the impartiality of the courts of justice is impaired, the magistracy is condemned or supported according as it is supposed to lean to the Orangeman or the Roman Catholic, and even trade and barter are regulated by the same unhappy distinctions of religious feeling. Such, gentlemen, is the picture of this country, a country possessing every material by the bounty of God and the intelligence of its natives, to become great, powerful, and wealthy, but in which every hope is blasted, and every exertion frustrated by the unhappy dissensions of its inhabitants. And now, gentlemen, it is time to ask ourselves the question, What must be the result of such a disordered state of things, and such a complete overthrow of all the relations of society? Some gentlemen will say rebellion—and the sooner it comes, the sooner we shall be able to crush it.—(Loud cheers, which lasted for several minutes.) Now I entertain a very different opinion; it is not the interest, and I firmly believe it is not the wish, of the Roman Catholic leaders to drive the people into rebellion.—(Loud hisses.) We have the best security for the purity of their intentions (hisses) in that respect in the stake which they hold in the country, and in the moral conviction that they would be the first victims of a rebellion.—(Loud cries from several voices, "No, no, we would be the first.") If a rebellion should take place, it will not be from the orders or example of the Roman Catholic leaders (hisses), but from the readiness of the two contending parties to come into conflict with each other, and from the total impossibility of checking the ebullition of popular frenzy, if the two parties be goaded and exasperated against each other by inflammatory speeches or exaggerated misrepresentations. But the result will be a state of society far worse than rebellion; it will be a revolution, a revolution not effected by the sword, but by condemning the civil, religious, and political institutions of the country, and involving every establishment, civil, political, and religious—there never was a time when the whole Catholic body (and it signifies very little whether their numbers be two millions or six millions), there never was a time when the whole body was so completely roused and engrossed by political passions as at present, they have found out the value of union, they have put in practice the secret of combination, they feel a confidence in the force of numbers, they have laid prostrate the pomp and power of wealth, they have contended against the influence of authority and the decrees of the legislature, and they have enjoyed an easy triumph over both. At present there is an union of the clergy, the laity, and the people.

own force, and some audacious democrat shall start up who will spurn all restraints, civil, political, and spiritual, and who will consign the whole power of Ireland to an absolute and senseless mob. Now, gentlemen, with such a state of things staring us in the face (and I do not think that I have overcharged the picture), there comes the last question, What is to be done? The country confessedly contains great advantages; it has made a wonderful progress notwithstanding all these drawbacks; it has confessedly the elements of wealth and prosperity within itself; but all is checked and counterbalanced by these unhappy discussions, and the unenviable conclusion of every speculation on the state of Ireland is, What is to be done? Can we go back to the penal laws? God forbid that such an experiment should be made! It is revolting to common sense; it is revolting to the dignity of man. Can we persevere in our present system? The statement which I have made, and the firm impression made upon my mind by an anxious attention to passing events, is, that we cannot remain in our present situation; something must be done; there is but one alternative, either to crush the Catholic Association — (cheers for several minutes)—there is but one alternative, either to crush the Catholic Association, or to look at the question with an intention to settle it: let us exercise all our ingenuity, let us argue with all our subtlety, there is no other alternative; and, with such a conviction upon my mind, I feel myself called upon to exhort my countrymen—men whom I have the honour of representing—to abstain from irritating harangues, to pause, and to weigh well the dangers of the country, to dismiss all personal bitterness from the contemplation of a whole nation's welfare, and to devise some means, with satisfaction to all parties, for restoring the predominance of established authority, and giving security to the recognised, the legal, the constitutional, institutions of society. I speak here as a Member of Parliament, as a member of the government, and as a citizen of the world. Is it possible that I can look with apathy upon the degraded state of my Catholic countrymen?—(Loud hisses.) I cannot express too strongly the contempt I feel for the persons who thus attempt to put me down. If the representation of the county depended upon the votes of those who interrupt me, I would not condescend to ask them, though their suffrages would secure my return. I must know, mixing as I do in the world, and holding the high situation I do, how the interests of Great Britain are wrapped up in the safety of Ireland. There is but one topic more, before I conclude an address already too long. A threat has been held out that the North of Ireland, and this county in particular, is to be visited by some itinerant demagogues, to stir up the elements of discord: let them undertake the task at their own peril. There never was a time when the Protestant proprietary were more determined to rise as one man to resist such an invasion. The attempt will be hopeless, utterly hopeless; but let them pause well on the consequences. They will meet here a sturdy, a bold, a determined, and, if driven to retaliation, a fierce yeomanry; they will be answerable to God and man for the flood of blood that will flow from such an attempt; no power can control it, but upon them be the responsibility. Let their deluded victims also reflect upon the fate which will attend them. If once the kindly tie which binds them to the landlord be broken, the result will be, not a quiet submission of the landlords, but a transfer of their lands to Protestant tenants. Thousands are to be found in this country who want such lands, and the force of numbers will no longer protect them, as it has hitherto done their deluded brethren in the South. I speak these words in kindness and in advice to them. With respect to myself, I shall be found at my post, and ready to make every sacrifice in defence of the rights of my country, the character of its gentry, and the support of the constitution.—The Honourable Gentleman then resumed his seat.

*The Right Hon. R. W. Horton to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Paris, 14th August, 1828.

I beg your Grace to excuse me for troubling you with a very few lines before I leave Paris. You will recollect that you addressed a short note to me on the 2nd instant, in consequence of my having written to you in the morning of that day, and having sent you certain enclosures. In your note you tell me that "you don't see what you can make of Mr. Mahoney." It is evident, therefore, that your Grace construed my letter as intimating an opinion that you *might* be able to make something of him; whereas nothing could be more alien to my intention than to produce such an impression on your mind.

I never for one moment contemplated the possibility of your Grace putting yourself directly or indirectly in communication with Mr. Mahoney, but as Mr. Mahoney's letter to me made it more than probable that I should be able to ascertain through him some desirable points of information, I did think that you should be made acquainted with such points. I advert to the degree of disposition on the part of the Association to *give way*, supposing that any practical measure, now only considered *hypothetically*, were likely to be carried into effect. There is so much suspicion on both sides, growing (I admit most naturally and inevitably) out of the train of past circumstances, that there is no basis for approximation. The Protestant says, "I will not suggest any securities, for, if I do you will reject them because they are proposed by me, and I shall have lowered my case by the offer." On the other hand, the Catholic says (speaking of the Ultras on both sides), "I will not offer any securities, because if I do you will raise your terms, and plead my acquiescence in the principle of securities as your justification."

It has been with reference to this state of the two parties that I have been induced to take the trouble and pains which I have done to bring them to some common centre in despite of their mutual repulsion.

I have written more than I had intended, but my apology for this and my last letter must be that, in the interview which your Grace was so obliging as to give me, you told me that you were desirous of seeing your way to a settlement of the question.

I beg to remain your faithful humble servant,

R. W. HORTON.

I need hardly explain that this letter requires no answer or acknowledgment; as I informed your Grace, I shall pursue my own course, be the issue of it what it may.

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*To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.*

[ 984. ]

MY DEAR PEEL,

15th August, 1828.

I did not answer your letter upon the Roman Catholic Question yesterday, as I was obliged to go to Windsor at an

early hour; and I wished to communicate what you had written to the Lord Chancellor, whom I was to meet at the Royal Lodge.

I will not now pretend to discuss the different topics in your letter and paper, but will do so at a future moment when I shall be more at leisure. In the mean time I tell you that I have communicated your paper to the Chancellor alone. Goulburn is not in town, and I had not shown him my papers, nor done more than merely mention the subject to him. Moreover, I told the King it should go no further than to you and the Lord Chancellor in this stage.

I have not told the King what you think; or even anything beyond the first paper.

The Lord Chancellor will sit in Chancery till the 19th or 20th; and it would not be convenient to him to enter upon the discussion of this question for some days after that time.

I have been advised to go for a short time to Cheltenham; and, if it would not be inconvenient to you, I would fix some day in the first week in September for you and the Lord Chancellor and I to meet.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.


*The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 15th August, 1828.

Cheltenham is not beyond the reach of persecution, and I am afraid that you must have a share from me as well as from others. You did not mention before leaving town what sort of communications you wished to follow you. I have not thought it necessary to forward to you all the rubbish from all parts of the world; but a selection shall be made every day, comprising whatever seems likely to possess the most interest. If you will with your pencil note on any paper what you wish respecting it, I will lose no time in paying attention to your remarks. In the mean time I send you a private letter, received yesterday from Lord Stuart, which is doubtless a confirmation, as far as it goes, of other reports which have reached us before. But whether the Emperor may be tired of the war or not, it seems clear from the last accounts that he was in a position to revive his interest, for the armies appear to be almost in contact.

The accounts of Ibrahim's determination to evacuate the Morea come from so many quarters, that it is impossible any longer to doubt them; and should it speedily be effected, it will give rather a strange character to the French expedition. I thought when we saw Polignac the other day that he was not very explicit with respect to future operations; and I suppose the truth is, that the French government, even if they wished it, do not



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~~done~~ at the present moment to stop their expedition. This ascendancy of the public voice over the government is becoming every day more obvious; and there are even indications that in the Portuguese Question they may take the side of liberality, in order if possible to render us odious, and to assume a sort of lead in the affair. I must beg again to call to your attention the very great difference between the language employed in the instructions to General Maison and that of Polignac, as inserted in the Protocol of our conferences. The General is ordered, if Ibrahim should not surrender at the first summons, to besiege him in his strong places, to attack them with the utmost vigour, and to compel him by force of arms to abandon the Morea in the shortest possible time. Our Protocol of the 19th of July, in which Polignac makes the proposal of the expedition, says in express terms that Ibrahim is to be made to evacuate the Morea, "*au moyen d'un blocus de terre*," to be undertaken in aid of that already established at sea. No doubt the method pointed out to the General is the most efficacious, and very likely the best; but this is another proof how little we can trust to the strict letter of their declarations.

I also send you a letter from Bagot, and the copy of one which I have written to him on the subject of the marriage. If the King of the Netherlands should really be in the difficulty which Bagot seems to apprehend, he may be glad of our assistance; if not, the proposal in the manner in which it is made can do us no harm.

Peel made his appearance here yesterday evening quite unexpectedly, and did not know that you had left town. Of course you will hear from him to-day.

Speculations abound on the subject of the Lord High Admiral's resignation; but I learn that he is in great good humour, that he lauds you to the skies, and is delighted with the King.

Ever most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

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*The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Whitehall, 15th August, 1828.

I return to you the correspondence which led to the resignation of the Duke of Clarence. I am sorry for the event under all circumstances, though I do not know how it could have been prevented. The Duke of Clarence is not very judicious in the selection of the grounds on which he makes his stand.

I am not sure from your letter whether you have written to Lord Melville proposing to him his re-appointment. Lord Ellenborough is probably uneasy in his present office, and anxious for an active and responsible appointment. I know not what Lord Melville's wishes are as to re-appointment, or what is the degree of Lord Ellenborough's discontent; but it appears to me that, considering the circumstances under which the vacancy has occurred at the Admiralty, there would be great advantage in placing there some peer previously unconnected with it, if one could



Of the comparative advantages and disadvantages of such an arrangement you will, however, be the best judge. Will Lord Melville be able to act cordially with Sir George Clerk and Croker?

In a separate cover I send you two letters with reference to the expected changes. One, not very legible, from Fitzgerald,\* who wishes to be transferred from the Board of Trade to the India Board; the other from Croker, who wants to leave the Admiralty. Of course I shall say not a word to either on the subject.

I think we desired Lamb to inform Lord Anglesey that we were of opinion that Lord Dunally had the best claim for the representative peerage. It is stated in the Irish newspapers that a priest in Tipperary had addressed his flock and informed them that he was authorised by Lord Glengall to request that they would liberally subscribe to the Roman Catholic rent as the best means of promoting their cause. If this be true, Lord Glengall ought to receive no countenance from the government. You propose that I should write immediately to Lord Anglesey with reference to Lord Erne's illness, and name either Lord Dunally or Lord Glengall. But do you not think that the King ought to be spoken to before any final communication is made to Lord Anglesey. Remember what passed as to Daly's peerage.

I am to see the Chancellor to-day. I shall not mention to Goulburn or to any one else but the Chancellor our correspondence on the Roman Catholic Question. I will not fail to observe any appointment that may suit you for us to meet the Chancellor.

Ever most truly yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

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*The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Whitehall, 15th August, 1828.

Enclosed is a letter from Lord O'Neil, from which it would appear that he has taken offence at one which he has received from you with respect to the peerage. You will see that he talks of resigning the office of Postmaster.

As he has a great name in the north of Ireland, I think his resignation would have a bad effect, and would increase the ferment that prevails there.

I have therefore written to him as a private friend, advising him to take no step without very mature deliberation, and stating that I see nothing in your letter which would warrant his resignation on that ground; that you have given to him the answer which I believe you have invariably returned to all who may have made applications for an advance, or the promise of an advance, in the peerage.

Ever, my dear Duke, most faithfully yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

P.S.—I shall probably return to Brighton to-morrow, but I am at your command at any time.

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\* Afterwards Lord Fitzgerald and Vesey.

*The Right Hon. Henry Goulburn to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Downing Street, 15th August, 1828.

Lord Aberdeen has just apprised me of the probability of his coming to an early settlement with the Spanish Minister as to the payment of the claims under the Treaty of 1823. The result of such an arrangement will be that we shall have to pay 200,000*l.* in satisfaction of the Spanish claims, and this sum will become payable in the course of next year, it being proposed to pay it to the British claimants as one of the Spanish instalments. Lord Aberdeen suggests that if this payment be inconvenient, the only alternative is to let the matter remain in its present unsatisfactory state. The inconvenience of an additional charge of 200,000*l.* in the course of next year is one which I cannot but feel most deeply, and should be most desirous to postpone. But on looking at the Convention, and observing that under that Convention Spain might obtain even a larger sum, I cannot say that we ought not to make the compromise. The payment however, will lead to great difficulty, and I fear that, without some additional taxation, the surplus which we are pledged to realise will never be made up. I have thought it better, therefore, not to give Aberdeen a definitive answer until I knew how far your Grace thought it advisable to complete the arrangement with Spain, which is in a state of forwardness. If it were possible to postpone the payment till the following year it would be a great relief, but I fear we must either pay soon or not receive anything from Spain.

Yours ever, my dear Duke, most truly,

HENRY GOULBURN.

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*To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.*

[ 985. ]

MY DEAR PEEL,

Cheltenham, 16th August, 1828.

I quite agree with you that I ought to communicate with the King before Lord Anglesey is written to about Lord Dunally; and I will write to his Majesty this day upon the subject.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.*

[ 986. ]

MY DEAR PEEL,

16th August, 1828.

I have received your letter of the 15th instant. I am very sorry that it did not occur to me that you might come up to London, as I might as well have waited for you as have travelled on the terrible day on which I set out.

I quite agree with you that it is very unfortunate that the

Duke of Clarence has resigned. I did everything in my power to avoid that result, excepting to give up Cockburn; and I was in hopes that the King, who I knew wished that he should stay, would have prevailed upon him to take back his resignation. But I suspect that he had pledged himself to Captain Spencer. I know that the King thinks so. It is not unlikely that when he found the King and the Lord Chancellor anxious that he should remain, he renewed the demand that Sir George Cockburn should be removed. I have not written to Lord Melville respecting the office of First Lord of the Admiralty, nor communicated with anybody on the subject excepting yourself, and talked of the arrangement generally to the Chancellor, who approved of it. Having asked the Duke of Clarence to continue to hold his office till I could make an arrangement for the performance of its duties which would be satisfactory to the King, and his Royal Highness having consented, I have time to hear from you again before it will be necessary to write to the King, which must be the first step.

Before Lord Melville left town, he told me that, in case of a vacancy in the Admiralty, he did not wish to fill it if the office could be made a convenience to the arrangements of the government; but that he should not like to see the office given to a person who would not add to our strength.

Then in respect to Lord Ellenborough, I entertain no doubt whatever that he will quit us, if advantage is not taken of such an opportunity of putting him in an office of business. He was very sore when Lord Aberdeen was placed in the Foreign Office, and he so expressed himself to me. Lord Ellenborough was probably not very useful to us in the last session of Parliament; but he may be necessary to us hereafter, and he would be very disagreeable in opposition. This is the Chancellor's opinion. I think, likewise, that if Lord Ellenborough had something to do he would be less indiscreet and more useful in the Cabinet. Under these circumstances, I don't think I could well do otherwise than appoint him to an office of business when the first opportunity will offer. In my opinion, it would be better that he should go to the Board of Control than to the Board of Trade. He would be permanently less troublesome at the former; and I must add that I think Mr. Courtenay is not a very advantageous head of a department in the House of Commons. Lord Ashley and Bankes would do the business of the

India Board very well. I propose to keep the office of Privy Seal vacant, because I am under the necessity of looking forward to future misfortunes. I consider you not pledged to anything, but I cannot but look to the not impossible case of your finding yourself obliged to leave us to ourselves. In this case I must have the command of all the means possible to make an arrangement to carry on the King's service; and if I could keep other offices vacant I would.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Earl of Aberdeen.*

[ 987. ]

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, Cheltenham, 16th August, 1828.

I return your box by the post. You had better send me everything as usual. Every little fact is of importance to enable one to form a judgment of what is going on; particularly when we have such ticklish people to deal with as the French and Russians.

You are certainly right about their plan of operations, but I don't think we could interfere with the mode in which they should perform the service with which we have charged them.

But have you observed the paragraph in the 'Journal des Débats'? Its object is to vilify us. It contains the announcement of the same design which Fagel was authorised and commissioned to communicate to the King of the Netherlands. The 'Journal des Débats' is Châteaubriand's paper, and has great influence in France. I think you should speak to Polignac again upon the subject of their expedition; founding what you will say upon the appearance that Ibrahim Pacha is coming away; and tell him that we rely upon the promise of the King of France that the French troops will evacuate the Morea as soon as that chief will have come away. You might write Lord Stuart an ostensible despatch to the same purport, directing him to show it; and in that despatch quote the words of the Protocol, and of any despatches from Paris or notes from Polignac in which this promise has been made. I suspect that they will stay in the Morea and employ themselves in getting the better of the rebellious Greeks for Cape d'Istria.

papers will suggest which we will allow them to do, which will not exceed 80 millions of francs.

I don't mind their running after popularity in relation to Portugal, or anywhere else provided they don't insult us by breaking faith with us.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 988. ]

*To the Right Hon. Henry Goulburn.*

MY DEAR GOULBURN,

Cheltenham, 16th August, 1828.

I have received your letter respecting the claims of Spanish creditors.

As I understand, the arrangement with the Spanish government is that they are to pay 900,000*l.* to British creditors in the specie of Spain, including in that sum 200,000*l.*, which it is supposed the King of England owes to subjects of the King of Spain; how, or when, or where, I am sure I cannot tell; but I conclude that this claim is as well founded, if not better founded, than that of the subjects of Spain upon England. I understand that this sum of 900,000*l.* is to be given at certain periods to the creditors, to be divided amongst them by their own agency. We can do nothing, therefore, to obtain delay in the way of enquiry, liquidation, &c.

We have no choice excepting either to conclude this bargain and pay the money; or to leave the matter to be liquidated in the manner pointed out by Mr. Canning's treaty.

We shall adopt this last-mentioned line with great disadvantage at present, having brought the creditors and the Spanish government to an agreement, and the consequences of omitting to carry that agreement into execution being additional clamour out of doors and renewed complaints and violence in Parliament, which will end in war, as Mr. Canning's treaty is unexecutable; and we shall have to bear the blame of this war, as we break off this arrangement.

I know of no remedy excepting to adopt every arrangement in our power between this and the next sessions to save expense and increase our means; and I entreat your attention again to those measures which I suggested when I last saw you.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

London, 16th August, 1828.

There has been no arrival to-day, and I have little or nothing to send you. I wish, however, that you would look at the notes of my friend Itabayana. The first I answered shortly, but it has brought a repetition of the demand, which perhaps it may be proper to answer a little more at length. Do you think this a proper occasion to announce our understanding of Don Pedro's abdication? It seems to me that we ought now to accustom ourselves to talk of the Queen Donna Maria II., and that we should no more hear of Pedro IV.

Itabayana made an application the other day for permission to send certain stores and provisions, free of duty, on board the Brazilian frigate at Falmouth, which, as a matter of course, was granted. It turns out, however, that gunpowder and muskets are amongst these articles; and although he says he means to send them to Brazil, of course Madeira is the place of their destination. I shall wait your answer before I apply to the Treasury for permission to embark these arms and ammunition.

Lieven has been with me this morning, and has read to me a despatch from Nesselrode on the subject of the part which has recently been taken at Constantinople by M. de Zuylen, the Netherlands minister. They complain loudly, as they say it tends to confirm the Porte in error, and to encourage the Turks in their attempts to disunite the Allies. The copy of the questions put by the Reis Effendi to M. de Zuylen, and his answers, is very different from what we possess, and certainly much more unfavourable to Russia. I gave him a copy of our paper, and told him that M. de Zuylen was a frank and honest man, and only actuated by his zeal to promote the common object. Indeed, Stratford Canning told me that he was highly satisfied with his co-operation. Lieven also read the despatch of Nesselrode to the Russian Minister at the Hague, in which, after pointing out what was objectionable in the proceedings of M. de Zuylen, he says that if a Russian minister, placed in similar circumstances, had acted in such a manner, he would have been instantly recalled, but that the Emperor leaves it to the wisdom of the King of the Netherlands to do as he thinks proper.

After some talk about Greek matters, Lieven said that he thought it possible some jealousy might exist, or be created hereafter, about Capo d'Istria, as President of Greece, from his connection with Russia. He protested that he was thoroughly a Greek, and no Russian; and he said that he would assure me in confidence and upon his honour that the instant the Treaty was executed and the independence of Greece decided, he would lay down his office and quit the country. On the whole he seemed very well satisfied with us, and confident that everything would end well.

I mean to propose a Conference on Monday, for the purpose of sending instructions to the admirals to procure transports wherever they are able, to convey Ibrahim to the Port of Alexandria; and that they should not wait for the Egyptian transports, which it is not clear the Pacha will ever send. If you should approve of it, I could make a proposal at the same Conference on Monday to do something about the purchase of the Greek slaves. The fact is that the English consul, and not the French, has

already obtained the consent of the Pacha for the return of those in his possession. If it is any object to prevent the French from taking the whole of this matter into their hands, the proposition may come from us; but I shall do nothing in it, unless I should hear from you about it on Monday morning.

Believe me ever most sincerely,

ABERDEEN.

I have just received the enclosed note from Croker.

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*The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Whitehall, 16th August, 1828.

Just look at the answer which Lord Anglesey has given to the Presbyterians of Ulster.

They come to him with a loyal and perfectly contented address; and contented they well may be, for they have been on a better footing as to eligibility for office than any other class whatever of the King's subjects. The Protestant of the Church of England was subject to the Sacramental Test; but for the last half-century the Protestant dissenter in Ireland has been subject to no test.

Lord Anglesey informs them "that it is pleasing to observe men who appear to forget their *past privations* in the present enjoyment of *equality of rights*." He informs them also that "they have *long and zealously, yet patiently*, sought the attainment of their *just privileges*."

Ever most faithfully yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

You may direct your letters to me, Whitehall, and they will be forwarded in my box.

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*The Right Hon. J. Wilson Croker to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Admiralty, 16th August, 1828.

His Royal Highness had been so decisive in charging what had happened as the result of a *personal* opposition on the part of Cockburn, that the latter felt it to be due to himself to cause the Duke of Clarence to be informed that he did not stand alone. He therefore told Captain Spencer yesterday that he might acquaint the Duke that Sir George Clerk, Lord Brecknock, and myself, concurred in his principles, and would have felt it necessary to have gone out with him. This Captain Spencer told his Royal Highness on his arrival in town this morning, who immediately sent for Sir George Cockburn, told him that he had not the least suspicion of this fact, that it made a great difference in his view, and that he had no longer any enmity against *him*, and begged to shake hands with him.

After the business of the Council, at which his Royal Highness attended as usual, he desired Cockburn, Owen, and Brecknock, to attend him into his private room, leaving me *alone* in the Council-room. In his private

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room he applauded Lord Brecknock for his manly conduct in expressing his adhesion to Sir George Cockburn; with whom (though still differing on the great principle) his Royal Highness had now entirely reconciled himself personally, and he hoped these *three* would come and dine with him at Bushy next Thursday, being his birthday. It is plain that he does not mean to honour me with an invitation, and I shall not be surprised to find that I am become his *bête noire*, for he *must* have one; a result however as to which I fortunately am quite indifferent, as long as there is no just reason for it.

His Royal Highness is apparently very ill; he is certainly in great pain, he thinks from gall-stones; a disease which, though very painful, is not, I believe, at all dangerous. His Royal Highness is making very large promotions on going out, and I need hardly say that the shorter the interregnum is, the more convenient and agreeable it will be to all parties.

Ever, my dear Duke, your most attached

J. W. CROKER.

P.S.—I ought to add that his Royal Highness said that he was delighted at being out of office; that nothing would induce him to return; that he looked upon the character of a *flag officer* of the fleet as a much *higher* one than that of *Lord High Admiral*. This, your Grace will see, was still harping on the pretension to *independent military authority*. His Royal Highness gives his conduct as many colours as the rainbow, but *independent power* was his real object.

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*Mr. Alexander Turnbull\* to Mr. Croker.*

SIR,

Toulon, 16th August, 1828.

I had the honour of writing to you a few days ago on my arrival here, and I fully expected to be able to announce the departure of the first division of the expedition yesterday, according to the positive order of the King; but about midday the wind rose strongly from the north-west, which, although fair, has prevented the few troops and horses still remaining on shore from embarking. The wind still blows with increasing violence, and it is probable that the expedition will not be able to sail before to-morrow evening.

As soon as it sails I shall endeavour to send you an exact note of the ships of war and troops of which it is composed. I will now mention generally that there are on board about 9000 men, of which a very small proportion is cavalry. The regiment of cavalry that was expected will sail with the second division, and it is supposed that about 3000 to 4000 troops will also form part of it. There are only about one hundred lancers, and some hundred horses and mules of the artillery train that accompany the present division.

The General-in-Chief has published an address to his troops, of which I have the honour of enclosing a copy.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ALEXANDER TURNBULL.



[ENCLOSURE.]

Division d'Expédition. Au Quartier-Général à Toulon, ce 13 Août, 1828.

Soldats !

De concert avec ses Alliés votre Roi vous charge d'une grande et noble mission : vous êtes appelés à mettre un terme à l'oppression d'un peuple célèbre. Cette entreprise qui honore la France, à laquelle tous les cœurs généreux applaudissent, ouvre devant vous un carrière de gloire, que vous saurez remplir ; j'en ai pour garant les sentiments et l'ardeur qui vous animent.

Pour la première fois depuis le 13<sup>me</sup> siècle nos drapeaux, aujourd'hui libérateurs, vont apparaître aux rivages de la Grèce. Soldats ! la dignité de la couronne, l'honneur de la patrie, attendent un nouvel éclat de vos triomphes ; dans quelque situation que les événements vous placent, vous n'oublierez pas que de si chers intérêts vous sont confiés.

Des privations, des fatigues vous attendent ; vous les supporterez avec courage ; vos chefs vous en donneront l'exemple.

Le Lieutenant-Général, Pair de France, Commandant en Chef la division d'expédition.

MARQUIS MAISON.

Pour copie conforme,

Le Maréchal de Camp, Chef de l'Etat-Major,

BARON DURRIEN.

989.]

*To Earl Bathurst.*

MY DEAR LORD BATHURST, Cheltenham, 17th August, 1828.

You will be glad to see what passed respecting the Duke of Clarence's resignation.

After the last letter from the King, and the Duke's answer to me, we both went to Windsor for the birthday, on the 12th August ; and as it was obvious that he had misunderstood (willingly or otherwise) the King's last letter to me, I begged his Majesty to speak to him, and explain it ; which the King did, in presence of the Lord Chancellor. The Duke then let out the truth, viz., that he would not remain in office unless Sir George Cockburn was removed. The King spoke to me upon the subject after dinner. I told his Majesty that it was impossible to remove Sir George Cockburn, first, because he had done no more than his duty ; and next, because the whole Council would follow him, excepting Owen, who admitted that the Duke was in the wrong, but thought that Cockburn ought to have spoken to him instead of writing.

The King replied, "It is Captain Spencer, or rather Lady Spencer, who does all the mischief, and my poor brother is the victim." He is quite right.

I this morning received an account that Cockburn had mentioned to Captain Spencer that which I had always kept secret, excepting to the King, viz., that the Council would all have retired with Cockburn. The Duke then sent for Cockburn, shook hands with him; and for Clerk and Brecknock, told them that they were very much in the right, that he approved of the conduct of them all; and he asked them all to dine with him at Busby Park next Thursday!!

The fact is, that Captain Spencer found that they had got upon very bad grounds; and as soon as he advised the Duke to be reconciled with Cockburn and his Council, he is so.

I understand he now says that he is a military officer only; and that he prefers to be the first flag officer of the fleet to being Lord High Admiral.

Believe me ever yours most sincerely,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Earl of Aberdeen.*

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, Cheltenham, 17th August, 1828.

[ 990. ]

I would give Itabayana a positive refusal to communicate to him the object or intention of our mission to the Brazils. It is very right to inform him that we consider the abdication by the Emperor his master to be complete and final.

We may allow him to embark his provisions, and his arms and gunpowder on condition that he will give assurances that they are not going to Madeira. But if we impose this condition we must state the reason, viz., that till Don Pedro has declared his own intentions, we do not intend to allow his subjects or the subjects of his daughter to carry on war from England against Portugal; and that, at all events, whatever may be his intentions in respect to Portugal, we do not intend to allow the Portuguese monarchy in Europe to be further weakened by the seizure of its remaining colonies by the Emperor of Brazil, or by their being revolutionised.

Lieven's pretending that Capo d'Istria is not a Russian is excellent. If he is not a Russian, why does he not remain in Greece? But the truth is that he is a Russian minister and

It was reserved for these times to falsify documents and to make false reports to attain political objects. There can be no doubt that the questions read by us at the Conference, as put by the Reis Effendi to Monsieur de Zuylen, and his answers, must have been the genuine questions and answers. They were the original documents sent by him to Mr. Stratford Canning or to Lord Cowley. If those produced by Prince Lieven are different they must be fabricated; and that for the purpose of driving this gentleman out of his office because he tells the Porte and his government and us the truth!!

I really think that Bagot ought to be informed how this matter stands; and that we ought to let Prince Lieven know that we think the Russian account of these queries is fabricated, and that the proceeding in respect to this minister, founded as it is upon our communication to the Conference of a confidential paper, is rather a harsh one, to say the least of it. I quite agree about the orders respecting the transports.

The way in which I look at the case of the slaves is this. We cannot prevent the return of Ibrahim to Egypt till they are restored, as we shall thereby injure the Morea and defeat our own purpose. We cannot go to war with Mehemet Ali to force him to restore the slaves; the only resource is then to buy them, if we must have them. Have them we must, or we shall have more trouble in Parliament than the slaves are worth; more particularly as the French, having at their disposal 80 millions of francs, are ready for everything. But I would recommend great caution and circumspection in the whole of this proceeding. I would first call on Capo d'Istria to furnish lists of persons supposed to be in captivity in Egypt, and then upon Mehemet Ali to give up the persons named in that list without ransom, in consideration of our sending home his army. At all events we should insist upon his giving up every one in the possession of the government or any of its establishments. We should likewise insist upon his accounting for those stated to be in Egypt in the list from Capo d'Istria, and to answer whether they are there or not, and if in Egypt, by whom detained. We must then open negotiations with each individual, with the assistance of the influence of Mehemet Ali, and all this under threat of blockade, if he should not comply. The two Consuls at Alexandria should be entrusted with these negotiations jointly. If they should

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proceed separately they will bid against each other, and each slave will cost us his weight in gold.

Ever, my dear Lord Aberdeen, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

I return Mr. Croker's letter.

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*To the King.*

[ 991. ]

Cheltenham, 18th August, 1828.

As I have occasion to send your Majesty a messenger upon another subject, I transmit your Majesty the letters which I have addressed to his Royal Highness the Duke of Clarence, and those which I have received from his Royal Highness since I attended your Majesty at Windsor.

They leave the affair exactly where it then stood.

Which is submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

[ ENCLOSURES. ]

I.

*The Duke of Clarence to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

DEAR DUKE,

Bushy House, 13th August, 1828.

In consequence of having had yesterday a most gracious interview with his Majesty, who considers his letter to your Grace, which was forwarded to me, as not a positive acceptance of my resignation of the office of Lord High Admiral, I must state to your Grace, that on the most mature and deep considerations of all that has passed in my official capacity since the 10th of last July, I cannot, either to the advantage of the King and the country, or with honour to myself, continue as the Lord High Admiral, if Sir George Cockburn is to continue one of my Council. I have the less difficulty in thus plainly stating my earnest wishes for the removal of this officer from any future communication at my Council Board, because his Majesty and the Lord Chancellor are fully in possession of my sentiments, and of my determination not to remain if Sir George Cockburn is not removed from being one of the members of my Council.

I remain, dear Duke, yours truly,

WILLIAM.

II.

*To the Duke of Clarence.*

[ 992. ]

SIR,

London, 13th August, 1828.

The Lord Chancellor informed me of his conversation with your Royal Highness at the Royal Lodge; and it increases the

concern which I feel that his Majesty should have lost the benefit of your Royal Highness's services.

Your Royal Highness is aware that an arrangement to perform the duties of the great department which your Royal Highness has conducted cannot be easily or very quickly made; and I hope that your Royal Highness will allow me to avail myself, for the benefit of his Majesty's service, of your offer to continue to conduct those duties for a short time till I can submit to his Majesty an arrangement of which he will approve.

I have the honour to be, Sir, with the highest consideration and most respectful attachment, your Royal Highness's most obedient and devoted servant,

WELLINGTON.

III.

*The Duke of Clarence to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Admiralty, 14th August, 1828. 10 a.m.

I am this moment arrived at the Admiralty, and have of course found your Grace's letter of this morning, announcing to me that I am no longer in the office of the Lord High Admiral.

I am perfectly aware that the situation I have held cannot be immediately filled up, and it is my bounden duty, as well as my inclination, to put the King's government to as little inconvenience as I can, and I shall therefore certainly conduct all the official business till my successors are fully prepared to enter on the important duties I shall have to resign to them.

I remain, my Lord Duke, yours sincerely,

WILLIAM.

IV.

[ 993. ]

*To the Duke of Clarence.*

SIR,

Cheltenham, 16th August, 1828.

In acknowledging the receipt of your Royal Highness's letter of the 13th instant from Bushy House, I beg leave to recall to your Royal Highness's recollection that the subjects on which, since the 8th of July, I have found myself under the necessity of submitting my opinion to your Royal Highness, have been the nature of your Royal Highness's official relation with your Council; upon which his Majesty, in his letter to me of the 11th, stated the alternative; and the act of going to sea with a squadron, the military flag of the Lord High Admiral

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being hoisted in the ship in which your Royal Highness was embarked.

In a conversation with which your Royal Highness honoured me at the Admiralty, on the day your Royal Highness last left town in the month of July, I submitted my reasons for thinking that it was impossible for me to recommend to his Majesty to remove Sir George Cockburn from your Royal Highness's Council; and those for which I earnestly entreated your Royal Highness to forego that wish.

I will not now enter further into that subject than to state to your Royal Highness that Sir George Cockburn would not have performed his duty by his Majesty and by your Royal Highness if he had not submitted to your Royal Highness his sentiments upon what was going forward; and I am certain that your Royal Highness is too just to feel any displeasure that I should have declined to recommend to his Majesty that one of his servants should be dismissed for an act which I considered it his duty to perform.

I am not aware that Sir George Cockburn has since that period done anything to incur your Royal Highness's displeasure; and I sincerely regret that, under these circumstances, I cannot be the person to recommend to his Majesty that he should be removed.

I have the honour, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

v.

*To the Duke of Clarence.*

[ 994. ]

SIR,

Cheltenham, 16th August, 1828.

I have had the honour of receiving your Royal Highness's letter of the 14th instant, and I beg your Royal Highness to accept my acknowledgments for the kindness with which your Royal Highness consents to continue to conduct the duties of your high office till an arrangement can be made for performing them.

I have the honour, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 995. ]

*To Viscount Melville.*

MY DEAR LORD MELVILLE, Cheltenham, 18th August, 1828.

Adverting to all the paragraphs in the newspapers you will have been surprised not to hear from me respecting the Duke of Clarence's resignation of his office.

I forget whether you were still in town when we received the account of his Royal Highness's having sailed from Plymouth with the squadron on the 29th of July. Blackwood having arrived in the Sound after his departure, and having remained there for some days.

He returned to London on the 7th of August, and as I had reported to the King on the 1st that he had sailed, and I thought the King, who was not pleased, would speak to him, I was disposed not to take any notice myself of what had taken place. But I found that he had behaved very ill towards Cockburn, as well during his absence as on his arrival in London; that the machine would no longer work as it was; and with the concurrence of the Cabinet I wrote to him on the 8th a letter, which I sent to him, as he had quitted the Admiralty when I called.

On the 9th I had a most violent scene with him. But I completely calmed him, and got the better of him, and we parted the best friends, although in the course of the visit he put into my hands a letter written, but not signed, conveying his resignation unless he should be allowed to do as he pleased.

He sent me that letter afterwards. Of course I kept the King informed of all that passed; and the King, on the 11th, wrote me a letter, in which he stated that the Duke must obey the law *or* resign.

The Duke considered this as an acceptance of his resignation. However, as we were to meet at Windsor on the 12th, I went there at an early hour, and as it was obvious that he had misunderstood (wilfully or otherwise) the King's letter, which left him an alternative, I begged the King to explain it to him. This the King did in presence of the Lord Chancellor, and his Royal Highness then made known the truth, viz., that he would submit to everything, that he had no complaint of me, but that Sir George Cockburn must be turned out. The King spoke to me upon the subject after dinner, and I then told his Majesty what I had not mentioned before, viz.,

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that Sir George Cockburn was so much in the right, and the Duke so much in the wrong, that the whole Board would have resigned if Cockburn had gone out, excepting Owen, who equally with others, thought the Duke in the wrong, but would not have resigned, because he thought that Cockburn ought to have spoken to him, when he first hoisted his flag, instead of writing.

The Duke, therefore, has resigned. I endeavoured to keep the matter quiet till I could make an arrangement, but he desired Captain Spencer to publish the event.

Since I left town I have been informed that Cockburn, finding that the Duke was running at him, spoke to Captain Spencer, and informed him that the Council and the Secretary were unanimous in thinking his Royal Highness wrong, and that they would all have resigned excepting Owen. Upon his Royal Highness being informed of this fact he sent first for Cockburn, and was reconciled to him, as he said, for ever. He then sent for Lord Brecknock and Owen, applauded their conduct highly, and asked them all to dine with him next Thursday at Bushy !!

This is the last of the story that I have heard. I will send you the letters to-morrow or next day; Lord Bathurst has them at present. I have not yet made, or even proposed to the King, any arrangement for the succession to the office. Peel was at Brighton, and I wrote to him on the day I returned from Windsor. I left town next morning and he came to town. This has rendered a correspondence necessary, of which I shall not know the result till the day after to-morrow. I will write to you, however, as soon as I shall know it.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Right Hon. Sir George Murray.*

[ 996. ]

MY DEAR MURRAY,

Cheltenham, 18th August, 1828.

I was anxious to see you before I left London, but I was so pressed with business that I could not. I wished to speak to you particularly about the instructions to the governors of the



We have now got that question into our hands; and all parties in Parliament are interested in our keeping possession of it. But we shall lose it with disgrace, and great injury to the public interests, unless we should give some pretty vigorous instructions to the governors of the several colonies; and unless they can manage on their parts to prevail on the Colonial Assemblies to take some efficient steps towards the enactment of the measures recommended in the Orders in Council. I earnestly entreat your attention to this subject.

Mr. Huskisson put the affairs of Canada into the hands of a Committee of the House of Commons. It would be desirable to see what that Committee are doing; and whether we cannot ourselves propose to Parliament what is necessary.

I likewise beg you to turn your attention to the coast of Africa. An enormous expense of money and of lives is annually incurred there for no purpose whatever. Would it not be possible to get rid of it altogether, with the exception of a superintendent over the liberated Africans at Sierra Leone? allowing that establishment to take care of itself by a militia. I believe the establishment at Fernando Po is as unhealthy as all the others, with the additional disadvantage of its being necessary to incur all the expense over again in buildings, clearing ground, &c.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 18th August, 1828.

We had our Conference this morning, at which I proposed the form of a letter to be written to the Admirals, which I will send you to-morrow when it shall have been approved of, and despatched to Corfu.

After the business of the Conference Polignac remained with me, and read a letter which he had received from M. de Rayneval this morning. It was in answer to one he had written on the subject of the French expedition, and of our apparent uneasiness in consequence of the reports which had reached us. Nothing could be more explicit and positive than the assertion of their determination to return, as soon as ever the evacuation of the Morea took place by the Turks and Egyptians. He (Polignac) had received a letter from the King himself, in which he said that he felt proud (*sic*) of our confidence, which he would take good care to deserve. He expressed himself offended by the notion of a doubt upon this subject, which was also the tone of the letter of M. de Rayneval. M. de la Ferronays positively



denied having said anything to justify the speech attributed to him. I mentioned to Polignac the language of their newspapers, which are supposed to be connected with government. He assured me they had but one at their disposal (the 'Messager des Chambres'). With respect to the 'Journal des Débats,' it was true that the ministers paid it, on the condition that it should abstain from abusing them; but that their connection with it extended no further. This, he said, he knew from personal experience, as he wished himself to have something inserted in the 'Journal des Débats,' and sent it to Paris for the purpose; but he received in reply the information that the government had not the power, by their agreement, to insert anything in that paper. Neither had they the wish to do so, for they did not desire to put themselves in any manner into the power of Châteaubriand, or to give him any ground for pretending to be their organ. He requested that I would not mention this species of connection with the 'Journal des Débats' to any one but to you. He added that the King and M. de la Ferronnays were perfectly agreed in their hatred of the liberty of the press, as exhibited in the journals; but that all the ministers were not of the same way of thinking. He abused Châteaubriand violently, and said that nothing would ever induce the King to consent to his being his minister; but he thought that nothing else would satisfy Châteaubriand. It appears, however, that there is now a speedy prospect of his going to Rome.

The assurances repeated by Polignac on the part of M. de la Ferronnays, M. de Rayneval, and the King himself, have been so very strong, and so perfectly explicit with respect to their intentions of returning from the Morea, that, whether sincere or not, I have suspended my despatch to Lord Stuart upon the subject for the present. In the letter which he read to me he was ordered not only to repeat these assurances to you and to me, but to take the first opportunity of making the same declaration to the King.

On the whole I can hardly suppose that at the present moment they have the intention of breaking faith with us. But it is impossible to feel any security about the duration of their honesty. I could not help telling Polignac that if the expedition enabled the government to despise popular clamour, to control the journals, and to direct the Chambers, so as to enable them to pursue a straightforward course, consistent with their own wishes and principles, it would be a liberation much more important than anything they could do in Greece.

I omitted to mention that when I saw Lieven the other day, he said that he had been officially applied to by the Swedish minister on the subject of the title of Prince Gustavus. He wished to know what we intended to do, as he was ready to act with us. I did not inform him of my having written to Bagot, but only said that we were ready to do anything to remove causes of difficulty and misunderstanding. Much the same as I had said to the Swedish minister himself.

Ever most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

*The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Brighton, 18th August, 1828.

I enter into all your reasons for replacing Lord Melville at the Admiralty. I think it would be very inconvenient to lose Lord Ellenborough. The mere circumstance of change in the government detracts from its strength; and, besides, Lord Ellenborough is very able, and would be very troublesome as an opponent in the Lords. I think with you that it would be better to place him at the Board of Control, than either at the Admiralty or the Board of Trade.

I saw Fitzgerald after I wrote to you on Saturday. He began the subject of his letter to me, and I thought it better to say to him, as my own opinion, that he ought to remain where he is; that having held the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer in Ireland, he must be conversant with the business generally of the Board of Trade. I quite agree with you that it is of more importance that the head of the Board of Trade should be in the House of Commons, than the President of the Board of Control.

The mention of the Board of Control reminds me of a subject of great importance connected with India, to which you and Goulburn should turn your attention. If the statement prepared by Lord Melville's directions respecting the finances of India be a correct one, the East India Company is not very far from insolvency.

Now, if this be the case, if there be an annual deficit of revenue, How can the India Company be justified in dividing ten per cent. on their Capital Stock? By making such a dividend they are propagating a delusion as to the value of India Stock. That, perhaps, is their own concern; but the Treasury has a clear right to remonstrate against such proceedings, if any claim could be made by the India Company (in case of the expiration of the Charter) that any portion of their debt, territorial or commercial, should be borne by the public.

Every dividend tends of course to increase the amount of the debt; and surely it is not just, supposing there to be a surplus on the commercial account, and a deficit on the territorial, that the commercial surplus should be divided among the holders of Stock, and the deficit on the other accounts to be allowed to go on increasing.

Might it not be advisable to request the Chairs to send you confidentially an account of Indian finance entering into details, that their account might be compared with that prepared at the Board of Control?

Do you ever read the French newspaper, the '*Journal des Débats*'? It is worth your looking at occasionally, as I fancy it is under the control of Châteaubriand, and that the political articles are written by him. There was a report a short time since that he was likely to go to the Foreign Department in the place of La Ferronnays. I hope there is no truth whatever in this. He is doing all he can to excite a military spirit in France, and to direct it against this country.

Ever most faithfully yours, my dear Duke,

ROBERT PEELE.

I rejoice to hear that you have offered the Deanery of Norwich to Mr. Gaisford. He is the person whom I mentioned to you when you first spoke to me of church affairs as the most eminent scholar in this country,

and probably in Europe. Every one will rejoice to hear of the offer. I quite agree with you that, supposing him to decline, Norwich is not exactly the place for Mr. Wodehouse.

I am sure you are right in setting your face against church preferment being in the most remote degree connected with local patronage.

This was the ground of my quarrel with Lord Shannon, who required to have the nomination to a living in the county of Cork.

I said not a word to Lord Wodehouse, excepting that you were the person to whom he should have addressed himself.

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*George R. Dawson, Esq., to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON,

Coleraine, 18th August, 1828.

I am sure you will excuse me for trespassing on your valuable time, for the purpose of giving you some account of the public meetings which have taken place in this part of the country, and which have made a great sensation.

It was long since determined to celebrate the erection of a pillar in commemoration of the siege of Derry by a public dinner; there was a general feeling among Protestants of all descriptions to attend that dinner; and, amongst the rest, I consented to become a steward. It happened unfortunately afterwards that the management of the dinner fell into the hands of a committee composed of the most violent and intolerant men opposed to the Catholic Question. In society they gave loose to their anticipations of a complete triumph over the Catholic party, and in a newspaper (the 'Derry Journal') they gave a character to the intended proceedings which no well-wisher of his country could countenance. In consequence all the moderate men, who otherwise would have rejoiced in an opportunity of marking their opinions, became alarmed, and expressed their intention of absenting themselves. I did not feel justified in following such a course, and I determined to attend, and to explain the reasons of my attendance.

The dinner took place, and it was certainly well attended in point of numbers; but there were not more than say half-a-dozen gentlemen of any property or influence in the county present, and there was a most lamentable deficiency of the trading and commercial part of the community of the city of Derry. The company was, in fact, composed of the most ultra-supporters of Orangeism, and of men who will for ever remain blind to the condition of the country. I shall refer you to the newspapers for an account of the proceedings of that day, and I shall never repent the course which I have taken, feeling confident that it is in unison with the opinions of all moderate and well-judging men in the country.

If we may judge of the feelings of the yeomen and middle classes by their attendance in Derry on that day, it is impossible to say that the dislike to anything like concession is at all abated. There were at least ten thousand most respectable, high-spirited, and wealthy farmers from the

events in Clare; \* until those occurred the two parties were beginning to feel more kind towards each other; but, since the termination of the election, the spirit of triumph on the part of the Catholics, and of alarm on the part of the Protestants, has exasperated both parties against each other more than ever. The announcement also of the mission of Mr. Lawless to the north of Ireland has increased the bitterness and alarm of many of the gentry; he has, I believe, actually commenced his crusade, and the very worst effects are anticipated from these proceedings. Last of all comes the report of the disbanding of the yeomanry. Nothing could be more unpropitious than the time when this announcement was made; it is looked upon as a blow aimed solely against the Protestants, and it has excited the strongest clamours against the government. In the present irritated state of public feeling in Ireland, it would have been a most fortunate circumstance if any proceeding of this kind had been postponed.

I really fear that matters are coming in this country to a most alarming crisis; both parties seem anxious for a trial of strength—I speak of course of the most violent among the two parties. The moderate men, among whom may be comprised a great proportion of the wealth of the trading and commercial persons in the community, are too few in number, and too much indisposed to neglect their own private affairs for the unpleasant task of mixing in public matters, to interfere to counteract the influence of interested and mischievous men; and I fear that the result will be a fatal collision. From morning till night this subject is the only topic of conversation, and every man talks of it just as he feels, without reference to public good. The system of organisation among the Catholics is going on with the greatest activity; on the circuits they have their reporters and agents regularly engaged to misrepresent and to publish everything, and in the country they are proceeding to organise their friends with the greatest precision, and with such skill that they will be able to find in a moment those who are ready to support their views at all hazards in every village and townland.

Such is the situation of this country, and it becomes the duty of every man who sees it to give those at the head of the government the most accurate information in his power. I trust in God that you will be able to steer us through all our difficulties, but I almost despair.

Believe me, dear Duke of Wellington, yours very sincerely,

G. R. DAWSON.

[ 997.]

*To Professor Gaisford.*

SIR,

Cheltenham, 19th August, 1828.

I have the honour to inform you that, in consideration of the recommendation of the Lord Bishop of Durham, and of your own distinguished merits, his Majesty has been pleased to approve of my offering you the Deanery of Norwich, vacating the Stall which you fill at the Cathedral of Worcester.

\* At O'Connell's election.

The Bishop had recommended you for another preferment which was not vacant; but I avail myself with great satisfaction of his Majesty's gracious permission to offer you the Deanery of Norwich.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*Dean Phillpotts to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Stanhope, Durham, 19th August, 1828.

I take the great liberty of transmitting to your Grace an abstract of the evidence given before the Parliamentary Committees in 1824 and 1825, respecting the 40s. freeholders in Ireland. I have been anxious to make it as fair as possible, and I trust that I have succeeded in my attempt to do so.

I will own that I have been the more rigidly scrupulous in sifting the evidence, because one of the highest authorities in the country, a man to whom I look up with the highest respect, Mr. Peel, opposed the Bill of 1825, "To regulate the exercise of the elective franchise in counties at large in Ireland," because "he would not consent to disfranchise a large portion of electors, almost without investigation."

"The investigation, which was then only begun, resulted (I humbly conceive) in the plainest and most conclusive proof that these "electors" hold their alleged franchise by fraud and perjury—the fraud of their landlords, and perjury of themselves; that, in consequence, the power and rights of the lawful and honest freeholder are extinguished; and that such an amendment of the law as would put an end to the present abominable system, would, in truth, be a real, practical, safe, and most efficient reform—would give a triumph to truth and justice—would do much to improve the morals of the Irish multitude—and not a little, we may hope, to re-establish peace and tranquillity in that unhappy country.

Shall I be forgiven if I venture to submit another suggestion on a matter not wholly foreign to this subject?

Might it be advisable to enact a *temporary* law, founded on the notorious state of things at present in Ireland, by which it should be required that, for \* years, no person shall be eligible to sit in Parliament for any county in Ireland who has not the qualification of property required by law in lands or tenements *within the limits of the said county* (saving the rights of the eldest sons of Peers, the said Peers having property in the said county); and further providing that it shall be *unlawful for any persons in any way to interfere, by asking votes or otherwise, in the said elections, who have not a right to vote at the same*; making the elections void if the successful candidate or any of his agents knowingly make use of, or are privy to, the interference of persons not entitled so to vote.

The benefits of such a restriction, at the present crisis, it must be unnecessary to recount. The restriction itself would be justified, probably,

in the estimation of all fair minds by the character of the times, especially as we may hope that it need not be continued for a very long period. At present, if that event should soon happen, which every loyal subject must fervently deprecate, a general election would take place under circumstances which, by the introduction of a large hostile force into Parliament from Ireland, would endanger the Constitution.

A precedent for making a different law for the regulation of Irish elections from that which prevails in England, is afforded by the series of statutes requiring the *registration* (and an oath that the tenant *occupies* the same, either by tilling, or grazing, &c.) of freeholds of less value than 10*l.* per annum, as a qualification for voting at a county election in Ireland. The same precedent may be stated as an answer to objections to the proposed alteration of the election-franchise, founded on the state of the law in England.

But I am ashamed of my presumption in giving expression to my own crude notions when I consider whom I am addressing. I venture, however, to assure myself of pardon, as I am actuated by no other views than an anxious wish for the public good, and sincere devotion to your Grace's service.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke, with the greatest respect,  
your Grace's obliged and most humble servant,

HENRY PHILLPOTTS.

I have a confident persuasion that it will be found that the existing law affords a strong hold upon the Irish prelates, which is not ordinarily contemplated. I cannot have access to a copy of the Irish statutes nearer than the Advocates' Library at Edinburgh. I shall set out for that place to-morrow. Should I find my notion well founded, I will venture to trouble your Grace with the result.

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*The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 19th August, 1828.

I send you the instruction to the Admirals which I mentioned yesterday, and which, after a few slight alterations, has been approved of. There are also some papers from Codrington, which have been at the Admiralty these ten days, but which we only received yesterday. They possess others at the Admiralty, of which we have sent for copies; for, up to this moment, I have never seen any account of the conference of Ibrahim Pacha with the Admirals, which has given rise to the expectation of the Morea being evacuated. I suppose we shall never get at the truth about these Greek slaves; you will see in one of the papers sent to you that M. de Rigny says, after minute enquiry he is satisfied they did not exceed five or six hundred in number. We had some conversation about these slaves at the Conference yesterday, but I made no formal proposition; the French seem resolved to take the lead in this matter, although I believe they have stopped the orders for a general purchase in consequence of your suggestion.

They have behaved well about the Portuguese refugees; for as soon as they learnt what were really our intentions, they immediately counter-

manded the vessels intended to be sent by the government, and made the same application to the Spanish government for an extension of the time.

I also send you a despatch which I have addressed to Bagot, upon a subject which is of great commercial importance, and respecting which the governments of Prussia and the Netherlands have, I fear, nearly come to an understanding. Sir Brook Taylor had previously been instructed to show some signs of life in this affair; but the conduct of Prussia, as stated by Bülow, is incomprehensible.

You will likewise receive a copy of the note which I have addressed to Itabayana about his arms and ammunition. I much fear that it will prove the fruitful mother of many more; for he is indefatigable.

The *Galatea* has arrived, and is ordered to Portsmouth; so that Strangford will be off before the end of the week; at least if his instructions can be recovered from Windsor by that time. I am sorry to find that none of the interceptions have been returned from Windsor since you left town. There were some of considerable importance. I have now directed that they should be sent down to you first, which will only make the delay of a couple of days.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

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*Earl Bathurst to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Cirencester, 19th August, 1828.

I am sorry that I was out when the Duke of Manchester called, as it prevented my returning the enclosures by his Grace.

If the Duke of Clarence should give any opening, you will do wisely I think to avail yourself of it. His illness will be attributed (and possibly justly) to his vexation at finding his resignation accepted, and it will not do to appear to say to him what Huskisson made you say of him, "There is no mistake, and there shall be no mistake."

I think Aberdeen is right in not sending the proposed despatch to Lord Stuart, after such a communication from Polignac; but I regret it had not gone before the communication was made, as it would have left on record all that had passed previously, and have obtained in writing the assurances which Polignac has given. Perhaps Aberdeen might write an account of what has passed to Lord Stuart, giving that as the reason why he has not made any representation for him to communicate, conceiving those given by Polignac as satisfactory.

I do not see on what the report rests that the Russian Admiral's ship has foundered. If the repairs of the Russian ships at Plymouth are only temporary, care should be taken to let them know the truth, because otherwise, if any mishap were to happen to any of them, the blame would attach to us.

Yours very sincerely,

BATHURST.

This fine weather looks ill for my refusal of sixty-eight shillings.



*The Right Hon. Sir George Murray to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Downing Street, 19th August, 1828.

I have got your letter of the 18th. I am now employed in preparing a communication to the several Governors of the West Indian Colonies on the subject of the slave question, and I shall submit it to your consideration as soon as it is finished. It is very important, and I am convinced it is for the interest of all the parties concerned, that the government should be allowed to manage this question in its own way.

The general view I take of the matter is, that we should endeavour strongly to impress upon the West Indian body the necessity of doing something; but that we should not prescribe positively and dogmatically the measures which they are to adopt. It may be very well that, in the Crown colonies, we should enforce, to a certain extent, such specific measures as appear to us to be useful and practicable; because these may be considered as not an improper field for experiment, but in the colonies which have legislatures we are more likely to make progress, I think, by letting these legislatures work in their own way, provided they show a disposition to make some progress in carrying into effect the general principles laid down by the Resolutions of the British Parliament upon the subject, than by dictating specific measures for their adoption.

The almost necessary result of dictating to an assembly over which we have no direct influence, is to produce resistance; and although there may be means found of overcoming that resistance by force, it is much better to avoid producing it if possible.

I regret very much the tone of Mr. Huskisson's letter disallowing the Jamaica Slave Law of December, 1826. The letter is written too much in the tone of captious criticism, and I have understood it was both hastily written and despatched without due consideration. I should be very glad therefore, to leave an opening to the legislature of Jamaica to bring forward that law again with a few modifications; but care must be taken in doing so to guard against their supposing that government will at all relax in enforcing the principles laid down for the amelioration of the slave population, and for fitting that population by degrees to pass from a state of slavery to a state of freedom.

I am not yet prepared to say much upon the affairs of Canada. I apprehend, however, that the only aid which government will have derived from the Canada Committee will be that of rendering more generally known the necessity of some change.

In Africa we are getting rid of the expense of the establishments on the Gold Coast, and I should hope we may in time do the same in regard to Sierra Leone, though not immediately. The establishment at Fernando Po appears to me to have been set on foot in a rather hasty and undefined manner; and I understood some time since, from a conversation I had with Sir George Cockburn about it, that it had been determined to wait the result of the rainy season before finally determining whether it should be retained or not. In the mean time it appears to be in a very anomalous situation, belonging rather more to the Admiralty than to the Colonial Department, and occasioning a considerable expenditure of money upon a rather precarious tenure.

Believe me always sincerely yours,

GEORGE MURRAY.



*To the King.*

[ 998. ]

Cheltenham, 20th August, 1828.

As it will be absolutely necessary that an arrangement should be made for performing the duties of the office of Lord High Admiral, I submit to your Majesty that the arrangement heretofore adopted should be adopted again; that the office should be in commission; and that Lord Melville should be appointed the First Commissioner.

I would then submit to your Majesty that Lord Ellenborough should be appointed to Lord Melville's situation at the Board of Control.

I do not submit to your Majesty any person at present to fill the office of Lord Privy Seal. It is impossible to know exactly what will be the result of the discussion in the Cabinet of the subject which, with your Majesty's permission, I have now under consideration; and which I hope soon to bring before your Majesty. I would recommend to your Majesty, therefore, to keep that office at your disposition, leaving Lord Ellenborough to continue to perform its duties for some time.

All of which is humbly submitted for your Majesty's pleasure, by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Earl of Aberdeen.*

[ 999. ]

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, Cheltenham, 20th August, 1828.

I return Croker's note in yours of the 18th. We ought to let the Russian ambassador know that the ships are in a bad state if they really are so.

I think that the letter to the Admirals will answer. You had better propose to Prince Polignac the details of the arrangement for the liberation of the Greek slaves as suggested by me, or any other of which you may approve. This proposition will induce him to reflect a little; and will show him that this matter will not be so easily settled as he imagines. I observed yesterday, in perusing one of the despatches from Lord Stuart de Rothesay, that he has mistaken the nature of the French engagement. They have engaged to quit the *Morea* when

the 6th of July will be carried into execution. It will be very desirable to set him right upon this point. In doing so you might bring out all that I suggested in my last letter, and even the last conversation with Polignac ; and you might desire him to show the despatch to Monsieur de Rayneval in case he had made the same mistake in conversation with this minister. Indeed you might desire him, in a private letter, to do so at all events.

I am anxious upon this point because I find that these paragraphs in the 'Journal des Débats' have attracted the attention of our colleagues as well as of the public. The former would think much more of them if they knew all that we do respecting La Ferronnays' conversation with Fagel ; which I am convinced took place.

In respect to Itabayana, if you should not have sent the note it might be as well to omit the paragraph which declares our intention to be neutral, in case Don Pedro should determine to carry on war to establish the rights of his daughter. We have not declared that intention yet ; although it is pretty certain that that will be our policy, and we have recommended to Don Pedro not to carry on war.


That which we have said is that we will not engage in a civil war in Portugal ourselves ; nor will we allow others to carry on such war from England. But we must look at the whole question of Don Pedro's right to the crown, to his right to make it over to his daughter, to his right of making war on his daughter's account and as her guardian and protector, and his right to call upon us for assistance, and to his means of carrying on war, before we can decide that we will be neutral in the contest between Don Pedro and his brother for the crown of Portugal. However, if the note has gone it does not signify. The paragraph comes in incidentally.

I wrote to Mr. Grant, as far back as last Easter, a letter about this question of the Rhine, and sent Lord Dudley a copy of it. I should think they have it in the office.\*

The whole question between the Netherlands and us is this. Shall the Netherlands take a transit duty upon the quality and value of articles going up the Rhine, or upon their weight and bulk ? They insist upon the former, we upon the latter interpretation of the Treaty ; and we are, I think, right.

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\* See page 349.



Aug., 1828.

NAVIGATION OF THE RHINE.

641

The King of the Netherlands has, in my opinion, a perfect right to demand compensation, by way of transit duty, for the use by foreigners of the rivers, canals and harbours in Holland; kept up as they are by the expenditure of vast sums by Holland; and likewise full security at the expense of those who use these rivers, &c., that the right of transit shall not be used to the detriment of the revenue of the Netherlands by smuggling, &c. But it is going a little far to insist upon a right of laying on an *ad valorem* duty in any shape.

The whole question is a very difficult one. The King is most obstinate about it; and you will recollect that I advised the Cabinet not to take the King of the Netherlands as the arbitrator in our Canadian question, on account of the differences likely to arise out of this question of the navigation of the Rhine.

I consider Bülow one of the most unfair and dangerous men that we could have to transact business with. He has pretended to be very candid and open about this question.

But the notice given to us that the stable door is open, is always after the steed has been stolen. I'll lay a wager that the whole question is settled.

We had better then consider what ground it would be most advisable for us to take to have it revised and altered hereafter.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

You had better send Lord Ellenborough these letters from Admiral Codrington. De Rigny mistakes the date of the instructions, and reasons upon them as if they had been received before the battle of Navarino.

I believe that Mr. Yeames is right in his estimate of the strength of the Russian armies. But I am much mistaken if they are not strong enough to attain their object. If they should fail it will not be for want of numbers, but from want of provisions and other supplies.

W.

[ 1000. ]

*To the Right Hon. Sir George Murray.*

MY DEAR MURRAY,

Cheltenham, 20th August, 1828.

I have received your letter. I quite concur with you in principle that we must not endeavour to force the colonial legislatures. But we must consider the Order in Council as the standard to which legislation for the amelioration of the slave population ought to tend ; and inculcate that principle in our correspondence with the governors ; pointing out to them the mode which each ought to pursue to induce the legislature of the colony under his government to adopt some measures in the same view. He ought to point out to them particularly how desirable it is to the colony that the question should be kept in the hands of the government, and of the colonial legislature, instead of being taken up by Parliament ; and that this object can be attained only by the colonial legislature taking an enlarged view of the case, and adopting something effectual.

In respect to Jamaica the object must be to prevail upon the Assembly to separate from the Slave Law that part of the Act of the last Session of the Assembly which tended to regulate matters of religion. It was to this part that Huskisson objected. If we can besides get them to do anything more, so much the better.

It was I who proposed that the garrisons on the coast of Africa should be exclusively naval. I made this proposal because it was so easy for the navy to supply them with good food, and to relieve them occasionally in case of sickness. I believe that the expense would have been greater, but the mortality would have been smaller.

In the mean time it was proposed to occupy Fernando Po, and the Lord High Admiral, who is not an economist, undertook the affair ; and I believe that the candle has been burning at both ends. But we must look at this whole question. I believe that, besides what the liberated Africans cost us, which I admit must still be expended, we expend so much that the interest of the sum amounts to more than the whole value of the trade, import as well as export ; that is to say, twenty times the value of all the trade in every year. Our settlements on the coast of Africa, therefore, are an expensive appendage.

Believe me, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To the Right Hon. R. Wilmot Horton.*

[ 1001. ]

MY DEAR SIR,

Cheltenham, 20th August, 1828.

I have only this day received your letter of the 14th.\* I don't exactly recollect the expression to which you refer in one which I wrote to you on the day or two before you left London. My opinion is that there is no use in communicating with the gentlemen of the Association; and that I should become useless myself in this Roman Catholic Question, if not so already, as well as in every other, if I were to open such communications in any channel.

We have been debating it now for twenty-five years; and there have been more speeches made, and more pamphlets written upon it than upon any question that ever came before Parliament; and yet I don't think there are two public men who agree in opinion upon it, whatever may be the general shade of their opinions. Yet it is expected from government that they are at once to find the way out of chaos.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*The King to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Royal Lodge, Wednesday,  $\frac{1}{2}$  past 3 p.m.,  
20th August, 1828.

MY DEAR FRIEND,

I have detained your messenger, expecting that by this time I might have received some further communication from you upon the Duke of Clarence's business, or that I probably might have had something to communicate to you upon that head; but, finding that not to be the case, I despatch your messenger back with these few lines. I have no objection to Lord Dunally as a Representative Peer upon the statement you have made respecting him. I sincerely hope that you already derive benefit from the Cheltenham waters.

Always sincerely yours,

G. R.

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*The Duke of Clarence to the King.*

Bushy House, 20th August, 1828.

His Royal Highness the Duke of Clarence being still too much indisposed to write himself, has dictated the following notes:—

That his Majesty will peruse by the notes that Captain Spencer will

read to the King that Sir George Cockburn wrote, not in his own name only, but in that of the whole Council of the Lord High Admiral, and therefore the Duke of Clarence, still conceiving himself correct as to the powers of the Act of Parliament and patent, does not see that his position is in the least altered. But he acquits Sir George Cockburn of any act of dishonour, though the Duke must ever consider the letter as ill timed and ill advised.

The Duke of Clarence, considering himself since the 16th of August totally out of office, and the Duke of Wellington's two last letters still further confirming him in that idea, did not, out of delicacy to the King, state the explanation that had taken place between himself and Sir George Cockburn, nor did he mean to do so till he had finally left the Admiralty.

The Duke cannot see, with the sentiments of the Cabinet on the subject of the Act of Parliament and patent, how he can remain in office.

WILLIAM.

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*The Duke of Clarence to the King.*

DEAREST BROTHER,                      Bushy House, 20th August, 1828, half-past 5 p.m.

I have had the advantage of hearing from Captain Spencer, who is just returned from the Royal Lodge, that, on the explanation he has been enabled and permitted to give, my conduct, and the grounds on which I make my stand, are perfectly understood and approved by the best of brothers and the sincerest of friends I possess. Having effected these two points nearest to my heart, I have now a duty to fulfil to the Sovereign of the country, and I must not bring the King into any difficulty with the administration. It is quite clear the Duke of Wellington either cannot or does not wish to alter the patent of the Lord High Admiral, nor may it be in his power to construe the present terms of the patent differently to what he has adhered to since the 10th of last July. And it is equally certain under such restrictions I cannot continue in office to be of any use to the King, or with credit to myself. I must therefore continue in the determination of my resignation, both for the purpose of preventing any difference between the King and the Cabinet, and also to have the satisfaction of enjoying the comfort that arises from self-approbation. I have through life, I trust, shown my dearest and best brother the uninterrupted and sincerest friendship, and whether in or out of office my conduct will ever be the same. Perhaps, indeed, I may be of more use to yourself, to whom I am most kindly and disinterestedly attached, by being altogether out of office, and consequently ready at any call to be employed or consulted as your own interest and comfort may dictate. I am convinced I am right in persisting in my resignation, and ever remain,

Dearest brother, yours most affectionately,

WILLIAM.

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## [MEMORANDUM.]

NOTES FROM RECOLLECTION OF A CONVERSATION HELD BY HIS MAJESTY WITH CAPTAIN SPENCER, AUGUST THE 20TH, AT THE ROYAL LODGE, on the occasion of Captain Spencer being honoured by his Majesty with an audience to submit to the King a note dictated by his Royal Highness the Duke of Clarence, who was in the morning too much indisposed to write himself.

His Majesty began by fully stating every part of the case that had come to his knowledge as it had occurred previously to the interview between your Royal Highness and Sir George Cockburn on the morning of the 15th instant.

His Majesty then said how anxious he had been to hear from your Royal Highness what had passed at that interview, and the result of it; that his anxiety arose chiefly from his great wish that your Royal Highness should be in the right, and that if you did feel it necessary to resign, you should do so on right grounds.

His Majesty here permitted me to explain to him your Royal Highness's sole and only motive for not having till now thought it your duty to acquaint his Majesty with the present state of the case, namely, that as the thing now rested only on the different construction put upon the patent by your Royal Highness and the Cabinet ministers, your Royal Highness had not before made this known to the King, because your first and main wish being not to embarrass his Majesty, you thought it most delicate for that purpose, not telling him till your Royal Highness had finally left the Admiralty, so as not to bring the ministers into any collision with the King on the subject.

His Majesty then asked me if he was to understand that the only difficulty in the case at present was the difference of opinion between your Royal Highness and the Cabinet respecting the powers granted by the patent to the Lord High Admiral? to which I replied that such was my belief and conviction, in proof of which I told his Majesty that your Royal Highness's opinion was that you were to be the judge of what points [exclusive of money questions] you consulted your Council upon, as you understood your Council was for the purpose of advising you when you wished it, but that you were not called upon to obtain their previous concurrence to any measure unless your Royal Highness thought it necessary.

That, on the other hand, as to what was the Cabinet's opinion, I referred to that part of the Duke of Wellington's letter of the 16th of July wherein his Grace mentions that it is meant that all official as well as pecuniary responsibility should be removed from your Royal Highness, who is stated to be "the efficient head of the Admiralty, aided and assisted by two or more members of his Council, in the same manner as the late Board of Admiralty," which your Royal Highness thinks proves that the Cabinet had so entirely a different view of the patent, that it seemed they considered your Royal Highness as being only one of a Board, and that if your Council opposed any measure, it could not be carried into effect.

The King being then put in possession of your Royal Highness's notes



of this morning, and his Majesty having attentively perused the extract from the Lord High Admiral's patent, his Majesty said that he had not before viewed the restriction of the powers as so great; that he agreed with your Royal Highness that, viewing the patent as the Cabinet did, you could not, consistently with your station, remain in with less power than the late First Lords of the Admiralty had; and that if the meaning of the patent was really what the Cabinet gave it, and that it could not under all circumstances be altered, his Majesty perfectly agreed with your Royal Highness in thinking you now put your grounds for resigning on a right footing.

His Majesty expressed his gratification at having had this explanation from your Royal Highness, and rejoiced at your being in the right under your view of the case; but, at the same time, his Majesty expressed his conviction of the difficulty there might be in having any alteration made in the patent.

His Majesty said that he thought this new state of things should be somehow made known to the Duke of Wellington; that he thought it due to all parties, and to his Grace as minister; and that his Grace should understand that unless the patent was altered so as to give the Lord High Admiral more power than the ministers at present seemed to think he had, your Royal Highness could not, with propriety, hold the situation.

His Majesty again observed that with the meaning of the patent, as given to it by ministers, the Lord High Admiral would scarcely have as much power as a First Lord Commissioner of the Admiralty, and that not having himself paid much attention to the patent before, this was his Majesty's first idea that it was so considered.

His Majesty expressed himself throughout in the warmest terms of affectionate kindness towards your Royal Highness, and commanded me to tell your Royal Highness that now his Majesty was made acquainted with the whole he thought you had acted quite right in putting it on the grounds you now had, which were the only true grounds to put it upon.

Finally, your Royal Highness must see, that however clear and plainly to be understood his Majesty's statement was, it is difficult to give a very correct or complete account of a conversation of a length of the one his Majesty honoured me with; and I can most truly assure your Royal Highness that it is still more out of my power to do justice to the words, and far less to the manner, in which his Majesty throughout every part of all that passed evinced his warm attachment and strong feeling towards your Royal Highness.

[ 1002. ]

*To the Earl of Aberdeen.*

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, Cheltenham, 21st August, 1828.

I beg you to look at the enclosures in Sir Edward Codrington's despatch to the Admiralty of the 19th July, sent by the Admiralty on the 9th and received the 16th August. I don't understand what is intended. It appears that by one trick

Mehemet Ali is to send a fleet out of Alexandria, and then that by another, this fleet having been taken over to the Morea, Ibrahim is to be induced to embark his army in it.

Are Mehemet Ali and Ibrahim Pacha parties, or either a party, to the scheme? This does not appear.

In war it is said that all is fair; and it must be admitted that we are not far from a state of war. But I must say that I think we are far enough removed from such a state to avoid everything that savours of war, that is not absolutely necessary to attain the purposes of the Treaty; particularly anything in the shape of a trick.

I would recommend to you to speak to Monsieur de Polignac upon this subject, to ascertain from him whether he can explain what is intended to be done; and, if it is what it appears to be, to urge him to concur with us in declaring that the French government can have nothing to say to it. I infinitely prefer to force the Egyptian troops to embark by the use of the French army.

It would be desirable to make some official enquiry how the letter from the Admiralty dated the 9th did not reach the Foreign Office till the 16th August.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*The Right Hon. J. Wilson Croker to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Admiralty, 21st August, 1828.

At the risk of occupying to no purpose two minutes of your Grace's time, I think I may as well inform your Grace that several little circumstances (none large enough to be specified) made me think on Sunday and Monday that the Duke of Clarence was making some attempt to open the door to a reconciliation, and return to office. This suspicion I find strengthened (if I may use so strong an expression) by the rumours to the same effect in the clubs yesterday: and, what is still more important, by the Duke's having despatched Captain Spencer yesterday morning on a mission to Windsor. All this *may* mean nothing, but I cannot help suspecting that there is, or has been, something going on.

When his Royal Highness announced his resignation, he gave orders for the removal of his effects from the Admiralty with more precipitation than was necessary, and for the last few days everything of that kind has been

shower of *promotions* which had been falling copiously ever since his return from Windsor.

Your Grace may possibly know all this, or at least the cause of all this, but it is possible you may not, and I therefore trust you will excuse my giving you the trouble of reading this short note.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke, your most attached and obliged

J. W. CROKER.

P.S.—I enclose for your Grace's information my last private report from Toulon. I have also a private report from Brest of the 12th, but nothing stirring there except the *Duquesne*, 80, which we knew was preparing for sea.

The Duke is so much better in health, that his great dinner takes place to-day.

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*The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 21st August, 1828.

Esterhazy has this morning communicated to me some very important information from Constantinople and Vienna. The report of the Internuncio of the Turkish statement of what has taken place on the Danube and in Bulgaria is dated 25th of July. If these Turks be not greater liars than Christians are, it would certainly appear that they have no reason to be dissatisfied with the events of the campaign hitherto. They pretend to have had an advantage in almost every affair; and the Internuncio says that the language of the Reis Effendi has become more confident of their final success, in consequence. He also confirms the account of a considerable increase of enthusiasm in the people, and that the war had become decidedly popular. Sixty thousand inhabitants of Constantinople had been enrolled to serve in case of necessity, and it was said that it might be carried up to ninety thousand.

The despatches of Metternich are also written in a spirit of considerable assurance with respect to Russia. He reasons the chances of failure, and seems to think it impossible for the Emperor to finish the war in the course of the present campaign, at least in the manner he would desire. He says that he has received rather coldly some advances made by Russia, and is determined for the present to watch. He highly approves in general of the line we have taken, but thinks that the permission given to the French expedition is a fault that we have committed; principally because the French government is so feeble as to be unable to control the public feeling. Although he has not the least doubt of their sincerity at present. He still complains of our going to talk to the Greeks, to whom we have nothing to say; and that we continue to mystify the Turks, who have really to decide, by dwelling on their adhesion to the Treaty, and acceptance of mediation, which, after all, does not explain to them what they are to expect. Both in the despatches and in a private letter which Esterhazy showed me, the strongest desire is manifested to go entirely with us; and with us to adopt

such a moderate tone as may make it easy to take any resolution which circumstances may render necessary at the moment.

I have seen Polignac to-day. He said that in consequence of what I had observed the other day on the subject of General Maison's instructions, supplementary instructions had been sent, desiring him not to act in a hostile manner except in the last extremity. What this means is not very clear. However, the extremity seems not very likely to arrive, for the departure of Ibrahim will probably take place immediately, if the accounts we have are to be at all depended upon. In this case Polignac said that the second division of the army would not sail. He again made use of many strong expressions of desire to act in entire concert, and again said that they wished more than ever to finish the Greek affair as speedily as possible, in order to have their hands free to act as might be necessary. He continued to dwell upon what might be expected from the Emperor being unable to control his army, as the great reason for our being prepared.

The note to Itabayana was sent; but although it might not be necessary to declare our intention to be neutral so explicitly, I think the whole spirit of our proceedings would scarcely have left us the possibility of following any other course in the first instance. Indeed, I am not certain if such intention has not been already pretty clearly implied, although not declared. The situation of Don Pedro, it is reasonable to suppose, will incline him to come to some accommodation. The revolt of his foreign troops, and the decided revolutionary spirit in the country, with the growing jealousy of everything Portuguese, must make him desirous of settling the question. I am afraid there is some truth in the reports of Don Miguel's aversion to the marriage. Whether any good can be done by getting the Nuncio to influence the Queen, as suggested by the French government, I do not know. Ofalia tells me he is sure that his Court is zealous in promoting this object; and if you recollect, it was strongly urged by them long ago.

I will write to Stuart by the mail of to-morrow, an ostensible despatch on the subject of the expedition. If I recollect right, he has made another mistake in his notion of the expedition; he does not seem to be aware that its object is to expel the Turks as well as the Egyptians from the Morea.\* It would not be very surprising if the Turks were the only troops they had to contend with.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN. 1

\* N.B.—Always confine the operations to the MOREA, as the French papers speak of extending them to *Athens*.

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*To the Earl of Aberdeen.*

Cheltenham, 22nd August, 1828.

I have received your letter of the 21st, my dear Lord Aberdeen. I am afraid that the Turks are greater liars than the Christians. There is no doubt that the Emperor of Russia is

40,000 men, he can carry their intrenched camp. The question is, whether his supplies will enable him to get on. I should doubt it, if he does not obtain possession of Varna.

It is always best to meet Metternich in front, and to answer him.

If our Admiral had done his duty (and for not doing it he has been recalled) we might have resisted the *vellété* of the French to send a military expedition. But situated as affairs were when we consented to send the expedition, we could not have refused without taking upon ourselves the responsibility of the failure to get Ibrahim Pacha out of the Morea. We therefore consented. But it is said we may be deceived. The French government cannot be answerable for their own actions. That may be true. But we have taken every precaution that it is possible to take.

Prince Metternich repeats the old objection to our treating with the Greeks, to which we have only to repeat the old answer; and he blames us for keeping the Turks at a distance. How can we avoid doing so? We are parties to the Treaty of the 6th July; are bound hand and foot by its stipulations; and we cannot approach the Turks excepting in concert with the other parties to the Treaty, or till we can tell the Turks what they can count upon, after settling with the Greeks according to the Treaty.

I don't think we have ever gone further in respect to Portuguese neutrality than to say that we waited for the declaration of Don Pedro. We said this in Parliament, in the King's Speech, and in the instructions to Lord Strangford.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.*

MY DEAR PEEL,

Cheltenham, 22nd August, 1828.

I send you a letter from Dawson \* which I beg you to return, although I don't propose to give any answer to it. I cannot approve of his making a speech so liable to misconstruction at a public dinner, composed of such company as he describes. But there is no use in writing upon the subject.

\* See page 633.

Is it possible that Lord Anglesey can think of disarming the yeomanry? What can have occasioned the report of the existence of such an intention? I conclude that he, or possibly the Master-General of the Ordnance, have been making enquiries about the arms of the yeomanry in consequence of information which I asked for two months ago.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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To Lord ——.

[ 1005. ]

MY DEAR ——,

Cheltenham, 22nd August, 1828.

Greville has sent me your note applying for the situation of a Welsh judge for Mr. —— . This Welsh judicature is very much disliked in Parliament, and the only mode which I can adopt to save it is to appoint to fill the situations which may become vacant those notoriously the best qualified. I entertain no doubt that Mr. —— is qualified. The question will be whether, in the opinion of the heads of the profession, he is the most so. If he is not, I am afraid that I cannot appoint him.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*The King to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR FRIEND,

Royal Lodge, 22nd August,  $\frac{1}{2}$  past 8 p.m., 1828.

Since I wrote last to you I have seen Captain Spencer, who was the bearer of the enclosed letter \* from my brother, the Duke of Clarence, and which, when you have perused and taken a copy (if you please), I will desire you to return to me.

I wish you would not *finally make your arrangements* till I see you next. I can have no objection to Lord Melville.

Ever sincerely yours,

G. R.

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*The Right Hon. J. Wilson Croker to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Admiralty, 22nd August, 1828.

The suspicions which I mentioned in my letter of yesterday are, it seems, unfounded, for his Royal Highness told Cockburn yesterday that nothing

would induce him to return; and his *family* profess to be delighted at his retirement. But all this smoke has not been without fire. I understand that Sir Wathen Waller, who oscillates between Bushy and Windsor, having learned from his Royal Highness that he had *reconciled himself with Sir George Cockburn, and would have been quite content to have gone on with him*, drove away to Windsor with the information, which he considered very important. It seems that (as Sir Wathen reported it) the King thought so too, and sent off to desire the Duke of Clarence to come to explain it. The Duke being ill, sent Captain Spencer, who, it is supposed, told his Majesty of the reconciliation with the Council, but at the same time is *said* to have conveyed his Royal Highness's renewed declaration that he could not hold the office of Lord High Admiral on the limited principle which had been, and still was, contended for. So, as is stated to me, the matter ended.

His Royal Highness was not well enough to dine at table yesterday; but before and after dinner was wonderfully affectionate to Sir George Cockburn. He told Sir George that he had long known that it was resolved to put Lord Grey in his place, and yet he begged the moment the new First Lord should be declared that he might be informed of it; but we hear today that he told Captain Spencer that he *had* been informed who his successor was, and he gave him to understand that it was *not* Lord Grey. If this be true his Royal Highness was mystifying Sir George Cockburn, which is indeed his Royal Highness's usual way of *keeping a secret*.

The shower of promotions which had, like the showers of rain, been suspended for two or three days, have, like them, recommenced, from which I infer that all thoughts of continuing in office (if they did exist) are now totally abandoned.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke,  
your Grace's most attached and obliged,  
J. W. CROKER.

*The Right Hon. Henry Goulburn to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Downing Street, 22nd August, 1828.

Would you be kind enough to read the enclosed, and to let me know what you think of it? If it be right to refuse it altogether, the advance recently made to the Welland Canal of 50,000*l.* gives a ground for doing so. It is certainly inconvenient to add to the unfunded debt, for which we are responsible on demand, even another 100,000*l.* But if the importance of giving assistance to the efforts of the Colonial Legislature overweighs this objection, we must consider the terms upon which such a loan is to be made. It will not, I think, be right, to accede to those which the Legislature has proposed. We advance money for public works in England and in Ireland under an engagement that the money should be repaid to us in from 16 to 20 years, and that we should receive an interest of 4*l.* or sometimes 5*l.* per cent. Could we properly do more for Canada than we do for Ireland?

I have requested Lord Aberdeen, as the Secretary of State in town, to



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THE DUKE OF CLARENCE.

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concert with the Chancellor the further prorogation of Parliament, and to settle with the King, either to-morrow or Monday, for a Council. It must be prorogued before Tuesday next. I suppose you have read Dawson's speech. I did not think that he had been so utterly deficient in discretion or in consistency.

Yours ever, my dear Duke, most truly,

HENRY GOULBURN.

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*Viscount Melville to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Melville Castle, Edinburgh, nd22 August, 1828.

I enclose herewith a letter which I have received from the Chairs of the East India Company, with a draft of a proposed letter to the Bengal government, which I will thank you to return to me. The draft appears to me to be in entire conformity to your suggestions, and I think you will agree with me that the Chairs have acted properly in delaying to bring forward the proposal respecting the employment of military officers in civil situations, as (if their calculation is accurate) the expense is beyond what we can afford; and we must endeavour to arrange some cheaper remedy for the inconvenience.

I received last night your letter of the 18th. The details contained in it would be wholly unaccountable and unexplainable in any other person than the gentleman to whom they relate. The expectations I had formed when he was first appointed have been fully realised. I shall be anxious to learn the final result.

Many thanks for the trouble you have taken in writing to me.

Ever yours most sincerely,

MELVILLE.

If you approve of the enclosed draft, I shall then write to Lord Hill, to suggest the arrangements as far as he is concerned, and shall not return it to the Chairs until I have his answer in the affirmative.

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*To the King.*

[ 1006. ]

Cheltenham, 23rd August, 1828.

I return the letter from the Duke of Clarence, of which, according to your Majesty's desire, I have taken a copy.

I am very happy to have seen this letter; as it places his Royal Highness's resignation on clear intelligible grounds.

His Royal Highness holds the office of Lord High Admiral under a patent, which, together with an Act of Parliament, regulates the mode in which its duties are to be performed.

His Royal Highness thinks that those regulations prevent his



I, on the other hand, however sensible I am of the advantages derived by your Majesty from the services of his Royal Highness the Duke of Clarence, do not think that I could, with propriety, recommend to your Majesty to alter the ancient patent of appointment of the Lord High Admiral, the provisions of which must have been and were well considered by your Majesty's servants when his Royal Highness was appointed to fill that high office ; and again in Parliament, when the Bill for regulating the office was under discussion.

His Royal Highness does me justice in believing that it is not in my power to give a different construction to the terms of the existing patent. The words are too clear to be mistaken ; and all those who have considered them have given them the same construction.

I confess that I think that his Royal Highness has taken an erroneous view of the nature of the authority of other high officers under your Majesty's government ; and I have submitted this reflection to his Royal Highness upon more than one occasion. But his Royal Highness having taken the view which he has taken of the limitations imposed by the patent upon the exercise of his authority, and of their consequences upon his Royal Highness's power to serve your Majesty with efficiency, and with credit to himself, acts in a manner consistent with his high character and station in the country by resigning.

The delay which occurred in my submitting to your Majesty an arrangement for the Admiralty is to be attributed to my desire to consult Mr. Peel before I submitted my opinion to your Majesty. Excepting the Lord Chancellor, to whom I threw out that arrangement as an idea floating in my mind on the last day I attended your Majesty, nobody else has any information on the subject.

Some inconvenience attends the delay of the arrangement ; but none that can be of consequence if your Majesty wishes that it should be longer delayed.

All of which is humbly submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Earl of Aberdeen.*

[ 1007. ]

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, Cheltenham, 23rd August, 1828.

I return the letter to Lord Stuart, which it appears to me will answer perfectly.

The Marquis de Palmella and his war in Portugal place us in the greatest possible embarrassment. I have not the means of judging here; but I believe that if we admit these Portuguese into his Majesty's dominions in the shape of troops, we ought to call Parliament. Yet in what other shape can we admit them? They must either remain in the transports which have brought them to England; or, if they should have been disembarked and their transports should not be at their own disposition, I recommend that you should communicate with the Admiralty and request them to allot a hulk or more to receive them till arrangements can be made respecting them. I know that some of them are at Portsmouth, as I have a letter from the Commander-in-Chief's office to desire to know what is to be done with them; and requiring permission to put them in the barracks. I think we did once permit some troops belonging to the King of the Netherlands, wrecked off Harwich, to go into the barracks there. But these were driven in by stress of weather. The Portuguese came here by choice.

I then recommend to you to tell the Marquis de Palmella that we cannot allow foreign troops to remain in England; that all individuals are welcome, but nothing in the shape of troops can remain; and as individuals they must conduct themselves peaceably and obey the laws. They cannot remain embodied in any one or two places. That which I recommend to him is to go to work frankly and fairly. If he means to employ these troops in carrying on war against Portugal, let him send them at once to the Brazils. If he does not, let him use his influence over them to persuade those who can accept the Infante's amnesty to go to Portugal and avail themselves of it. Those who cannot, such as the superior officers and civil servants, may remain in England as individuals. But I beg the Marquis de Palmella to observe that we cannot allow his Majesty's dominions to be made the seat of the cabinet, the government, the arsenal, and harbour, by which war is to be carried on in the name, but without the knowledge or consent, of Don Pedro against Portugal.

that the money of which the British creditors of Portugal were defrauded on the 1st of June was employed at a later period to carry on war in Portugal; and that a part of it was allotted to enable one of his Majesty's subjects to raise a corps of his Majesty's subjects, contrary to the laws of this kingdom, in order to co-operate in this war. This was done while the Marquis de Palmella and the Vicomte d'Itabayana were each of them claiming the privileges of Portuguese ambassador at this Court!

Before the Marquis de Palmella calls upon us for our sympathy, he might as well lay out these sums with economy in providing for these individuals; who I must and shall always say have been brought to the state in which they are, first, by his want of foresight before he joined them, and by his want of firmness afterwards.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 1008. ]

*To the Right Hon. Henry Goulburn.*

MY DEAR GOULBURN,

Cheltenham, 23rd August, 1828.

It appears to me that Sir Frederick Maitland has exceeded his powers in giving the Royal Assent to this Act. Lord Bathurst authorised him to assure the colony that they would be assisted in making a loan to construct the canal to the Rideau, which canal the public are now constructing at their expense; and he goes and assents to an Act, not for raising money to construct a canal to the Rideau, nor for any other water-communication, but for the general purposes of the colony, to the amount of 90,000*l.*; and this for no other purpose than to save the colony, who have a surplus revenue,  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. upon this sum. This would be a very profitable operation for the colony; but a very bad one for Great Britain; and as we have lent 50,000*l.* in Canada this year for the purpose of completing the Welland Canal, and are besides completing the Rideau Canal, I think we may refuse.

I wrote to the King and to the Chancellor yesterday about the Council; and proposed that it should be on Monday.

Dawson's speech was too bad. Surely a man who does such things ought to be put up in a strait waistcoat!

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.



AUG., 1828.

EVACUATION OF THE MOREA.

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*Viscount Melville to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Melville Castle, Edinburgh, 23rd August, 1828.

I return herewith the letters enclosed with your note of the 20th, which I received by the Carlisle post this morning. The King's letter of the 11th is admirable.

I shall be "prepared for a start," but not willingly, as I should much prefer remaining where I am, both as to *this* place and my place in the government. I shall probably hear from you in a day or two as to your intended arrangements in consequence of the Lord High Admiral's resignation, and though I shall not make difficulties, or decline going back to the Admiralty if you cannot arrange it in any other way that will be satisfactory to you, there are circumstances in the present state of that office which make the change not altogether agreeable. Those are matters, however, for conversation more than correspondence; and as I conclude that I shall have to set out on hearing from you again, I should take the road to Cheltenham in the first instance, if I were sure of finding you there.

Herries, who is on a tour in this country, called here this morning, and told me that you meant to be at Cheltenham a fortnight. There is a very direct line from hence by Carlisle, Lancaster, Stafford, and Worcester.

I remain ever yours sincerely,

MELVILLE.

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*The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

London, 23rd August, 1828.

I have never been able to perceive that the evacuation of the Morea by Ibrahim Pacha was so absolutely certain as is pretended. With his father's consent to the measure, he has always been willing to go; but up to this moment we have no real knowledge of the decision of Mehemet Ali. On the contrary, the last account from Alexandria described his having sent a Tatar to Constantinople for orders. It is presumed however, from the late communications between Ibrahim and the Admirals, that he is ready to go at all events. I think his own proposal does not go further than to express his readiness, if his father will send him transports; and the Admirals appear to take it for granted that he will embark on board any ships which may be provided for him. But this is by no means a necessary inference. It is true that by the recent measures of blockade the situation of Ibrahim has become more difficult; and his officers especially appear decided in their wish to return to Egypt upon any terms. But the father and son may perhaps understand each other, and may either be endeavouring to gain time, or to find means of communication with the view of obtaining supplies. There seems no great danger of this, as whatever may leave Alexandria will be accompanied by a force of the Allies. It seems to me that we have done the best thing under the circumstances. If Ibrahim waits to be absolutely compelled to embark, it will always be useful to have transports ready to receive him, when the French expedition shall have forced

It is rather singular that we have no intelligence from the Russian army. Lieven accounts for it by saying that it was the intention of the Emperor to despatch a considerable force, by a circuitous route, to occupy a place in the rear of the Turks, called *Aidos*, on the road to Constantinople, and thus to intercept their retreat. Their delay was in order to allow time for this to be effected, as the place is distant.

I explained verbally to Esterhazy, when he showed me his despatches, what in fact has been written to Lord Cowley, both on the subject of the French expedition, and of communications with the Greeks. Esterhazy appeared perfectly satisfied, and said that he had already written to his government in this sense. I forgot to mention that Metternich stated that a great change had taken place at Petersburg, and that the war was universally unpopular, every one who had been most favourable to it now pretending that they had always been against it. This account has reached us from some other quarter, but I forget at present from whence it came. The Internuncio also mentioned that M. de Zuylen had communicated to the Porte the reasons for the recall of Codrington, and the letter which had been addressed to him. The Reis Effendi had the utmost difficulty to comprehend the business at all; and the notion that the Admiral had been remiss in the execution of measures of severity seemed to him incredible. On the whole, it made a very unfavourable impression at the time. This would be confirmed by the arrival of Stratford Canning's answer to the Reis Effendi, so that if they should be disposed ever to give way, they must perceive that nothing now is to be gained by delay.

There will probably be a short time yet before Strangford can sail. It has occurred to me that it is perhaps scarcely decent to leave the subject of the Constitution perfectly unnoticed in his instructions. I send you therefore a draft, which, if you approve of, I will forward to him at Portsmouth. I believe it is consistent with the language we have always held, and is confined to generalities not likely to commit us.

I also send some communications from Madeira. It is clear that the Consul should be recalled. The precise moment at which it may most conveniently be done is perhaps a little doubtful.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

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*Mr. William Allen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

Gravelly Cottage, Lindfield, near Cuckfield, Sussex,  
23rd of 8th month, 1828.

May I beg leave to submit most respectfully to the Duke of Wellington a few facts and suggestions which have in my humble opinion an important bearing upon the best interests of the colony of Sierra Leone, and which I have been induced to offer at this time in consequence of the lamented death of the late Colonel Denham.

Although I have never visited Sierra Leone, I have derived much information with respect to its state from divers persons who have resided several years in the colony, and are intimately acquainted with its local circumstances. With regard to myself, I have no personal interest to promote,

never having had, either directly or indirectly, any pecuniary concern there. The interest which I feel in the subject arises from the idea I entertain of the immense advantages which must result to the continent of Africa, and to our own country also, by well-directed efforts in that quarter.

The expense of the colony to government has hitherto proved a considerable burden, and to a very great extent an unnecessary one, for I have the authority of most of the principal merchants, and the great body of the inhabitants, to state that a reduction might take place in the military Staff, perfectly consistent with the safety of the colony, by which a saving of 30,000*l.* per annum might be made in the Royal African Corps, the Commissariat, the Ordnance, and Barrack Departments. The recruiting depôts are stated to be amply sufficient, with the aid of the militia, composed of inhabitants who have property at stake, for all purposes of defence, parade, and guard. The well-trying loyalty of the population, and the diversity of nations of which it is composed, will be a guarantee not only against domestic commotion but external enemies.

It is decidedly the opinion of those who best know the nature and circumstances of the colony, that a *civil* in the place of a military governor is quite essential to its prosperity. A civil governor, not being distracted with a multiplicity of objects, would have leisure to attend to those details which are of the utmost consequence in an infant colony. By enforcing a proper attention to the cultivation of the soil he would secure the means of subsistence to the Africans landed from the slave ships; he would give effect to the intentions of government in settling them down in the undisturbed possession of small allotments of land; he would encourage them to raise exportable produce, and assist them in sending it to this country; he would pay attention to the manufacture of indigo, so easily procurable from the plants that abound there; he would stimulate the settlers to raise cotton for our manufactures at home, so as to render us in time independent of North and South America for that article; he would act powerfully in extinguishing the slave trade, by conciliating the friendship of the surrounding natives, and assisting them to exchange the products of their country for our manufactures; he should make it a principal part of his business to see that such an education is given to the people of colour as would promote morals and religion, and the acquisition of habits of industry, and thus qualify some of them to fill situations which have hitherto proved so destructive to the lives of Europeans. By employing a *small part* of the savings which might easily be made from the proposed reduction of the military establishment, in the extension of commerce and agriculture, such a stimulus would be given to the colony as to relieve the mother country in a very few years from the burden of expense which it has hitherto sustained. Permit me to add, in conclusion, that the measures to be adopted should be upon the most liberal scale with regard to education, so as to engage the talents and unite the energies of all sects in one common exertion for the general good.

With sentiments of great regard and esteem, I remain, respectfully,  
thy sincerely attached friend,

WM. ALLEN.

[ 1009. ]

*To the Earl of Aberdeen.*

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, Cheltenham, 24th August, 1828.

I have made two or three observations in the margin of your despatch to Lord Strangford, which otherwise is quite right.

I think you and I mean different things in respect to the removal of the Egyptian troops from the Morea. I advert to a proposition contained in one or two of the enclosures of Sir Edward Codrington's last despatch; from which it appears to be intended to draw out a fleet from Alexandria by some *hocus pocus*; take that fleet over to Navarino; persuade Ibrahim Pacha that it is sent for him; and prevail upon him to embark in it by some other trick. Commodore Campbell is sent to Alexandria to superintend this manœuvre.

I protest against such tricks. They are unworthy of real officers, even in war; but situated as we are in relation to the Turks, they would be shameful.

These are the measures to which I referred when I wrote you the letter to which yours is an answer; but as I did not state the numbers of the enclosures in Codrington's despatch, I conclude that you have not found them. But if you will have them looked for you will find them.

I think it will be very desirable to instruct Lord Strangford to inform the Emperor Don Pedro that if he proposes to carry on war against Portugal on behalf of his daughter, he cannot make England the country from which this war is to be carried on.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 1010. ]

*To the Earl of Aberdeen.*

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, Cheltenham, 24th August, 1828.

Since I wrote my other letter I have perused the papers from Mr. Murdoch.

You may rely upon it that we cannot make Don Miguel and the Portuguese responsible for British property at Madeira, which we must do, unless we are really and have all the appearance of being neutral.

I recommend to you, therefore, to recall Mr. Veitch forth-

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with ; and appoint any respectable merchant there to take charge of the consulate till you can send one. Inform the Vicomte de Asseca that you have done so, and for what reason ; and, at the same time, that if there should be any vexation to British subjects or injury to their property, either in Portugal or in any of the colonies of Portugal, we shall consider the Portuguese government responsible, and demand and enforce the demand of compensation for all such vexations, injuries and losses. This is the only way of dealing with such people.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.*

[ 1011. ]

MY DEAR PEEL,

Cheltenham, 24th August, 1828.

I return Croker's letter. I sent you that from Sir George Hill and one from Dawson some days ago. I rather think that the Lord High Admiral might have thought of retaining his office ; and that the King might have encouraged the notion till his Majesty was certain who was the person whom I should recommend for his successor ; respecting which I should think that the paragraphs in the newspapers excited some doubts in his mind.

As soon as I received your answer to my letter I wrote to the King ; and I received his answer yesterday, with one from the Lord High Admiral to his Majesty. It appears from these letters that there had been some discussion carried on by the intermediation of Captain Spencer ; but the letter from the Lord High Admiral states that he cannot expect that I should alter the terms of the patent, and that he must resign. The King approves of Lord Melville, but I conclude objects to Lord Ellenborough ; as he has desired me to postpone the arrangement till he shall see me.

I shall go home from hence on Sunday next ; and shall be happy to see you and Mrs. Peel at Stratfield Saye on that day, or on Monday or Tuesday, as may be most convenient to you. I think that I shall be under the necessity of going to Windsor on Monday, the 1st, in order to settle the arrangement of the



shooting. However, make the arrangement that will best suit your own convenience and that of Mrs. Peel.

I will ask the Lord Chancellor to come down on Tuesday.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 1012. ]

*To the Right Hon. Sir George Murray.*

MY DEAR MURRAY,

Cheltenham, 24th August, 1828.

You will see that I have altered a few words and struck out a few in your despatch.

I would wish you to add a paragraph requiring that the Sunday should be allowed as a day of rest and set apart for religious instruction, allowing as a counterpoise any regulation that may be thought proper to prevent the resort of improper people to slaves at undue hours in the character of religious teachers, without the leave of proprietors. I have marked the place where such a paragraph might be inserted +.

I should think that the governors should besides have an instruction directing them to converse with the members of the Legislative Assemblies, and to point out to these gentlemen individually the advantage which the colonies in general and proprietors in particular would derive from concession on this subject.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Brighton, 24th August, 1828.

I shall go to the Council to-morrow at Windsor. You probably will not be there.

I return Dawson's letter to you, and I enclose one which he wrote to me, which is however very much to the same effect.

I have sent him no answer, for I have not patience to write one; but I wrote a letter to Sir George Hill, in which I expressed my opinion very freely as to the proceedings in Derry. I consider Dawson's conduct unfair and impolitic in the extreme.

I have been as much astonished as you appear to be by the reports about the disbanding of the Irish yeomanry. Some time since I wrote to Lord Anglesey complaining that I heard nothing from the Irish government as

to what was passing in Ireland ; that I read in the newspapers that 500 armed men had assembled at Ballinamore in military array ; that I heard indirectly through Sir John Byng that enquiries were going on into an alleged attempt to corrupt the sentries at the barracks at Buttevant, but that as Secretary of State I knew nothing about the matter. I had not had a single line.

I told Lord Anglesey that supposing the reports were wholly without foundation, it was of great importance that the Secretary of State should *know* them to be so.

I enclose Lord Anglesey's reply, which I have this morning received.

The paper to which he refers was one which I drew up in reply to the statements which he had forwarded to me from Lord Cloncurry and the Society for the Improvement of Ireland.

If my paper is *mordant*, it is only so because it convicts the Society of the grossest ignorance on every one of the subjects on which they had addressed the Lord-Lieutenant, and of the utmost unfairness in representing that the British government had favoured Scotland, and neglected Ireland.

I was determined not to leave such a paper on record in my office without an answer to it.

As to the yeomanry, hearing the reports about the intention of reducing them, receiving letters from such persons as Sir George Hill lamenting the reduction, and the time chosen for it, I have written to Lord Francis Gower, repeating my regret that I hear reports of measures taken or intended by the Irish government, and am unable to determine whether there be any foundation for them.

It cannot be true that the Irish government have done anything with respect to the yeomanry.

Any step taken, or intention formed, without consulting us previously would be most improper.

Besides, we included the Irish yeomanry in the estimates, and Parliament voted it.

Ever, my dear Duke, most faithfully yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

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*The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

London, 25th August, 1828.

I saw the King to-day at Windsor, and as I am too late for the post I send you this by a messenger, though perhaps it is hardly necessary.

When I went in to the King he said, "I have had a long conversation with the Chancellor about the Duke of Clarence, and he will tell you all I have said to him."

He then showed me a letter which he had had from the Duke of Clarence, which he said that he had sent to you. He had your answer in his hand, but did not show it to me.

He seemed uneasy about the Duke's retirement, and I supposed from his

664 PENALTIES AGAINST ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOPS.

He said, "The Duke's resignation makes a great sensation. The navy takes it up, &c., &c. When does the Duke of Wellington return to London? I signed the patent of Lord High Admiral, but I did not attend to it. The Duke of Clarence seems to think it gives him no more power than a member of the Board. If that is the case I certainly agree with him that he ought not to have accepted it."

From all this I inferred that the Duke of Clarence, having made up his quarrel with Cockburn, and having no pretence for desiring his dismissal, was looking out for some other concession, which being made might enable him to retain his office.

I report this to you because it is possible that you may think it better to see the King before you proceed further, supposing that you have only written to Lord Melville. The Duke of Clarence evidently is now seeking for some alteration in his patent.

I am pretty confident that you will consider this out of the question; but perhaps you could convince the King that it is so much better by speaking to him than by writing. He appeared to wish to see you soon after you arrive in town.

The King spoke very warmly of Dawson's proceedings, and said he must be mad.

He has a deeper *tinge* of Protestantism than when you last saw him.

Ever, my dear Duke, most faithfully yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

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*Dean Phillpotts to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY LORD DUKE,

Edinburgh, 25th August, 1828.

I have much pleasure in saying that my anticipations are fully confirmed, and that by the law of the land as it now stands all Roman Catholic bishops claiming to be bishops of sees are liable to severer penalties than it could be desirable to inflict—transportation in the first instance, and the punishment of high treason if they return.

This is the effect of 9 W. III. c. 1 (Irish), entitled "An Act for banishing all Papists exercising any ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and all regulars of the Popish clergy, out of this kingdom."

The Act of 21 and 22 G. III. c. 24, s. 6 (Irish), enacts "that no Popish ecclesiastic, taking and subscribing the oath of 13 and 14 G. III. c. 35 (Irish), and registering his name, &c., with the registrar of the diocese where his place of abode is, shall, after the passing of that Act, be subject to the penalties, &c., of 9 W. III. c. 1, and other subsequent statutes."

But the 8th section of the same Act provides "That no benefits in this Act contained shall extend, or be construed to extend, to any Popish ecclesiastic who shall (*inter alia*) use any symbol or mark of ecclesiastical dignity, or authority, or assume or take any ecclesiastical rank or title whatever, but that all the pains and penalties which now subsist according to the laws now in being" (of course 9 W. III. c. 1, among them) "shall remain in full force against such Popish ecclesiastic so offending as aforesaid."

Now it is quite notorious that every one of the Irish Roman Catholic

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bishops at present does "assume and take the ecclesiastical rank or title" of Bishop or Archbishop, Dean, Vicar-General, &c., of *particular sees*, deaneries, &c., and consequently does fall within the exception of the statute.

As this is the case, no new law is necessary to restrain them from making these most offensive and most mischievous pretensions; and all that needs perhaps to be done is to make known what the existing law really is, and to let it be understood that when the political concessions to the laity are granted, the law will be put in force against those ecclesiastics who shall continue to offend by such illegal assumption of rank and title.

I have reason to believe that no security would be deemed by many of the best friends of the Established Church more effectual, nor anything would be more likely to allay the clamour of many of the loudest enemies to adjustment, than the declared purpose of enforcing the law in this particular, with whatever modification it might be deemed necessary to accompany it.

When I return to Stanhope, which I shall not do in less than ten days, I will take the liberty of transmitting to your Grace some evidence of the shameless and rapidly-growing pretensions of the Popish hierarchy, which may more strongly evince the importance of proving that the existing law is decidedly adverse to those pretensions.

I have the honour to be, my Lord Duke, with the greatest respect,

your Grace's obliged and most humble servant,

HENRY PHILLPOTTS.

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*To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.*

[ 1013. ]

MY DEAR PEEL,

Cheltenham, 26th August, 1828.

I have just received your letter of the 25th instant. It is very extraordinary that you should not have received my letter of the 24th before you wrote to me on the 25th. I told you therein that the King had sent me the letter from the Lord High Admiral which he showed to you.

In my answer I told him that I could not recommend to his Majesty to alter the terms of the patent; nor will I do so. But I shall see his Majesty on Monday next.

Between the King and his brothers the government of this country has become a most heart-breaking concern. Nobody can ever know where he stands upon any subject. I knew that the King was anxious that the Duke of Clarence should remain in office; and so was I. But I thought that he was convinced, as I was, that Sir George Cockburn could not be dismissed; that the Duke of Clarence must obey the laws and regulations for his

equally with the Duke of Clarence, thought that I could not consent to alter the terms of the patent.

As for his Protestantism I don't so much mind it.

I wish that the Chancellor would speak out to the King.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 1014. ]

*To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.*

MY DEAR PEEL,

Cheltenham, 26th August, 1828.

I return Dawson's letter. A Mr. Pleman, who is here, has just sent me a letter from him of the 22nd, containing the same sentiments and opinions as he has given you. Dawson should recollect that he is the servant of the government; that he is supposed as the Secretary of the Treasury to be in my confidence; and as your brother-in-law to be in yours. He should be a little more cautious.

I likewise return Lord Anglesey's letter. He is conducting himself in a very extraordinary manner. I understand that his whole conversation and every answer he gives to an address contain some insinuation or invective against the government. He has been repeatedly heard to say that his hands were tied up by the ministers, otherwise he would do everything that was wished. He declared openly that he would not have accepted office, and would afterwards have resigned, if Lord Holland and Sir John Newport had not advised him first to accept and then to stay.

I think that you had better enquire whether it is true that he intends to disarm any of the yeomanry; otherwise the order might be given and even partially carried into execution, or resisted, previous to our knowing anything about the matter.

Upon referring to your letter I see that you have written to Lord Francis, which will answer the purpose.

I saw the commencement of your letter respecting the schemes for the improvement of Ireland; but I did not see the end of it. There was nothing in it to which anybody could object. I wish you would send it to me.

Ever yours, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To Mr. William Allen.*

[ 1015. ]

DEAR SIR,

Cheltenham, 26th August, 1828.

I have received your letter respecting the settlement of Sierra Leone; and I assure you that you cannot desire more than I do to discontinue the enormous expenses incurred at Sierra Leone, and in general upon the coast of Africa; expenses which exceed in amount the whole annual value of the trade, import as well as export, between this country and those settlements.

I have frequently looked into the detail of those expenses; and I confess that I don't agree with you in thinking that they can be diminished by the diminution of the Staff, or the expense of the military establishments, as long as it is necessary to maintain European troops at Sierra Leone, or in the Gambia. On the contrary, my opinion is that if European troops are still required in those settlements, whether for the purposes of defence, of police, of preventing slave trade, or of protecting lawful commerce, humanity requires that the expense should be vastly increased.

It is not fair that the State should employ its subjects as officers and troops in such unwholesome climates without taking care of them, by affording to them good barracks and hospitals when they may fall sick, and good wholesome food; and the care and superintendence of officers capable of taking charge, of commanding them, and keeping them in order.

I can answer for it that the Ordnance and Barrack Departments are not only not too large, but not large enough to perform the duties of these departments, if the State require at these stations European troops.

If these troops are not required, it is my opinion that the whole of the establishments of Commissariat, Barracks, and Ordnance may be discontinued.

Then in respect to the appointment of a civilian as governor, I have reason to know that one cannot be found trustworthy and capable, who will go to that climate unless a salary should be given to him, and establishments formed quadruple the amount in expense of those now existing. The last appointed governor could not have existed upon his salary if he had not been a

Sir, that you will find these hopes of economy disappointed, unless we should at once withdraw the European troops; and I assure you that nobody will rejoice more sincerely if this can be done than I shall.

Ever, dear Sir, yours most faithfully,

WELLINGTON.

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*The King to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR FRIEND,

Royal Lodge, 26th August, 1828.

I have just written to Lord Hill, in consequence of the unexpected and sudden death of poor Sir Henry Torrens being reported to me, to acquaint him of my intention that Sir Herbert Taylor should be his successor. I am sure that neither you, nor Lord Hill, nor myself, nor indeed the whole army, can have a difference of opinion as to the propriety of this appointment. His long service as Secretary to the Commander-in-Chief (my late for ever regretted brother), and in which place he succeeded the late Sir Henry Torrens when he was appointed Adjutant-General, entitle him; while by the correctness of his conduct, as well as the amiable tone of his manners to every one, he gained and ensured to him the affections, goodwill and respect of the army. One word more; besides, it is a *real pleasure to me to have him at the head of my own Staff.*

This appointment of Sir Herbert Taylor to be Adjutant-General will, of course, vacate the office of Surveyor-General to the Ordnance, and I thought you would be glad to have the earliest information of it.

Always your sincere friend,

G. R.

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*The Lord Chancellor to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE OF WELLINGTON, Wimbledon, Tuesday, 26th August, 1828.

It will give great pleasure to Lady Lyndhurst and myself to accept your invitation for Tuesday next, 2nd September. The King is not *very comfortable upon the subject of the Duke of Clarence.*

Ever yours,

LYNDHURST.

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*The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 26th August, 1828.

I send you the copy of a despatch which goes to-day to Mr. Bosanquet, on the subject of the conduct of the Spanish authorities at Coruña towards the *Belfast* steam-packet. It is entirely founded upon the opinion of the King's Advocate, and has been delayed so long, from that opinion not

having been received. I also send you the copy of a letter which I have written to M. de Palmella, in which I hope your sentiments will be correctly expressed. It appeared to me desirable, before sending it, that it should be seen by the King's Advocate, in order that we may be quite safe in the matter of law. He has read it therefore, and says it is perfectly right.

I have looked at the enclosures of Sir Edward Codrington's despatch, to which you have alluded; and, although the whole business is not very intelligible, I presume that what is intended is this: the party to be tricked is the Sultan. Mehemet Ali and M. Drovetti, the French Consul, are supposed to have made an agreement by which the Pacha engages to send transports for his son, if he can do so without exciting the anger of the Porte. He is, therefore, in the pretended absence of the blockading squadron, to send out his fleet for the purpose avowedly of provisioning the fortresses of the Morea; but this fleet is to be met with and conducted by a *douce violence* to Navarino, where Ibrahim and his men are to be embarked for Alexandria. The whole of this scheme is too clumsy for the Porte to be the dupe of it; and it seems more likely that the Pacha is endeavouring to deceive M. Drovetti, upon whom, by the way, I do not know that any great reliance is to be placed. At all events, the French expedition will put an end to the contrivance, as, if Ibrahim be not actually gone, his evacuation of the Morea will be a *bonâ fide* transaction, as he will then act from compulsion. We shall also have done right in procuring transports, without compromising the Pacha of Egypt at all.

You will see by one of Lord Cowley's despatches to-day that M. de Zuylen appears to have executed our commission perfectly well, in informing the Reis Effendi of the cause of Sir Edward Codrington's recall. The displeasure of the Reis Effendi, in consequence of this communication, is not so apparent from the letter of M. de Zuylen as it is represented to have been by the Internuncio, in the observations made to him. As Bagot has mentioned this subject, in his last letter to me, of the complaint made against M. de Zuylen, I have thought it might be useful to write to him privately on the subject, in order that the King may be in possession of the circumstances of the case, and that he may know what we think of M. de Zuylen. You will see from my letter to Bagot, what seems to me to be the probable origin of this affair; and this opinion is founded very much on what I have learnt from M. Falck.

Believe me, my dear Duke, ever most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

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*The Right Hon. Robert Peel to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Whitehall, 26th August, 1828.

I think the best plan will be that we should come to you to dinner at Stratfield Saye on Tuesday.

I had not received your letter of the 24th when I wrote to you last night by the messenger. You understand the King's *looks* as well as any one, and would not have mistaken his manner towards Ellenborough at the



I am not sure whether you have written to Lord Anglesey respecting Lord Dunally. Being doubtful, I have written to him myself, informing him that I have had a note from you, in which you mention his Majesty's approval of Lord Dunally.

Turn in your mind the enclosed from James Daly before we meet.

Thomas Martin (Dick Martin's eldest son) will not submit to *pledge* himself to oppose the government. Shee (a son of Sir George Shee, and a follower of Palmerston), will take the pledge. Now if we were sure that Martin would succeed against Shee without much commotion I should earnestly advise on public grounds that the King should execute his intention of making Daly a Peer. I have written confidentially to Gregory, who is a Galway man, to ask his opinion as to the probability of Martin's success.

It is not safe to ask the father any question of any kind.

Ever, my dear Duke, most faithfully yours,

ROBERT PEEL.

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*Lord FitzRoy Somerset to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD,

Horse-Guards, 26th August, 1828.

I send you a copy of a letter which I have just received from Sir Herbert Taylor, announcing the King's intention to appoint him Adjutant-General, Sir William Keppel Colonel of the Queen's, and Major-General Macdonald Colonel of the 67th.

The letter from the King to Lord Hill is now in my hands, and will be forwarded by this night's post, if his Lordship should not make his appearance before that hour.

Sir William Keppel is already Governor of Guernsey, and has held the 67th Regiment seventeen years, fifteen of which it was on the Indian establishment. He is therefore not a little fortunate in getting another regiment serving in India.

Your most faithful and affectionate

FITZROY SOMERSET.

It being six o'clock and there being no tidings of Lord Hill, I have thought it best to open and copy the King's letter, intending to send the original to Lord Hill, and keep the copy for his information should he arrive here before it reaches his country-house.

The King's letter contains a very high encomium upon Sir Herbert Taylor, and states his intention to appoint him Adjutant-General. It states also that his old and much-esteemed friend, Sir William Keppel, appearing anxious to be removed to the Queen's, he has felt great pleasure in gratifying his wishes; and that a regiment being vacant on *such an occasion*, Lord Hill will probably coincide with his Majesty in thinking that Major-General Macdonald should fill up that vacancy.

There is also a postscript lamenting Lord Hill's illness.

[ENCLOSURE.]

*Sir Herbert Taylor to Lord Fitz Roy Somerset.*

MY DEAR LORD FITZROY,

Windsor, 25th August, 1828. 12 p.m.

In consequence of the report made to the King of poor Torrens's death, I received an order this morning to come here, and his Majesty told me this evening that he intended that I should succeed him as Adjutant-General; that Sir William Keppel should be transferred to the Queen's; and that Macdonald, in consideration of his having been so many years Deputy Adjutant-General, should have the 67th; and he wrote this evening to Lord Hill to communicate this arrangement, as also to the Duke of Wellington respecting my appointment. I shall send this by orderly to-morrow, as you may be glad to know all this before Lord Hill can send you his Majesty's letter.

I need not, I trust, tell you that I have not directly or indirectly applied for this mark of favour, however flattering it is to me from the manner in which it has been conferred.

Believe me, &c.,

H. TAYLOR.

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*Le Prince de Polignac to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MON CHER DUC,

Portland Place, ce 26 Août, 1828.

Je crois devoir réparer une erreur dans laquelle je suis tombé, et qui pourrait être fatale à une personne dont la position malheureuse mérite compassion. J'ai eu l'honneur de vous dire que le Capitaine Landeg avait servi dans votre régiment aux Indes. J'ai commis une méprise à ce sujet; cet officier était aux Indes lorsque votre Grâce y était, mais il ne m'a jamais dit qu'il eut servi sous vos ordres. Sachant que Sir Digby Mackworth, Bart., connaissait la famille du Capitaine Landeg, j'ai pris auprès de lui des renseignements sur le compte de cet officier. Sir Digby m'a dit qu'il avait beaucoup connu son père, M. Landeg, mort Colonel au service de la Compagnie des Indes, et dont les propriétés étaient contiguës aux siennes; que le Capitaine Landeg, dans son enfance, venait souvent passer quelque temps à sa campagne, et qu'il peut garantir que la personne qui se dit le Capitaine Landeg est bien la même qu'il a connue anciennement; qu'il ne garantit pas également tous les détails de la vie militaire de cet officier, attendu qu'il l'a beaucoup perdu de vue depuis que le Capitaine Landeg a embrassé la profession des armes; qu'il ne l'a même pas vu depuis quelques années, et il suppose que le Capitaine Landeg n'a pas osé se présenter dans l'état de misère dans lequel il est, devant lui (Sir Digby), qui l'avait connu dans des circonstances plus heureuses, mais qu'il serait charmé d'apprendre que cet officier pût obtenir un emploi quelconque qui le sortit de l'affreuse position où il est, et qui le mit à même de donner du pain à sa femme et à ses enfants, parmi lesquels se trouve un jeune garçon de 11 ans, qu'il a vu depuis peu, et qui lui paraît être un enfant très-intelligent. Il croit encore savoir que M. Landeg père a déshérité son fils, mais il en ignore la raison, et je soupçonne que c'est à cause d'un mariage contracté par le Capitaine Landeg, et qui déplaisait à son père. Sir Digby Mackworth demeure 27, Brunswick

Le Capitaine Landeg a servi, à ce qu'il paraît, dans la campagne de Hollande ; il y a reçu deux blessures. J'ai été moi-même m'assurer de l'état de misère dans lequel il se trouve, et il est impossible d'en voir qui excite plus la pitié ; lui, sa femme, et ses enfants sont à peine vêtus, et souvent ils manquent de pain ou des pommes de terre pour se nourrir. Le moindre emploi donné à ce père de famille serait un véritable acte de charité.

Je ne terminerai point cette lettre, mon cher Duc, sans vous entretenir quelques moments d'objets plus importants. Lord Aberdeen a dû mander à votre Grâce il y a quelques jours le résultat d'une conversation que j'ai eue avec lui concernant les articles peu mesurés que de certains journaux français insèrent depuis quelques semaines dans leurs feuilles. J'espère que les explications que je lui ai données à ce sujet vous auront satisfait. Elles sont exactes. Mon gouvernement n'a rien de plus à cœur que de maintenir la bonne intelligence qui existe entre les deux pays ; et il déplore la licence dont use certains journaux, mais que nos lois sur la liberté de la presse mettent à l'abri de toutes poursuites. C'est une erreur de croire que le 'Journal des Débats' soit un journal ministériel. On a arrêté ses attaques intérieures contre les ministres, mais on ne dirige ni ses opinions ni son langage, qui ne saurait, par conséquent, avoir aucune influence sur la marche ni sur les intentions franches et amicales du gouvernement français.

Voilà, mon cher Duc, ce que j'eusse désiré vous dire de vive voix, mais ne le pouvant, je me borne à vous le mander, en renouvelant à votre Grâce les assurances de ma haute considération.

LE PRINCE DE POLIGNAC.

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
*To the King.*

Cheltenham, 27th August, 1828.

Your Majesty's commands of the 26th instant reached me last night. In consequence of the unfortunate death of Sir Henry Torrens your Majesty's service has sustained a great loss ; and there can be no doubt that if Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Taylor will undertake the duties of the office there cannot be an appointment better calculated for the benefit of your Majesty's service, and to give general satisfaction. I am certain that Lord Hill will submit the recommendation to your Majesty that Sir Herbert Taylor should be appointed Adjutant-General with great pleasure.

All of which is submitted to your Majesty by your Majesty's most dutiful and devoted subject and servant,

WELLINGTON.



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THE EASTERN QUESTION.

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*To the Earl of Aberdeen.*

[ 1017. ]

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, Cheltenham, 27th August, 1828.

I quite concur in your note to the Spanish government and in your letter to Palmella and Bagot.

I have not been able to open a box which Lord Dunglass has sent me, which contains, I conclude, some of the despatches to which you refer. But I send it back; and have requested that Lord Dunglass will send the despatches in another box.

I am aware that the trick referred to in the enclosures in Admiral Codrington's despatch is upon the Sultan; but I think we ought to refuse to be parties to it, for the reasons which I heretofore stated to you, to remonstrate against it to the French government, and to forbid our officers from being concerned in its execution.

I see in the newspapers that the affair of Schumla hangs. We must not expect that the Russians will not succeed.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

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*To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.*

[ 1018. ]

MY DEAR PEEL, Cheltenham, 27th August, 1828.

I shall see you next week, and we will talk over this affair of Daly; but I confess that I should be afraid of the consequences of giving credit to anything we may hear of the influence of property in favour of Mr. Martin, against that of the priests in favour of Sir George Shee.

It is true that there are more Roman Catholic gentry in Galway than in any other county in Ireland, and they may have more influence over their tenantry than the Protestant gentry. But that influence did not appear in the Clare election to produce more effect than that of Protestant proprietors. We can avoid to make this creation, and the defeat which may be and the riot and disturbance which must be the consequence, without adverting to ulterior and more disastrous consequences. We can avoid it without inconvenience even to Daly; as the King's pleasure having been taken and the warrant signed, he must have the Peerage.

I therefore think that we ought to avoid all these evils.

*The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 27th August, 1828.

I send you to-day some more notes from M. d'Itabayana, one of which perhaps it may be as well to notice at present, although we are not in a condition to give peremptory instructions for the conduct of our Minister at Rio. We are waiting for some papers to enable the King's Advocate to make up his mind with respect to which of the vessels should be demanded; I believe there can be no doubt of four being in this predicament; they are mentioned in my brother's protest, presented as soon as the decision of the Special Commission was known. The French appear to be quite determined not to submit to these judgments.

There is another note from Itabayana which requires attention. The proposition to extend the duration of the slave trade would not be listened to in the House of Commons. But I am afraid that we shall have large compensation to make for vessels taken, and condemned, by the zeal of our captains and judges, contrary to the stipulations of our treaty. The whole of this case is at present before the King's Advocate. I do not know that the establishment of a Special Commission, either in London or at Rio, for the revision of these sentences would be of much use.

Esterhazy has heard nothing from Vienna by the messenger who brought us the intelligence which you will have seen in Lord Cowley's last despatch. As the Emperor arrived at Odessa on the 8th, it seems clear that some considerable time must still be required before the reinforcements, which are necessary, can be brought up for the attack of Schumla. May we not hope that the probability of a march to Constantinople in the course of this campaign is greatly diminished?

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

In consequence of various reports, I took an opportunity the other day of speaking to M. de Polignac about the evacuation of Cadiz by the French. He said that all their transports were now otherwise employed; but he assured me that orders had been sent ten days ago for the remaining troops to begin their march to France by land.

[ 1019. ]

*To the Right Hon. Robert Peel.*

MY DEAR PEEL,

Cheltenham, 28th August, 1828.

I return the copy of the paper sent to Lord Anglesey in reply to statements of the Society for the Improvement of Ireland.

I have looked in vain for the parts that are supposed to be *mordant*.

I return Mr. Campbell's letter. The pensions on the Civil List of Scotland for this year are granted. But I will see what the case is.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To Dean Phillipotts.*

[1020.]

**MY DEAR SIR,**

28th August, 1828.

I wrote to you yesterday in answer to your letter received some days ago, informing me that you were going to Edinburgh; and I have this day received your letter from Edinburgh, dated the 25th August.

The question is whether the 6th clause of 21st & 22nd George III. is still in force. Upon that point look at the 1st clause of the 33rd George III.

In my opinion the clause of the 21st & 22nd George III. is still in force. But I must tell you that in the better legal opinion of Lord Plunket it is not.

Believe me, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

*To Major-General ———.*

[1021.]

**MY DEAR SIR,**

Cheltenham, 28th August, 1828.

I have received your letter of the 24th August, and I confess that I am at a loss to know how to answer it.

It is perfectly true that you have rendered very important services to the Ordnance, and that I have had frequent occasions to refer to you, since your return from his Majesty's dominions in North America and in the West Indies, for information and an elucidation of your reports on those countries; and that you are entitled to the approbation of his Majesty's government for your services, and to be considered as occasions may offer.

But I beg you to consider whether it is the practice to appoint any officer, be his services what they may, to fill the situation which he may select for himself; and I beg you likewise to look around you at what has been passing and see whether objections may not be felt to appoint you to fill that particular situation, by those who have a right to give an opinion when such an appointment comes under consideration.

In respect to the office of Surveyor-General, it is, or is likely to become, vacant; and I will not at this moment give any opinion upon the subject of your appointment to that office, excepting this: It is perfectly well known that I am not forgetful of those who have rendered services to the public under my direction; but that I make no promises. I will likewise add

that I cannot suffer myself to be dictated to or influenced by complaints of inattention to services rendered to make any arrangement to fill any public office, in favour of which all the considerations do not combine which ought to induce me to prefer such arrangement to every other.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 1022. ]

*To the Earl of Aberdeen.*

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, Cheltenham, 28th August, 1828.

I return the Vicomte d'Itabayana's note, and your answer to the one relating to the prizes; which I think will answer perfectly.

In respect to the note about the slave trade, we cannot enlarge the term during which Brazil should be allowed to continue the trade. I do not understand the other part of the subject sufficiently to be able to give you an answer respecting the establishment of a *commission mixte*. But I know enough of Messieurs de Palmella and d'Itabayana to be very certain that when they make an appeal to our equity we ought to be on our guard.

In respect to the answer to your note about the arms, I observe that Monsieur d'Itabayana has cautiously avoided to give any assurance that the arms were not intended to be sent to Madeira. No diplomatic agents at this or any other Court would venture to conduct themselves as the Portuguese and Brazilian agents conduct themselves towards the government of this country. We shall never be on good terms with them till we shall convince them that they cannot so conduct themselves with impunity; and in saying this I do it of a people with whom I am well acquainted.

The Russians have, in my opinion, committed a great mistake in going to Schumla at all. They ought to have made the siege of Varna, and to have opened for their communication that port, and for their army that road upon Constantinople. They should have covered this operation against the enterprises of the troops at Schumla by a corps at Pravadi or elsewhere.

I still believe that they are strong enough to take Schumla.

But if the Emperor is afraid of losing men I cannot answer for the result of the campaign. They appear to me at present to be like all other men who have made a false movement. They have lost time, and they must in some manner undo what they have done.

That which they will most probably do will be to reinforce their army destined for the siege of Varna.

You will recollect that I gave this opinion to Prince Polignac some time ago. But on the French and Russian authorities he pronounced me to be in the wrong.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

---

*The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Foreign Office, 28th August, 1828.

Will you have the goodness to say if you think that Stuart should be directed to take any steps such as he suggests in his letter to me? I do not much like the sort of business, but perhaps something of the kind may be necessary. M. de Rayneval's declaration on the subject of the return of the French expedition I suppose may be sufficient for the present; although he has made it in terms rather more dry and laconic than I anticipated.

You will also receive two letters from Bagot; but it does not appear that anything further can be done at the present moment on the subject of either. With respect to the marriage, it seems that Austria is the Power which might naturally make some proposition, as having been the first cause of the difficulty; as well as from the Prince Gustavus being in the Austrian service, and the establishment of the couple being projected at Vienna. The Swedish minister has been with Esterhazy, and was with me yesterday; he said that the King was satisfied with the intention expressed at Vienna, as reported by Count Lowenhjelm, but was impatient that something should be done; as, if nobody took the first step, the matter would remain in its present state, notwithstanding the favourable dispositions of all the Powers of Europe.

Count Bjornstierna introduced Count Wedel, who is come to help him in his timber negotiation, as a principal Norwegian proprietor. I confined myself to expressing a desire to forward their object, should it, on examination, be found practicable, and have referred their papers to the Board of Trade.

As to the navigation of the Rhine, it does not seem possible to do more, until we know what these two governments are actually about. Sir Brook Taylor has already been written to, and has also received a copy of my last letter to Bagot. The hostility of the Netherlands government certainly does not promise very well for the issue of our American arbitration. With respect to this American question, perhaps it may be proper to make a few remarks upon Mr. Lawrence's last note, and they need be but few; for



although his note is a long one, it seems to me that he does not advert to the real subject under discussion ; but confines himself very much to the general question of sovereignty.

I am sorry to find that the box which you could not open contained Lord Heytesbury's and Lord Cowley's last despatches. They are sent again to-day.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

[ 1023. ]

*To the Earl of Aberdeen.*

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, Cheltenham, 29th August, 1828.

I return the letters enclosed in yours of yesterday.

Lord Stuart's plan will cost us nothing, and I think it will be desirable to adopt it. Lord Stuart might be desired not to avail himself of the power which this arrangement will put in his hands without orders from England. It is one thing to have in our hands the power of publishing in France what it may be interesting to us to communicate to the French public ; another thing to make use of that power upon any occasion excepting one of necessity.

All this refers to a French paper. I doubt the expediency of doing anything about Galignani ; although it is certainly true that that is the newspaper which supplies to all the others of France and of the continent the offensive paragraphs of the worst of the English newspapers. Lord Stuart might be desired to let us know what Galignani would cost.

In respect to the Prince of Sweden, it appears to me that the King of the Netherlands has already made a concession, which I understood from Count Bjornstierna would be quite satisfactory to the King of Sweden ; viz., that he would call him *Le Prince Gustave, fils du ci-devant Roi de Suède*. He said this to you and me at St. James's on the day he was presented to the King. You had better ask Bjornstierna if I misunderstood him. It would be strange indeed if the King of the Netherlands was not allowed to call his son-in-law that which he is in fact, the son of him who was heretofore King of Sweden !

I think Bagot is mistaken respecting the case of the Rhine. We and all other Powers must negotiate with the King of the Netherlands, but not upon the right of the navigation—to that all nations have a right—but we must also negotiate with the

King of the Netherlands respecting the means of preventing the exercise of our right of navigation from being abused for the purposes of illicit commerce in the Netherlands and the detriment of the King's revenue. But in negotiating upon these points we must take care that our right to navigate freely and to carry by the Rhine what we please is not defeated.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

---

*To Admiral Sir W. Sidney Smith.*

[ 1024. ]

DEAR SIR,

Cheltenham, 29th August, 1828.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 28th instant; and I assure you that nothing could give me greater satisfaction than to have it in my power to forward your views, or to improve your situation in life.

I am convinced that you will see that it is difficult, if not impossible, for me, entering into office in the month of January, 1828 (my predecessors, under whose directions your services, and others such as yours, were performed, being either dead or disabled from conveying their sentiments upon those services), to find the means for his Majesty to reward them all; as I am willing to admit they deserve to be rewarded. The question which naturally occurs is, Why did not Mr. Pitt, Lord Melville, Mr. Perceval, Lord Liverpool, or Mr. Canning, under whom those services were performed, and who had a knowledge of all the circumstances of the cases respectively, reward these services?

The answer is, they have rewarded them, but inadequately. And then the question occurs again, Why did not they provide adequately for that for which it was their duty to provide, if the claim really existed, as it appears it did? These are not questions sought for in order to defeat a claim. They naturally occur; and if I did not consider them, they must be brought to my recollection by those who must be consulted and must decide upon these subjects.

Under these circumstances, and as I really have no means at my disposition of rewarding such services, I feel great objection to recur to transactions, however honourable, and mari-

torious, which occurred many years ago; and which ought, and, indeed, must have been, considered by my predecessors in office.

In respect to the employment of you in your profession, in the manner pointed out in your letter; it is a subject with which I have no more to do than I have with the employment of an officer in the navy of the King of France.

I don't think either that, considering the nature and state of the diplomatic service in this country, I ought to do otherwise than decline to recommend to Lord Aberdeen that you should be employed in that branch of the service.

I really feel most sensibly for your situation; and most particularly because I have no means of relieving you.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

---

*The Right Hon. J. Wilson Croker to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE,

Admiralty, 29th August, 1828.

I am sorry to tell your Grace that his Royal Highness is going on with promotions to an extent which alarms even Captain Spencer, who has spoken both to Cockburn and me, and, I believe, even to his Royal Highness on this subject. Spencer a little surprised us to-day by talking of his Royal Highness's retirement as *doubtful*; and I have reason to think that he (his Royal Highness) would not be disinclined to make any sacrifice, *in point of promises*, to keep his situation; but those who know him best are satisfied that, whatever he may *promise*, he would not and could not in *practice* depart from the *principle of independence* which has taken a deep root in his mind. I am the more confirmed in this opinion, from his Royal Highness having yesterday, in the midst of an affable and good-humoured conversation at the Council, reverted to his old doctrine that it was on points of expense only that he thought it necessary to consult his Council.

In short, I am satisfied that, even if all that has passed were to be tinkered up, we should have a new crisis of the same kind before a fortnight; and I even believe that those whom his Royal Highness consults are so much of the same opinion, that they would be sorry to see the affair patched up.

I fear that the flood of promotions and other similar irregularities will continue to flow as long as the present state of things lasts; for Cockburn, who under any other circumstances would have felt himself bound to object, is reluctant to do so at present, imagining that each is to be the last

and thinking that it would be very inconvenient to do anything to disturb the good humour with which his Royal Highness affects to resign.

Believe me to be, my dear Duke,  
your Grace's most obliged and attached  
J. W. CROKER.

*Sir Herbert Taylor to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR LORD DUKE,

Pall Mall, 29th August, 1828.

Before I left Windsor the King was pleased to acquaint me that he had received your Grace's answer to the communication of his Majesty's intention to appoint me Adjutant-General, in the room of my poor friend Torrens, whose death I sincerely lament *on every account*.

I beg to assure your Grace that I have been very much gratified by learning that you considered this arrangement unobjectionable; and I have been not less happy to find, on my return to town, that it is satisfactory to Lord Hill, whose good opinion and confidence it shall be my earnest study to merit.

I cannot, however, quit the Ordnance, in which your Grace's kindness had placed me so eligibly and so much to my satisfaction, without repeating to you the expression of my sincere thanks for that mark of your approbation and friendly disposition which I shall be most anxious to preserve by a correct discharge of my duties in every station. I may add that I shall not quit without regret a department in which I have experienced the greatest kindness and support from every individual in it, and the duties of which are so interesting and satisfactory.

I have the honour to be, with great regard, my dear Lord Duke,  
your Grace's most obliged and faithful servant,  
H. TAYLOR.

*To the Earl of Aberdeen.*

[ 1025. ]

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,

Cheltenham, 30th August, 1828.

I return all the despatches sent me by this day's post. Monsieur Ancillon has made a great mistake in supposing that he has not betrayed the interests of Europe in the treaty with the Netherlands, by allowing the King of the Netherlands to lay a duty upon the quality, rather than upon the weight and bulk of the articles navigating the Rhine. I think that no time should be lost in representing this to him. It is very important to us not to lose this question of the Rhine; but it is still more important that the battle should be fought by Prussia rather than by

In respect to Mr. Canning's despatches, my opinion is that the indemnity should be demanded for every description of local property.

I think we ought to notice the paragraph in Mr. Canning's despatch to the Netherlands minister of the 11th August, in which he announces that the Russian sloop will wait fifteen days for the answer; and that the omission to bring it back will be considered as another proof of the disinclination of the Turks to enter into the arrangement. He was not ordered to make such a communication. The inference may be well founded; but why is it to be announced, excepting for the purpose of irritation?

If the Turks do not come to negotiate, the case is provided for by the instructions to Mr. Canning; the arrangement is to be made with the Greeks on the basis of the treaty.

We are about to have a revival of the old complaints against everybody. We have seen every report from the Internuncio, and we have no reason to suspect that his Secretary has endeavoured to prevail upon the Reis Effendi not to give way.

Mr. Canning is already lending himself to lay the ground for carrying the operations of the French army beyond the Morea. You will recollect what the Prince de Polignac said to you, as well as to me, upon that subject.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 1026. ]

*To the Earl of Aberdeen.*

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN, Cheltenham, 30th August, 1828.

I enclose a letter from Sir Richard Vyvyan and Mr. Pendarvis, the members for the county of Cornwall, and a Memorial regarding some Dutch emigrants who have been brought in there by stress of weather by a Dutch ship destined for the Brazils; and they remain at Falmouth at the charge of the inhabitants of that town, the ministers of the Emperor of Brazil refusing to do anything for them. It would be very desirable to have this matter officially stated to, and answered by, M. d'Itabayana, in order that the world may have an opportunity of being acquainted with all the merits of the Brazilian government.

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If he will do nothing, either in the way of sending these people to Brazil or home, or to pay their expenses here, application should then be made to Baron Falck. But I think that before we approach Baron Falck we should be quite certain of what the Emperor of Brazil's ministers will do.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

---

*To the Duchess of Kent.*

[ 1027. ]

Cheltenham, 30th August, 1828.

I have had the honour of receiving your Royal Highness's letter of the 28th instant; and I assure your Royal Highness that you do me justice in believing that I have not lost sight of your Royal Highness's reasonable wishes in favour of your faithful servant; and that I shall be anxious at all times to do everything in my power to be of service to your Royal Highness.

No office has been vacated up to this moment of which I have not been under the necessity of discontinuing the existence, excepting those of which the business requires that the holder should sit in Parliament. The office of Surveyor-General of the Ordnance, to which your Royal Highness adverts, is one of these. Sir Herbert Taylor, who is about to vacate it, must have come into Parliament. I would besides beg to submit to your Royal Highness that although the salary of that office has been reduced, and is at present but little higher than that now received by Sir John Conroy, the business of the office is immense, and would require such constant attendance and attention from the holder of it, that Sir John Conroy could not render that service to your Royal Highness which is so necessary to your dignity and comfort, if he were to be appointed to fill it. Under these circumstances I confess that I had not thought of Sir John Conroy as a candidate for the office of Surveyor-General of the Ordnance.

I have, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

[ 1023. ]

*To Sir Herbert Taylor.*

MY DEAR GENERAL, Cheltenham, 30th August, 1828.

I rejoice I assure you to see any arrangement made which can be agreeable to you. But I must add that I regret exceedingly the loss of your services at the Ordnance; which I don't think can be replaced.

I did everything in my power to prevent the reduction of the salaries. But the gentlemen of the House of Commons could not stand to what was necessary. The consequence is that we can get no man with parliamentary talents to accept the offices. We can get plenty out of Parliament. But we thus weaken the King's government where it wants strength.

It is, besides, the fact that the officers of the Board of Ordnance have been so loaded with business by the arrangements made in my time, that men of business are now absolutely necessary to transact it.

Believe me, &amp;c.,

WELLINGTON.

*The Earl of Aberdeen to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

MY DEAR DUKE, Priory, 30th August, 1828.

From discussion with those who understand the subject, I learn that, notwithstanding the provisions of the Brazilian Treaty, the abolition of the slave trade will be extremely difficult to effect at the time stipulated. I am informed that the Abolitionists would be glad to admit of an extension of the term, if by the new Convention precautions were taken to secure its suppression at the termination of the period. Under the present law, it is said that we shall be able to accomplish little. This is the language of Dr. Lushington, and others of that description. I send, therefore, for your approbation, an answer to Itabayana's proposition, in which I have given a kind of qualified assent, but which we can escape from whenever we please. To his second proposition I have given a plain refusal, as it would place a very important question in other hands than our own, where at present it is safe.

I also send you a letter for the recall of Mr. Veitch, the Consul at Madeira, which shall be transmitted on Wednesday if you approve of it. I think you will find it necessary to look a little at some parts of this Portuguese Question before long. You will see from a letter of M. d'Asseca of 27th, to M. de Santarem, that we are likely to have a good deal of difficulty with Don Miguel with respect to the marriage. It is very true, as M. d'Asseca observes, that I have always refused to treat the marriage as a subject of discussion with him, and have always viewed it as a thing already determined, and as agreed to by Don Miguel himself; as expected

by all Europe, and as taken for granted in all our measures of intervention with Don Pedro. You will see, however, from the tone of his letter, that a different decision is to be expected at Lisbon. Having an opportunity yesterday, I spoke to Ofalia about the influence to be employed by the Spanish government. He assured me that he was quite certain of the wishes of his government; that the proposal had been voluntarily made by them, and that we might depend on their doing their best to carry it into execution. He had not heard lately on the subject. Should Don Pedro be disposed to listen to our suggestions, it would be natural enough for him to ask us what guarantee we proposed to give him that his daughter should ever find her way to the throne of Portugal, in the event of his abandoning all his claims and agreeing to all our wishes. The obstinate refusal of Don Miguel would place us in an unpleasant predicament; but I am not aware how to operate further upon his mind at present. I have gone as far as it was possible to do, with any degree of prudence, in the way of alarming Asseca for the consequences, without positively committing ourselves. Something may be hoped for from Spain; and possibly, if we could communicate with him, the Pope's Nuncio at Lisbon might be useful.

You will see that Stratford Canning does not give us a syllable of information about the departure of Ibrahim; but it appears that Codrington was at Alexandria. I saw Polignac yesterday, and protested against the appearance of trick and manoeuvre which was going on; he knew nothing whatever of the matter, and agreed in the same expression of feeling on the subject.

I see from Canning's despatches, that the ground will soon be laid for the French crossing the Isthmus, unless we take care; and he will not, of his own accord, be very resolute against it. The French will surely never be happy unless they can manufacture divers touching paragraphs about the white flag floating on the towers of the Acropolis of Athens. Polignac told me they had sent a corps of *savants*, which looks like a leisurely examination of the country.

It is rather hard that we should have the question of limits sent back to us again here, as Canning is disposed to do, when in fact we can only refer it to the Plenipotentiaries. It will be necessary, however, to take care that something shall be decided somewhere, otherwise it might be found a very convenient method of indefinitely prolonging the whole concern.

Ever, my dear Duke, most sincerely yours,

ABERDEEN.

---

*Lord Downes to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.*

30th August, 1828.

I send your Grace a Memorandum respecting the changes that have been made within the last three or four years in the armament of line-of-battle ships, in consequence of the question which your Grace asked me the other morning.

I am ever your Grace's most faithful servant,



## [ENCLOSURE.]

## MEMORANDUM.

30th August, 1828.

The alterations which have lately been made in the armament of ships consist in the substitution of 32-pounders for 24 and 18-pounders on the middle and upper deck, and of two 68-pounder carronades on the lower deck.

The first-rate men-of-war are to have on the

Lower deck . . . . .	30	32-pr. guns of 63 cwt.
"    " . . . . .	2	68-pr. carronades or short guns.
Middle deck . . . . .	34	32-pr. guns of 54 cwt.
Upper deck . . . . .	34	32-pr. guns of 48 cwt.
Quarter deck . . . . .	2	18-pr. guns.
"    " . . . . .	14	32-pr. carronades.
Forecastle . . . . .	2	18-pr. guns.
"    " . . . . .	2	32-pr. carronades.

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The second, third, and fourth rates are also to be armed with 32-pounders, viz. :—Long 32-pounders of 63 cwt. on the lower deck, and medium 32-pounders of 48 cwt. on the upper deck.

The names of thirty ships of the line have been notified to the Ordnance Department to be armed with 32-pounders of 48 cwt., 8 feet long. Of the above ships, eight are building, and nine are cutting down to 74's. We are preparing guns for them; 211 have already been cast; there remain 621 to be cast. Fifty-three of the 211 are in store at Woolwich. Thirty-five 68-pounder carronades or short guns have been cast; but only four have been issued.

No more are to be cast until a decision is come to with respect to a 10-inch gun of General Miller's invention, which is now casting; that gun is to weigh 64 cwt., to carry a shell-shot of 76 lbs. with a charge of 8 lbs. of powder. General Miller has also proposed a 12-inch gun, to weigh 84 cwt., to carry a shell-shot of 100 lbs., with a charge of 10 lbs. of powder.

The Admiralty have recently had a 68-pounder carronade mounted on the poop of the *Blenheim*, which was fitted on purpose to receive it. This is stated to be for experiment, but I don't know what the particular object is.

I do not believe that any alterations have been made in the armament of frigates. They continue to mount 18-pounder guns and 32-pounder carronades.

D.

[ 1029. ]

*To the Earl of Aberdeen.*

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,                      Cheltenham, 31st August, 1828.

I return the letter to Mr. Veitch, which I think will answer perfectly.

I think we ought to look a little further into the Brazilian slave question before we send this note. We should know positively for what reason it is the existing Convention cannot be carried into execution.

I see that General Guilleminot expects to come to blows with the Turks. There is something very extraordinary in this

Aug., 1828.

THE EASTERN QUESTION.

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

expedition. But I hope that it will be found only in the situation of the government in France.

I believe that they do not know what to decide upon any question. If the Plenipotentiaries send the question of limits back to the Conference, the Conference must decide it, as that will be after discussion with the Greeks.

Ever, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

END OF VOL. IV.



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February, 1871.

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

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

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